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The Parasomnia Defence: Expert Evidence in Criminal Trials 
 
There are increasing numbers of defendants seeking to rely on the occurrence of 
sleepwalking or some other parasomnia in their defence to a criminal charge. 
Consequently this has become a matter for public concern, particularly in relation to 
sexual assaults committed after alcohol consumption. This study used ethnographic 
methods to understand how the expert witnesses assess the accused in these cases, 
and then present their evidence to the jury. It also looked at the two-way interactions 
between law and medical science, and the difficulties each field has with the other. 
Sleepwalking in particular is an under-researched condition, with the basic 
phenomenology not fully explored yet. The experts must often rely on professional 
experience and give opinions, rather than relying on solid scientific evidence. Juries 
rarely return the special verdict, and victims are left dissatisfied by the incredible nature 
of the defence. The law pertaining to automatism and insanity is complicated and out of 
step with medical science. The Law Commission has recently examined this tricky area 
of law and recommended reform. The study concludes that the standard of expert 
evidence is generally good, although further work is needed to examine the specifics of 
how opinion and test results are presented to the jury. A number of recommendations 
are made about the standard of admissibility, legal reform and future directions of 
research.  
iii 
 
 
 
SUBMISSION OF THESIS FOR A RESEARCH DEGREE 
 
Part I. DECLARATION by the candidate for a research degree. To be bound in the thesis 
 
Degree for which thesis being submitted: PhD Law  
Title of thesis: The parasomnia defence: expert evidence in criminal trials 
This thesis contains confidential information and is subject to the protocol set down for 
the submission and examination of such a thesis. 
NO  
Date of submission:     Original registration date: 1st Nov 2009  
(Date of submission must comply with Regulation 2D) 
Name of candidate: Dr John Rumbold   
Research Institute: Social Sciences Name of Lead Supervisor: Prof Martin Wasik  
 
I certify that: 
(a) The thesis being submitted for examination is my own account of my own research 
(b) My research has been conducted ethically. Where relevant a letter from the approving 
body confirming that ethical approval has been given has been bound in the thesis as 
an Annex 
(c) The data and results presented are the genuine data and results actually obtained by 
me during the conduct of the research 
(d) Where I have drawn on the work, ideas and results of others this has been 
appropriately acknowledged in the thesis 
(e) Where any collaboration has taken place with one or more other researchers, I have 
included within an ‘Acknowledgments’ section in the thesis a clear statement of their 
contributions, in line with the relevant statement in the Code of Practice (see Note 
overleaf). 
(f) The greater portion of the work described in the thesis has been undertaken 
subsequent to my registration for the higher degree for which I am submitting for 
examination 
(g) Where part of the work described in the thesis has previously been incorporated in 
another thesis submitted by me for a higher degree (if any), this has been identified 
and acknowledged in the thesis 
(h) The thesis submitted is within the required word limit as specified in the Regulations 
Total words in submitted thesis (including text and footnotes, but excluding references and 
appendices) 98,500 words 
 
Signature of candidate  ………………………………… Date ………………… 
 
iv 
 
 
 
Table of Contents    
Introduction 
Chapter One – An Introduction to Parasomnias 
1.1 Definition 
1.2 Sleep Physiology and Staging 
1.3 Sleep Pathophysiology 
1.4 NREM Parasomnias 
1.5 REM Parasomnia 
1.6 Genetics of Parasomnias 
1.7 Sleep Medicine and Diagnosis of Parasomnias 
1.8 Sleepwalking and Polysomnography 
1.9 Summary 
Chapter Two - Forensic Parasomnias 
2.1 Forensic Parasomnias in Fiction 
2.2 Forensic Parasomnias and Their Assessment 
2.3 The Spectrum of Behaviour 
2.4 Complex Behaviour 
2.5 Freud, Rumination and Stress 
2.6 Risk Assessment 
2.7 Alcohol and Sleepwalking 
2.8 Malingering 
2.9 Factitious or Induced Parasomnia 
2.10 Summary 
Chapter Three – Sleepwalking and Other Parasomnias as a Defence 
3.1 Forensic Sleepwalking – Historical Cases and Case Reports 
3.2 Pre-1800 
3.3 Post-1800 
3.4 Sleepwalking Trials in the UK 
3.5 Sleepwalking Cases in Other Common Law Jurisdictions 
3.6 Summary 
Chapter Four – Parasomnia Trials in the Media 
4.1 Press Reports Database: Methods 
v 
 
 
 
4.2 Results 
4.3 Misreporting 
4.4 The Media Discourse 
4.5 Conclusion 
Chapter Five – Mental Condition Defences and Parasomnias 
 History of the mental condition defences of insanity and automatism 
5.1 Insanity Defence 
5.2 Prior to the 16th Century 
5.3 Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries 
5.4 Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries 
5.5. Automatism 
5.6 Limits to the Defence of Automatism 
5.7 Total Loss of Control 
5.8 Parasomnia Case Law 
5.9 Parasomnias and Mental Condition Defences 
5.10 Disposal 
5.11 Mental Condition Defences in Other Common Law Jurisdictions 
5.12 Summary 
Chapter Six – Criminal Responsibility and Moral Philosophy 
6.1 Theoretical Issues in Automatism 
6.2 Criminal Responsibility 
6.3 Cognitive Neuroscience and Criminal Responsibility 
6.4 Doctrinal Issues 
6.5 Theory versus Practice 
6.6 Summary 
Chapter Seven – Expert Evidence 
7.1 Duties of an Expert Witness 
7.2 Admissibility 
7.3 Issues in the Expert Witness Community 
7.4 Junk Science 
7.5 Accreditation 
7.6 Science and the Law 
7.7 Knowledge, Truth and the Jury 
vi 
 
 
 
7.8 Summary 
Chapter Eight – Empirical Research 
8.1 Research Questions 
8.2 Research Training 
8.3 Research Methodology 
8.4 Methods 
8.5 Results 
8.6 Analysis of Results 
Chapter Nine – Discussion 
9.1 Expert evidence 
9.2 Assessment of the Episode 
9.3 Scientific Controversies 
9.4 Public and Parliamentary Debate on Automatism and Sleepwalking 
9.5 Criminal Law Theory 
9.6 Policy Issues 
Chapter Ten – Conclusions 
Review of themes 
10.1 Difficulty of Diagnosing Sleepwalking 
10.2 Difficulty of Determining Parasomnic Episode 
10.3 Difficulty with Alcohol and Sleepwalking 
10.4 Difficulties with Public Perception 
10.5 Difficulties with Expert Evidence 
10.6 Difficulties with the Law  
10.7 Conclusions 
10.8 Recommendations 
10.9 Directions for Future Research 
 
Bibliography 
 
Glossary (Medical and Legal) 
 
 
vii 
 
 
 
Appendices  
A) Research Materials (information sheet, consent form, interview schedule, questionnaire for 
forensic sleep experts and ethical review panel approval letter) 
B) Sample Interview 
C) Directions to the Jury in Lowe 
D) Material from Mark Pressman re Falater 
F) Press Reports Database 
G) List of UK Sleep Centres 
 H) Sleep Research Time Line 
I) Neurolaw Web Resources 
J) CPS Response re Expert Witness Register 
K) Sample Epochs and Hypnogram 
L) Basic Neuroscience 
M) Hansard 15th Oct 2008 
N) Rape (Defences) Bill 
O) Early Day Motion 463 
P) Savarin’s Account of the Monk in “Physiologie du Gout” (from Paradox Lost) 
Q) My Comments on Reform of the Law on Insanity and Automatism 
R) Levels of Evidence in Evidence-Based Medicine 
S) Publications arising from my research 
1 
 
 
 
Introduction  
  
0.1 Background to the project 
My background is that my first degree was medicine and I worked in the NHS for 
several years (not in the area of sleep medicine). I later changed career and took the 
Graduate Diploma in Law at Keele University. My interest in the sleepwalking defence 
came from a discussion with a medical colleague, during preparation for postgraduate 
medical exams, of an infamous sleepwalking homicide case. I discussed the case of 
Parks with two consultant neurologists during clinic. They both expressed doubt that the 
heinous acts Parks committed could have been genuinely committed during an episode 
of sleepwalking. One consultant was quite adamant that patients during an episode of 
sleepwalking or psychomotor epilepsy would not be violent, and that such defences 
were spurious.   
They are not the only sceptics – in 1981 Sir Martin Roth stated that  
‘behaviour of the type exhibited in the legal cases of murder or other violent crimes 
during sleep-walking is, to my knowledge, unknown. The phenomena in question 
appear to be peculiar to courts of law.’1  
A similar opinion appeared in the tabloid press from a prominent psychiatrist, Dr Cosmo 
Hallstrom following high profile cases (see below). Sometime later I studied for the 
graduate diploma in law and found the legal doctrine of insane and non-insane 
automatism intriguing because of the almost complete divorce of the legal definitions 
                                                     
1 ROTH, M. (1981) Modern psychiatry and neurology and the problem of responsibility. In HUCKER, S.J., 
WEBSTER, C.D. and BEN-ARON, M.H. (eds.). Mental disorder and criminal responsibility. Toronto: 
Butterworths. 
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and doctrines from the medical understanding of disease processes. In fact, nearly 
every doctor I interviewed considered the internal/external divide doctrine nonsensical. 
This prompted my curiosity about how expert evidence on parasomnias is: 1) provided; 
2) treated by the courts; and 3) whether the criminal justice system affects the way that 
expert evidence is provided. My main question was whether the sleepwalking defence 
was valid or a legal fiction akin to the semi-apocryphal “Twinkie defence”.2  
0.2 Exploration of the topic 
On exploration of the literature I found that there was considerable disagreement 
between expert witnesses in some cases,3 and I wanted to find out the reasons for this. 
There are no legal criteria for assessing sane automatism equivalent to the 
McNaughtan Rules,4 apart from the unhelpful formulations e.g. “total loss of control”, 
which is very difficult if not impossible to apply to sleepwalking. All the experts have the 
same guiding principles from the court, so I wanted to determine what other factors are 
operating that might explain a range of opinions from the same facts. One factor I 
examined was how evidence-based the expert evidence was, which threw up some 
interesting issues about over-reliance on so-called “objective” tests. Forensic sleep 
disorders is an area where expert opinion is still very important, just like the area of child 
                                                     
2 POGASH, C. (2003) 2003-last update, Myth of the 'Twinkie defense' / The verdict in the Dan White case 
wasn't based on his ingestion of junk food. Available: http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/Myth-of-the-
Twinkie-defense-The-verdict-in-2511152.php. 
3 EBRAHIM, I.O. and FENWICK, P. (2008) Sleep-related automatism and the law. Medicine, Science and 
the Law, 48(2), pp. 124-36.; PRESSMAN, M.R., MAHOWALD, M.H., SCHENCK, C.H., CRAMER 
BORNEMANN, M.A., MONTPLAISIR, J.Y., ZADRA, A., PILON, M., GRUNSTEIN, R., BUCHANAN, P.R. 
and TACHIBANA, N. (2009) ‘Sleep-related automatism and the law’ (letter to the editor). Medicine, 
Science and the Law, 49(2), pp. 139-43. 
4 R v M’Naghten (1843) 10 Cl & F 200; spelling used in this thesis taken from Moran’s monograph ((1981) 
Knowing Right from Wrong: The Insanity Defence of Daniel McNaughtan. New York: The Free Press.)  
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abuse where the role of opinion has been so controversial.5 
Sleepwalking trials are increasingly reported in the media, and they are often 
sensational in nature. The reports often imply a tenuous basis for the defence. The 
media interest reflects a genuine increase in the use of the sleepwalking defence, which 
is due to a combination of high profile trials, increasing awareness among the legal 
profession, and greater availability of diagnostic testing and medical expertise. 
Consequently, there has been public debate about the proof “required” for an acquittal 
due to sleepwalking (although sane automatism is actually a “denial-of-proof” defence). 
In the case of Jeal (unreported), the accused was charged with rape and acquitted, and 
there was an article in the Daily Mail about the injustice to his victim and the defence of 
automatism in general.6 I learned from his solicitor that in fact he was acquitted on 
grounds of mistake as to consent. The case prompted comments such as:   
‘A rape is a rape and should be treated as such.’ (Harry Cohen, MP) 
 
‘I would like to see some sort of reverse burden of proof where the defendant has to 
come up with evidence to prove they have a history of sleepwalking, doctors' reports, 
and witnesses. Otherwise anyone can simply say 'I was asleep’.’ (DC Richard Rock, 
Hampshire Police).7 
‘People do sleepwalk and they do strange things in their sleep, but it is usually is no 
more complex than grinding the teeth or smacking the lips—at most they may get up 
and make a cup of tea. I would think it was extremely difficult to perform such a 
                                                     
5 ROBERTS, A. (2008) ‘Drawing on expertise: legal decision-making and the reception of expert 
evidence’. Criminal Law Review, 6, pp. 443-62. 
6 KOSTER, O. (2008) ‘How could the man who ‘raped’ me be cleared because he was sleepwalking’. 
Daily Mail (Nov 15th). 
7 JAMIESON, A. (2008) 'Victim speaks out after man cleared of rape while sleepwalking’. Daily Mail (Nov 
15th). 
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complex manoeuvre as having sexual intercourse while asleep—especially if the 
other person is unwilling’ (Cosmo Hallstrom, Fellow of the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists (FRCP), from Harry Cohen’s speech proposing a Bill to amend to the 
Sexual Offences Act 20038 ; Harry Cohen MP was also the primary sponsor for Early 
Day Motion 463 ‘Automatism as a defence in law’ on 14th Dec 20099. NB: Dr 
Hallstrom is neither a sleep medicine specialist nor a forensic psychiatrist). 
Reports like this lead to public disquiet and frank disbelief over sleepwalking acquittals. 
This particular article even led to an attempt to change the law. This thesis considers 
the way expert witnesses present their evidence about parasomnias in criminal trials to 
assess whether this is justified. Whilst forensic psychiatrists have the MacNaughtan 
Rules to guide, or possibly restrict, their evidence, there are no equivalent guidelines for 
medical evidence supporting a defence of sane automatism. Automatism is defined as 
involuntary action, but ‘voluntary action’, ‘will’, and ‘act’ are defined in terms of each 
other in the law. The case law is confusing and inconsistent and it is a welcome 
development that the Law Commission are preparing a report on insanity and 
automatism as part of the tenth programme, project seven. They have consulted with 
the Sleep Medicine section of the Royal Society of Medicine among other stakeholders. 
Their discussion document sets out a number of reforms, which I discuss in Chapter 9.  
It is apparent from the literature that although in most cases there is common ground 
between expert witnesses, there is on occasion profound disagreement about whether a 
particular episode represents a parasomnia or not. There are particular issues that are 
controversial, such as the role of alcohol in triggering sleepwalking. 
                                                     
8 See Appendices M & N 
9 See Appendix O 
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0.3 My approach  
My research used semi-structured interviews to elicit how forensic sleep experts 
conform their opinions on alleged parasomnia episodes to the demands of the criminal 
justice system. I also looked at whether the training and specialty of forensic sleep 
experts affect their opinions. Is the expert evidence given affected by preconceptions 
and/or ideologies? Do the expert witnesses have any concerns over how their evidence 
is treated by the criminal justice system? Is the expert evidence given robust and 
reliable? The data from the interviews were analyzed to see if the views expressed had 
any implications for the law on automatism or the way expert evidence is received. 
As well as the empirical work, I have done library-based work on the normative side of 
the basis for the parasomnia defence and how to reconcile the medical and legal 
aspects of automatism. The basis for legal automatism has been analyzed and criticized 
by several commentators, including RD Mackay, RF Schopp and B McSherry. 
Additionally the Law Commission has recently examined the law on insanity and 
automatism. I examined their criticisms of the current law and proposals for reform in 
light of my data. 
I have disseminated some of my findings at the Socio-Legal Studies Association 
Conference at De Montfort University, Apr 3rd 2012; Faculty of Forensic and Legal 
Medicine Conference in Edinburgh,  May 12th 2012; Centre of Social Ethics and Policy 
Senior Seminar Series at the University of Manchester, Oct 17th 2012; the International 
Academy of Law and Mental Health Conference in Amsterdam, July 2013; and the 
British Sleep Society Conference in Edinburgh, October 2013; “Forensic sleep medicine 
and expert evidence” at the London Sleep Medicine Course on Mar 19th 2014; seminar 
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on media representations of sexsomnia with Gethin Rees at the Institute of Criminal 
Justice Research, University of Southampton on 26th Mar 2014; “Non-insane 
automatisms - A perspective from sleep” at the Mason Institute, University of Edinburgh, 
on April 9th 2014; presentations on “His bizarre defence won the backing of an expert’: 
Ambiguity in the media reporting of sexsomnia defences” in collaboration with Gethin 
Rees, and “Capacity versus character: How should we approach excuses for 
personality-altering medical conditions?” at the SLSA Conference, Aberdeen on April 
10th 2014; “Sleepwalking and Gender-based Violence” at the North West Gender 
Conference, Lancaster University on Apr 22nd 2014; and “Assessment of forensic 
parasomnias and the rules of evidence” at the FORREST Conference on Law and 
Science, Northumbria University on July 3rd 2014. I also organized a medico-legal 
seminar on automatism at Keele University on Jun 14th 2013, to promote dialogue 
between doctors and lawyers and provide input for the Criminal Law Commissioner. 
In addition to the examination of the sleepwalking defence specifically I have also 
examined the wider issues surrounding the assessment of criminal responsibility and 
the law on automatism generally. As Buchanan put it 
‘interpretations of what constitutes automatism, the legal concepts of actus reus and 
mens rea, approaches defining consciousness, and neuroethological ideas like fixed 
action patterns and central pattern generators are established and evolving 
concepts’.10 
It is my hope that this thesis will contribute to the process of evolution. Finally, Prof 
                                                     
10 BUCHANAN, P.R. (2011) Sleep Sex. Sleep Medicine Clinics, 6(4), pp. 417-428. 
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Coles’s11 comment on an article I sent was 
‘It is a comprehensive overview of our current knowledge -- or lack, thereof!  There is 
clearly a knowledge vacuum here and, as a result, an urge to fill it.’12 
It was humbling and a welcome reminder of both the perils of failing to drive knowledge 
in this field forward, and the greater perils of filling the gaps with flawed science.  
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Chapter 1: An Introduction to Parasomnias 
1.1 Definition 
Parasomnias have been defined as  
‘unpleasant or undesirable behavioral or experiential phenomena that occur 
predominantly or exclusively during the sleep period’.1  
The AASM definition is  
‘a group of sleep disorders broadly defined as undesirable physical or experiential 
events that occur within entry into sleep, within sleep, or during arousals from sleep’.2 
Abnormal states related to sleep were recognized in Homer’s time,3 with an incident in 
The Odyssey (volume 10) where Elpenor appears to have a confusional arousal when 
woken suddenly from sleep. He then falls from the roof, breaking his neck. Parasomnias 
can be primary sleep disorders, or secondary to another disorder. Primary parasomnias 
are classified according to the sleep state they occur in - rapid eye movement (REM) 
sleep or non-rapid eye movement sleep (NREM) sleep - although there are a number of 
miscellaneous disorders which do not correspond to a particular sleep state. It is 
important then at this stage to explain the rudiments of sleep physiology and staging. 
 
1.2 Sleep Physiology and Staging 
 
As Mahowald et al state, 
                                                     
1 MAHOWALD, M.W. and  CRAMER BORNEMANN, M.A., (2010). Chapter 94 NREM Sleep-Arousal 
Parasomnias. In KRYGER, M., ROTH, T., and DEMENT, W. (eds.). Principles and Practice of Sleep 
Medicine. 5th Ed. Philadelphia: Saunders, pp 1075-1082, 1075 
2 AMERICAN ACADEMY OF SLEEP MEDICINE (2005) International classification of sleep disorders: 
diagnostic and coding manual. 2nd Ed. Westchester, IL: American Academy of Sleep Medicine. 
3 Generally considered to have lived in the 7th or 8th century BC 
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‘the concept that sleep is simply the passive absence of wakefulness is no longer 
tenable’.4  
It is not the case that the brain lies dormant during sleep5 , although some parts are 
inactive. Indeed some parts of the brain are more active than during wakefulness. The 
fact that loud noises, touch and bright lights can awaken us indicates there is some 
rudimentary awareness of the environment during sleep. Additionally the sleeping brain 
will distinguish between sounds that might indicate some danger (or the need for a baby 
to be fed) and the usual sounds of the night, and even between one’s own name 
spoken and another’s.6 The systematic study of the sleeping brain was made possible 
with the development of electroencephalography (EEG) in 1929. By 1937, Loomis, 
Harvey and Hobart had classified sleep in five stages, A to E7. There is a time line of 
relevant events in sleep research at Appendix F.  
The current understanding is that the brain is normally in one of three states – 
wakefulness, NREM sleep or REM sleep. Parasomnia arises when the brain is 
simultaneously in, midway or oscillating rapidly between, two of these states (see Fig. 1 
below).8 NREM sleep is divided into three stages in the American Academy of Sleep 
Medicine (AASM) system in current use (stage N3 combines stages 3 and 4 of the 
obsolete Rechtschaffen and Kales [R&K] scoring system). The depth of sleep increases 
                                                     
4 MAHOWALD, M.W., SCHENCK, C.H., ROSEN, G.M. and HURWITZ, T.D. (1992) The Role of Sleep 
Disorder Center in Evaluating Sleep Violence. Archives of Neurology, 49(June), pp. 604-7. 
5 Horne provides an illustration of the active nature of sleep in Sleepfaring – animals have to come out of 
hibernation periodically to sleep (HORNE, J. (2007) Sleepfaring: A journey through the science of sleep. 
Oxford: OUP, p.9.). 
6 Perrin, Garcia-Larrea et al. (1999). 
7 A – interrupted alpha; B – low voltage; C – spindles; D – spindles plus random; E – random (LOOMIS, 
A.L., HARVEY, E.N. and HOBART, G.A. (1937) Cerebral states during sleep, as studied by human brain 
potentials. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 21(2), pp. 127-44). 
8 MAHOWALD, M.W., CRAMER BORNEMANN, M.A. and SCHENCK, C.H. (2009) Behavior and 
Parasomnias (RSBD). In STICKGOLD, R. and WALKER, M. (eds.) The Neuroscience of Sleep. Academic 
Press, pp. 18-21. 
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from stage N1 to stage N3, but there is not necessarily a simple progression through the 
stages - the subject can and will revert to a lighter stage (for sample epochs and 
hypnogram see Appendix K). Anything that deepens and/or fragments sleep will 
increase the chance of a NREM parasomnia. The proportion of deep or slow-wave  
sleep (SWS or stage N3) varies according to a number of factors such as (i) sleep 
deprivation; (ii) consumption of central nervous system (CNS) depressants e.g. 
sedatives, alcohol;( iii) fever; and (iv) hypersomnia e.g. due to Kleine-Levin Syndrome.9 
 
Figure 1 Intersection of NREM and REM sleep and wakefulness 
 
Factors that affect sleep fragmentation include (i) stress; (ii) sleep-disordered breathing; 
                                                     
9 CARSKADON, M.A. and DEMENT, W.C. (2011) Monitoring and staging human sleep. In KRYGER, 
M.H., ROTH, T., and DEMENT, W.C. (eds.). Principles and practice of sleep medicine. 5th Ed. St Louis: 
Elsevier Saunders, pp. 16-26; MAHOWALD and CRAMER BORNEMANN (2010), see footnote 1 
12 
 
 
 
(iii) alcohol consumption (although it is a sedative, there is a rebound effect later in the 
night); (iv) environmental factors such as noise, room temperature, and disturbance by 
bed partner, children or pets; and (v) endogenous stimuli such as pain, itching or 
periodic limb movements (PLMS).10  Many chronic medical disorders are associated 
with sleep fragmentation – the arthritides, fibromyalgia, Parkinson’s disease, 
Alzheimer’s disease, gastro-oesophageal reflux, and asthma among others.11 
After about 90 minutes, REM sleep will be entered. This cycle repeats itself through the 
night, approximately every 90 minutes with the amount of REM sleep with each cycle 
increasing. Thus the proportion of NREM and REM sleep varies during the night, with 
NREM sleep predominating in the first third of the night. This means that NREM 
parasomnias tend to occur in that first third. REM parasomnias rarely occur within an 
hour of sleep onset, unless sleep deprivation or narcolepsy leads to early onset of REM 
sleep. The sleeper is not paralyzed during NREM sleep. During REM sleep there is 
paralysis, except for the eye muscles (and the muscles of respiration). This loss of 
muscle tone (atonia) is picked up by the chin electromyogram (EMG) leads, which 
detect electrical activity in the mentalis and submentalis muscles. This stage of sleep is 
where we have detailed dreams, and without this paralysis we might act out our dreams 
with potentially disastrous results (as occurs in REM sleep behaviour disorder). This 
stage of sleep is lighter (dubbed “paradoxical sleep”), and the person in a REM 
parasomnia is much more easily woken than from a NREM parasomnia. They will 
remember their dreams clearly and become more quickly orientated and alert. 
                                                     
10 PRESSMAN, M.R. (2007) Factors that predispose, prime and precipitate NREM parasomnias in adults: 
Clinical and forensic implications. Sleep Medicine Reviews, 11, pp. 5-30. 
11 GUILLEMINAULT, C., KIRISOGLU, C., BAO, G., ARIAS, V., CHAN, A. and KASEY, K. (2005) Adult 
chronic sleepwalking and its treatment based on polysomnography. Brain, 128, pp. 1062-69. 
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1.3 Sleep Pathophysiology 
Any condition where the brain is between the states of NREM sleep, REM sleep, and 
wakefulness may manifest bizarre behaviour.  States between NREM sleep and 
wakefulness are disorders of arousals. Disorders of arousal of forensic importance are: 
● Confusional arousals (also known as sleep drunkenness, sleep inertia or 
somnolentia,  l’ivresse du sommeil [French] and Schlaftrunkenheit [German]) 
● Sleep terrors (also known as night terrors, incubus attacks, parvus nocturnes and 
NREM nightmares) 
● Sleepwalking (also known as somnambulism and noctambulism) 
● Sexsomnia (this is not considered a distinct subtype by all - see below) 
● Nocturnal paroxysmal dystonia  
The REM parasomnias are:  
● Rapid eye movement sleep behaviour disorder (RBD) 
● Parasomnia overlap syndrome  
There are other relevant causes of unwanted or unusual behaviours during sleep:  
● Nocturnal epilepsy e.g. nocturnal frontal lobe epilepsy (NFLE), which can be 
inherited as an autosomal dominant condition 
● Obstructive sleep apnoea (as a precipitant of a parasomnia e.g. confusional 
arousal) 
● Post-traumatic stress disorder 
● Narcolepsy 
14 
 
 
 
● Sleep-related dissociative states 
● Status dissociatus (a rare parasomnia associated with a breakdown of the 
boundaries between the three states) 
The diagnosis of primary parasomnia must involve the exclusion in some instances of 
other causes, particularly nocturnal epilepsy and sleep-disordered breathing (SDB).12 
The parasomnias that are most important forensically are sleepwalking, sleep terrors 
and sexsomnia. This is because these are the parasomnias where the most complex 
behaviour is exhibited, and there will be difficult questions over where the behaviour 
was voluntary or not. Confusional arousals can occur in anyone, but sleepwalking is the 
commonest pathological13 parasomnia.  
  
1.4 NREM Parasomnias 
 
NREM parasomnias tend to occur during the first third of the night, when there is the 
greatest amount of slow wave sleep. A confusional arousal occurs during or just after 
awakening from NREM sleep. It can occur in anyone, and can result in a violent 
reaction to forcible rousing of the subject. This phenomenon is recognized by soldiers:  
‘A common belief among young soldiers living in the barracks, propagated by the 
“barracks lawyer”, is that a soldier could not be court martialled for striking someone 
attempting to wake him if the conduct occurs during the first few seconds of waking. 
                                                     
12 See glossary for definition of terms 
13 That is, it usually requires a predisposition. 
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While simplistic, this belief contains a kernel of truth.’14 
Confusional arousals typically last 30 seconds to a minute, although some last up to five 
minutes. They are more likely to occur from deep sleep and are much more common in 
children. This is the main parasomnia that is recognized as a non-insane automatism, 
as there needs to be no predisposition and it always requires an external trigger. Sleep-
disordered breathing may result in frequent confusional arousals, and can also trigger 
sleepwalking. Cartwright believes that the shooting by Ricksgers was due to a 
confusional arousal induced by obstructive sleep apnoea.15 He shot his wife with a 
revolver he kept under his pillow (see section 3.5.3).  
Sleep terrors are characterized by the sufferer sitting up in bed, and emitting a blood-
curdling scream. They usually occur during the first third of the night (REM nightmares 
tend to occur in the second half of the night). Episodes can also occur during daytime 
naps, so ‘sleep terrors’ is the preferred term to ‘night terrors’. They occur most 
commonly between the ages of five and seven, affecting up to six per cent of children. It 
affects less than one per cent of adults, and is much more likely to be associated with 
psychopathology in them.  A sleep terror can then result in a confusional arousal. Sleep 
terrors can result in directed and purposeful violence relating to the content of the night 
terror. The cases of Frasier16 and Thomas17 were probably sleep terror-related. 
1.4.1 Sleepwalking is the commonest parasomnic condition, estimated at between one 
and four per cent of the adult population. The prevalence in childhood is up to 10 to 
                                                     
14 DAVIDSON, M.J. & WALTERS, S. (1993) "United States v. Berri: The Automatism Defense Rears Its 
Ugly Little Head." The Army Lawyer, (October), pp. 17-26. 
15 NOFZINGER, E.A. and WETTSTEIN, R.M. (1995) Homicidal behavior and sleep apnea: a case report 
and medicolegal discussion. Sleep, 18(9), pp. 765-82. 
16 YELLOWLEES, D. (1878) ‘Homicide by a Somnambulist’. Journal of Mental Science, 24, pp. 415-58. 
17 DE BRUXELLES, S. (2009) Man with rare sleep illness who killed his wife of 40 years during nightmare 
is declared innocent. Times (Nov 21st). 
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30%.18 Ohayon’s study of the UK adult population found a prevalence of 2.0 per cent.19 
It follows that most childhood sleepwalkers do not become adult sleepwalkers. 
Conversely, it is uncommon for someone to be an adult sleepwalker if they were not a 
sleepwalker as a child or adolescent, although one study puts the figure as high as 16.9 
per cent. Brain injury (traumatic and non-traumatic) can cause adult onset 
sleepwalking.20 Drugs may also induce sleepwalking: propanolol, lithium, valproic acid, 
paroxetine, amitriptyline, venlafaxine, bupropion, zolpidem and zopiclone21, sodium 
gamma oxybutyrate, and quetiapine and other atypical antipsychotics22. However in 
most cases these are simply reports of possible adverse effects, with no confirmation of 
their parasomnic nature. Given that many of these reactions have been in people with a 
psychiatric disorder, alternative explanations such as sleep-related dissociative 
episodes are possible or even probable. In the case of propanolol, nightmares are a 
known side-effect and might be confused for RBD. Several of the reports cite sleep 
eating, which is not always parasomnic and is correlated with psychological and 
psychiatric disorders to a much greater extent than parasomnias.23 In particular, there 
have been widespread media reports in the USA of acts committed under the influence 
of Ambien (zolpidem, also marketed as Stilnoct). The so-called “Ambien defence” has 
received great scrutiny, especially given the prominent warnings in the patient 
                                                     
18 PARTINEN, M. (1994). Epidemiology of sleep disorders. In  KRYGER, M.H., ROTH, T. and DEMENT, 
W.C. (eds.). Principles and practice in sleep medicine. 2nd Ed. Philadelphia: WB Saunders, pp. 437-52. 
19 OHAYON, M.M., GUILLEMINAULT, C. and PRIEST, R.G. (1999) Night terrors, sleepwalking, and 
confusional arousals in the general population: their frequency and relationship to other sleep and mental 
disorders. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 60(4), pp. 268-76. 
20 LOPEZ, R., JAUSSENT, I., SCHOLZ, S., BAYARD, S., MONTPLAISIR, J. and DAUVILLIERS, Y. 
(2013) Functional Impairment in Adult Sleepwalkers: A Case-Control Study. Sleep, 36(3), pp. 345-51. 
21 Lopez (2013), see footnote 20. 
22 DAGAN, Y. and KATZ, G., (2013). A Case of Atypical Antipsychotic-induced Somnambulism: A Class 
Effect. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 74(4), pp. 370 
23 HOWELL, M.J., SCHENCK, C.H. and CROW, S.J. (2009) A review of nighttime eating disorders. Sleep 
Medicine Clinics, 13(1), pp. 23-34. 
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information leaflets (c.f. Hardie). ‘Z-drugs’ (zolpidem, zopiclone) induce amnesia and 
confused and/or disinhibited behaviour, and these impairments will not automatically 
excuse the accused from any illegal acts (see Kingston, 6.2.4). Such episodes must be 
carefully distinguished from genuine parasomnia24 (see comments about the medico-
legal significance of amnesia at 6.2.1). The “Ambien defence” is probably the inspiration 
for the recent cinematic release ‘Side Effects’ (see 2.1.1). Alcohol and other agents 
acting on gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA) receptors (including benzodiazepines and 
Z-drugs) affect memory more than motor skills, and therefore seem a more plausible 
explanation than parasomnia for some of the more complex behaviours (see below). 
Those with behaviour triggered by Z-drugs will usually lack a family history of 
parasomnias. 
The typical sleepwalker just sits up or walks around looking for something, and goes 
back to bed without incident. More complex behaviour has been described, including 
driving, cooking and eating food, texting and emailing.25 However, the texts and emails 
do not have the same content as texts and emails sent by an awake person. For 
example, one patient sent an email saying 
‘I don’t get it. please esplain LUCY!! 
cOME TOMORROW AND SORT THIS HELLHOLE Out!!!!! 
Dinner & drinks, 4;00pm shars house. Wine and caviar to bring only. everything else 
                                                     
24 VINCENT, N. (2013) April 18th 2013-last update, The Stilnox defence: automatism or amnesia? 
Available: http://nicolevincent.net/?p=385.; TEACHER, B.E. (2010) Sleepwalking Used as a Defense in 
Criminal Cases and the Evolution of the Ambien Defense. Duquesne Criminal Law Journal, 1(Summer), 
pp. 127-38. 
25 MORRISON, I., RUMBOLD, J.M.M. and RIHA, R.L. (2013) Medicolegal aspects of complex behaviours 
arising from the sleep period: A review and guide for the practising sleep physician. Sleep Medicine 
Reviews, 18(3), pp. 249-60. 
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a guess?  MANANA XXOO D’26  
There is some debate about sleep-related driving and sleep-related eating; sleep driving 
in particular is associated with Z-drugs rather than sleepwalking,27 although Mahowald 
and Schenck’s long distance driver was not taking any medication.28 Sleep-related 
eating disorder (SRED) and nocturnal eating syndrome (NES) are seen as distinct 
entities; SRED is considered parasomnic and NES is not.29 
The triggering factors recorded by sleepwalking patients in one case-control study were: 
Trigger   % reported 
Stressful events  52.04% (n=51) 
Strong positive emotions 41.84% (n=41) 
Sleep deprivation  26.53% (n=26) 
Alcohol   12.24% (n=12) 
Intense physical activity   5.10% (n=5)30 
1.4.2 Sexsomnia is considered either as a distinct parasomnia, a variant of 
sleepwalking, or behaviour caused either by sleepwalking or confusional arousal. Other 
terms that are used include ‘sexual behaviour during sleep’, ‘abnormal sexual behaviour 
in/during sleep’, ‘atypical sexual behaviour during sleep’ (ASBS), ‘somnambulistic 
sexual behaviour’, ‘sleep-related abnormal sexual behaviour’ or ‘sleepsex’. These may 
                                                     
26 SIDDIQUI, F., OSUNA, E. and CHOKROVERTY, S. (2009) Writing emails as part of sleepwalking after 
increase in Zolpidem. Sleep medicine, 10, pp. 262-64. 
27 PRESSMAN, M.R. (2011) Sleep and Drug-Impaired Driving Overlap Syndrome. Sleep Medicine Clinics, 
6(4), pp. 441-45; PRESSMAN, M.R. (2011) Sleep Driving and Z-Drugs: sleepwalking variant or misuse of 
drugs? Sleep Medicine Reviews, 15, pp. 285-92. 
28 SCHENCK, C.H. & MAHOWALD, M.W. (1995) A Polysomnographically Documented Case of Adult 
Somnambulism With Long-Distance Automobile Driving and Frequent Nocturnal Violence: Parasomnia 
With Continuing Danger as a Noninsane Automatism? Sleep, 18(9), p.765. 
29 VETRUGNO, R., MANCONI, M., FERINI-STRAMBI, L., PROVINI, F., PLAZZI, G. and MONTAGNA, P. 
(2006) Nocturnal eating: sleep-related eating disorder or night eating syndrome? A 
videopolysomnographic study. Sleep, 29(7), p. 949. 
30 Lopez (2013), see footnote 20. 
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be used as synonyms for sexsomnia or simply a description of the behaviour regardless 
of cause (see below).   
Sleep sex has a number of causes: 
● Non-REM parasomnia, sleepwalking and confusional arousal (although  
● Sleep disordered breathing 
● RBD 
● Sleep epilepsy 
● Sleep-related dissociative disorders 
● Medication  
● Malingering31 
Clinical estimates are often low, because patients are reticent about volunteering such 
symptoms and physicians may not ask directly about them. Guilleminault et al found 
that four per cent of sleepwalkers exhibit ASBS,32 but a more recent study found eight 
per cent of those referred with sleep disorders reported ASBS (how many of these were 
sleepwalkers is not known).33 Unpublished data suggest 1 in 10 sleepwalkers exhibit 
ASBS.34 A Norwegian telephone survey found that 2.7% of the adult general population 
reported sexual acts during sleep at least once in the last three months.35 There is a 
figure of one per cent of the US population cited in the literature,36 but its origin seems 
                                                     
31  BUCHANAN, P.R. (2011) Sleep Sex. Sleep Medicine Clinics, 6(4), p. 417 
32 GUILLEMINAULT, C., MOSCOVITCH, A., YUEN, K. and POYARES, D., 2002. ‘Atypical Sexual 
Behavior During Sleep'. Psychosomatic Medicine, 64, p. 328-336. 
33 CHUNG, S.A., YEGNESWARAN, B., NATARAJAN, A., TRAJANOVIC, N. and SHAPIRO, C.M. (2010) 
Frequency of Sexsomnia in sleep clinic patients. Sleep, 33(Abstract Supplement), pp. A226. 
34 Personal communication from Ian Morrison and Renata Riha. 
35 BJORVATN, B., GRØNLI, J. and PALLESEN, S. (2010) Prevalence of different parasomnias in the 
general population. Sleep medicine, 11(10), pp. 1031-1034. 
36 XU, M. (2009) Sexsomnia: A Valid Defence to Sexual Assault? J. Gender Race & Justice, 12, pp. 687-
712. 
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to be an estimate given in an interview with “David Saul Rosenberg” (probably a 
misnomer of David Saul Rosenfeld).37 Nielsen’s study found that 16.8% of 
undergraduates reported they often had dreams associated with sexual arousal; only 
21.7% said that they never had such dreams.38 His work suggests that state 
dissociation is much more common than previously appreciated. This may have 
important implications for the defendant accused of sexual offences committed during 
sleep - however the participants were asked about sexual arousal, rather than any 
interaction with bed partners. Further research is required to see what forms of 
behaviour are associated with these dreams and whether they cause interpersonal 
difficulties and the potential for criminal charges. It has been suggested that the typical 
sexsomniac will desist when the partner refuses their advances, but not in the forensic 
cases.39 
Sleep sex can be categorized according to the related harm: 
1. Annoying to bed partner but not harmful. For example sexual moaning and 
sexually related sounds.  
2. Annoying to bed partner and at times harmful to index case. Examples of this 
category include violent masturbation with bruising and soreness of the genital 
area.  
3. Harmful to bed partner or others, where sex was forcibly imposed on the bed 
                                                     
37 PASICK, A. (2000) 13 Jan 2000-last update, An Unconscious Love Life - 'Sleepsexers' Remember 
Nothing in the Morning. Available: http://www.rense.com/ufo6/sleepsex.htm. 
38 NIELSEN, T., SVOB, C. and KUIKEN, D.( 2009) Dream-enacting behaviors in a normal population. 
Sleep, 32(12), pp. 1629-1636. 
39 Personal communication from Ian Morrison. 
21 
 
 
 
partners.40 
This classification may not be particularly sensitive to sexual behaviour during sleep 
with potential medico-legal consequences.  
 
1.5 REM Parasomnia  
 
Rapid eye movement sleep behaviour disorder (RBD) was first described as a distinct 
clinical entity in 1986 by Schenck et al.41 It consists of REM sleep without atonia 
(RSWA) with abnormal dreams which are then acted out. This discovery had been 
predicted by a condition induced in cats by surgical lesions of the brainstem near to the 
locus coeruleus. It usually occurs in males over 50 years of age, and often precedes the 
diagnosis of a neurodegenerative disorder (e.g. Parkinson’s disease, dementia with 
Lewy bodies or multiple system atrophy) by several years. It can be induced by drugs 
such as propanolol, tricyclic antidepressants, selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors, 
venlafaxine and caffeine. RBD can also be induced by stress, and there are reports of 
an association with post-traumatic stress disorder.42 Also the discontinuation of REM 
suppressant agents such as alcohol, amphetamines, cocaine and imipramine can 
induce RBD,43  possibly via rebound increase in REM sleep. Narcolepsy44  is often 
                                                     
40 Guilleminault (2002, see footnote 32). 
41 SCHENCK, C.H., BUNDLIE, S.R., ETTINGER, M.G. and MAHOWALD, M.W. (1986) Chronic 
behavioral disorders of human REM sleep: a new category of parasomnia. Sleep 9(2), pp. 293-308. 
42 HUSAIN, A.M., MILLER, P.P. and CARWILE, S.T. (2001) REM sleep behavior disorder: Potential 
relationship to post-traumatic stress disorder. Journal of Clinical Neurophysiology, 18, pp. 148-157. 
43 SCHENCK, C., HURWITZ, T. and MAHOWALD, M. (1993) ‘REM sleep behavior disorder: an update on 
a series of 96 patients and a review of world literature’. Journal of Sleep Research, 2, pp. 223-31. 
44A disorder marked by excessive daytime sleepiness, uncontrollable sleep attacks, and sudden attacks 
of loss of muscle tone (cataplexy) 
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associated with RBD, where the prerequisite RWSA is present in 50% according to one 
study.45 It is also common in narcolepsy to go straight into REM sleep, which can also 
happen after extreme REM deprivation. One estimate of the incidence of RBD from 
Ohayon’s study of sleep violence is 0.5%.46 
Episodes of RBD involve complex and varied motor behaviour, often related to dream 
enactment. This feature is enough to diagnose “probable RBD”, but video-PSG is 
required to make a definite diagnosis. Dream enactment occurs in normal individuals47 
and dream-like mentation can also occur with sleepwalking and sleep terrors48 - see 
Savarin’s account in Appendix P and discussion below for an example. Also OSAHS 
can resemble RBD - this may be because arousals from REM can result in acting out a 
dream during a confusional arousal. Another feature of RBD is that the dream content is 
altered, with much more confrontation, aggression and violence.49 The victim typically 
dreams he is the victim of aggression. This has been disputed; however, the patients 
studied were on a treatment (clonazepam) which may alter dream content.50 Schenck 
describes the typical sufferers of RBD as particularly “calm and pleasant” individuals,51 
                                                     
45 DAUVILLIERS, Y., ROMPRE, S., GAGNON, J., VENDETTE, M., PETIT, M. and MONTPLAISIR, J. 
(2007) REM Sleep Characteristics in Narcolepsy and REM Sleep Behavior Disorder. Sleep, 30(7), pp. 
844-9. 
46 OHAYON, M., CAULET, M. and PRIEST, R. (1997) ‘Violent Behavior During Sleep'. Journal of Clinical 
Psychiatry, 58, pp. 369-76. 
47 Nielsen (2009), see footnote 38. 
48 OUDIETTE, D., CONSTANTINESCU, I., LECLAIR-VISONNEAU, L., VIDAILHET, M. and SCHWARTZ, 
S.E.A.( 2011)  Evidence for the Re-Enactment of a Recently Learned Behavior during Sleepwalking. 
PLoS ONE, 6(3), pp. e18056. 
49 Schenck(1993), see footnote 43 
50 D’AGOSTINI, A., MANNI, I., LIMOSANI, I., TERZAGHI, M., CAVALLOTTI, S. and SCARONE, S. 
(2012) Challenging the myth of REM sleep behavior disorder: No evidence of heightened aggressiveness 
in dreams. Sleep medicine, 13(6), pp. 714 -19; UGUCCIONI, G., GOLMARD, J., DEFONTRÉAUX, A.N., 
LEU-SEMENESCU, S., BRION, A. and ARNULF, I. (2013) Fight or flight? Dream content during 
sleepwalking/sleep terrors vs rapid eye movement sleep behavior disorder. Sleep Medicine Clinics, 14, 
pp. 391-398. 
51 SCHENCK, C.H. (2005) Paradox Lost: Midnight In The Battleground Of Sleep And Dreams. 
Minneapolis: Extreme Nights LLC. 
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but a recent study showed no particular personality types were associated with 
idiopathic RBD.52 It may be that the spouses or bed partners of people with long-
standing RBD only stay with them if these violent sleep behaviours are out of character 
and their waking characteristics make up for the night-time problems. Alternatively it has 
been suggested this apparent calmness is in fact the apathy of the neurodegenerative 
disorders associated with RBD.53 Usually the eyes are closed during an episode, and 
the patient rarely stands up or walks around – therefore the victim of any violence is 
almost always the bed partner. They are also much more easily awoken, which reduces 
the harm they inflict. Despite the high frequency of harmful behaviour, the average 
diagnostic delay in one study was 8.7 years.54 
1.5.1 Schenck analyzed Savarin’s account of a somnambulist monk55 after Schulz & 
Curtin categorized it as an example of RBD,56 and details the features that point to 
sleepwalking: 
1) The monk was a known sleepwalker, who opened doors and had his eyes open 
2) The monk was acting purposively based on his dream and knew where to go 
3) The episode happened shortly after falling asleep, far more typical for a NREM 
parasomnia57 
This demonstrates that even an expert can be misled by the history. Similarly, Brian 
Thomas’s episode suggested RBD as a possibility (see 3.4.2). In fact video-PSG and 
                                                     
52 SASAI, T., INOUE, Y. and MATSUURA, M. (2012) Do patients with rapid eye movement sleep behavior 
disorder have a disease-specific personality? Parkinsonism & related disorders, 18(5), pp. 616-618. 
53 D’Agostinin (2012), see footnote 50. 
54 WHITE, C., HILL, E.A., MORRISON, I. and RIHA, R.L. (2012) Diagnostic Delay in REM Sleep Behavior 
Disorder (RBD). Journal of Clinical Sleep Medicine, 8(2), pp. 133-36. 
55In “Physiologie du Gout” - see Appendix P 
56 SCHULZ, P. and CURTIN, F. (2004) An early description of REM sleep behaviour disorder. Sleep, 27, 
pp. 116-17. 
57 Schenck (2005), see footnote 51. 
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his medical history suggest he suffered a sleep terror (or alternatively parasomnia 
overlap syndrome). Pressman, Mahowald and Schenck published a useful article on the 
issue of distinguishing sleep terrors from RBD.58 
1.5.2 Parasomnia overlap syndrome is where the person has both NREM and REM 
parasomnias. They have RBD plus either sleepwalking or sleep terrors typically. Status 
dissociatus is a term coined by Mahowald and Schenck for an extreme and persistent 
form of state dissociation characterized by a “complete breakdown of state-determining 
boundaries”, with simultaneous features of wakefulness, NREM sleep and REM sleep.59  
 
1.6 Genetics of Parasomnias  
 
All the parasomnias are known to be familial to a greater or lesser degree, with the 
exception of RBD (although several of the conditions causing RBD can be inherited). 
Pedigrees60 of severe parasomniacs often show a high proportion of different 
parasomnias among relatives – the greater the number of close relatives with 
parasomnia, the worse the parasomnia is likely to be. The sleep pedigrees of some of 
the most dramatic examples of sleepwalkers have been reviewed in the literature.  
1.6.1 This is the sleep disorder pedigree for Scott Falater, who stabbed his wife 44 
times and then drowned her in the pool: 
                                                     
58 PRESSMAN, M.R., MAHOWALD, M.W. and SCHENCK, C.H. (2005) Sleep terrors/Sleepwalking - Not 
REM Behavior Disorder. Sleep, 28, pp. 278-79. 
59 MAHOWALD, M.W. and SCHENCK, C.H. (1998) Chapter Ten: Dissociated States of Wakefulness and 
Sleep. In LYDIC, R., and BAGHDOYAN,H.A. (eds.). Handbook of Behavioral State Control: Cellular and 
Molecular Mechanisms. CRC Press, pp. 143-58. 
60 A pedigree in this context means the medical histories of blood relatives. 
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(figure reproduced from ‘Sleepwalking Violence:  A Sleep Disorder, a Legal Dilemma, and a 
Psychological Challenge’,(Cartwright 2004) by kind permission of Rosalind Cartwright – Scott Falater is 
‘Mr A’). It details his relatives (circles are females, squares males) and their diagnoses as per the colour 
key chart. 
 
1.6.2 Another infamous sleepwalker is Kenneth Parks, a Canadian ‘gentle giant’ who 
drove 23 km to his in-laws house and killed his mother-in-law and seriously injured his 
father-in-law. Like Scott Falater, he had a strong family history of sleep disorders. 
Twenty members of his family suffered parasomnias or related phenomena: 
(sleepwalking=5, sleeptalking=7, nocturnal enuresis=5, and sleep terrors=3;61 there is 
no full Parks family pedigree for sleep disorders in the literature). Three had been 
known to leave the house while sleepwalking.  
1.6.3 These two cases illustrate that a relevant history for sleepwalking must include 
other sleep disorders: night terrors, nocturnal enuresis (bed-wetting), night terrors, sleep 
talking and bruxism (grinding the teeth and clenching the jaw). The parasomnia with the 
strongest genetic component is sleep terrors. Up to 90% of sufferers have a family 
history of sleep terrors or sleepwalking. Interestingly, similar episodes can be produced 
                                                     
61 Schenck (2005), see footnote 51. 
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by benzodiazepine antagonists;62 this suggests a plausible mechanism for inheritance.  
Twin studies have demonstrated that there is a substantial genetic contribution to 
sleepwalking; 80% of adult sleepwalking in males and 36% of adult sleepwalking in 
females63. There has been one genetic locus identified recently at chromosome 20q12-
q13.13,64 and sleepwalking is also linked to certain HLA types.65 It is not known what 
the mode of inheritance is - it has been hypothesized as multi-factorial or autosomal 
recessive with incomplete penetrance. Sleepwalking and sleep terrors seem to have a 
common genetic predisposition.66 The amount of slow wave sleep, which affects the 
likelihood of parasomnia, is influenced by a specific gene, the retinoid acid receptor beta 
encoding gene or Rarb.67  
1.6.4 Guilleminault found a link between inherited abnormalities of the lower jaw and 
upper airway and sleep disorders - 33 out of 50 subjects of a highly selected group of 
seven families.68 He has also found a strong link between sleep disordered breathing 
and non-REM parasomnias that fail to respond to conventional treatment - in a 
retrospective analysis he found that almost all sleepwalking resistant to drug treatment 
was due to sleep-disordered breathing. This is largely based on diagnosing UARS, 
                                                     
62 Benzodiazepines are sedative/hypnotics such as temazepam and diazepam. 
63HUBLIN, C., KAPRIO, J., PARTINEN, M., HEIKKILA, K. and KOSKENVUO, M. (1997) Prevalence and 
genetics of sleepwalking: A population-based twin study. Neurology, 48, pp. 177-81; in Bram Stoker’s 
Dracula, Lucy Westenra is a sleepwalker as was her mother – the first description of hereditary 
sleepwalking. 
64 LICIS, A.K., DESRUISSEAU, D.M., YAMADA, K.A., DUNTLEY, S.P. and GURNETT, C.A. (2011) Novel 
genetic findings in an extended family pedigree with sleepwalking. Neurology, 76, pp. 49-52. 
65 HLA=Human Leukocyte Antigen; strong associations with particular HLA types may indicate an 
autoimmune component to a disease; however the associations with sleepwalking do not suggest this. 
66 KALES, A., SOLDATOS, C.R., BIXLER, E.O., LADDA, R.L., CHARNEY, D.S., WEBER, G. and 
SCHWEITZER, P.K. (1980) Hereditary factors in sleepwalking and night terrors. British Journal of 
Psychiatry, 137, pp. 111-118. 
67 MARET, S., FRANKEN, P., DAUVILLIERS, Y., GHYSELINCK, N.B., CHAMBON, P. and TAFTI, M. 
(2005) Retinoic acid signaling affects cortical synchrony during sleep. Science, 310, pp. 111-13. 
68 CAO, M. and GUILLEMINAULT, C. (2010) Families with sleepwalking. Sleep medicine, 11(7), pp. 726-
734. 
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which requires an oesophageal pressure transducer. A prospective study of CPAP or 
surgical treatment for those failing to respond to first-line treatment found that compliant 
patients reported no sleepwalking events over six months.69 Anecdotally, sleep 
physicians in the UK do not see the same degree of SDB in their patients, and there has 
been no reproduction of these results by other researchers. Whether or not upper 
airway resistance syndrome is a distinct clinical entity is debated.70 
 
1.7 Sleep Medicine and Diagnosis of Parasomnias 
 
The area of sleep medicine was recognized as a specialty by the American Medical 
Association in 1996. Here in the UK it is not even recognized as a subspecialty. It is a 
special interest of clinicians from a number of specialties - neurology, neuropsychiatry, 
psychiatry, respiratory medicine and clinical psychologists. There is only one clinician 
practising in the UK with a sleep medicine qualification - Professor Williams, who is 
board-certified in sleep medicine.71 The British Sleep Society was founded in 1989. It is 
a multi-disciplinary body reflecting the different groups that are involved in sleep 
medicine and research – physicians, psychologists, sleep technologists, physiologists 
and medical sociologists. The diagnosis of most medical disorders rests largely with the 
patient’s history - that is, their account of their condition. This is slightly complicated in 
parasomnias72 because the most informative accounts will usually be from other people 
                                                     
69 GUILLEMINAULT, C., KIRISOGLU, C., BAO, G., ARIAS, V., CHAN, A. and KASEY, K. (2005) Adult 
chronic sleepwalking and its treatment based on polysomnography. Brain, 128, pp. 1062-69. 
70 DOUGLAS, N.J. (2000) Upper Airway Resistance Syndrome Is Not A Distinct Syndrome. American 
Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine, 161(5), pp. 1413-15. 
71 There is no UK recognized qualification in sleep medicine. 
72 The same would be true for most types of epilepsy 
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- bed partners, family and flatmates - since the patient will generally be unaware during 
the parasomnia (although he or she may give accounts of finding themselves in another 
room in the night having walked there from wherever he or she was sleeping, or have 
incomplete vague memories). Usually the clinician takes these accounts at face value, 
but there will be circumstances where he cannot (see 2.9). Sleepwalking in particular is 
diagnosed on the patient’s history, as video-polysomnography (video-PSG) is not 
considered diagnostic (but see below). It is the only parasomnia that the International 
Classification of Sleep Disorders (current version ICSD-3)73 states is diagnosed 
clinically. Where the account is from the victim, their account may not be accurate for 
several reasons - fear affecting their recall, desire to see the accused punished, or 
disbelief. In some cases of sleepwalking, just like some cases of epilepsy, even experts 
may be unable to tell at the time if the person was sleepwalking - as expert No 2974 
related 
‘most people who have small children have found their children sleeping someplace 
you didn’t want them sleeping, they’re asleep on the couch or they’re asleep on the 
floor at midnight and you want them in their bed so you think you wake them up and 
you carry on a conversation with them and the child goes off to bed and goes to 
sleep, and in the morning has absolutely no recollection whatsoever of being 
awakened or the conversation, doesn’t know how they got into bed’. 
Another interviewee described exactly this type of experience with his own children. 
1.7.1 The process of performing video-polysomnography is very labour-intensive. 
                                                     
73 AMERICAN ACADEMY OF SLEEP MEDICINE. (2014) International Classification of Sleep Disorders. 
3rd Ed. American Academy of Sleep Medicine. 
74 Where experts asked for their quotes to be unattributed, a numerical designation has been used. 
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Simply applying the various electrodes and sensors to the patient and checking them 
takes about an hour. The number of these varies between centres, particularly the 
number of EEG electrodes. The American Academy of Sleep Medicine recommends 
eight for assessment of parasomnias - two occipital, two central, two frontal and two 
reference electrodes75. There are several phases to analyzing and reporting a sleep 
study, and it takes several hours. Every epoch (thirty seconds of data) is assigned a 
sleep stage (see Appendix K for some sample epochs). It is time-consuming but 
essential – the current computerized systems are insufficiently accurate for either 
clinical or forensic purposes. It is essential for the instructing lawyer to ensure that the 
video-PSG is staged and analyzed by a “blinded”76 expert.  Some sleep experts 
routinely do at least two nights of video-polysomnography, relying on the second night’s 
results only. However, many sleep studies in the non-forensic setting are one night only, 
so this means that the expert interpreting the study is not comparing like with like.  
1.7.2 As with any medical disorder, it is important to bear in mind the differential 
diagnoses. These will include: 
● Malingering 
● Psychogenic states  
● Drug or alcohol induced states of amnesia and/or disinhibition 
● Epilepsy 
To this list we may need to add factitious parasomnias (see case study at section 2.9). 
                                                     
75 IBER, C., ANCOLI-ISRAEL, S., CHESSON, A., QUAN, S., for the American Academy of Sleep 
Medicine. (2007)The AASM manual for the scoring of sleep and associated events: rules, terminology 
and technical specifications. 1st Ed. Westchester, IL: American Academy of Sleep Medicine. 
76 That is, they are not aware of the details of the case prior to assessment of the polysomnogram. 
30 
 
 
 
1.7.3 Nocturnal dissociative disorders are typically associated with a childhood history 
of sexual or physical abuse. They are hysterical fugue episodes, and often similar 
episodes occur during daytime as well. Observation over several days as an inpatient 
may be necessary to diagnose dissociative episodes. Mahowald and Schenck reported 
a series of 8 patients out of 150 consecutive patients referred for evaluation of sleep-
related injuries. Two of the eight fulfilled the DSM-III-R criteria for Multiple Personality 
Disorder (MPD). The other six, although not fulfilling the criteria, were strongly 
suspected of having MPD.77 
Nocturnal epilepsy can be extremely difficult to distinguish from sleepwalking. It has 
been hypothesized that both sleepwalking and nocturnal frontal lobe epilepsy activate 
the central pattern generators.78 The accurate detection of nocturnal epilepsy requires 
the full panel of EEG electrodes79, rather than the AASM recommended set or the set 
for simply staging sleep.  
  
1.8 Sleepwalking and Polysomnography 
 
There is no agreement in the literature on diagnostic features of sleepwalking on the 
video-PSG, apart from an actual sleepwalking episode. This is unlikely to occur during 
                                                     
77 SCHENCK, C.H., MILNER, D.M., HURWITZ, T.D. and MAHOWALD, M.W. (1989) Dissociative 
disorders presenting as somnambulism. Polysomnographic, video and clinical documentation (8 cases). 
Dissociation, 11, pp. 194-204. 
78 TASSINARI, C.A., RUBBOLI, G., GARDELLA, E., CANTALUPO, G., CALANDRA-BUONAURA, G., 
VEDOVELLO, M., ALESSANDRIA, M., GANDINI, G., CINOTTI, S., ZAMPONI, N. and MELETTI, S. 
(2006) Central pattern generators for a common semiology in fronto-limbic seizures and in parasomnias. 
A neuroethologic approach. Neurological Sciences, 26(3 Supplement), pp. s225-s232. 
79 E.g. international 10-20 system (21 electrodes). 
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testing and as such may indicate malingering80 - apparent “sleepwalking” episodes are 
not always definitive proof because movement artefacts affect the EEG signal. If there is 
clear EEG evidence of the behaviour arising during sleep or from a state arising from 
deep sleep (N3), malingering can be excluded.  There are a number of features on 
polysomnography which are suggestive of sleepwalking:  
 a higher proportion of SWS, especially when very fragmented 
 increased arousal index (arousals per hour) 
 increased relative power of low delta activity  
 hypersynchronous delta activity 
 increased cyclic alternation pattern81 
1.8.1 Some forensic sleep experts believe that spectral analysis of EEGs is a reliable 
method for diagnosing sleepwalking. The method involves computerized analysis of 
EEG frequencies during slow wave sleep, as opposed to visual scoring of epochs. This 
shows greater numbers of micro-arousals, wake after sleep onset, and a decrease in 
slow-wave activity during the first sleep cycle, in sleepwalkers.82 It is not universally 
agreed that it is suitable for forensic diagnosis, even when blinded assessment is 
used.83 Cartwright and Guilleminault report the use of spectral analysis in expert 
testimony, and they demonstrated that the specific markers persist after the index event 
                                                     
80 EBRAHIM, I.O. and FENWICK, P. (2008) Sleep-related automatism and the law. Medicine, Science 
and the Law, 48(2), pp. 124-136. 
81 BANERJEE, D. and NISBET, A. (2011) Sleepwalking. Sleep Medicine Clinics, 6(4), pp. 401- 415. 
82 GUILLEMINAULT, C., POYARES, D., ABAT, F. and PALOMBINI, L. (2001) Sleep and wakefulness in 
somnambulism: A spectral analysis study. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 51, pp. 411-16. 
83 GAUDREAU, H., JONCAS, S., ZADRA, A. and MONTPLAISIR, J. (2000) Dynamics of Slow-Wave 
Activity During the NREM Sleep of Sleepwalkers and Control Subjects. Sleep, 23(6), pp. 755-60. 
32 
 
 
 
(see 3.5.3 for further details).84 Both sleep deprivation and sudden arousals improve the 
diagnostic utility of the video-PSG in sleepwalking,85 although there is disagreement 
about their utility in the forensic setting.86 
 
1.9 Summary 
 
Parasomnias are disorders characterized by a state somewhere between wakefulness 
and sleep. They are not uncommon in the general population. Parts of the brain remain 
active that are normally dormant in sleep, which explains the behaviour seen. 
Assessment by an experienced clinician is essential and the diagnosis of some 
common parasomnias remains clinical. The utility of sleep studies is debated. 
                                                     
84 CARTWRIGHT, R.D. and GUILLEMINAULT, C. (2013) Defending Sleepwalkers with Science and an 
illustrative case. Journal of Clinical Sleep Medicine, 9(7), pp. 721-26. 
85 PILON, M., MONTPLAISIR, J. and ZADRA, A. (2008) Precipitating factors of somnambulism: Impact of 
sleep deprivation and forced arousals. Neurology, 20(June 10th), pp. 2284-90. 
86 MAHOWALD, M., CRAMER BORNEMANN, M. and SCHENCK, C. (2007) Finally- sleep science for the 
courtroom. Sleep Medicine Reviews, 11(1), pp. 1-3. 
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Chapter 2: Forensic Parasomnias 
 
2.1 Forensic Parasomnias in Fiction 
 
 
Sleepwalking often appears in fiction - perhaps the best known fictional sleepwalker is 
Lady MacBeth (Act 5, scene 1): 
Gentlewoman:  Neither to you nor any one; having no witness to confirm my 
speech. 
[Enter LADY MACBETH, with a taper] 
Lo you, here she comes! This is her very guise; and, upon my life, fast asleep. 
Observe her; stand close. 
Doctor:  How came she by that light? 
Gentlewoman: Why, it stood by her: she has light by her continually; 'tis her 
command. 
Doctor: You see, her eyes are open. 
Gentlewoman:  Ay, but their sense is shut. 
Doctor:  What is it she does now? Look, how she rubs her hands.  
Gentlewoman:  It is an accustomed action with her, to seem thus washing her 
hands: I have known her continue in this a quarter of an hour. 
LADY MACBETH: Yet here's a spot. 
Doctor:  Hark! she speaks: I will set down what comes from her, to satisfy my 
remembrance the more strongly. 
LADY MACBETH:  Out, damned spot! out, I say!--One: two: why, then, 'tis time to 
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do't.--Hell is murky!--Fie, my lord, fie! a soldier, and afeard? What need we fear who 
knows it, when none can call our power to account?--Yet who would have thought 
the old man to have had so much blood in him. 
Doctor:  Do you mark that? 
LADY MACBETH: The thane of Fife had a wife: where is she now?— What, will 
these hands ne'er be clean?--No more o' that, my lord, no more o' that: you mar all 
with this starting. 
Doctor:  Go to, go to; you have known what you should not. 
Gentlewoman:  She has spoke what she should not, I am sure of that: heaven 
knows what she has known. 
The account reflects the notion that the somnambulist speaks the truth and expresses 
repressed memories and desires in their sleep. 
2.1.1 It is not surprising that forensic sleep disorders appear a number of times in fiction 
- the public are understandably intrigued and horrified by the prospect of someone 
killing in their sleep. The most recent cinematic release to deal with this was Side 
Effects. The film deals well with some of the issues surrounding sleep disorders and the 
potential responsibility of prescribers for illegal acts triggered by adverse drug reactions. 
The basic plot is that a fictitious drug that can cause sleepwalking is blamed for a 
homicide (see 1.4.1 re “Ambien defence”). The film makers had clearly done their 
research, even if there are some minor quibbles (for example, there is a case the 
defence attorney describes that resembles Falater, except in this instance he is 
acquitted).  
One particular exchange that illustrated an important issue in forensic sleep disorders 
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occurred between Dr Banks, one of the main protagonists, and his wife. She asks "Did 
the person do the thing? Are they guilty?" and he replies "In this case, those are two 
very different things”1. There was also a good discussion in court of legal responsibility 
and consciousness. During his testimony, Dr Banks compares the mental state of a 
sleepwalker with an insect: 
Dr Banks (DB): What makes us human, what differentiates us from let’s say insects, 
is that we have consciousness, an awareness of what we’re thinking and what 
we’re doing. If for example I’m hungry, I’m consciously aware of that, and so I go to 
the fridge and I make myself a sandwich. 
Defence Attorney (DA): So you intend to make a sandwich. 
DB: Yes. 
DA: So what you’re saying is that to have intent, you must also have 
consciousness? 
Prosecution Attorney: Objection Your Honour. The question calls for a legal 
conclusion, not a medical one.  
Judge: Overruled. You may continue. 
DB: Consciousness provides a context or meaning for our actions - if that part of 
you doesn’t exist, then basically we are functioning much like an insect where you 
just respond instinctively without a thought to what your actions mean. 
DA: And that part, that meaning to action, does that exists when we’re asleep?  
DB: No. 
DA: So without consciousness, how do we prove intent? 
                                                     
1 About 42 minutes in (DVD version) 
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DB: I don’t believe we can. (Personal transcript of DVD 49- 51 mins) 
That comparison is interesting, as it could be argued that mammals are a better 
example as their functioning is closer to humans. The point that motor functions are 
separate and distinct from the faculties that make us human and morally and legally 
responsible is well made. However, an expert witness would not be asked to comment 
on legal questions like this in reality.  
The uncomfortable possibility the film raises is that a motivated and educated person 
could simulate a sleepwalking defence. It is a possibility that most if not all forensic 
sleep experts will concede, and probably one that is already in the mind of juries. One 
famous example of malingering is one of the Hillside Stranglers, Kenneth Bianchi, who 
fooled a number of psychiatrists with claims of multiple personality disorder. A number 
of textbooks on psychology were found at his home by police.2  
2.1.2 Other examples of actual or potential forensic sleepwalking in film and TV include: 
● In My Sleep where the protagonist wonders if he has murdered his best friend’s 
wife whilst sleepwalking.3 
● Sexsomnia featured in Law and Order: Special Victims4 and Desperate 
Housewives.5 
● A case of homicide in the first series of Perry Mason6 . 
● Sleepwalking and sexsomnia in Midsomer Murders7. 
● Steptoe and Son: A Loathe Story8 - here Harold goes to bed after a humiliating 
                                                     
2 CHALEFF, G. (1988) The Hillside Strangler: People v. Buono. Litigation, 14(4), pp. 23-58. 
3 2010 cinematic release 
4 Season 9, episode 2 
5 Season 7, episode 2 
6 "The Case of the Sleepwalker's Niece" 
7 Series 12, episode 7: “The Great and The Good” 
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defeat at badminton by Albert, his father. He gets up in the night and walks 
through the house, eyes closed. He gets a cleaver from the kitchen and goes to 
decapitate his father in bed.  Albert wakes up, and shouts at Harold and throws a 
glass of water over him, which wakes him. He is perplexed and horrified at what 
he had been about to do.9  
● Father Jack Hackett sleepwalking in the nude in Father Ted 10. 
 
2.2 Forensic Parasomnias and Their Assessment 
 
The diagnosis of any condition is potentially more complicated in the forensic setting, 
where there may be an incentive to deceive the specialist (see below at 2.9 for other 
circumstances where this may apply). The sleepwalker has to rely on the account of 
others to confirm his sleepwalking, combining diagnosis and corroboration. The fact that 
the eye witness to the index episode is often the victim is potentially problematic, but it 
appears that usually the victim’s account is truthful even when it serves to exculpate the 
defendant. A particular issue is that the expert instructed by the defence often is not 
permitted to interview the victim, and so may not have all the evidence required for an 
authoritative opinion. They will have access to witness statements and the prosecution 
expert’s report, but they will not be able to ask their own questions of the witness. 
Particular details can be very important - if the person has his eyes closed, this 
indicates RBD rather than a NREM parasomnia. In homicide cases, this important detail 
                                                                                                                                                                           
8 Series 7, episode 5 
9 This episode strongly resembles the account by Savarin of a somnambulist monk in “Physiologie du 
Gout” (see Appendix P). 
10 Series 2, episode 6: “The Plague”  
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might not be known as the only eye witness is dead. This makes the genuine 
parasomniac’s defence more difficult. Brian Thomas’s episode resembled RBD, so 
when testing did not show RBD, his defence may have failed. Fortunately his NREM 
parasomnia was recognized by the sleep experts involved (see 3.4.2).  
2.2.1 Technology has arguably added little to the diagnosis of sleepwalking (although 
not some other parasomnias). Eye witness accounts combined with a prior history of 
sleep disorder continue to be the most important part of forensic sleep evaluation, and 
modern testing is generally just supportive of the clinical assessment. At least one 
forensic sleep expert doesn’t use video-PSG (except to rule out nocturnal epilepsy) and 
others use the test to rule out or rule in disorders other than simple parasomnias e.g. 
nocturnal epilepsy or SDB. Expert 29 stated 
‘sleep studies are of absolutely no value whatsoever after the fact - period’  
 
adding 
 
‘sleep studies end up as in the Falater case just being a smokescreen. It just 
confuses everybody. And you get people arguing over things that are totally 
irrelevant, and the jury, how can they be expected to sort through all of this testimony 
about sleep studies, when in fact the sleep studies should not be allowed in the 
courtroom because they’re irrelevant.’ 
 
Many interviewees disagreed with this position, arguing that sleep studies may provide 
valuable corroboration of a sleep disorder. There is much debate over the significance 
of certain non-specific findings however. Where sleep disordered breathing triggers 
parasomnias, effective management will generally greatly reduce or eliminate 
parasomnic episodes. By contrast, video-PSG is essential to diagnose RBD (because 
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of the other possibilities for dream-enacting behaviour), which is commonly associated 
with violence against the bed partner. However, they rarely get out of bed, so their 
harmful acts are less likely to reach the attention of the criminal justice system except 
when serious harm results. Some experts insist on ‘blinded’ assessment of forensic 
sleep studies, but most do not. There have been no studies to assess the impact of 
‘blinding’ on the reporting of sleep studies. 
2.2.2 The exact pathophysiology of sleepwalking is uncertain, but functional 
neuroimaging in one patient showed that activity in the frontal lobe was suppressed, 
and activity in the limbic system increased.11 Intracerebral EEG recordings, again in a 
single patient, showed that during confusional arousals there was activation of the 
motor and cingulate areas, whilst delta wave activity characteristic of slow wave sleep 
persisted in the prefrontal cortex.12 Certainly the violent and sexual behaviour exhibited 
is consistent with the limbic system. The violent behaviour is usually only a reaction to 
opposition 13 – so the advice is that rather than confront a sleepwalker, one should 
gently guide them back to bed. The defensive rage exhibited has been studied in animal 
models, and contrasts with the other main form of aggression, predatory attack. 
Defensive rage is reactive, affective and impulsive. Predatory attack is pre-meditated 
and goal-orientated. It is not generally accepted that sleepwalking- related violence is 
caused by a switch from sleepwalking to sleep terror as Levy and Cartwright suggest 
                                                     
11 BASSETTI, C., VELLA, S., DONATI, F., WIELEPP, P. and WEDER, B. (2000) Research Letter: SPECT 
during sleepwalking. Lancet, 356(Aug 5th), pp. 484-85. 
12 TERZAGHI, M., SARTORI, I., TASSI, L., DIDATO, G., RUSTIONI, V., LORUSSO, G., MANNI, R. and 
NOBILI, L. (2009) Evidence of Dissociated Arousal States During NREM Parasomnia from an 
Intracerebral Neurophysiological Study. Sleep, 32(3), pp. 409-412. 
13 PRESSMAN, M. (2007) ‘Disorders of arousal from sleep and violent behavior: the role of physical 
contact and proximity'. Sleep, 30, pp. 1039-47. 
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(Levy14 cites Cartwright’s account of violence at the end of a sleepwalking episode 
associated with sudden interruption - this  description is more suggestive of confusional 
arousal, which is well recognized to arise out of sleepwalking15). 
Involvement of the fusiform gyrus is suggested by the problem with recognition of faces 
seen in sleepwalking, most vividly demonstrated by Kenneth Parks where he described 
attacking a woman without being aware that it was his mother-in-law (see 3.5.1). 
Shneerson and Ekirch also report this phenomenon.16  Some experts believe that the 
longer episodes represent a merging of sleepwalking into a secondary dissociative 
episode17. Sleepwalking could be considered a variety of dissociative disorder, albeit 
not psychogenic in nature (see below at 2.3, 2.4). Podolsky states 
‘Somnambulistic activity is closely related to a form of behaviour known as a fugue. In 
a true fugue the individual suddenly leaves his previous activity and does something 
which has no apparent relation to what he has just been doing, and for which he has 
complete amnesia. In somnambulism there is an identical dissociation except that it 
begins during sleep.’18 
These studies of brain function have only looked at single patients, so it is impossible to 
draw any firm conclusions about the general population of sleepwalkers from them. It 
cannot be assumed that sleepwalking has only one phenotype, and there is some 
evidence to the contrary - some patients exhibit much more complex behaviours than 
                                                     
14 LEVY, N. and BAYNE, T. (2004) Doing without deliberation: automatism, automaticity, and moral 
accountability. International Review of Psychiatry, 16(3), pp. 209-15. 
15 CARTWRIGHT, R. (2004) Sleepwalking Violence: A Sleep Disorder, a Legal Dilemma, and a 
Psychological Challenge. American Journal of Psychiatry, 161(7), pp. 1149-58. 
16 SHNEERSON, J.M. and EKIRCH, A.R. (2011) The Clinical Features of Sleep Violence in Arousal 
Disorders: A Historical Review. Sleep Medicine Clinics, 6(4), pp. 493-98. 
17Personal communication K Dembny, C Idzikowski. 
18 PODOLSKY, E. (1961) Somnambulistic homicide. Medicine, Science and the Law, 1, pp. 260-65. 
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the majority. This may however be a reflection of having a ‘stronger dose’ of 
sleepwalking genes - the current theory is that sleepwalking may be a polygenic 
disorder. Certainly Kenneth Parks and Scott Falater had strong family histories. It is 
better understood what occurs in the brain during RBD, where the sufferer is acting out 
their dreams because of lack of the usual muscular paralysis that occurs during rapid 
eye movement sleep. The sufferer’s eyes will be closed, and on awakening he will 
vividly remember the dream.  
2.2.3 Sleep experts, like epilepsy specialists, rarely witness episodes (and if they do 
observe events in the sleep lab there has to be a high index of suspicion of 
malingering19 – and so are heavily reliant on eye witness accounts. Video-
polysomnography is neither specific nor sensitive enough to rule in or rule out 
sleepwalking by itself. According to Bonkalo the characteristics that distinguish those 
report violent behaviours in sleep are: 
● Male sex (47/50) 
● Age 27-48 
● A strong childhood and/or family history of sleepwalking 
● Nocturnal enuresis 
● Nightmares 
● Agitation on awakening20 
 Sleep-related violence is much more common in males than females in all reported 
series, especially between the ages of 15 and 44. Other risk factors include: 
                                                     
19 EBRAHIM, I.O. and FENWICK, P. (2008) Sleep-related automatism and the law. Medicine, Science 
and the Law, 48(2), pp. 124-136. 
20 BONKALO, A. (1974) Impulsive acts and confusional states during incomplete arousal from sleep: 
criminological and forensic implications. Psychiatric Quarterly, 48, pp. 400-409. 
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● Limb jerking21 
● More stressors 
● Disturbed sleep schedule 
● Excessive use of caffeinated beverages 
● Drug abuse 
● Less slow wave sleep22 
In any case, as Mahowald pointed out  
‘[You] can prove someone is a sleepwalker… But that is only Part 1 of a two-part 
question. The second question is whether he was sleepwalking on the night of the 
murder. Only God can answer that.’23 
Even if only God can answer the question authoritatively, the jury has to provide an 
answer. The expert is there to help them come to the best answer possible. This 
principle applies generally to causes of automatism, such as epilepsy (generally 
psychomotor) and hypoglycaemia. The most important criteria for assessing forensic 
sleepwalking episodes (apart from the nature of the act itself) are: 
- Previous history of sleepwalking, usually in childhood or adolescence (unless there 
is a precipitating event e.g. head injury) 
- Confusion and bewilderment on the part of the accused, with no attempts to conceal 
the crime 
- The crime is motiveless and out of character 
                                                     
21 OHAYON, M., CAULET, M. and PRIEST, R. (1997) ‘Violent Behavior During Sleep'. Journal of Clinical 
Psychiatry, 58, pp. 369-76. 
22 MOLDOFSKY, H., GILBERT, R., FRANKLIN, A. and MACLEAN, A. (1995) ‘Sleep-Related Violence’. 
Sleep, 18(9), pp. 731-9. 
23 STRYKER, J. (1999) 1999-last update, ‘Sleepstabbing:The strange science of sleep  behavior and one 
verdict: Guilty!’ . Available: http://www.salon.com/1999/07/08/sleepwalking/. 
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2.2.4 There have been more extensive criteria published in the literature. Fenwick listed 
criteria for assessing parasomniacs in 1987: 
History 
1. Family History. It is essential to enquire in detail about other family members who 
sleepwalk or have had night terrors. 
2. Childhood sleepwalking. It is common for the onset of sleepwalking to be in early 
childhood. 
3. Adolescent sleepwalking. Although most sleepwalkers start in childhood, a few 
do begin in adolescence. However, most adolescent sleepwalkers have a childhood 
history of sleepwalking. 
4. Late onset sleepwalking and night terrors are rare [see below]. They usually only 
occur after a precipitating cause, for example head injury. Regard with suspicion 
any episode of sleepwalking or night terror in an adult which is said to be the first 
episode. 
Specific Factors 
1. Episodes will only occur during slow-wave sleep, and thus are most likely to 
occur within two hours of sleep onset. 
2. There must be disorientation on awakening. A straight arousal into clear 
consciousness is unlikely to occur on awakening from a sleep automatism. Such an 
arousal usually indicates an arousal from dreaming sleep.24 
3. Any witness to the event should report inappropriate automatic behaviour, 
                                                     
24 Note that in 1987 RBD had not yet been described. 
44 
 
 
 
preferably with an element of confusion. 
4. There must be amnesia for the event. Memories are poorly recorded during stage 
4 sleep25 and are equally poorly recalled. It is possible for fragments of distorted 
memory to be retained. 
5. Trigger factors are important. Drugs, alcohol, excessive fatigue and stress can all 
precipitate a sleep automatism. 
6. If there is a sexual element in the crime, enquire carefully for sexual arousal 
(penile tumescence in men); its presence makes a sleep automatism highly 
unlikely.26  
7. The nature and quality of the previous sleep mentation must be that of stage 4 
sleep. It should be non-narrative, non-dreamlike, with only a vague visual content, 
and consist mostly of thoughts and feelings. 
8. Attempts to conceal the crime are most unusual. As the crime is committed in the 
absence of consciousness, and followed by amnesia, the natural response on 
awakening is to summon help immediately. 
9. There may be a previous history of violence during a sleep automatism, and 
some people may have a tendency to violent behaviour. 
10. It is helpful if the crime can be shown to be motiveless and out of character for 
the individual.27 
 
NB: It is now recognized that adult onset sleepwalking is not rare. This guidance 
                                                     
25 R&K scale 
26 It is now recognized that because sleepwalking/sexsomnia occurs out of N3 sleep (rather than during 
N3 sleep), an erection is perfectly consistent with a NREM parasomnia. 
27 FENWICK, P. (1987) Somnambulism and the Law: A Review. Behavioral Science and the Law, 5(3), 
pp. 343-57. 
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precedes the discovery of RBD, so naturally excludes any phenomena related to REM 
sleep. 
Mahowald et al in 1990 also formulated guidelines for the evaluation of sleep violence, 
which largely correspond with Fenwick’s criteria: 
1. There should be reason (by history or formal sleep laboratory evaluation) to 
suspect a bona fide sleep disorder. Similar episodes, with benign or morbid 
outcome, should have occurred previously.  
2. The duration of the episode is usually brief (minutes). 
3. The behavior is usually abrupt, immediate, impulsive, and senseless- without 
apparent motivation. Although ostensibly purposeful, it is inappropriate to the 
total situation, out of (waking) character for the individual, and without evidence 
of premeditation. 
4. The victim is someone who merely happens to be present and who may have 
been the stimulus for the arousal. 
5. Immediately following return of consciousness, there is perplexity or horror, without 
attempt to escape or to conceal or cover up the action. There is evidence of lack 
of awareness on the part of the individual during the event. 
6. There is usually some degree of amnesia for the event; however, this amnesia 
need not be complete. 
7. In the case of NT/SW or sleep drunkenness, the act may: 
 (a) occur upon wakening (rarely immediately upon falling asleep) - usually at 
least one hour after sleep onset 
 (b) occur upon attempts to awaken the subject, or 
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 (c) have been potentiated by alcohol ingestion, sedative/hypnotic administration, 
or prior sleep deprivation28 
 
2.2.5 The history gathered from family and friends is usually sufficient to make an 
accurate diagnosis of sleepwalking (or other parasomnia), but this cannot tell us if on 
the night in question the episode was sleepwalking (or other parasomnia). The 
requirement for the crime to be motiveless and out of character is understandable but in 
some circumstances problematic. This was an issue with Michael Ricksgers and Scott 
Falater - there was a possible motive in each case. However, human experience 
suggests that with hindsight and close scrutiny a plausible motive for murder could be 
found in most marriages.  
In two recent UK cases the expert opinion was that the accused genuinely suffered a 
parasomnia but nonetheless the episode in question was not parasomnic in nature 
(John Docherty in Glasgow29 and Stephen Davies in Swansea,30 both reported in the 
national press). The US forensic sleep expert Cramer Bornemann has stated the 
majority of forensic sleepwalking cases “are bogus”;31 however, he has also stated he 
would not have a sleepwalker as a partner on safety grounds. A two or three night sleep 
study is considered necessary for reasonable reliability, because the unfamiliar situation 
of the video-PSG will affect sleep quality (the first night’s results are usually discarded in 
this case, which is problematic for comparison with typical non-forensic sleep studies). 
                                                     
28 MAHOWALD, M., BUNDLIE, S., HURWITZ, T. and SCHENCK, C. (1990) ‘Sleep Violence – Forensic 
Science Implications: Polygraphic and Video Documentation’. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 35(2), pp. 
413-32. 
29 JOHNSON, S. (2011) Taxi driver who said he stabbed wife while sleepwalking jailed for six years. Daily 
Telegraph (Apr 2nd). 
30 SMITH, R. (2011) Sexsomniac cleared of raping teen girl; Ex backs up sleep defence after living with 
his illness for years. The Mirror (July 5th). 
31 CRAMPTON, S. (2009) Sleepwalking: you wouldn’t credit what you can do whilst you’re meant to be at 
rest. Times (Sept 19th). 
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This is very difficult practically if the accused is on remand, and if the prisoner can travel 
to a facility for a forensic sleep study (for example, the Edinburgh Sleep Centre32 or 
Broadmoor Hospital) the study will be of far better quality and therefore more likely to be 
diagnostic. Sleep studies will also pick up sleep-disordered breathing which can 
precipitate parasomnias, whether snoring sufficient to cause arousals, upper airway 
resistance syndrome (UARS) or obstructive sleep apnoea/hypopnoea syndrome.  
2.2.6 The recurrence of harmful acts due to parasomnias is extremely rare, and so the 
assessment of future dangerousness is generally straightforward. However, Mahowald 
and Schenck recommend that some parasomnic patients be categorized as constituting 
a continuing danger, and outpatient supervision of treatment is appropriate in these 
cases.33 Treatment for parasomnias is generally very successful. Pharmacotherapy is 
usually clonazepam or other benzodiazepines, and melatonin can be useful for REM 
parasomnias. Alternative treatments including psychological therapies,34 and 
behavioural interventions such as alarms to awaken the sleepwalker if he opens the 
bedroom door. Where the parasomnia is triggered by sleep-disordered breathing, it is 
important for the patient to comply with treatment, which may include non-invasive 
ventilation via a face mask which forms a seal over the nose or mouth (continuous 
positive airways pressure or CPAP). Compliance can be monitored electronically - this 
                                                     
32 Currently closed. 
33 SCHENCK, C.H. & MAHOWALD, M.W. (1995) A Polysomnographically Documented Case of Adult 
Somnambulism With Long-Distance Automobile Driving and Frequent Nocturnal Violence: Parasomnia 
With Continuing Danger as a Noninsane Automatism? Sleep, 18(9), pp. 765-772 
34 HURWITZ, T.D., MAHOWALD, M.W., SCHENCK, C.H., SCHLUTER, J.L. and BUNDLIE, S.R. (1991) A 
Retrospective Outcome Study and Review of Hypnosis as Treatment of Adults with Sleepwalking and 
Sleep Terror. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 179(4), pp. 228-33; KALES, J.D., CADIEUX, R.J., 
SOLDATOS, C.R. and KALES, A. (1982) Psychotherapy with night-terror patients. American Journal of 
Psychotherapy, 36, pp. 399-407; SCHENCK, C.H., MILNER, D.M. and HURWITZ, T.D. (1989) A 
polysomnographic and clinical report of sleep related injury in 100 adult patients. American Journal of 
Psychiatry, 146, pp. 1166-73. 
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is required by the DVLA where sleep apnoea affects driving, and supervision (but not 
treatment) can be mandated by the courts but only when an accused is found NGRI. 
Surgery and mandibular advancement devices35 are alternative treatments for SDB. 
 
2.3 The Spectrum of Behaviour  
 
Various forms of unwanted behaviour are commonly reported during sleepwalking and 
other parasomnias, some merely anti-social or harmful to the sleepwalker only but many 
that are potentially criminal outside the home. Sleepwalkers may injure or even kill 
themselves (parasomniac pseudo-suicide36); for example, Sam Torrance, the golfer, 
injured himself sleepwalking in 1994.37 The sleepwalker is more danger to himself than 
anyone else. Urinating in a cupboard or sleepwalking in the nude will normally only 
result in embarrassment if the sleepwalker is among family or friends. The same 
behaviour in a hotel might result in arrest for indecent exposure.  
Nocturnal wandering in the nude is apparently very common according to a survey 
commissioned by Travelodge, whose staff reported a sevenfold increase in “nude 
sleepwalking” (over 400 cases in one calendar year).38 Staying in a hotel on business is 
associated with several factors that can trigger sleepwalking - sleeping in an unfamiliar 
setting, high pressure work situations or long distance travel during the day, and 
frequently alcohol late at night. How many of these incidents are actually sleepwalking 
                                                     
35 These prevent the lower jaw dropping back and so keep the airway open. 
36 MAHOWALD, M., SCHENCK, C., GOLDNER, M., BACHELDER, V. and CRAMER BORNEMANN, M. 
(2003) Parasomnia pseudo-suicide. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 48(5), pp. 1158-62. 
37 GLASGOW HERALD. (1994) Brand races ahead as Montgomery bows out. Glasgow Herald (Sep 3rd). 
38 TELEGRAPH. (2007) ‘Hotels train staff for naked sleepwalkers’. Telegraph (Oct 25th). 
49 
 
 
 
is open to debate, given the frequent prominent role of alcohol. One incident of nude 
sleepwalking in a hotel was the subject of a multi-million pound defamation suit, after 
colleagues spread rumours about Donal Kinsella who entered the room of a female 
colleague whilst sleepwalking.39  
2.3.1 Violence behaviour during sleep (VBS) is relatively common (see below for more 
details), occurring in up to 2.1% of adults in the UK,40 and reported by the majority of 
sleepwalkers. Ohayon found that only five out of 313 reporting VBS talked to a 
physician about this.41 Dream enactment behaviour was found to be remarkably 
common by Nielsen. They asked about several behavioural manifestations including 
aggressive movements, and also sexual arousal. Unfortunately there was no 
examination of sexual behaviour per se, so it is difficult to know the medico-legal 
importance of the behaviour found.42 This frequency of minor incidents is not reflected in 
the reported criminal trials, and it seems that most minor offences are dealt with 
informally. Sleepwalkers do not seek out their victims and seldom go far (although 
Savarin’s somnambulist monk illustrates that there are exceptions to this rule), so their 
victims will usually be family or friends who are probably aware of their condition and so 
far less likely to involve law enforcement. The sleepwalker will be at greater risk when 
sleeping outside their home.  Confusional arousals result in less complex behaviour and 
                                                     
39 PITEL, L. (2010) Sleepwalking businessman awarded £8.5m over ‘juicy’ press release. Times (Nov 
19th). 
40 OHAYON, M., CAULET, M. and PRIEST, R. (1997) ‘Violent Behavior During Sleep'. Journal of Clinical 
Psychiatry, 58, pp. 369-76. 
41 OHAYON, M.M., and SCHENCK, C.H. (2010) Violent behavior during sleep: prevalence, comorbidity 
and consequences. Sleep medicine, 11(9), pp. 941-946. 
42 NIELSEN, T., SVOB, C. and KUIKEN, D. (2009) Dream-enacting behaviors in a normal population. 
Sleep, 32(12), pp.1629-1636. 
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are related to proximity in 100% of cases versus 40-90% of sleepwalking cases.43 
2.3.2 Table 1 sets out several of the features that help decide whether an episode truly 
represents a parasomnia.  
                                                     
43 Pressman (2007), see footnote 13. 
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Table 1: Features that support or refute a parasomnia defence (adapted from a 
table developed with R Riha and I Morrison44 
 
Strong reason 
to support 
defence 
 
Reason to support 
defence 
 
Neutral 
 
Reason to 
reject defence 
 
Strong reason 
to reject 
defence 
Reliable eye 
witness account 
absolutely 
consistent with 
parasomnic 
behaviour 
 “Accused didn’t 
appear to be asleep” 
 Reliable 
eyewitness 
account totally 
inconsistent with 
parasomniac 
behaviour 
Unable to 
identify close 
relatives and 
friends [ID 90] 
 Mumbled 
conversations 
 Conversations 
that relate to 
previous events 
 
 
 Minor Intoxication Major 
intoxication45 
Alcohol-related 
episode where 
alcohol known 
trigger46 
 Confused behaviour Complex learned 
behaviour such as 
driving 
 Evidence of 
planning 
 Difficulty navigating 
obstacles 
Navigating familiar 
environments 
Navigating 
unfamiliar 
environments 
Evidence of 
working memory 
or higher cortical 
function 
 Sexual activity with bed 
partner 
  Seeks out 
partner for sexual 
activity 
 Reaction to 
confrontation, victim 
nearby  
  Seeks out victim 
 No motive or 
advantage from event 
 Clear motive  
 Activity contrary to 
waking sexual 
orientation, no 
evidence of sexual 
arousal (sexual 
offences) 
 
 Sexual 
attraction 
 
 Shock and horror at 
actions, inconsolable. 
Denial   
                                                     
44 MORRISON, I., RUMBOLD, J.M.M. and RIHA, R.L. (2014) Medicolegal aspects of complex behaviours 
arising from the sleep period: A review and guide for the practising sleep physician. Sleep Medicine 
Reviews,18(3), pp.249-60. 
45 Some experts argue major intoxication rules out the defence. 
46 On the grounds that this indicates culpable prior fault 
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Previously 
diagnosed 
parasomnia 
behaviour in 
keeping with 
episode 
Personal and family 
history of parasomnias 
and/or sleep disorders, 
especially when 
verified by several 
parties 
Parasomnia or sleep 
disorder was 
diagnosed 
retrospectively47 
 No previous 
history of 
parasomnia 
 Out of character  Consistent with 
character 
 
  Total amnesia or 
very fragmented 
memories 
 Clear memory for 
events 
 Roused with difficulty 
and confused on 
arousal 
 No change in 
state when 
confronted and 
responds 
appropriately 
to situation  
 
 Immediately identifies 
behaviour as 
parasomnia 
  Attempts to cover 
up illegal act (see 
above) 
  Lack of specific 
findings on video-
PSG 
  
 
This table is based on a combination of the literature and expert opinion (from my 
collaborators on the paper and interview data). It can be seen from this table that very 
few features are good indicators that an episode is parasomnic in nature, and the expert 
witnesses will often couch their testimony as the episode being “consistent with” a 
particular parasomnia. This also acknowledges the fact that in many cases malingering 
cannot be excluded. 
2.3.3 Many of these features concern the facts of the case, which are for the jury to 
decide. It is appropriate for the sleep expert to state whether or not in his opinion certain 
actions were compatible with parasomnia, as the expert witness is able to address the 
ultimate issue. An example of such an analysis by Pressman is included in Appendix D. 
There he details 66 particulars of Scott Falater’s actions (see below at 3.5.2 for more 
                                                     
47 CARTWRIGHT, R. (2000) Sleep-related violence: does the polysomnogram help establish the 
diagnosis? Sleep medicine, 1, pp. 331-35. 
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details of the case). Where these analyses are based on suppositions about the 
functions that are disabled during sleepwalking, caution is necessary since this is not 
known with any degree of certainty. A case in point is the exclusion of sleepwalking 
cases by Fenwick in 1987 where sexual arousal was present, but subsequently it was 
recognized that this is entirely consistent with sleepwalking (see above at 2.2.4). 
Cartwright considers that spatial awareness and fine motor coordination can be 
preserved,48 and Schenck lists a number of different functional disorders that can be 
caused by parasomnias, and concludes that  
‘A full range of activations, and dynamic associations, dissociations and 
recombinations of these Parasomnia components exists during sleep and during 
arousals from sleep, for all age groups and for both genders.’49 
However, he does not believe there are different subtypes of sleepwalking, just a range 
of manifestations depending on the circumstances. Riha does believe there are different 
phenotypes. Several sleep experts observed that there is a small group of patients with 
much more complex behaviour. The particular triggering events vary from person to 
person. Sexsomnia is an example of a very specific trigger and type of behaviour, 
although there is no consensus on whether sexsomnia is merely a subtype of 
sleepwalking or a distinct and separate clinical entity. Some experts consider that true 
sexsomnia rarely involves leaving the bed. A recent poster presentation at the 
Dubrovnik Conference on Cognitive Science looked at spatial awareness during 
sleepwalking and the authors found that ‘while the majority of sleepwalkers stay within a 
                                                     
48 Cartwright (2000), see footnote 47 
49 SCHENCK, C.H. (2005) Paradox Lost: Midnight In The Battleground Of Sleep And Dreams. 
Minneapolis: Extreme Nights LLC, at p. 26. 
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known environment during a somnambulistic episode, the ones who wander into a 
previously unknown space seem to have approximately the same level of spatial 
orientation and coordination’.50 
2.3.4 The issues with the spectrum of possible behaviour illustrate a key issue with 
forensic sleep disorders. There is a dearth of research, and the literature is dominated 
by case reports which often only expand the repertoire of possibilities. There has been 
some systematic study, and Cramer Bornemann of the Minnesota group is compiling a 
case series from referrals to Sleep Forensics Associates. An Italian group have 
analysed the published case reports, and they conclude that there is a need for an 
international consensus on assessment of forensic sleep disorders.51 However, the 
evidence base to justify any such consensus is not there at the current time. The 
continued analysis of the same case reports merely emphasizes the lack of proper 
research on this area. Also more studies that look at violent and sexual behaviour 
during parasomnia outside the forensic setting are needed. There are of course a 
number of trials where the parasomnia defence was raised and the experts were 
unanimous one way or the other. For example, Stephen Reitz was convicted of 
murdering Eva Weinfurtner, his lover, in California in 2004. Although family and friends 
testified that he was a sleepwalker, he had been violent in the past towards his lover 
and once threated to “gut her like a fish”. The assault had been sustained and frenzied. 
Most of the experts agreed that this was not a sleepwalking episode (see further details 
                                                     
50 MITROVIC, M. and KATIC, L. (2013) Sleepwalking Movement Behaviour: A Study on (Somnambular) 
Perception of Space, V. Dubrovnik Conference on Cognitive Science, 16-19 May 2013 2013 (the full 
paper is in preparation). 
51 INGRAVALLO, F., POLI, F., GILMORE, E.V., PIZZA, F., VIGNATELLI, L., SCHENCK, C.H., PLAZZI, 
G. (2014) Sleep-related violence and behavior in sleep: a systematic review of medical-legal case reports 
Journal of Clinical Sleep Medicine 10(8), pp. 927-35. 
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at 3.5.4).  
By contrast, Brian Thomas was acquitted for strangling his wife. He had a strong history 
of parasomnias, and he was a “decent man and a devoted husband” according to Judge 
Nigel Davis. He had no motive, his brother stating  
‘They were a loving couple and always like that together. He has always been a 
loving husband and a family man.’52 
Both the sleep experts instructed agreed that this episode was sleep-related, most likely 
a sleep terror (see further details at 3.4.2).  
The circumstances of the death of Reeva Steenkamp’s death at the hands of Pistorius 
raise the possibility of a confusional arousal53. This was raised with the defence team, 
who responded that they would not be running this defence as Oscar did not claim to 
have been confused when he shot the person he believed to be an intruder. The 
possibility of a confusional arousal would arguably render having a firearm under one’s 
pillow inadvisable (see 3.5.5 for the case of Michael Ricksgers).  
 
2.4 Complex Behaviour 
 
Those people who show particularly complex behaviour in the night need careful 
evaluation. The folk psychological beliefs held by jurors may lead them to make 
erroneous conclusions about the compatibility of certain actions with parasomnia, and 
this is one of the major tasks of an expert witness to correct these and why they need to 
                                                     
52 DE BRUXELLES, S. (2009) Man with rare sleep illness who killed his wife of 40 years during nightmare 
is declared innocent. Times (Nov 21st). 
53 Personal communication from Dr Nisbet. 
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be clinicians with extensive experience of patients with parasomnia. Many motor tasks 
associated with parasomnias seem incompatible with sleep to the layperson, but the 
level of consciousness, presence or absence of executive function and duration are 
much more important. Thus a list of the features of an episode is useful (see Appendix 
D for an example), especially where the particular acts may be ambiguous or their 
interpretation heavily dependent on context. This enables the jury to reach its own, 
possibly different, conclusions. For example, driving a highly familiar route is compatible 
with automaticity,54 but navigating an unfamiliar one is not.  As expert 29 stated 
‘the behaviours that a lot of these people exhibit are really extraordinary, and if you 
take regular sleepwalking, ones that do not have forensic implications, the 
behaviours can be extraordinary, you don’t have to extrapolate very far from the 
clinical complex sleepwalking population to the forensic behaviour. The behaviours 
can be extraordinarily protracted and extraordinarily complex, and sometimes they 
end up with medico-legal consequences, but often the ones that don’t are still as 
impressive.’ 
To an extent, the literature is not helpful, as the considerable number of case reports 
generally highlight rare and extreme instances of parasomnia. An example is the case 
of Parks; individually, the aspects of the episode were possible during sleepwalking 
(although rare manifestations), but collectively the possibility of the entire episode 
representing sleepwalking is more and more remote with each complex behaviour. 
Some sleep experts believe that more complex behaviour occurs during a confusional 
arousal at the end of a sleepwalking episode, but confusional arousals are short-lived. 
                                                     
54 See 5.7 for an explanation of automaticity. 
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Some sleep experts believe that the longer sleep behaviours represent a merging of 
parasomnia with a psychogenic dissociative episode. Others believe that these 
episodes e.g. Kenneth Park’s homicidal bout are purely dissociative in nature. One 
expert commenting on the possibility that Parks’ episode was a sleep-related fugue 
stated 
‘it probably makes more sense in terms of the complexity of driving a car and 
handling all of that that you’re looking at something other than sort of “normal” 
sleepwalking. It doesn’t fit that, for that length of time and that complexity of 
movement’. (Butler) 
Several experts differentiated “common or garden” sleepwalkers from the patients with 
more complex and problematic behaviour who often had extensive psychopathology. 
One expert when asked about distinguishing sleep-related dissociative states from 
parasomnia remarked 
‘I think that’s difficult to say and I suppose what it boils down to is what terminology 
you use … I’m not sure how big a difference it makes what you call it.’  
Whether sleep-driving is a true variant of sleepwalking is disputed by Pressman, 
particularly because most of the reported instances were associated with Z-drugs 
(zolpidem and zopiclone) and other hypnotics.55 He considered that at least some of the 
episodes were a combination of somnambulism and drug effects. Vincent and others 
have also questioned whether the “Stilnox defence” (Stilnox is a brand of zolpidem) is 
                                                     
55 PRESSMAN, M.R. (2011) Sleep and Drug-Impaired Driving Overlap Syndrome. Sleep Medicine Clinics, 
6(4), pp. 441-45; PRESSMAN, M.R. (2011) Sleep Driving and Z-Drugs: sleepwalking variant or misuse of 
drugs? Sleep Medicine Reviews, 15, pp. 285-92. 
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really automatism or simply amnesia.56 
The importance of this distinction depends on what verdicts and disposal options are 
available - if the accused can only be acquitted by reason of insanity, then the diagnosis 
is irrelevant (except to guide disposal). If a sleepwalker can receive a plain acquittal, 
then the diagnosis is very significant. The label of legal insanity is highly undesirable to 
most defendants, because of the stigma associated with mental illness generally and in 
particular with ‘insanity’; with being so mentally impaired as to be excused criminal 
punishment. Certainly someone who suffered a homicidal dissociative episode would 
require psychiatric treatment and detainment for public safety. This would not generally 
be considered appropriate for a sleepwalker.57 
All the participants considered that parasomnia equated to medico-legal automatism, 
except those who believed in islands of lucidity or marked heterogeneity of parasomnic 
episodes. The ‘islands of lucidity’ hypothesis is that the sleepwalker can ascend to a 
higher level of consciousness before returning to a state of legal automatism. If this is 
the case, then actions consistent with a higher level of consciousness are still 
compatible with a parasomnic episode. If this is not possible, then any action suggestive 
of a higher level of consciousness rules out parasomnia from that point in time onward. 
If the level of consciousness can vary in this way, then the process of determining 
criminal responsibility is separate from the determination of whether or not the episode 
was parasomnic. Weiss and del Busto noted  
                                                     
56 VINCENT, N. (2013) April 18th 2013-last update, The Stilnox defence: automatism or amnesia? 
Available: http://nicolevincent.net/?p=38; TEACHER, B.E. (2010) Sleepwalking Used as a Defense in 
Criminal Cases and the Evolution of the Ambien Defense. Duquesne Criminal Law Journal, 1(Summer), 
pp. 127-38. 
57 Nor is it possible in the UK, subsequent to the enactment of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims 
Act 2004. 
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‘Parasomnias can be considered both mysterious and paradoxic. Actions during 
sleep can range from simple to complex, raising a fundamental question as to the 
nature of consciousness, often believed to be a mystery. In addition, these behaviors 
seem paradoxic, because they seem directed and purposeful and yet occur during a 
state of relative unconsciousness. One must ask, “What physical actions are possible 
during a sleeping state?” before judging whether free will was compromised or even 
absent. Whether those behaviors can be considered purposeful, voluntary, or 
culpable is a matter for evolving jurisprudence.’58 
It may be that as our understanding of parasomnias evolves, we will move away from 
the syllogism that sleepwalking=sleep=lack of responsibility as per the Latin aphorism 
‘In somno voluntas non erat libera’ (A sleeping person has no free will). This makes the 
parasomnia defence in effect a status defence. We know now that sleep is not a 
passive state, so the assumption may well also be questioned. Although parasomnias 
arise out of sleep, with the exception of RBD the person is not truly asleep, as Podolsky 
states 
‘[a]lthough such persons appear to be walking in their sleep, they are not asleep in 
the normal sense of the word. Their perceptions are often quite acute.’59 
Certainly some experts consider that parasomnic (especially sleepwalking) episodes 
needed to be evaluated on an individual basis for capacity and therefore criminal 
responsibility, because of the heterogeneity seen. This would entail an assessment less 
orientated simply to the diagnosis of parasomnia. Given the lack of definition of the 
                                                     
58 WEISS, K.J. and DEL BUSTO, E. (2011) Early American Jurisprudence of Sleep Violence. Sleep 
Medicine Clinics, 6(4), pp. 469-82. 
59 Podolsky (1961), see footnote 18. 
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relevant capacity in English law (except for “total loss of control”), this is potentially 
problematic. 
Where complex behaviour is associated with violence, the sleep physician must be 
careful not to validate or excuse such behaviour as parasomnia without a solid basis 
(see Section 2.8 and 2.9 below about the problem of malingerers). Indeed, one of my 
interviewees states in her letters to patients with psychogenic nocturnal dissociative 
episodes associated with violence that any potentially criminal actions by the patient 
would not be due to parasomnia. The reverse, reassuring patients that their actions 
would be excused on the grounds of parasomnia, would seem unwise, with the potential 
for inciting criminal behaviour by patients in the knowledge they would be exonerated by 
their sleep physician. 
   
2.5 Freud, Rumination and Stress 
 
During the first half of the twentieth century, the Freudian school of psychoanalysis led 
to the assumption that sleepwalkers might be acting out repressed desires. The 
psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Freud practised during the highly repressive Victorian 
age, when many of his patients would have been unable to express their feelings and 
desires to anyone but a doctor. It seems quite plausible that sleep-related dissociative 
disorders were more common in that era. One interviewee commented 
‘the reason we got interested in this area is that in the seventies, when we started our 
sleep program, we were teaching the party line, which was that adults who had 
sleepwalking and sleep terrors had psychiatric disease, because that’s what the book 
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said, and that’s what the articles said.’  
Hartman’s case series from a tertiary centre in London published in 2001 found a high 
incidence of psychiatric disorders in their population (see below).60 The general 
consensus now is that the sleepwalker’s actions do not reflect conscious, subconscious 
or unconscious desires - but even if they do, the paralysis of executive functioning 
means they are not criminally responsible. Indeed, the presence of a feasible motive is 
considered to rule out automatism (which is a reflection of the difficulties in determining 
whether or not someone was an automaton). This is problematic - as mentioned above, 
it is probably the case that a motive for murder could be found in many marriages. 
Some sleep experts believe that where a person is stressed and ruminating over 
something prior to falling asleep, this mental rehearsal may “prime” them to commit 
those complex actions whilst sleepwalking. For example, Kenneth Parks was very 
stressed about going to see his in-laws the following day to tell them about his gambling 
debts and forthcoming trial for embezzlement. Scott Falater was under considerable 
stress at work, and had been planning to repair the pool motor the next day. Cartwright 
believes that both men had been primed to perform their complex actions. Schenck also 
believes in a priming effect, where actions that have been ruminated over become 
lodged in procedural memory and manifest during parasomnias (however he believes 
that Falater was most likely in a sleep fugue). This priming effect relates purely to the 
complex motor actions rehearsed mentally rather than any intention to commit harm. If 
premeditation of harm were followed by those actions during parasomnia, this would 
                                                     
60 HARTMAN, D., CRISP, A.H., SEDGWICK, P. and BORROW, S. (2001) Is there a dissociative process 
in sleepwalking and night terrors? Postgraduate Medical Journal, 77, pp. 244-9. 
62 
 
 
 
pose questions of culpability (cf Gallagher61 and see 6.2.3). A study by Oudiette 
confirmed that recently learned behaviour can be acted out during sleep.62 This is part 
of the process of memory consolidation. Other sleep experts believe that these actions 
arise out of either full consciousness or a dissociative state.  
There is the risk that patients with nocturnal dissociative episodes will be misdiagnosed 
as having a parasomnia (see previous section). Hartman’s case series found that two 
out of 22 patients exhibited dissociative behaviours, but it is questionable whether they 
had genuine parasomnias (although the paper states there was polysomnographic 
confirmation of the diagnosis, sleep studies are not generally considered reliable in 
diagnosing sleepwalking). It seems more likely given the descriptions that the patients 
were exhibiting sleep-related dissociative disorder.  
 
2.6 Risk Assessment 
 
The medical and legal literature of forensic sleep disorders is relatively sparse, partly 
due to the apparent rarity of serious harm to others during parasomnias. Cartwright 
estimated in 2000 that there were sixty-eight cases where sleepwalking was invoked as 
a defence to murder reported in the forensic literature,63 whilst Ebrahim counted 
approximately 100 in 2009.64 The occurrence of potentially harmful behaviour during 
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S.E.A. (2011) Evidence for the Re-Enactment of a Recently Learned Behavior during Sleepwalking. PLoS 
ONE, 6(3), pp. e18056. 
63 See footnote 47 
64 EBRAHIM, I.O. and SHAPIRO, C.M. (2010) Medico-legal consequences of parasomnias. In THORPY, 
M.J. and PLAZZI, G. (eds.). The Parasomnias and Other Sleep-Related Movement Disorders. 
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sleep on the other hand is relatively common. The risk of recurrence of serious harmful 
behaviour due to sleepwalking is extremely low, and there have been very few cases 
recorded. It is not known exactly why this is the case. One explanation is that, as 
Schenck puts it, the more extreme acts that lead to involvement of the criminal justice 
system arise from a “perfect storm” of circumstances which would be very unlikely to 
recur. However, Schenck and Mahowald do not consider that this is always the case, 
and recommend the medico-legal concept of ‘parasomnia with continuing danger as a 
non-insane automatism’.65 This is a reflection of the politico-legal milieu of the USA 
where indefinite hospitalization is the common disposal under the insanity defence.  
Another explanation for the lack of recurrence is that sufferers receive and adhere to an 
effective treatment regime. Treatment is generally very effective at reducing 
sleepwalking and other parasomnias. Clonazepam is the first line drug but other 
treatments have been used including non-pharmacological modalities – hypnotherapy 
and cognitive behavioural therapy work by enabling sufferers to cope with stress better 
(a common trigger).66 Violence may be recurrent with the other parasomnias, and 
violence towards the bed-partner is a particular issue with RBD. 
The exact prevalence of violence during sleepwalking is difficult to ascertain because 
violence probably makes it far more likely for sleepwalkers to seek referral. Another 
difficulty is that the studies of violence do not necessarily distinguish between self-injury, 
injury to others and damage to property. Ohayon (1997) in a study of the UK population 
by telephone interviews found that 2.1 per cent of adults reported currently experiencing 
                                                     
65 See footnote 33 
66 Hurwitz (1991), Kales (1992), Schenck (1989), see footnote 34. 
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violent or injurious behaviour during sleep.67 This survey used a validated computerised 
diagnostic tool, but nonetheless this is probably an overestimate of violence related to 
parasomnia given the estimated prevalence. However, of the 106 subjects reporting 
VBS, only 15 (0.3 per cent of the population) had actually hurt themselves or their bed 
partner. The incidence of VBS in males was 2.6 per cent and in females 1.7 per cent. 
These figures are likely to include confusional arousals and violence not truly related to 
sleep, as there was no assessment by a sleep specialist. Moldofsky found that 59% of 
consecutive patients with sleep terrors and sleepwalking reported harmful behaviours 
(but only 9 of the 26 were harmful to other people [14 per cent of the total],68 and 
Guilleminault (1995) found in a retrospective review that 70 per cent of patients were 
‘violent’ (but only 41 per cent of their patients were violent to others, rather than only 
injuring themselves).69  A case-control study found that among 95 confirmed 
sleepwalkers there was a history of violent and dangerous sleep related behaviour in 
57.9 per cent (n=55).70 In 31.2 per cent (n=30) of the sample the harm was directed to 
self, and in 45.8 per cent (n=44) it was directed at the bed partner. It also found that 
violent behaviour causing moderate to severe injury to the patient had occurred in 10.6 
per cent (n=ten, eight males). Violent behaviour towards the bed partner requiring 
medical care had occurred in 6.4 per cent (n=five, four males). The most consistent risk 
factor for violence is sex, being 1.6-2.8 times more common in males with arousal 
                                                     
67 Ohayon (1997), see footnote 40 
68 MOLDOFSKY, H., GILBERT, R., FRANKLIN, A. and MACLEAN, A. (1995) ‘Sleep-Related Violence’. 
Sleep, 18(9), pp. 731-9. 
69 GUILLEMINAULT, C., MOSCOVITCH, A. and LEGER, D. (1995) Forensic sleep medicine: nocturnal 
wandering and violence. Sleep, 18, pp. 740-748. 
70 LOPEZ, R., JAUSSENT, I., SCHOLZ, S., BAYARD, S., MONTPLAISIR, J. and DAUVILLIERS, Y. 
(2013) Functional Impairment in Adult Sleepwalkers: A Case-Control Study. Sleep, 36(3), pp. 345-51. 
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disorders.71 There are two main explanations posited for this difference: firstly that 
males are biologically more pre-disposed to violence (as evidenced by the male 
preponderance of ictal and peri-ictal aggression;72 and secondly that males due to their 
greater size and strength are more likely to injure females than vice versa. Press reports 
of trials show an even greater preponderance of males73 (it should be noted that 90 per 
cent of murders are committed by males).74 
Violence is more commonly associated with RBD than with disorders of arousal. In rapid 
eye movement sleep behavior disorder (RBD) 97% of injuries inflicted by males.75 This 
partly reflects the much higher proportion of male sufferers (90%), but differing sex 
ratios for violence in RBD due to different causes suggests a genuine biological cause. 
Assault of sleeping partners occurred in 64% (n=53) of patients with RBD in Olson’s 
study, two suffering attempted strangulation.76 
Another risk factor which this author found on examination of press reports of trials is 
the accused being a current or former member of the armed forces77. The reasons for 
                                                     
71 SICLARI, F., KHATAMI, R., URBANIOK, F., NOBILI, L., MAHOWALD, M.W., SCHENCK, C.H., 
CRAMER BORNEMANN, M.A. and AND BASSETTI, C.L. (2010) Violence in sleep. Brain, 133, pp. 3494-
3509. 
72 RODIN, E. (1973) ‘Psychomotor epilepsy and aggressive behavior’. Archives of General Psychiatry, 28, 
pp. 210-3; DELGADO-ESCUETA, A., MATTSON, R., KING L, GOLDENSOHN, E., SPIEGEL, H. and 
MADSEN, J.E.A. (1981) Special Report. The nature of aggression during epileptic seizures. New England 
Journal of Medicine, 305, pp. 711-6; MARSH, L. & KRAUSS, G.L. (2000) ‘Aggression and violence in 
patients with epilepsy'. Epilepsy & Behavior, 1, pp. 160-8; TASSINARI, C.A., RUBBOLI, G., GARDELLA, 
E., CANTALUPO, G., CALANDRA-BUONAURA, G., VEDOVELLO, M., ALESSANDRIA, M., GANDINI, 
G., CINOTTI, S., ZAMPONI, N. and MELETTI, S. (2006) Central pattern generators for a common 
semiology in fronto-limbic seizures and in parasomnias. A neuroethologic approach. Neurological 
Sciences, 26(3 Supplment), pp. s225-s232. 
73 See Chapter 4 - the male: female ratio for violent crimes (including sexual assaults) was 29:1. 
74 COOPER, A. & SMITH, E.L. (2011) Homicide Trends in the United States, 1980-2008. NCJ 236018. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics. 
75 Siclari (2010), see footnote 71 
76 OLSON, E.J., BOEVE, B.J., and SILBER, M.H. (2000) ‘Rapid eye movement sleep behavior disorder: 
demographic, clinical and laboratory findings of 93 cases’. Brain, 123, pp. 331-9. 
77 Seven out of 41 (17 per cent) defendants were currently or previously in the armed forces - see 
Chapter 4. 
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this preponderance are not known, but the drinking culture may contribute and two of 
the defendants had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. Moldofsky 
found that stress, excess caffeinated beverages, drug use, a disturbed sleep schedule 
and less slow-wave sleep all increased the risk of violence.78 Alcohol has an 
inconsistent effect on sleepwalking and some believe there is no link,79 but it is 
generally acknowledged by UK experts as a trigger for some sleepwalkers whilst 
reducing sleepwalking in others or having no effect (see further below). 
It has been suggested that individuals who repress their emotions are more likely to be 
violent sleepwalkers. The tendency for sleepwalking has a physical basis and is 
commonly associated with a family history of sleep disorders, but it is recognized that 
psychological factors can trigger a particular episode, and stress is a well-known 
precipitant of sleepwalking. For that reason cognitive behavioural therapy that helps the 
sleepwalker deal with stress is beneficial.  Stress is also a confounding factor for the 
effect of alcohol on sleepwalking, given that alcohol is frequently used more when 
people are stressed. 
One factor that decreases the level of violence suffered by partners is the precaution of 
sleeping in a separate room, therefore any survey of violence needs to ask about safety 
and security measures employed. One patient in Olson’s study constructed a plywood 
barrier to separate him from his wife.80 One patient slept in a straitjacket for his own 
                                                     
78 See footnote 68. 
79 PRESSMAN, M., MAHOWALD, M.W., SCHENCK, C.H., and CRAMER BORNEMANN M. (2007) 
Alcohol-induced sleepwalking or confusional arousal as a defense to criminal behavior: a review of 
scientific evidence, methods and forensic considerations. Journal of Sleep Research, 16, pp. 198-212; 
PRESSMAN, M.R., MAHOWALD, M.W., SCHENCK, C.H., CRAMER BORNEMANN, M.A., BANERJEE, 
D., BUCHANAN, P. and ZADRA, A. (2013) Alcohol, sleepwalking and violence: lack of reliable scientific 
evidence. Brain, 136(2), pp. e229.  
80 See footnote 76. 
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safety, having already suffered a fracture of the spinous process of the third cervical 
vertebra.81 Another sustained a hangman’s fracture (a fracture of the odontoid process), 
which as the name suggests often results in death. A number of apparent suicides are 
suspected to have been parasomnic episodes.82 The fact that a couple continue to 
share a bed does not rule out serious problems; partners may decline to sleep apart for 
a number of reasons: 
 denial;  
 marital harmony83 ;  
 episodes not thought sufficiently frequent;  
 feeling sorry for partner affected by parasomnia; or 
 simply no spare bedroom.84 
Sexual behaviour during sleep (SBS) was first reported in the modern literature in 1955 
by Langeludekke,85 followed in 1986 by Wong who described masturbation during 
sleep86. ‘Sexsomnia’87 is the specific term for abnormal sexual behaviour related to 
parasomnia.88  As Fenwick states, the rise in cases of sexsomnia can be largely 
attributed to social changes: 
‘There has been a major shift in social behaviour. It is now not unusual after an all-
night party for young single people to sleep over at a friend’s house; but of more 
                                                     
81 Mahowald (1990), see footnote 28. 
82 Mahowald (2003), see footnote 36 at page 187. 
83 One interviewee reported that a patient’s wife told him if they didn’t sleep together, then the marriage 
was effectively over. 
84 Schenck (2005), see footnote 49. 
85 LANGELUDDEKE, A. (1955) Crimes committed during sleep. Nervenarzt, 26, pp. 28-30. 
86 WONG, K.E. (1986) Masturbation during sleep: a somnambulistic variant? Singapore Medical Journal, 
27, pp. 542-43. 
87 Sometimes mis-described as “sexomnia” or “sexomania” in the press. 
88 SHAPIRO, C., TRAJANOVIC, N. and FEDOROFF, J. (2003) Sexsomnia – A New Parasomnia? 
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68 
 
 
 
significance, it is now socially acceptable for men and women to sleep together in the 
same room and even in the same bed, even if they have not known each other, or 
known each other well.’89 
The reported cases of sexsomnic sexual assaults in the UK have usually occurred after 
consumption of large amounts of alcohol by the accused, and often also by the victim. 
Normally a victim of a sexual assault would wake upon being touched and so most 
putative sexsomnia cases are sexual assaults rather than rape. Where the victim is 
intoxicated, the accused may achieve penetration before she (or he) awakes. An 
internet survey of sexual behaviour in sleep found that although the authorities were 
much more likely to be involved in cases where there was sexual contact with minors, 
the prevalence of such paraphilias90 did not seem much different from that observed in 
the general population (as far as this can be estimated).91 It is true that sexual 
behaviour and orientation may be different during sexsomnic episodes. Similarly 
although sexsomnia episodes are more evenly distributed between the sexes, forensic 
sexsomnia cases are almost always males. An Australian case illustrates the different 
attitude to sexsomnia in women, with sexual activity during sleep seen as a problem for 
the affected woman but not a criminal issue.92  
The experience of Cramer Bornemann in the USA is somewhat different. He describes 
the typical sexsomnia case he encounters as being the divorced or separated man who 
has his daughter over for a sleep-over when he has to share a bed with her due to lack 
                                                     
89 FENWICK, P. (1996) ‘Sleep and Sexual Offending’. Medicine, Science and the Law, 36(2), pp. 122-
134. 
90 Psychosexual disorders in which sexual gratification is obtained through highly unusual practices that 
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91 TRAJANOVIC, N., MANGAN, M. and SHAPIRO, C. (2007) Sexual behavior in sleep. Social Psychiatry 
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of space.93  
 
2.7 Alcohol and Sleepwalking 
 
One of the most contested areas of the sleepwalking defence is the role of alcohol in 
triggering sleepwalking (there is further discussion of the controversy in Chapter 9). The 
prominent North American sleep experts believe that there is no good evidence that 
alcohol triggers forensic sleepwalking episodes (whether violent or sexual behaviour) at 
all. The Sleep Forensics Associates group refuse to testify in cases involving significant 
alcohol ingestion. Schenck states this position is based on the policy issue that it is 
impossible to distinguish alcoholic intoxication from sleepwalking. They also point to a 
lack of research and to the studies that show that consumption of alcohol has a clinically 
insignificant effect on the amount of slow-wave sleep. The basis of the claim that this 
effect is clinically insignificant is not entirely clear, but the comparison is made with the 
effect on slow wave sleep of sleep deprivation (a recognized trigger for sleepwalking 
and other NREM parasomnias).  
Most British experts agree that alcohol appears to precipitate sleepwalking in some 
sleepwalkers on the basis that a small minority of sleepwalkers report an association. 
The sceptics contend that factors associated with alcohol consumption such as a late 
night and stress may in fact be responsible for the apparent connection. Also the 
patients and eyewitnesses will be often unable to distinguish alcohol-related episodes 
                                                     
93 CRAMER BORNEMANN, M.A. (2013) Sexsomnia: A Medicolegal Case-Based Approach in Analyzing 
Potential Sleep-Related Abnormal Sexual Behaviors. In KOTHARE, S.V. and IVANENKO, A. (eds.). 
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from true parasomnias - the effects of alcohol on the brain are remarkably similar to that 
seen in the limited studies of sleepwalking. The major difference is the effect of alcohol 
on the cerebellum, which will cause unsteadiness and slurring of speech. All of those 
agree that as greater amounts of alcohol are consumed, it is increasingly likely that the 
behaviour is related to alcohol intoxication rather than sleepwalking. The discussion at 
the medico-legal seminar on automatism at Keele confirmed this consensus, with the 
caveat that most sleepwalkers report alcohol has either no effect on or reduces their 
sleepwalking. A recently published case-control study also found an association, with 
12% of sleepwalkers reporting that alcohol exacerbated their sleepwalking.94 Ebrahim 
reviewed the literature on alcohol and sleep and came to a different conclusion to 
Pressman et al.95 There are other experts who agreed with Ebrahim about some of the 
problems with Pressman’s review, particularly the selection of more generic papers on 
alcohol and sleep that did not address the relevant questions. Ebrahim argues that only 
nine out of the 19 studies are relevant. The majority (seven) of these nine studies show 
significant increase in slow-wave sleep for the first two to four hours of sleep (which is 
the relevant period for NREM parasomnias).96 Another relevant point is that since the 
effect occurs in a minority of sleepwalkers, studies of the general population of 
sleepwalkers may be inappropriate anyway. 
This weak positive association between sleepwalking and alcohol consumption means 
that when large amounts of alcohol are consumed, the experts in the Sleep Clinic 
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Group97 rely on the Alcohol Provocation Test (APT) to prove that alcohol is a relevant 
trigger for sleepwalking for the defendant. The procedure involves a three-night sleep 
study. The first night’s results are “discarded” – its purpose is to acclimatise the subject 
to the test conditions (see comments above at 1.7.1 about the issues with this). The 
second night is the “diagnostic baseline” night, to see what occurs during sleep in the 
absence of alcohol. The third night is the alcohol challenge night, where the subject 
consumes the amount of alcohol that will achieve the blood alcohol levels calculated to 
have been present during the episode of harmful behaviour. The presence of 
parasomnias or parasomnia-related signs is considered to indicate a capacity to 
respond to alcohol consumption with a parasomnia episode. On the other hand, a 
negative APT neither rules out alcohol as a trigger nor a parasomnic episode as the 
cause of the behaviour. The extent of variation across different nights for the same 
subject makes the designation of the second night as a ‘baseline’ questionable. The 
proponents of the APT state that the case report by Hartmann validates the test. Patient 
P.H. consumed two typical cocktails on nights 2 to 4 of four non-consecutive nights of 
polysomnography with the following result: 
‘On Night 2, 1½ hours after sleep onset, he began talking and cursing in his sleep, 
disconnected himself from the electrodes, got up, and wandered down the hall; he 
looked confused and could not be awakened for a time by the technician. This 
episode was very similar to some of P.H.’s milder sleepwalking episodes as 
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described by his wife.’98 
Abstinence from alcohol led to full resolution of his nocturnal wandering. The difficulty 
with this case report is that we do not know what stage of sleep this behaviour arose 
from, so we cannot be sure this was sleepwalking. It has been stated that a 
“sleepwalking” episode during polysomnography is a ground to suspect malingering.99  
One of the experts who formerly used the APT now disavows its use.  
The main basis of the sceptic’s position is the scientific data on the effect of alcohol on 
sleep, although there are other policy and legal justifications. There are several 
criticisms of the APT listed in the review of alcohol and sleepwalking by Pressman et al: 
‘1. This test was specifically created for legal purposes and has never been used in 
clinical settings. 
2. This test lacks any data regarding its sensitivity, as there are no reports of the 
effects of alcohol at any dose on clinically diagnosed sleepwalkers. 
3. This test lacks any data on its specificity, as it has never been tested on normal 
controls or patients with other types of sleep disorders. 
4. There are no normative data on which to base clinical or forensic decisions. 
5. The basic premise of alcohol testing that alcohol increases SWS [slow wave 
sleep] and arousal threshold is supported by only six of 19 published research 
studies. 
6. No episodes of sleepwalking have been reported during alcohol studies. 
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7. At the time of the criminal act most defendants were chronic alcohol users, but at 
the time of the sleep study they have been abstinent for months or years. The 
alcohol provocations thus cannot be a ‘recreation’. 
8. Administering a large quantity of alcohol to someone who is no longer tolerant to 
large quantities of alcohol is potentially dangerous. 
9. Other factors present at the time of the crime cannot be duplicated including: 
a. sleep quantity and patterns for at least 1 week; 
b. stress levels; 
c. use of other legal or illegal drugs. 
10. Trigger for episode unknown 
11. Other people, including victims not present in sleep laboratory. 
12. Sleep laboratory is sound shielded. 
13. Sleep laboratory is absolutely dark. 
14. Numerous electrodes and sensors placed on patient may disrupt sleep. 
15. Sleep laboratory practices can disrupt usual sleep patterns. 
16. Abstinent alcoholics have very poor quantity and quality of sleep. 
17. Abstinent alcoholics have frequent arousals in sleep. 
18. Administration of alcohol may result in an increase in SWS in abstinent 
defendants whose SWS has not dropped to very low levels. 
19. Administration of alcohol to individuals whose baseline level of SWS during 
74 
 
 
 
abstinence has remained low may not show any increase in SWS. 
20. Administration of alcohol is known to increase the severity of OSA and cause a 
change from simple snoring to sleep apnea. Sleep apnea is associated with 
frequent arousals from sleep. Frequent arousals from sleep may reduce SWS. 
21. Presence of arousals or HSDWs [hypersynchronous delta waves] is not 
diagnostic of sleepwalking.’100 
 Also it is not possible to “fail” the APT e.g. a negative result does not rule out 
parasomnia.  Arousals seen on video-PSG in the intoxicated patient may not have the 
same significance as arousals in the non-intoxicated patient. What is uncontroversial is 
that alcohol may exacerbate OSAHS and upper airways resistance syndrome, by 
relaxing the muscles in the upper airways as noted at (20) above. Where these 
conditions trigger parasomnia, it seems an entirely defensible conclusion that alcohol 
will exacerbate that parasomnia. The role of large amounts of alcohol and the use of the 
APT is a particular concern for Pressman and colleagues. Their review emphasizes the 
lack of solid evidence that alcohol increases the likelihood of sleepwalking, but provides 
no positive evidence to support the conclusion that a certain level of alcohol 
consumption rules out sleepwalking as a defence. However, he does not disapprove of 
testimony based on clinical experience about the effect of alcohol on sleepwalking, 
especially if qualified - simply expert testimony containing claims there is scientific 
evidence to prove that alcohol can trigger sleepwalking. He also disagrees with the use 
of the APT, in which he is not alone. It was not possible as part of this project to study 
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how the results of the APT are presented in court, on grounds of time and cost. 
Alcoholic blackout is an important differential diagnosis for sleepwalking. Alcohol and Z-
drugs have an almost identical effect on the brain as sleepwalking, except alcohol 
affects the cerebellum more (leading to slurred speech and unsteadiness), and both 
alcohol and Z-drugs affect memory more than motor skills. Some sleep experts believe 
it is impossible to reliably distinguish clinically alcohol intoxication from sleepwalking or 
sexsomnia (presumably in the lack of the cerebellar signs mentioned above). It would 
also be a reasonable position to take that alcohol-induced sleepwalking ought not to be 
an excuse, being a consequence of alcoholic intoxication as per Finegan v Heywood101 
(albeit a rare consequence). Regardless of the scientific support for a link, there is a 
compelling policy argument for not considering alcohol-related parasomnic episodes as 
an excuse. It is also a perfectly ethical position to consider that the accused is entitled to 
argue any defence that the law allows, that the expert witness is there to assist the jury, 
and that it is for the jury to decide rather than the expert witness.  
 
2.8 Malingering 
 
An important aspect of any forensic clinical assessment for loss of capacity or 
conditions that may cause loss of capacity is the capability to detect malingering. All the 
sleep experts I spoke to started from an assumption that the defendant was not 
sleepwalking until persuaded otherwise. All the experts with a substantial workload 
spoke of cases they refused to take, because there were insufficient facts to support 
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putative parasomnia. On the other hand, there were few cases where they felt there 
was definite subversion - only one expert reported a case where he felt the defendant 
had been “put up to it” by his lawyer (for further details, see 8.5.11). There have been 
cases where a parasomnia was claimed but later an alternative story was presented, 
such as Sean Freaney, who was convicted of murder at Oxford Crown Court.102 He 
initially claimed he had been sleepwalking but changed his defence to that of erotic 
asphyxiation after expert evidence did not support his claims. In other cases like that of 
Zack Thompson,103 even though he dropped the sleepwalking claim, it cannot be 
assumed that this entails fabrication on his part. An individual who is amnesic for the 
criminal act in question will be genuinely seeking an explanation for that loss of 
memory. 
Outside of criminal proceedings, Mahowald et al report an individual who attended for 
assessment whom they suspected was malingering. The man reported increasingly 
violent episodes directed at his wife, apparently arising during sleep, including chasing 
her with a hammer. After exhaustive testing, no sleep disorder was diagnosed. It was 
suspected he was trying to have his violent behaviour legitimised in case he was ever 
charged with a violent offence, including murder.104 One sleep expert described a 
patient whose wife alleged episodes of sleepwalking and sexsomnia that could never be 
substantiated on testing and circumstantial evidence suggested the accounts were 
untrue (personal communication - see below at 2.9 for further details) and other sleep 
experts report similar patients where there was reason to believe the accounts of a bed 
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partner were factitious. Where the accused has some memory for the events but denies 
this, it might be possible by neurological testing to detect this - what might be 
considered advanced forms of lie detection. However as Allen puts it 
‘Because there is no unique response pattern associated with lying, methods that are 
subsumed under the rubric “deception detection” do not assess lying per se, but 
instead assess various processes associated with deception.’105 
There are two main modalities that have been studied, “brain fingerprinting” and fMRI lie 
detection. “Brain fingerprinting” refers to the detection of the P300 event-related 
potential (ERP) or the related P300-MERMER (memory and encoding related 
multifaceted electroencephalographic response), particular brain signals that occur 
when the person is presented with familiar information, aka as the “guilty knowledge 
test”. Thus if the accused denied any memory of certain events that only a conscious 
guilty party would know, the detection of the P300-ERP or P300-MERMER would 
suggest that the person was deliberately concealing that guilty knowledge.  
Functional MRI has been used to try and detect lying. A company called “No Lie MRI” 
markets its services for a variety of uses. Functional MRI was used in a Channel 4 
series, most notably on two of the so-called “Tipton Taliban”106.  It works by producing 
images of the activation of parts of the brain when questions are asked. It relies on the 
assumption that different parts of the brain are activated when the person is telling the 
truth than when they are lying. However, these associations are based on MRI studies 
in artificial situations, where the subjects are being asked to lie; furthermore, there is 
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nothing at stake, unlike in the criminal justice system. It may well be prone to 
countermeasures.  
Although there have been attempts to introduce such evidence into courts in the USA, 
the only case where such evidence has been admitted was in the Indian trial of Aditi 
Sharma for the murder of her former fiancée. The technique used was the Brain 
Electrical Oscillations Signature (BEOS) test.107 The consensus is that the technique is 
not sufficiently proven.108 It is difficult to see how any of these techniques would be 
helpful in the person who is amnesic for some other reason, the commonest being 
alcoholic intoxication or blackout.  
 
2.9 Factitious or Induced Parasomnia 
 
A few interviewees related cases where it appeared that the bed partner’s accounts of 
the patient’s sleep behaviour were fabricated.  Since the description of Munchhausen’s 
Syndrome by Proxy by Meadow in 1977,109 doctors have been aware that children can 
be the victim of a parent or carer who alleges or manufactures illness in the child. The 
term factitious or induced illness is preferred now, decoupling the diagnoses of victim 
and perpetrator. The victims are anyone who will neither refute the fabrication nor 
disclose the induction of illness, so children under the age of 6 or adults with mental 
impairment and/or communication difficulties e.g. dementia or severe mental handicap 
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are the usual victims. To these categories we propose adding a group to which we all 
belong periodically, the sleeping. In any condition where the person is unaware of or 
amnestic for his behaviour, allegations of misconduct can be fabricated. With epilepsy, 
dissociative states or simple alcohol intoxication the person will be usually aware of a 
period for which they have amnesia. By contrast, with sleepwalking and other 
parasomnias it is perfectly feasible that the individual returns to bed with no indications 
of a parasomnic event – thus the person will have no reason to suspect fabrication of 
the event.  
2.9.1 The perpetrator of the fabrication or induction of illness will have some secondary 
gain; often there may be a need for medical attention. However there may be other 
reasons, for example monetary gain or resolution of interpersonal difficulties. The 
presence of these issues should therefore prompt suspicion in combination with a 
vulnerable patient and a pattern of symptoms that could be induced or fabricated. It is 
well recognized that individuals can fabricate claims of sleepwalking themselves for 
secondary gain, most commonly when seeking a defence to criminal charges (or simply 
embarrassing behaviour). Forensic sleep experts universally have a high degree of 
scepticism about claims of sleepwalking. Schenck reports in Paradox Lost that the 
Minnesota Regional Sleep Disorders Centre has  
‘extensively evaluated several men who claimed to have had a violent parasomnia, 
and concluded that they most likely planned to intentionally harm or kill a spouse, for 
which they would invoke a parasomnia defense for non-culpability.’110 
Reports of trials also show that known sleepwalkers will claim to have been 
                                                     
110 See footnote 49. 
80 
 
 
 
sleepwalking during an episode that is completely inconsistent with a parasomnia – an 
example is the recent trial in the UK of Stephen Davies where although an expert 
witness agreed that Davies had episodes of sexsomnia, he did not have one on the 
night in question (for more details see Chapter 4). Thus even the confirmed diagnosis of 
sleepwalking/sexsomnia per se should not provide a defence to potentially criminal 
harmful behaviour. Again, Schenck acknowledges this in Paradox Lost warning that: 
‘there will be cases in which a malingerer also has a parasomnia, which if 
documented in the sleep lab may allow that person to succeed with the plan of 
malingering in which a reputed parasomnia is a central feature.’ 
Another example of factitious or induced parasomnia is where genuine sleep disorders 
are induced in children by a caregiver; mostly sleep apnoeas induced by suffocation.  
2.9.2 In the cases of factitious parasomnia described by my interviewees, there was no 
physical or clinical evidence to support the allegations of parasomnia (sexsomnia and 
violent sleepwalking), and there were domestic circumstances that suggested a motive 
for fabrication by the bed partner. Several of the sleep experts I spoke to had such 
cases, but unfortunately few of them could remember sufficient details to report them. 
Nisbet commented 
‘I’ve seen one case where a patient with REM sleep behaviour disorder and memory 
problems whose wife … I wouldn’t necessarily say she was angling for a divorce, she 
was so angry with him, she was exaggerating the condition and making it worse than 
it was … it took 2 or 3 times of seeing them before one could fully appreciate there 
was that going on.’ 
Two other centres described a patient where it was felt that the wife was fabricating 
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allegations of sexsomnia. In particular, it seems that spousal resistance to sleeping in 
separate beds where there are reportedly frequent and serious incidents of violence or 
aggression may be a marker for factitious parasomnia. The inability to capture episodes 
in the sleep laboratory has no significance, given the usual lack of the regular bed 
partner and the unfamiliar surroundings, but resistance to home monitoring may also 
suggest fabrication. 
 
2.10 Summary 
 
Parasomnias are relatively common, but episodes rarely lead to the sufferer facing 
criminal prosecution. The most probative facts relate to the nature of the act itself, but a 
close second are the details of the family and medical history, especially accounts from 
bed partners, family and friends of previous episodes. Tests are not definitive, and even 
a firm diagnosis of a parasomnia does not determine the mental state of the accused at 
the time of the criminal act. The complexity of actions that are possible during 
parasomnia often surprises both laypeople and doctors who do not specialize in sleep 
medicine, so it is essential for lawyers to instruct a suitably qualified and experienced 
expert with a substantial regular exposure to patients with parasomnia. Episodes where 
there has been consumption of alcohol require a careful assessment of the relative 
likelihoods of the episode being related to intoxication or parasomnia.  
There is a clear need for more research into the prevalence of harmful behaviour due to 
parasomnia. Clinicians should ask their parasomnia patients about potentially harmful 
behaviour and warn them about risky situations such as sharing a bed with a stranger. 
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There may also be a need to educate the public about the potential for harmful 
behaviours during sleep. 
83 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Sleepwalking and Other Parasomnias as a 
Defence 
“In all of us, even in good men, there is a lawless wild-beast nature, which peers out in 
sleep.” (Socrates) 
 
3.1 Forensic Sleepwalking – Historical Cases and Case Reports 
 
Sleepwalking and other parasomnias have been recognized as a defence for many 
years in the UK, treated for the majority of that time as a non-insane but latterly as an 
insane automatism (although recent cases may indicate a swing back to non-insane 
automatism). The notion that persons are not responsible for illegal acts committed 
during sleep goes back centuries further. It is rarely used as a defence, although 
increasing awareness of sleep disorders, improved diagnostic tests and high- profile 
trials has seen the number of referrals to forensic sleep experts increase exponentially; 
Dr Idzikowski reports one enquiry per week. The proportion of referrals seen as bona 
fide varied between 10 and 80%. Cartwright reported in 2000 that there were sixty-eight 
cases where sleepwalking was invoked as a defence to murder reported in the forensic 
literature.1 It seems that the sleepwalking defence occurs most commonly in 
Anglophone common law countries. Riha commented 
‘I sometimes give talks in Europe and my colleagues in Prague for instance, although 
they’re in neurology departments, say they hardly ever see people presenting with 
                                                     
1 CARTWRIGHT, R. (2000) Sleep-related violence: does the polysomnogram help establish the 
diagnosis? Sleep medicine, 1, pp. 331-35. 
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sexsomnias – now whether that’s under-reported or [some other reason] that’s 
difficult to tell’ 
The reasons for this disparity are not clear - it has been attributed to cold war fixations 
on the threat of Soviet totalitarianism with films like “Invasion of the Body Snatchers”: 
‘These were allegories about the way in which good, free-thinking American citizens 
can be possessed by alien forces that turn them into zombies - automatons who were 
following the directions not of their own minds but of the minds of others.’2 
However, the pre-occupation with the “missing defendant” predates this, as Eigen 
relates in detail (see Section 3.5).  
 
3.2 Pre-1800 
 
It has been recognized since at least the Council of Vienne (1313)3 that a sleeper 
should not be held responsible for killing or injuring someone, and they reported 
instances of homicides by sleeping persons. In the 15th century the phenomenon of 
“murderous sleepwalkers” was described.4 The sixteenth-century canonist Covarrubias 
stated that the act of a sleeper was not a sin unless he deliberately arranged matters 
beforehand. The jurist Matthaeus in the seventeenth century considered that the 
sleepwalker deserved punishment if “he harboured enmity against that person”5 and the 
                                                     
2 COLES, E.M. and JANG, D. (1996) A Psychological Perspective on the Legal Concepts of "Volition" and 
"Intent". Journal of Law and Medicine, 4(August), pp. 60-71. 
3 The fifteenth Ecumenical Council of the Roman Catholic Church held 1311-12 in France 
4 EKIRCH, A.R. and SHNEERSON, J.M. (2011) Nineteenth-Century Sleep Violence Cases: A Historical 
View. Sleep Medicine Clinics, 6(4), pp. 483-91. 
5 WALKER, N. (1968) Crime and Insanity in England Volume One: The Historical Perspective. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, pp.166-7. 
85 
 
 
 
Scot Mckenzie expressed a similar sentiment: 
‘Such as commit any crime whilst they sleep, are compared to Infants…and therefore 
they are not punisht, except they be known to have Enmity against the person killed; 
or that Fraud be otherways presumable: quo casu they be punisht extra ordinem.’6 
In 1600 the knight von Gutlinge, when awoken from sleep, stabbed his friend to death. 
He was found guilty and executed. Colonel Culpeper in 1686 apparently shot a 
Guardsman and his horse during a dream;7 he was found guilty of manslaughter whilst 
insane, and was pardoned a few weeks later. In 1791 a Silesian woodcutter Bernard 
Schedmaizig awoke from sleep and killed his wife confusing her for an intruder. His 
state was described as Schlaftrunkenheit or “sleep drunkenness”.8 These early 
accounts tend to suggest confusional arousals. Although the diagnosis of sleep 
disorders was not as sophisticated and of course no tests were available, nonetheless 
where there is sufficient detail we can be reasonably confident that these episodes 
represent parasomnias. 
  
3.3 Post-1800 
 
The Victorian public was familiar with somnambulism and related states of mental 
absence such as hypnotism, as documented by Eigen.9 In 1853 Sarah Minchin, a 17-
                                                     
6 The Laws and Customs of Scotland in Matters Criminal, (1678) Edinburgh. 
7 Robert MacNish in The Philosophy of Sleep relates a simplified version of the tale, changing the name 
to Sir Peter Lely who is acquitted. 
8 BONKALO, A. (1974) Impulsive acts and confusional states during incomplete arousal from sleep: 
criminological and forensic implications. Psychiatric Quarterly, 48, pp. 400-409. 
9 EIGEN, J.P. (2003) Unconscious Crime: Mental Absence and Criminal Responsibility in Victorian 
London. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
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year old servant girl who had stabbed one of her master’s children in the middle of the 
night, put forward a sleep-related defence but this did not succeed.10 It has been 
suggested she suffered sleep terrors as her mother confirmed she often screamed in 
the night. The possibility of somnambulism was raised after comparing her behaviour to 
a description of somnambulism in Taylor’s Medical Jurisprudence.11The doctor who 
testified to the court, Henry Bullock (a house surgeon rather than a forensic psychiatrist) 
was not convinced.12 The case attracted no publicity and she was sentenced to three 
months in jail on the relatively minor count of unlawfully wounding (although she had 
been charged with attempted murder and grievous bodily harm). Esther Griggs was 
tried in 1858 for throwing her baby to its death from a first floor window after having a 
nightmare (or more likely night terror) that the house was on fire. The grand jury refused 
to indict her.13 These early cases were not recorded by law reporters but by journalists – 
a trend that continues to the current day as their salaciousness often outweighs their 
legal importance. The Griggs case was also reported in the second edition of Bucknill 
and Tuke’s Manual of Psychological Medicine (1862). A famous case from the 19th 
century in Scotland involved Simon Fraser, a known sleepwalker who threw his 18-
month-old son against a wall, killing him. Fraser was not formally acquitted according to 
Walker - the Court ‘deserted the diet simpliciter’ (that is, the trial was abandoned; the 
jury returned a narrative verdict – “The jury find that the panel killed his child when he 
was unconscious of the nature of the act which he committed, by reason of a condition 
arising from somnambulism; and that the panel was not responsible"). Fraser was 
                                                     
10 R v Sarah Minchin,(1853) The Proceedings of the Old Bailey, case 725 (Jun 13th) 
11 The Hunter’s Tale; Eigen (2003), see footnote 8 
12 Ekirch (2011), see footnote 4.  
13 Walker (1968), see footnote 5. 
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advised by the judge not to sleep in the same room as anyone else in an ad hoc 
arrangement. The  case was reported in the medical literature with the warning that 
“[s]omnambulism is a condition so obscure and ill-defined, and might so easily be 
simulated and used as a cloak for crime, that considerations of public safety make it 
necessary to examine the patient’s history very closely”.14 I would suggest that since 
1878 the same caveat has continued to apply. 
There is an earlier case, Albert Tirrell who in 1846 in Boston reportedly killed a 
prostitute by slitting her throat and then set fires to destroy the evidence. Although many 
sources state the defence of sleepwalking succeeded, Weiss and del Busto found that 
this was not the case: 
‘The prosecutor demanded that, by law, the jury state the grounds for acquittal. “The 
Foreman of the Jury stated that the question of somnambulism had not entered into 
the consideration of the Jury.’15 
A notable contemporary forensic psychiatrist, Isaac Ray, believed Tirrell was 
malingering. In Kentucky, the case of Fain v Commonwealth was reported in 1879. The 
accused had a history of sleepwalking and shot a hotel porter when the victim had tried 
to awaken him. He was acquitted of manslaughter on appeal.  
3.3.1 Wharton, a noted lawyer of the time, set out criteria for responsibility in 
somnolentia, some of which are still recognized now (see Fenwick and Mahowald & 
Schenck criteria at 2.2): 
‘a. A general tendency to deep and heavy sleep must be shown, out of which the 
                                                     
14 YELLOWLEES, D. (1878) Homicide by a Somnambulist. Journal of Mental Science, 24, 415-58. 
15 WEISS, K.J. and DEL BUSTO, E. (2011) Early American Jurisprudence of Sleep Violence. Sleep 
Medicine Clinics, 6(4), pp. 469-82. 
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patient could only be awakened by violent and convulsive effort (in other words, a 
history of relevant sleep disorder) …. 
e. The act must bear throughout, the character of unconsciousness. 
f. The actor himself, when he awakes, is generally amazed at his deed, and it seems 
to him almost incredible. Generally speaking he does not seek to evade 
responsibility, thought there are some unfortunate cases in which, the wretchedness 
of the sudden discovery overcomes the party himself, who seeks to shelter himself 
from the consequences of a crime of which he was technically, though not morally, 
guilty.’16 
In the 1880s, a French detective Robert Ledru was asked to investigate the murder of a 
man on the beach in Le Havre. He came to the conclusion that he himself must have 
shot the victim after seeing his characteristic footprint (with the big toe missing) and 
realising his own socks were wet. The police were reluctant to accept his “confession”, 
but on confinement in the cells with a gun at hand, he shot at the guards during a 
sleepwalking episode. Ledru was exiled to the country.17 In 1893 in France there was a 
case reported where a servant shortly after falling asleep shot two people. Charcot, the 
famous French physician, gave an opinion on an attempted murder during apparent 
somnambulism where a servant injured his landlady and another employee with a 
gun.18 
                                                     
16 Weiss (2011), see footnote 15 
17 PODOLSKY, E. (1961) Somnambulistic homicide. Medicine, Science and the Law, 1, pp. 260-65; 
LOOK AND LEARN. (2012) Jan 2012-last update, Chief Inspector Ledru, the policemen who 
caught...himself. Available: http://www.lookandlearn.com/blog/15523/chief-inspector-ledru-the-policeman-
who-caught-himself/. 
18 BROUARDEL, P., MOTET, D. and GARNIER, P. (1893) Affaire Valrof. Double tentative de meurte. 
Somnambulisme allegue. Annales d’hygiene publique et de medecine legale, 29, pp. 407-524. 
89 
 
 
 
3.3.2 The modern reporting of cases of forensic sleepwalking probably begins with 
Podolsky in 1961, although there had been two case series on Schlaftrunkenheit or 
“sleep drunkenness” (confusional arousal in English) in German by Gudden in 1905 and 
Schmidt in 1943. Podolsky commented on a number of historic cases, including Ledru.19 
Most of these early case reports involve homicide and all the accused were men. This 
preponderance of males persists into modern times – all but two of the cases reported 
in the recent press have involved male defendants. The preponderance is even more 
pronounced for violent or sexual crimes. Generally the successful sleepwalking defence 
resulted in acquittal on the grounds of sane automatism in England, until the case of 
Burgess20 (although one defendant was detained in Broadmoor, so presumably had 
been found ‘guilty but insane’, the direction at the time under The Trial of Lunatics Act 
1883).21  
 
3.4 Sleepwalking trials in the UK 
 
3.4.1 The most controversial sleepwalking case heard in the UK is probably Lowe – like 
the case of Parks, dramatic and dividing sleep experts about whether or not it was truly 
a parasomnic episode. Lowe battered his father to death during a prolonged assault 
which had several features atypical of a sleepwalking automatism. He sought out his 
victim; the episode lasted some time, involving at least four separate attacks in the 
                                                     
19 Podolsky (1961), see footnote 16. 
20 [1991] 2 WLR 1206 
21 HOPWOOD, J.S. & SNELL H.K. (1933). Amnesia in Relation to Crime. British Journal of Psychiatry, 79, 
pp. 27-41. 
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night;22 and there were disorganized and ineffective attempts to clear up the blood. The 
case report published in Medicine, Science & the Law23 prompted heated discussion in 
the forensic sleepwalking community. Pressman et al argued that the amount of alcohol 
consumed by the defendant made the defence of sleepwalking untenable, and that the 
Alcohol Provocation Test used was unvalidated. The case was described as “the first 
sleepwalking murder in the UK” by Ebrahim, apparently ignoring Fraser from the 
previous century, and the admittedly contentious Boshears.24 Lowe was found not guilty 
by reason of insanity, and received an admission order. He was released after ten 
months. His sentencing occurred before the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 
2004 came into effect, which restricts commitment for a hospital order to those with a 
mental disorder within the Mental Health Act 1983 that requires specialist treatment.  
3.4.2 More recently, there has been the case of Brian Thomas at Swansea Crown 
Court, on trial for the murder of his wife.25 Mr Thomas had a strong history of sleep 
disorders - he had been a sleepwalker since childhood. However, he attributed erectile 
dysfunction to his medication for depression and Parkinson’s disease, and so would 
periodically omit to take them so he could make love to his wife. One such occasion 
was the holiday with his wife in July 2008. He took their campervan to West Wales for a 
romantic break. Their sleep was disturbed by boy-racers in the car park where they 
were staying overnight. Later that night he had a dream that someone was on top of his 
                                                     
22 PRESSMAN, M.R., MAHOWALD, M.H., SCHENCK, C.H., CRAMER BORNEMANN, M.A., 
MONTPLAISIR, J.Y., ZADRA, A., PILON, M., GRUNSTEIN, R., BUCHANAN, P.R. and TACHIBANA, N. 
(2009) Sleep-related automatism and the law (letter to the editor). Medicine, Science and the Law, 49(2), 
pp. 139-43. 
23 EBRAHIM, I.O. and FENWICK, P. (2008) Sleep-related automatism and the law. Medicine, Science 
and the Law, 48(2), pp. 124-136. 
24 TIMES. (1961) U.S. Sergeant is cleared of murder. Times (Feb 8th) News,5. 
25 DE BRUXELLES, S. (2009) Man with rare sleep illness who killed his wife of 40 years during nightmare 
is declared innocent. Times (Nov 21st). 
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wife in the campervan. He went to pull the man off by pulling at his neck. In the morning 
he realised he had in fact strangled his wife and called 999, stating 
“I think I've killed my wife. Oh my God. I thought someone had broken in, I must have 
been dreaming or something. What have I done?”  
It is not clear whether his sleep disorder was REM sleep behaviour disorder (RBD) or 
night terrors. The diagnosis of Parkinson’s disease might suggest REM sleep behaviour 
disorder, which is associated with neurodegenerative diseases, and he was the right 
age for RBD. However the diagnosis of Parkinson’s disease seems dubious given that 
he often did not take his trihexyphenidyl. The video-PSG suggested that a night terror 
was the likely cause – there was sleep apnoea and periodic leg movements causing 
arousals but nothing else. The detail and content of the dream recalled goes against 
simple sleepwalking which occurs during non-REM sleep where the mentation is more 
emotions with less detail and less aggression. The issue at trial was whether or not the 
appropriate verdict was plain acquittal or the special verdict. Evidence was heard by the 
prosecution about the low likelihood of recurrence. As well as the two sleep experts, a 
forensic psychiatrist approved under Section 12 of the Mental Health Act 1983 gave 
evidence. She was not a sleep expert and simply gave evidence about whether or not 
Mr Thomas had a mental disorder that required hospital treatment. This is probably due 
to Section 24 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act, which precludes a 
hospital order where the condition is not a mental disorder under the Mental Health Act. 
However it does not hinge on whether or not the condition is a ‘disease of the mind’. It 
was decided that there were no public safety issues, at which point the prosecution 
offered no further evidence. The jury were directed by the trial judge to acquit.  
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3.4.3 The case of Lowe and the accompanying publicity saw the beginning of the 
upward trend in the sleepwalking defence and inquiries by solicitors to sleep experts 
(figures kind courtesy of Dr Fenwick).  
 
 
Fig 1: Graph of increasing numbers of referrals to Peter Fenwick plus the 
numbers of trials reported in the press 
Some are highly speculative – one sleep expert described an enquiry about the 
possibility of automatism due to sleepwalking in a case where the solicitor’s client 
violently assaulted someone during the day whilst wide awake. On the other hand, 
another expert witness had a case referred to him for assessment where the possibility 
of sleepwalking had not been raised by the defendant or his solicitors despite a strong 
personal history. Although a finding of guilt cannot necessarily lead to the conclusion 
that the defence was spurious, on occasion the defendant will completely change his 
defence or plea when the experts do not support a sleepwalking defence. For example, 
Goldie had claimed to his victims of child sexual abuse (but not in court) that he suffered 
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sexsomnia.26 Freaney, convicted of the murder of his partner at Oxford Crown Court, 
had initially claimed he was sleepwalking but changed his defence to one of erotic 
asphyxiation.27 Unfortunately these defences, although recognized as spurious and 
rejected, are presented as evidence for the lack of credibility of sleepwalking defences 
generally - rather than evidence that the experts can and do detect malingerers. There 
are no figures on how often the sleepwalking defence is presented, but given the 
collective experience of British sleep experts it seems unlikely that there are more than 
30 cases per year. There are also no figures on how many incidents occur during 
sleepwalking that do not progress through the criminal justice system.  
3.4.4 Sleep clinicians universally agree that sleepwalkers do strange things during 
somnambulistic episodes in situations where there is no secondary gain and therefore 
no reason to malinger. They sometimes put themselves in considerable danger. 
Mahowald reported one sleepwalker who wears a hospital restraint jacket in bed after 
sustaining a cervical fracture falling from a window during a parasomniac episode.28 
There have been several pseudo-suicides reported.29 Nocturnal wandering is apparently 
very common in hotels, as previously noted (see 2.3). In fact unwanted behaviour is 
often the trigger for seeking medical help for a problem that is generally seen as a 
source of amusement rather than an illness. Thus it is not surprising that a substantial 
proportion of those relying on the sleepwalking defence have not sought medical help 
                                                     
26 BBC NEWS. (2011) 2011-last update, Dunfermline man who blamed 'sexsomnia' jailed for abuse. 
Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-edinburgh-east-fife-13682135. 
27 OXFORD MAIL. (2011) Jurors take just 20 minutes to convict killer Sean Freaney. Oxford Mail (Mar 
10th). 
28 MAHOWALD, M., BUNDLIE, S., HURWITZ, T. and SCHENCK, C. (1990) ‘Sleep Violence – Forensic 
Science Implications: Polygraphic and Video Documentation’. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 35(2), pp. 
413-32. 
29 MAHOWALD, M., SCHENCK, C., GOLDNER, M., BACHELDER, V. and CRAMER BORNEMANN, M. 
(2003) ‘Parasomnia pseudo-suicide’. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 48(5), pp. 1158-62. 
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prior to their arrest.  
3.4.5 Minor episodes of violence appear to be common, but recurrence of serious 
violence is rare. One sleepwalking expert considered that compulsion of treatment was 
not necessary because the sleepwalker would automatically seek medical advice and 
comply with measures to reduce the risk of recurrence. One participant recounted the 
concerns of one man acquitted on the grounds of sleepwalking: 
‘he contacted [his attorney] and … the forensic psychologist, because he was off 
meds, and he’d begun to have sleepwalking behaviours which were of concern. 
Nothing violent, but because he was now back to sleepwalking and given this 
previous history, it caused him huge anxiety.’ 
There are no recorded second trials of individuals for serious crimes where 
sleepwalking was argued in defence, so it is not known what approach would be taken 
(in one instance where a sleepwalker committed a second violent act, he pleaded 
guilty). Schenck & Mahowald suggest that those acquitted once of parasomnia with a 
known trigger e.g. excessive alcohol consumption should not be permitted the defence 
subsequently.30 In the case of Finegan v. Heywood, a man who knew that excessive 
alcohol consumption triggered his sleepwalking was convicted of drink driving whilst 
sleepwalking. This conviction was on the basis that his state of automatism was self-
induced.31 Even the sleep experts who are persuaded that alcohol is a significant trigger 
for sleepwalking believe that those with a previous history of harmful behaviour 
                                                     
30 SCHENCK, C.H. & MAHOWALD M.W. (1998) An Analysis of a Recent Criminal trial Involving Sexual 
Misconduct with a Child, Alcohol Abuse and a Successful Sleepwalking Defence: arguments supporting 
two proposed new forensic categories. Medicine, Science and the Law, 38(2), pp. 147-52. 
31 [2000] S.L.T. 905; in the recent case of Queally, (BBC NEWS, 2014-last update, Available: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-suffolk-30088748 'Sleep driving' jockey Tom Queally banned.) 
District Judge Knight commented that the law had previously ruled that sleepwalking was no defence to 
drink driving. It is not known which case she was referring to.  
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following alcohol consumption should not be exonerated. Judge Tyrer in Pooley directed 
the jury that if alcohol was the sole trigger for his sleepwalking, then this was self-
inflicted and not an excuse.32 
3.4.6 Although sleepwalking and sexsomnia are often triggered by external stimuli, for 
example something that causes a sudden awakening or the presence of a bed partner, 
it is questionable whether these would count as an external cause in law (see 5.6.1). 
Martin JA in Rabey found that “the ordinary stresses and disappointments of life which 
are the common lot of mankind”33 were not the type of events that could support the 
defence of sane automatism, which contrasts with the ordeal of the accused in R v T34 
who had been raped. Lord Lane came to a similar conclusion in Burgess: 
‘the possible disappointment or frustration caused by unrequited love was not to be 
equated with something such as concussion’.35  
Similarly the presence of a bed partner is fundamentally different from an unusual and 
unexpected event like the attack of a swarm of bees or being struck by a stone, and so 
it is arguable this precipitating factor would not be sufficient to render sexsomnia a sane 
automatism. In any case, the argument prevailed in Burgess that 
‘although sleepwalking can no doubt be triggered by external factors such as stress, 
such factors are merely to be regarded as external triggers of a condition the primary 
source of which is internal to the accused.’36 
In other words, the presence of an external trigger does not fundamentally alter whether 
                                                     
32 BUCKS HERALD. (2007) ‘Man Cleared of Rape after Sleepwalking Defence’. Bucks Heralds (Jan 
18th). 
33 (1981) 79 Dominion Law Reports 435 
34 [1990] Criminal Law Review 256 
35 [1991] 2 WLR 1206 
36 MACKAY, R. (1995) Mental Condition Defences in the Criminal Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, at p. 46. 
96 
 
 
 
or not the condition is considered to have an internal cause. In Hennessy, the presence 
of stress, anxiety and depression did not mean that the defendant’s hyperglycaemia had 
an external cause. Lord Lane states 
‘[t]hey constitute a state of mind which is prone to recur. They lack the feature of 
novelty or accident, which is the basis of the distinction drawn by Lord Diplock in 
Reg. v. Sullivan’.37  
 
3.5 Sleepwalking cases in Other Common Law Jurisdictions 
 
3.5.1 Perhaps the most infamous case of homicidal somnambulism is the case of Parks. 
The Parks case truly divides the expert witness community, and for this reason should 
not be held up as an archetypal forensic sleepwalking episode (although it is often used 
as such in discussions of legal philosophy, for example). Parks was a 23 year old 
Canadian ‘gentle giant’38 who in 1987 killed his mother-in-law and severely injured his 
father-in-law with a kitchen knife. He drove 23 km to his in-laws’ house, negotiating at 
least one set of traffic lights. Afterwards he reported himself to the police station, 
bloodied knife in the car, saying  
“I just killed someone with my bare hands; Oh my God, I just killed someone; I've just 
killed two people; My God, I've just killed two people with my hands; My God, I've just 
killed two people.  My hands; I just killed two people.  I killed them; I just killed two 
people; I've just killed my mother- and father-in-law.  I stabbed and beat them to 
death.  It's all my fault”.  
                                                     
37 R v Hennessy [1989] 2 All ER 9 
38 Frequent childhood sleepers are often tall, apparently due to the effect of their sleep disorder on growth 
hormone production 
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Only then did he realise that he had severed several tendons to his hand, which 
required extensive surgery and would ordinarily have been extremely painful.39 
This episode has several features not typical of sleepwalking – his behaviour was very 
complex, lasted for at least 25 minutes40 and he had sought out his victims. On the 
other hand, he was bewildered and shocked by the effects of his actions, utterly 
remorseful, made no efforts to conceal his crimes and handed himself in, and had no 
animosity towards his victims. His indifference to his own wounds and failure to 
recognize his parents-in-law also points to dissociation, whether parasomnic or 
psychogenic. He had a history of sleepwalking, sleeptalking and childhood enuresis and 
a strong family history of sleep disorders including sleepwalking, adult enuresis, 
nightmares and sleeptalking. He had been under considerable personal stress, racking 
up large debts due to his gambling addiction. He had embezzled $30,000 from his 
employers to fund his gambling and consequently lost his job. Secondary to this he was 
suffering insomnia – and sleep deprivation worsens parasomnias. 
The court heard medical evidence that sleepwalking was not considered a neurological 
or psychiatric problem and that the likelihood of recurrence of violent somnambulism. 
Furthermore they found that the cause of his impairment was the natural state of sleep, 
rather than sleepwalking, and therefore couldn’t constitute insanity: 
‘Accepting the medical evidence, the respondent’s mind and its functioning must 
have been impaired at the relevant time but sleep-walking did not impair it. The 
                                                     
39 (1992) 95 Dominion Law Reports 27; [1992] 2 SCR 871; BROUGHTON, R., BILLINGS R, 
CARTWRIGHT, R., DOUCETTE, D., EDMEADS, J., EDWARDS, M., ERVIN, F., ORCHARD, B., HIL, L.R. 
and TURRELL, G. (1994) Homicidal Somnambulism: A Case Report. Sleep, 17(3), pp. 253-64; KRYGER, 
M. (1995) Sleep Medicine and the Law. Sleep, 18(9), pp. 721-23 
40 Broughton (1994), see footnote 39. 
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cause was the natural condition, sleep.’41  
The reasoning behind this conclusion is given by Galligan JA 
 
‘According to the doctors, when the respondent attacked Mr. and Mrs. Woods he 
was in a state of sleepwalking. But the impairment of his mind and its functioning 
was not the result of his sleepwalking, it was the result of his being asleep. The 
impairment of his faculties of reason, memory and understanding coincided with his 
sleepwalking, but sleepwalking did not cause the impairment.’42  
They also considered the two approaches to distinguishing between sane and insane 
automatism, the continuing danger theory and the internal/external dichotomy. La 
Forest J quotes Martin JA in Rabey  
‘The internal cause approach has been criticized as an unfounded development of 
the law, and for the odd results the external/internal dichotomy can produce; see 
Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd ed. 1983), at pp. 671-76; Stuart, Canadian 
Criminal Law (2nd ed. 1987), at pp. 92-94; Colvin, supra, at p. 291.  These criticisms 
have particular validity if the internal cause theory is held out as the definitive answer 
to the disease of the mind inquiry.  However, it is apparent from the cases that the 
theory is really meant to be used only as an analytical tool, and not as an all-
encompassing methodology.  As Watt J. commented in his reasons in support of his 
charge to the jury in this case, the dichotomy "constitutes a general, but not an 
unremitting or universal, classificatory scheme for ‘disease of the mind'".’43 
He was acquitted, and his plain acquittal was upheld on appeal. Many forensic sleep 
                                                     
41 R v Parks (1990) 73 O.R. (2d) 129 (CA); 56 CCC (3d) 449 [PDF not paginated]. 
42 Parks (CA), see footnote 41. 
43 Parks (SC) see footnote 38 at pp.901-02. 
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experts express doubt that Parks was sleepwalking, suggesting that he was in a 
dissociative state instead. Others cite the case to support the defence of sleepwalking in 
similar circumstances, which is a fundamental misunderstanding of the status of a jury 
verdict. The Canadian court heard testimony from various experts that sleepwalking 
was not a psychiatric disorder. Burgess was distinguished on the grounds of wholly 
different medical evidence (although the facts were similar). The Canadian doctrine on 
sleepwalking was partly based on the assertion that since sleepwalking arises from a 
normal condition, sleep, it could not be an insane automatism. It was however asserted 
that no one factor was determinative. In Stone this principle was further developed into 
an approach which considered several factors but with the issue of public safety most 
determinative of the appropriate verdict, as Bastarche J comments: 
“The internal cause theory and the continuing danger theory should not be viewed 
as alternative or mutually exclusive approaches to the disease of the mind inquiry.  
Rather, a holistic approach should be adopted under either or both of these 
approaches to the inquiry may be considered by trial judges. It is therefore more 
appropriate to refer to the internal cause factor and the continuing danger factor. In 
addition to these two factors, policy factors may also be considered in determining 
whether the condition the accused claims to have suffered from is a disease of the 
mind.” 
This change in approach is reflected in the decision in the sexsomnia case of Luedecke 
where it was held that sleep disorders should be judged on the basis of continuing 
danger and so the verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder 
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should have been left to the jury.44  
Various explanations for the failure for the prosecution to adduce expert evidence in 
Parks were related to me in my interviews, including: a belief on the part of the 
prosecution lawyers that the defence was not credible; that the sleepwalking defence 
was so strong that no medical evidence could be offered; and accusations of coercion 
of expert witnesses by the North American “sleepwalking mafia”.45 I spoke to the 
Honourable Mr Justice Gary Trotter and Dr Brian Butler, who were both involved with 
the case. They explained that it was a strategic decision by the Crown attorney, who 
believed that the jury would use their common sense and convict him despite all the 
medical evidence adduced by the defence. In particular, the Crown did not want to risk 
the jury returning the special verdict. I established that there was medical evidence 
against the episode being sleepwalking, given by the late Professor Oswald46 amongst 
others. The prosecution team were aware of this evidence; however, on the weight of 
medical opinion they felt the defence was legitimate. 
3.5.2 Another dramatic case where sleepwalking was the basis of the defence was 
Arizona v Falater.47 The defendant stabbed his wife 44 times and then returned to 
drown her in the pool. It appears he went to repair the pool motor in his sleep and it is 
presumed that his wife tried to lead him back to bed. The knife used in the repair was 
the murder weapon. He had changed his clothes and taken out his tools prior to the 
assault. Afterwards he put the tools back, changed back and bandaged his hand. The 
neighbour, woken by dogs barking and a woman screaming, saw Falater motion to his 
                                                     
44 R v Luedecke [2008] ONCA 716 
45Personal communication from one of my interviewees, who asked for the comment to be unattributed. 
46 Personal communication. 
47 CARTWRIGHT, R. (2004) Sleepwalking Violence: A Sleep Disorder, a Legal Dilemma, and a 
Psychological Challenge. American Journal of Psychiatry, 161(7), pp. 1149-58. 
101 
 
 
 
dogs to stay down. He then rolled his wife into the pool, at which point the neighbour 
called the police. When the police arrived he was not aware that his wife was dead and 
assumed the police were hunting for the assailant.  
He had a strong history of sleepwalking and there were circumstances of sleep 
deprivation and considerable stress at work leading up to the episode where he. He had 
no discernible motive, and this was totally out of character – he testified that his wife 
was his only friend. However the episode had several atypical features. Falater returned 
to drown his wife, apparently still alive, after the frenzy of stabbing. There were efforts to 
conceal evidence, bloody clothing and the murder weapon being placed in a 
Tupperware container, put inside a rubbish bag and placed within the wheel-well of his 
car. A neighbour witnessed Falater signalling to his dog to lie down. Ultimately, the jury 
did not believe that the episode was sleepwalking, and returned a verdict of guilty. Mr 
Falater’s son has qualified as an attorney and continues to pursue a gubernatorial 
pardon. 
Pressman was the expert witness instructed by the State of Arizona in Falater, and he 
notes 65 details of the incident.  Some of these are inconsistent with sleepwalking e.g. 
actions that demonstrated that working memory was functional (see Appendix D). Not 
all his conclusions are uncontroversial - there has been work on spatial perception in 
sleepwalking that suggests that the ability to navigate may be retained. It was also 
established that it was unlikely that the Tupperware box in which the bloody clothes and 
weapon were stashed was normally in the car boot, given the effect of the ambient 
temperature in Phoenix on the plastic used. He also maintained that there was a motive 
for murder (Yarmila Falater had genital warts which may have indicated marital 
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infidelity).  
Cartwright, who was involved in both cases either as a consultant or as an expert 
witness, considers that both these cases are consistent with sleepwalking.48 Parks had 
been due to meet his in-laws the following day to admit to his considerable gambling 
debts, a meeting which he was apparently very anxious about. Likewise Falater had 
planned to fix the pool motor the next day that he was working on when apparently 
disturbed by his wife. Thus they were both acting out the plans they had for the next 
day. They were both under extreme stress, acted out of character and had no apparent 
motive for the homicides. None of these features make the case for sleepwalking 
specifically, and would fit with a hysterical dissociative episode also. Even if this was the 
case, the defendants would not be criminally responsible (but would be legally insane). 
3.5.3 Cartwright describes the case of “The Good Neighbour”,49 with further details in a 
co-authored article.50 The accused was considered “a stable, big, all-around decent 
guy”, and he was often asked to look after his neighbours’ houses when they were out 
of town. In the period in question, he was under a great deal of stress - his wife had had 
a difficult pregnancy and was staying with her mother. He had a busy day, keeping 
himself going with caffeinated drinks into the evening. During the night, he crossed the 
road into a neighbour’s house (not one of those he had been asked to look after). He 
entered the house and went into the bedroom where he allegedly stroked the leg of the 
neighbour’s daughter in bed. The daughter led the confused man out of the house, and 
he slept for the rest of the night. The daughter didn’t mention it to her boyfriend or 
                                                     
48 Cartwright (2004), see footnote 47. 
49 CARTWRIGHT, R. (2010) The Twenty-four Hour Mind. New York: Oxford University Press, at pp. 102-
104. 
50 CARTWRIGHT, R.D. and GUILLEMINAULT, C. (2013) Defending Sleepwalkers with Science and an 
illustrative case. Journal of Clinical Sleep Medicine, 9(7), pp. 721-26. 
103 
 
 
 
phone the police at the time. He was well known to be a sleepwalker. The case went to 
court charged as home invasion and intent to commit a sexual assault, but the jury were 
persuaded he was sleepwalking and he was acquitted. It was not possible to perform 
sleep studies with the addition of caffeine, as there was insufficient time prior to trial to 
obtain institutional ethical approval. This case contributes to Cartwright’s theory that 
excess caffeine consumption triggers sleepwalking (Howard and D’Orban, and 
Moldofsky also found caffeine consumption to be associated with sleepwalking51). In 
both cases, the person was under considerable stress and suffering sleep deprivation, 
which are generally accepted triggers of sleepwalking. 
3.5.4 In the case of Stephen Reitz his actions were extremely violent, but not entirely 
out of character. He launched a frenzied attack on the married woman with whom he 
had been having an affair, stabbing and beating her to death. Their relationship had 
been volatile, with evidence of domestic violence. Reitz claimed he had a history of 
sleepwalking, and stated he had killed his girlfriend during a dream where he struggled 
with an intruder. He had consumed alcohol and cocaine that night. The wounds in his 
victim’s neck were like those he inflicted on sharks (he was a commercial fisherman). 
He had a history of sleepwalking, and during a sleep study he actually had a violent 
sleep terror.52 Nonetheless the jury convicted him of first degree murder.  
3.5.5 Michael Ricksgers shot his wife with a .357 Magnum. He suffered severe 
obstructive sleep apnoea, and he claimed that he shot his wife during a dream about an 
                                                     
51 HOWARD, C. and D'ORBAN, P.T. (1987) Violence in sleep: medico-legal issues and two case reports. 
Psychological Medicine, 17(4), pp. 915-25; MOLDOFSKY, H., GILBERT, R., FRANKLIN, A. and 
MACLEAN, A. (1995) ‘Sleep-Related Violence’. Sleep, 18(9), pp. 731-9. 
52 SLEEP FORENSICS ASSOCIATES. (2013) 2013-last update, Case Studies: Sleepwalking. Available: 
http://sleepforensicsassociates.com/caseStudies/cases-sleepwalking.php. 
104 
 
 
 
intruder.53 The prosecution argued that he was planning to leave his wife, and that the 
shot was aimed. He is serving life without parole. If these men have been wrongly 
convicted, their refusal to accept their guilt on grounds of their sleep disorder will likely 
thwart attempts to get parole. 
 
3.6 Summary 
 
It has been recognized for centuries that sleepers can harm others, and accepted that 
this behaviour is not blameworthy. Increasing awareness of parasomnias and better 
access to sleep studies and sleep physicians have led to these conditions being used 
as the basis for a defence more and more frequently, at least in common law countries. 
Whether or not parasomnias are always an insane automatism is uncertain, given the 
lack of definitive rulings on external triggers. There are some indications that judicial 
pragmatism has resulted in dangerousness replacing external factors as the 
determining criterion of the type of automatism (see 6.5.2). The issue of prior fault 
seems to be neglected in the consideration of lack of criminal responsibility due to 
automatism. 
                                                     
53 NOFZINGER, E.A. and WETTSTEIN, R.M. (1995) Homicidal behavior and sleep apnea: a case report 
and medicolegal discussion. Sleep, 18(9), pp. 765-82. 
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Chapter 4: Parasomnia Trials in the Media 
 
 
4.1 Press Reports Database: Methods 
 
 
There were two main reasons for analyzing press reports of parasomnia trials. The first 
is that sleepwalking (or other parasomnia) cases are rarely to be found in law reports – 
the law is settled and consequently parasomnia trials are usually decided at the court of 
first instance (although some are reported in the academic medico-legal literature). Only 
cases that are appealed are covered in the official law reports. However, trials that are 
not appealed are frequently reported in the press, and hence the press is an important 
albeit flawed source of information for parasomnia trials as a whole. The second 
purpose of this study is to see if media coverage appears generally to be fair, or is 
prejudicial to defendants relying on the parasomnia defence, by analyzing the language 
used to report the verdicts. An analysis was made by the author of press reports of 
criminal proceedings in the UK from 1994 to 2011 where sleepwalking or another 
parasomnia was reported as the basis of the defence. There were 41 cases in total.1 
The terms “sleepwalking” OR “sexsomnia” AND “trial” were used for the search on 
the Nexis UK database of UK newspaper articles. Also a search of major news websites 
was conducted via Google. The time frame was from 1996 when several major 
newspapers first had an online presence up until July 2011. The main report of the 
verdict was chosen for each newspaper. Duplicate reports (typically where local 
newspaper all featured the same article) were eliminated. Post-verdict reporting affected 
                                                     
1 This includes one case, Jeal, where the basis of the defence was misreported (see 4.3.2). 
106 
 
 
 
the content of the articles, with the conclusions of the story affected by the verdict 
returned by the jury. However, post-verdict reports could feature a degree of 
editorializing without running the risk of contempt of court. The sleepwalking defence 
attracts a lot of media attention, but it is apparent from speaking to expert witnesses and 
from barristers’ web pages that not all sleepwalking trials are reported in the media. 
Peter Fenwick estimated back in 1994 that there were 15 trials per year of violent 
sleepwalkers,2 and that was prior to the widespread recognition of sexsomnia.3 Some 
cases are reported in the medical literature, but since the trial of Burgess4 there have 
been no new points of law raised with regards to the sleepwalking defence. The 
substantive law is controversial, and widely criticised in criminal law texts, but appears 
to be settled. For these reasons, I conducted a search of the Nexis database for 
newspaper articles about trials where the defence of sleepwalking or another 
parasomnia was presented. The time frame was from 1994 when several major 
newspapers first had an online presence up until July 2011. All trials where 
sleepwalking or another parasomnia was mentioned as the basis of a defence were 
included, whether or not the defence was run at trial. One example where the defence 
was dropped is the case of Sean Freaney, who was convicted of murder at Oxford 
Crown Court.5 He initially claimed he had been sleepwalking but changed his defence to 
that of erotic asphyxiation after expert evidence did not support his claims. 
There have been a number of high profile parasomnia trials in recent years, one of the 
                                                     
2 ROFFEY, M. (1994) 'But I was asleep through the whole thing, your honour': Sleepwalking isn't always 
comic; people can get hurt, writes Monique Roffey. The Independent (Sep 25th). 
3 The term ‘sexsomnia’ was coined in 2003, although sexual activity in sleep was recognized prior to this. 
4 [1991] 2 WLR 1206 
5 OXFORD MAIL. (2011) Jurors take just 20 minutes to convict killer Sean Freaney. Oxford Mail (Mar 
10th). 
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best known being that of Brian Thomas in 2009 who strangled his wife in their 
campervan (see 3.4.2).6  
 
4.2 Results 
 
The collected data were analysed for year of trial, jurisdiction/court, age and sex of 
defendant, offence(s) charged, outcome, prior history of sleepwalking, whether alcohol 
was involved, and number and type of newspapers in which reports appeared. A 
general trend for increasing numbers of trials being reported in the press was seen, 
although the numbers are too low to draw definite conclusions and the most recent 
figures are probably affected by the Brian Thomas trial. The trial of Lowe in 2005 saw a 
rise in referrals to one eminent sleep expert (see Graph 1), and the most active expert 
witnesses all reported a similar increase in referrals as awareness of sleep disorders 
increases among the legal profession, which suggests that the increase in the number 
of trials reported is not simply down to greater press interest but due to a genuine 
increase in the use of the sleepwalking defence. The increased awareness of 
sleepwalking as a possible excuse is not an unalloyed benefit and one expert witness 
commented that ‘It’s a barrister’s playground.’ 
                                                     
6 DE BRUXELLES, S. (2009) Man with rare sleep illness who killed his wife of 40 years during nightmare 
is declared innocent. Times (Nov 21st). 
108 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.1 
  
 
 
Graph 1 Number of trials reported in the press 
 
 
 
 
Graph 2 – Referrals per year to Peter Fenwick (up to 2005) overlaid on press 
reports per year (with thanks) 
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Demographics: The average age of the accused was 37.1 years of age. The male: 
female ratio was 39: 2. 
Jurisdiction:   Court: 
England & Wales  32 Crown Court   29 
Scotland  8       Magistrates’ Court  5 
Northern Ireland 1      High Court   2 
    Sheriffs’ Court  57      
There are a few striking findings. The first is the high number of cases in which the 
accused was serving or had served, in the armed forces – 7 out of 41(17%). It is also 
remarkable that there were only two cases where the accused was female. The medico-
legal literature reports a male preponderance with a ratio in violent arousal disorders of 
1.6-2.8 to 1, and higher for rapid eye movement sleep behaviour disorder, with 97% of 
injuries inflicted by males.8 
                                                     
7The Scottish Sheriffs’ Courts deal with some sexual offences, hence the greater proportion of cases 
dealt with by this court than by the English Magistrates’ Courts. 
8 SICLARI, F., KHATAMI, R., URBANIOK, F., NOBILI, L., MAHOWALD, M.W., SCHENCK, C.H., 
CRAMER BORNEMANN, M.A. and AND BASSETTI, C.L. (2010) Violence in sleep. Brain, 133, pp. 3494-
3509. 
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4.2.2 
Offences
22%
46%
7%
22%
3%
Type of offence
1: Murder/Attempted Murder
2: Sexual Offences
3: Sexual Activity with a Minor
4: Drink Driving
5: Other
 
Figure 2 
 
Numbers of cases: 
1: 22%  Murder   7 
   Attempted Murder 2 
2. 46%  Indecent Assault 4 
   Sexual Assault 7 
   Rape   8 
3. 7%    Sexual Activity with a Minor 3 
4. 22%  Drink Driving  9 
5. 3%  Other (Criminal Damage) 1 
 
The offences charged were mostly sexual offences, homicide and drink driving (see 
Figure 2). The fact that the offences that go to trial are serious ones is no surprise – 
there is anecdotal evidence less serious offences are either dealt with outside of the 
criminal justice system, fail to secure funding for expert opinions and sleep studies, or 
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sleep studies are performed but the evidence is not tested in court.9 It appears, for 
example, that nude sleepwalking is very common in hotels, but staff are trained to deal 
with it informally and sympathetically rather than treat it as a criminal act.10 Also most of 
the acts are perpetrated towards family or friends, who will usually be aware of the 
sleepwalker’s condition, and so the criminal justice system is never involved at all.  
The male preponderance in the press reports and in the literature may reflect the 
greater ability of males to inflict serious harm. Also, female sexsomnia is probably less 
likely to involve the police due to social and physiological differences – female sexual 
aggression is perceived differently and penetration would require active male 
participation. As mentioned above, seven defendants currently, or had previously, 
served with the armed forces. Of these, two had been diagnosed with post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) and in another his experiences in the Gulf War were blamed for 
precipitating his parasomniac episode. 
4.2.3 Parasomnia: 
Sleepwalking      20 
Sexsomnia      9 
Defendant changed plea before or during trial 311 
Confusional arousal     3 
Miscellaneous      612 
 
 
                                                     
9 Personal communication from Dr Idzikowski. 
10 TELEGRAPH. (2007) ‘Hotels train staff for naked sleepwalkers’. Telegraph (Oct 25th). 
11In 2 cases defendants changed their plea to guilty; in the other case the defendant maintained his 
innocence but changed the basis of his defence to erotic asphyxiation in a sex game gone wrong. In all 
those cases it was due to lack of support for a sleepwalking defence. There were other cases where the 
defendant pleaded guilty but maintained that they were sleepwalking (drink driving cases). 
12In 3 cases the parasomnia was not specified; in one case the diagnosis was probably night terror; in 
one case there was not in fact any parasomnia claimed (Jeal); and in one case the defence was on the 
basis of sleepwalking or other cause of automatism. 
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Prior History of Parasomnia Family History of Parasomnia 
 (where reported):  (where reported): 
Yes 3       Yes 22 
No 1       No  5 
 
Precipitating event/factor   Consumption of alcohol before the episode 
(where reported):     
Yes    13   Yes 28 
 PTSD   2   No 2 
 War experiences 2 
 Stress   5 
 Medications  313 
 Sleep apnoea 1 
No    4 
4.2.4 Verdict:   
   Convicted  18 (44%)   
              Acquitted                22 (54%) 
      Not guilty by reason of insanity   1 (2%) 
 
Seven defendants admitted their guilt at or before the trial. In two cases (both drink 
driving) it was accepted that the defendant was sleepwalking, but nonetheless they 
were convicted.14 In another case of drink driving the defendant admitted guilt and 
received an absolute discharge on the basis of his sleepwalking, a disposal which 
usually suggests that the court found no moral culpability.  In seven cases either the 
prosecution offered no evidence (3 cases) or the jury was directed by the judge to 
acquit (4). Jason Jeal was acquitted on the grounds of mistake as to consent rather 
than sleepwalking. Mark Phillips was convicted at the Crown Court but his conviction 
                                                     
13In one case withdrawal from treatment for his parasomnia 
14Cf BBC NEWS, 2014-last update, 'Sleep driving' jockey Tom Queally banned. Available: <a 
href='http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-suffolk-30088748' 
target='_blank'>http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-suffolk-30088748</a> 
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was quashed on the basis that the jury did not hear all the medical evidence.15 The 
most surprising finding is that in only one case did the jury return the special verdict (in 
one further case since the sampling time frame a defendant was found NGRI). Given 
the precedent in Burgess16 that sleepwalking is an insane automatism, one might have 
expected that this would be the normal outcome in these cases. My discussion with one 
barrister (involved in an unreported case) confirmed that some judges do not direct the 
jury that sleepwalking is an insane automatism or even to consider the special verdict. A 
jury so directed would have to choose between a conviction and an outright acquittal. 
 4.2.5 The importance of alcohol as a triggering factor in sleepwalking is probably the 
most contentious area in the forensic setting, and certainly an issue many of the reports 
highlighted. It seems all the expert witnesses agree that small amounts of alcohol can 
trigger sleepwalking in a small proportion of sleepwalkers. However, sleepwalking has a 
number of features in common with alcohol intoxication – amnesia, reduced control and 
reduced consciousness. The voluntarily intoxicated defendant has no defence on the 
basis of his intoxication (although he may lack the mens rea for crimes of specific 
intent). Alcohol was involved in the majority of cases reported (28 out of the 30 cases 
where alcohol consumption was mentioned). Given the contentious role that large 
amounts of alcohol are said to play in sleepwalking episodes, this is rightly of public 
concern.  
 
4.3 Misreporting 
 
                                                     
15 WALTON, S. (2008) Sex case man in legal bid; Cleared sleepwalker wants to prevent change in law. 
Middlesborough Evening Gazette (Dec 8th) News, 1. 
16 [1991] 2 WLR 1206 
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4.3.1 There are a number of cases where my research has uncovered gross 
misreporting of criminal trials. In the case of Stephen Davies, the expert witness, Dr 
Idzikowski, agreed that Davies did suffer from sexsomnia but testified that the episode 
in question was not sexsomnia. The press reports, however, stated that the expert 
witness supported the defence of sexsomnia. There were several later corrections, 
which stated that his defence was not sexsomnia but a plain denial of rape.17 Davies’s 
complaint to the Press Complaints Commission about the Guardian newspaper, on the 
grounds that his trial was misreported as sexsomnia, was upheld (Press Complaints 
Commissions Case 4853).18 In fact the defence was three-stranded and did include the 
defence of sexsomnia. The jury was apparently not sure that the defendant had no 
reasonable belief of the victim’s consent, and so they acquitted him. The newspaper 
misreporting of the case might be partly explained by its complexity, but probably arose 
because the court reporter was present for one part of the expert testimony, but not the 
crucial part.19 
4.3.2 Jeal was misreported in the press as a sleepwalking defence - he was a 
sleepwalker, but in fact he argued that he had made a mistake as to consent.20 His 
story as told to me by his solicitor is as follows: he had been visiting friends and was 
going to be staying overnight in their spare bedroom. He had an argument with his wife, 
before falling asleep on the couch. His wife went home instead. The couple whose 
house it was also had an argument, and the woman then went and slept in the spare 
                                                     
17 DAILY MAIL. (2011) Sep 6th 2011-last update, ‘Stephen Davies’ (a correction). Available: 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/article-2033139/Stephen-Davies.html. 
18 PRESS COMPLAINTS COMMISSION. (2011) Sept 27th 2011-last update, Stephen Davies and 
Eleanor Parker v The Guardian about Accuracy. Available: http://complaints.pccwatch.co.uk/case/4853/. 
19 Personal communication from Dr Idzikowski 
20 KOSTER, O. (2008) ‘How could the man who ‘raped’ me be cleared because he was sleepwalking’. 
Daily Mail (Nov 15th). 
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room. Mr Jeal woke up on the couch, and then went to the spare bedroom. Assuming 
the woman in the bed was his wife, he proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. 
The jury acquitted on this basis - sleepwalking was not argued at all. 
4.3.3 This reporting error was compounded when the issue of automatism as a defence 
in rape cases was then taken up by Harry Cohen, then MP for Leyton and Wanstead. 
He submitted an early day motion about the Jeal case proposing a change in the law 
which would have denied the defence of automatism to those accused of sexual 
offences. He commented  
‘A rape is a rape and should be treated as such.’  
 
 However, it seems he was happy for parasomnia to be argued as an insane 
automatism from his speech in the Commons where he stated 
‘The expert medical opinion presented evidence that sleepwalking was a mental 
abnormality and could deem the defendant legally insane. The judge accepted that, 
but the series of more recent cases to which I have referred have overridden that 
decision as far as rape is concerned.’21  
This is also suggested by his Early Day Motion which stated that he  
‘considers that those are not proper defences for rape or murder which warrant 
walking free without any consequence and if they are now deemed to be so, 
represent a massive legal loophole; further considers that anyone who kills or 
commits rape cannot be considered completely safe to walk free in the community 
without much more extensive tests to check that they will not act in the same 
manner again and that the seriousness of the act should require detention for such 
                                                     
21 _ 
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tests in all cases’.22 
 
Other comments about the case were: 
‘I would like to see some sort of reverse burden of proof where the defendant has to 
come up with evidence to prove they have a history of sleepwalking, doctors' reports, 
and witnesses. Otherwise anyone can simply say 'I was asleep'.’(DC Richard Rock, 
Hampshire Police).23 
‘People do sleepwalk and they do strange things in their sleep, but it usually is no 
more complex than grinding the teeth or smacking the lips—at most they may get up 
and make a cup of tea. I would think it was extremely difficult to perform such a 
complex manoeuvre as having sexual intercourse while asleep—especially if the 
other person is unwilling’. (Cosmo Hallstrom, Fellow of the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists (FRCP), from Harry Cohen’s Early Day Motion 15th Oct 2008. NB: Dr 
Hallstrom is neither a sleep medicine specialist nor a forensic psychiatrist).  
It is extremely worrying that attempts can be made to change the law that are based on 
an erroneous account of a trial.  
4.3.4 Although the case is outside the sampling period of my study, news reports in 
March 2012 provide a vivid illustration of some of the problems. When Zack Thompson 
was sentenced at Nottingham Crown Court, DC Paula Winfield commented that  
“Sleepwalking as a criminal defence had never been successfully challenged in a 
sexual offence before. But we could not let that discourage us from doing all we could 
to achieve justice for a young woman who has been through such a traumatising 
                                                     
22 HANSARD, 15th Oct 2008-last update, Early Day Motion 463 sponsored by Harry Cohen. Available: 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm081015/debtext/81015-0003.htm> 
23 JAMIESON, A. (2008) Victim speaks out after man cleared of rape while sleepwalking. Daily Mail (Nov 
15th). 
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ordeal.”24 
She added 
 
“We hope this conviction sends out the message that sleepwalking can no longer be 
a safe defence in cases of rape.’25 
It was certainly not a “first”, and, of course, the traumatic nature of her ordeal is no 
indicator that the defendant was not sleepwalking. The underlying assumption in the 
police officer’s remark is that a dangerous new legal defence has now been 
successfully challenged in its entirety. Graham Buchanan for the Crown Prosecution 
Service stated  
‘Prosecutors have worked long and hard to make this happen, including securing 
evidence from the scene from the Portuguese authorities and identifying and 
assessing necessary medical experts to show that a defence of sleepwalking was not 
valid in this case.’26 
The sleepwalking defence had been challenged before; Dr Pressman, the expert 
witness involved, had agreed that another defendant, Brian Thomas, was asleep when 
he strangled his wife, and there had also been other convictions in sexsomnia cases. 
Pressman is well known for his robust rebuttals of the sleepwalking defence, especially 
where alcohol is involved. The quote carries the implication that the expert witness may 
have been chosen on the basis of this approach rather than his generic expertise. 
However, the CPS did respond and stated that a number of other professionals were 
                                                     
24 JENKINS, R. (2012). Rapist is jailed after expert challenges sleepwalking defence. Times (Mar 30th) 
News. 
25 DOLAN, A. (2012) Jail for rapist who said he was sleepwalking. Daily Mail (Mar 30th). 
26 FURNESS, H. (2012) Rapist jailed after "sleepwalking" claim rejected in legal first; A man has been 
jailed for raping a 17-year-old girl after his claim to have been sleepwalking was rejected by international 
experts in a landmark case. Telegraph (Mar 30th) News. 
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approached as potential expert witnesses, but apparently none could provide expert 
evidence for various reasons. 
 
4.4 The Media Discourse 
 
4.4.1 The literature on media reporting of crime shows consistently that violent and 
interpersonal crimes (which represent only a small proportion of offences reported to the 
police or prosecuted in court) are featured disproportionately in the media.27 There is 
also a focus on the unusually deviant. 28 Chibnall described eight professional 
imperatives of crime reporting: 
 Immediacy  
 Dramatization 
 Personalization 
 Simplification 
 Titillation 
 Conventionalism 
 Structured access 
 Novelty29 
Sleepwalking trials satisfy the imperative of novelty; they often provide titillation, 
                                                     
27 REINER, R. (2007) Media-made criminality: the representation of crime in the mass media. In 
MAGUIRE, M., MORGAN, R. and REINER, R. (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Criminology. 4th Ed. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 302-40. 
28 ERICSON, R., BARANEK, P. and CHAN, J. (1987) Visualising Deviance. Milton Keynes: Open 
University Press. 
29 CHIBNALL, S. (1977) Press Ideology: The Politics and Professionalism. Law and Order News: An 
Analysis of Crime Reporting in the British Press. London: Tavistock. 
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especially in cases of sexsomnia; and the media reports often employ dramatization, 
personalization (prominent use of quotes from victims), simplification (omission of 
salient corroborating facts) and conventionalism (‘the lawyers are at it again’). Thus we 
can see how the ‘backwards rule’ (or ‘inverted pyramid’) results in  
‘news, entertainment, and infotainment media [taking] the least common crime or 
justice event and make it the most common crime or justice image.’30 
There is little research on how the so-called “new media” (largely characterized by 
immediacy and lack of regulation) will affect the presentation and public perception of 
crime, but it seems likely to lead to lazy repetition of similar if not identical reports which 
will tend towards the superficial. Ray Surette comments that the increased immersion in 
the new media will mean that  
‘Directly experienced reality will lose its social pre-eminence to mediated 
knowledge.’31  
This may have considerable consequences for public faith in the criminal justice system. 
4.4.2 Specifically in parasomnia cases, the tone of media reports is frequently sceptical. 
The exception to this was the case of Brian Thomas, perhaps because it seemed so 
clear-cut and was a personal tragedy for the man involved. More generally, press 
reports imply that the jury was almost forced to acquit the defendant because he 
claimed to be sleepwalking. The press, particularly the tabloids, seem to subscribe to 
Packer’s Crime Control model of criminal process, which emphasizes the importance of 
safety, rather than the Due Process model, which stresses the need for the state to 
                                                     
30 SURETTE, R. (2011) Media and Crime and Justice in the Twenty-First Century. Media, Crime and 
Criminal Justice: Images, Realities, and Policies. 4th Ed. Wadworth: Cengage Learning. 
31 Surette (2011), see footnote 27. 
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prove to the criminal standard that the defendant was at fault.  
It is often stated or implied in the press reports that ‘anyone could claim to be 
sleepwalking and so get off’. In fact no sleep expert would consider supporting such a 
defence if the defendant did not have a clear history (established from family and 
friends) of sleepwalking, usually since childhood. In the cases considered in this study, 
no defendants were acquitted without a history of sleepwalking, although in some cases 
its importance was only appreciated only after the harm had occurred. There is even 
more press scepticism about cases of sexsomnia than there is in cases of homicidal 
somnambulism, possibly because the activity appears to the lay-person to be less 
consistent with sleepwalking. The more complex behaviour enacted during sexsomnia 
is consistent with the known science, but the circumstances in which many of these 
offences occur differ from the cases reported in the literature where proximity is 
essential – usually the victim is in bed with the sexsomniac.  
4.4.3 Further analyzing the contents of the press reports, the author examined the 
reports of trials resulting in verdicts of not guilty, not proven (a verdict available only in 
Scotland) or not guilty by reason of insanity. I also looked at the reporting of trials 
where, although the defendant was found guilty, the claim that the defendant had been 
sleepwalking at the time was believed (all drink driving cases). I have summarized the 
collective reporting of each trial rather than including all individual reports; otherwise the 
results would be skewed by the much greater number of reports about certain trials. 
I graded the reporting of trials as: 
- Prejudicial  33% (8/24)  
- Sceptical  25% (6/24) 
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- Balanced  29% (7/24) 
- Supportive  13% (3/24) 
This assessment is, of course, subjective but based on consideration of the following 
criteria: language used to describe the argument for sleepwalking; reporting of 
corroborating events and testimony; inclusion of expert testimony; inclusion of other 
sleepwalking cases, especially extreme ones; and inclusion of prejudicial quotes from 
the victim, relatives of the victim or lobbying bodies.  
Prejudicial reports were those that included quotes from lobbying groups or victims or 
their families that expressed disbelief at the verdict and other sceptical comments. 
Sceptical reports were those that relayed a sense that the jury had been bamboozled by 
the criminal justice system by words such as “after claiming” or included the more 
extreme sleepwalking trials reported in incredulous terms. Supportive reports 
emphasized the relevant supporting facts, expert testimony, lack of motive and/or 
personal tragedy for the accused. 
4.4.4 The reports often described acquittals in terms that suggested that juries had been 
swayed by a dubious defence, or by lawyers and unethical “experts” colluding to 
persuade ordinary people to forsake common sense. The defence was often described 
in terms such as “setting a ridiculous example”, “bizarre”, “ludicrous” or “beggared 
belief”. The following are a sample of quotes from press reports to illustrate particular 
themes: 
Quotes expressing disbelief: 
  “I despair with these people. It actually shows how simple these magistrates and 
judges are” - Mike Jobbins (Campaign Against Drink Driving [CADD]) on the Stephen 
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Hearn case.32 
  ‘Road safety campaigners yesterday said the decision to acquit the Solihull computer 
analyst "beggared belief" and set a dangerous precedent’ (Stephen Hearn case).33 
  “I find it deeply disturbing. As a society we seem to want to find any reason not to 
name something as rape” - Prof Liz Kelly, the director of Child and Women Abuse 
Studies at London Metropolitan University commenting on the James Bilton case.34 
“He didn’t appear to be asleep” – the victim in the Warren Kelly case.35 
  “We just feel totally numb by it all. I don't believe that he was sleepwalking. I don't 
know what was going through his head” - mother of the victim in the Ecott case.36  
  ‘An alarming number of terrible acts, then, have been committed, we are told, by 
individuals who are in this strange trance-like state which absolves them of any 
responsibility for their actions. A viewpoint which, the grieving families of the victims 
might feel, is just a little too convenient.’ (Ecott case).37 
Quotes that might imply that the jury had little choice because of the claims of 
sleepwalking: 
  ‘An alleged sex attacker who claimed he must have been sleepwalking if he molested 
his young babysitter has been cleared’ (Iain Tarkenter trial).38 
‘A man accused of raping a woman was yesterday cleared by a jury after claiming he 
                                                     
32 EVENING TIMES. (2003) Sleepwalker escapes drink-drive charges. Evening Times, (Feb 28th) 3. 
33 DAILY STAR. (2003) Snoozer Road Rage. Daily Star (Mar 1st) News. 
34 STOKES, P. (2005) Sleepwalker cleared of three rapes. Daily Telegraph (Dec 20th). 
35 SUN. (2009) Sleeping groper in the clear. Sun (Mar 4th) News, 30. 
36 SALKELD, L. (2007) 'Sexsomniac' RAF man sobs as he is cleared of raping girl in his sleep. Daily Mail 
(Sep 25th). 
37 CLARKE, N. (2007) Can you be a killer in your sleep? Daily Mail (Aug 9th). 
38 EVENING CHRONICLE. (2000) Sleepy man is cleared of attack. Evening Chronicle (Oct 4th) Local 
News, 2. 
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suffered from sleepwalking’ (James Bilton case).39  
  ‘An RAF man was yesterday cleared of raping an underage girl after claiming he had 
been sleepwalking’ (Kenneth Ecott case).40 
Quotes expressing concerns about public safety: 
  “What worries and concerns me is that this verdict has given him a new lease of life 
to go and do it again to somebody else” - victim’s mother in the Ecott case.41 
  “There’s no way he’s an appropriate person to be teaching kids. Whether he did it in 
his sleep or not seems irrelevant to me. He still admitted what he did in open court” - 
mother of child at the school where Allan Kellman worked.42  
  ‘the reality is that the 33-year-old financial advisor is a convicted drunk driver who 
continues to pose a threat to himself and unsuspecting road users’ (Graham 
Finegan’s appeal).43 
Quotes expressing policy concerns about the availability of the sleepwalking defence:  
   “It may well be other people accused of serious crime will try and avail themselves of 
this defence.” DCI Durkin in the Lowe case.44 
  ‘You can go into court and say: “Sorry I did that, I was sleepwalking.” Mike Jobbins, 
chairman of CADD in the Hearn case.’45 
  "This is setting a ridiculous example and others will try it on now." Jack Sparrow, 
                                                     
39 GIBB, F. (2005) Rape trial jury accepts defence of sleepwalking. Times (Dec 20th) News. 
40 SMITH, R. (2007) Not a rapist.. a sexsomniac; Sleepwalker cleared of attack at party. The Mirror (Aug 
5th) News,18. 
41 Salkeld (2007), see footnote 33. 
42 TURNER, K. (2002) Sex scandal sir is back at school; Staff warn of walkout pounds 50,000 to stay 
home gulf trauma defence. Daily Record (Jun 7th) News,7. 
43 MADELEY, G. (2000) This man has a rare sleepwalking disorder. When he drinks he goes into a trance 
and gets behind the wheel of his car. Last week appeal judges gave him his licence back. Is it a licence to 
kill? Daily Mail (Apr 1st). 
44 PERRONE, J. (2005) Sleepwalker cleared of murdering father. Guardian (Mar 19th), 6. 
45 Evening Times (2003), see footnote 29 .  
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CADD in the Bough case.46 
  ‘The ruling could have far reaching implications for future assault cases’(Darren 
Greenwood trial).47 
  ‘Campaigners last night warned that the not proven verdict handed down to James 
Thomas could open the floodgates for similar defences in future.’48 
Quotes critical of the judiciary: 
  “It is ludicrous - the courts do not take drinking and driving seriously. To them it is 
a motoring offence and to us at CADD it is a criminal offence.” Mike Jobbins, 
chairman of CADD in the Hearn case.49 
  “By his own admission he could have killed himself or someone else. Yet, three 
appeal court judges have controversially allowed Finegan to stay on the road” 
(Graham Finegan’s appeal).50 
Some of these quotations indicate that the media discourse is more about the criminal 
justice system in general, rather than the sleepwalking ‘defence’. The sleepwalking 
defence is clearly uncommon, but the discourse is about a supposedly dysfunctional 
criminal justice system which defies common sense. A headline from a Daily Mail article 
summed up the attitude of some sections of the press:  
‘The sexsomnia defence finally fails: Delivery driver jailed for sexual assault (even 
though he claims to have been asleep)’.51 
                                                     
46 GARDNER, A. (2004) Drink driving? No.. I was sleepwalking; Court let-off for motorist. Sunday Mirror 
(Oct 3rd) Features, 10. 
47 DAILY TELEGRAPH (2010) 'Sexsomniac' cleared by jury. Daily Telegraph (October 29th) News, 2. 
48 ROBERTSON, G. and ROSE, G. (2011) Sleepwalker is cleared of raping teenage girl. The Scotsman 
(Jan 15th). 
49 Evening Times (2003), see footnote 29. 
50 Madeley (2000), see footnote 40. 
51 REYNOLDS, E. (2012) The sexsomnia defence finally fails: Delivery driver jailed for sexual assault 
 
125 
 
 
 
However, the reporting of the Machin case illustrates the ambivalence of the media 
about sexsomnia.52  
4.4.5 It would be a mistake, however, to consider the media in an entirely negative way. 
It was noticeable that the local press tended to have superior coverage of trials and 
more balanced reporting. For example, the Yorkshire Post report on the James Bilton 
trial included his personal and family history of sleepwalking and the features of the 
episode that were consistent with sleepwalking and sexsomnia.53 By contrast, the Mirror 
report contained none of these details.54 To some extent this may reflect the use by 
local newspapers of specialist court reporters that learn their trade over a period of time. 
National media coverage of crime is clearly unrepresentative of social reality and not 
just because sections of the media have a particular political agenda. This discourse 
may involve exposing injustice and promoting law reform. The discourse in other cases 
resembles that of Dershowitz’s polemic about criminal defences in the USA, The Abuse 
Excuse55 –– a preoccupation with expert evidence being perverted to defeat the ends of 
justice. The famous example is the “Twinkie Defense” which entered the public 
consciousness56 and indeed legal mythology as the archetypal exploitation of junk 
science by unethical lawyers who claimed that over-consumption of Twinkies made Dan 
                                                                                                                                                                           
(even though he claims to have been asleep). Daily Mail (Apr 21th) News; notably contradicts their 
assertion about the Thompson case being the first time the sleepwalking defence had been rebutted. 
52 REES, G. and RUMBOLD, J.M.M. (2014) ‘His bizarre defence won the backing of an expert’: Ambiguity 
in the media reporting of sexsomnia defences, Presentation at the Socio-Legal Studies Association 
conference, Apr 10th, 2014.  
53 HEMMINGS, J. (2005) Jury clears man of raping woman friend after 'sleepwalking' defence. Yorkshire 
Post (Dec 20th). 
54 KEY, I. (2005) Jury clear sleepwalk 'rape' man. Mirror (Dec 20th) News, 11. 
55 DERSHOWITZ, A.M. (1994) The Abuse Excuse. New York: Time Warner. 
56 It receives a mention in Buffy the Vampire Slayer (Out of Mind, Out of Sight) and the X-Files (Sein Und 
Zeit). 
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White kill Harvey Milk.57 The comments about believability reflect the tendency from 
some areas of the press to appeal to the common sense of the public, although 
generally there was deference to medical experts.58 This ignores the cardinal feature of 
parasomnia cases, which is that the condition and behaviour seen is far outside the 
experience of the ordinary person.  
Many of the press reports focussed on the amount of alcohol consumed by the 
defendant, and on eyewitness accounts that suggested that the defendant did not 
appear to be sleepwalking. This position is supported by some forensic sleep experts 
e.g. Pressman and colleagues who argue that those claiming the sleepwalking defence 
who have drunk large amounts of alcohol would have no defence otherwise and 
therefore that  
‘[c]laims of alcohol-induced parasomnias presented solely to circumvent the laws of 
voluntary intoxication should be understood for what they are and rejected’.59  
The effect of media reporting on perceptions of the sleepwalking defence, especially the 
sexsomnia defence, can be seen in the complaint by Stephen Davies (see above) who 
tried to distance himself from the use of the sexsomnia defence – despite arguing it in 
court. 
 
                                                     
57 POGASH, C. (2003) 2003-last update, Myth of the 'Twinkie defense' / The verdict in the Dan White 
case wasn't based on his ingestion of junk food. Available: http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/Myth-of-
the-Twinkie-defense-The-verdict-in-2511152.php. In fact, Twinkies were never mentioned specifically. 
The consumption of junk food was suggested as an effect of Dan White’s disturbed mental state, not a 
cause of it. 
58 REES, G. and RUMBOLD, J.M.M. (2014) ‘His bizarre defence won the backing of an expert’: Ambiguity 
in the media reporting of sexsomnia defences, Presentation at the Socio-Legal Studies Association 
conference, Apr 10th, 2014 2014. 
59 PRESSMAN, M., MAHOWALD, M.W., SCHENCK, C.H., and CRAMER BORNEMANN M. (2007) 
Alcohol-induced sleepwalking or confusional arousal as a defense to criminal behavior: a review of 
scientific evidence, methods and forensic considerations. Journal of Sleep Research, 16, pp. 198-212. 
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4.5 Conclusion: 
 
The conclusions from this research can only be tentative, given that press reports are 
an incomplete and unreliable record of sleepwalking trials. It also has to be noted this 
study looked at post-verdict reporting only (although most of the press stories were 
post-verdict, due to the shortage of court reporters). This explains the use of critical 
quotes from relatives or other parties to avoid liability for defamation when the verdict 
was not guilty (also, victim impact statements are a source of easy copy). The 
considerable male preponderance in reported press cases is consistent with the 
medico-legal literature. It was notable the number of drink driving offences that were 
reported. It might be expected that strict liability offences might attract more use of the 
defence of automatism, and drink driving is one of the more serious strict liability 
motoring offences. In these cases, even when the sleepwalking was accepted by the 
court, it did not normally result in acquittal (although it did affect the sentencing).  
 There were a few cases where the sleepwalking defence was initially claimed by the 
defence but not argued in court after sleepwalking experts found no support for it. The 
apparent over-representation of defendants who were serving, or had previously 
served, with the armed forces may merit further research to ascertain the reasons for 
this. PTSD may play a part in this association. PTSD is associated with RBD, and RBD 
may also be misdiagnosed as PTSD.60  
The newspapers are generally sceptical of the sleepwalking defence, which is arguably 
                                                     
60 HUSAIN, A.M., MILLER, P.P. and CARWILE, S.T. (2001) REM sleep behavior disorder: Potential 
relationship to post-traumatic stress disorder. Journal of Clinical Neurophysiology, 18, pp. 148-57. 
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a valid position to take in an opinion piece, although it should not get in the way of fair 
and accurate reporting of ongoing criminal trials. They were most critical when the 
accused had consumed substantial amounts of alcohol, which is not unreasonable 
given the policy issues and the consensus among forensic sleep experts that these 
cases are problematic. However, when reporting took a highly critical tone, this was 
often at the expense of including important corroborating features and comment by 
sleep experts. Although not directly disputing the verdict in acquittals, quotes from 
victims, relatives and lobby groups were sometimes provided to imply that the claims of 
the defendants were beyond belief. Although there is deference to medical experts and 
therefore ambivalence about the defence as a whole, the general discourse in the 
reports considered in this chapter was largely one of how defence lawyers can 
hoodwink juries and so foil justice; in effect that the sleepwalking defence is just another 
“Twinkie defence” - proposed by desperate lawyers, backed up by junk science and 
swallowed by bewildered or gullible jurors. 
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Chapter 5: Mental Condition Defences and Parasomnias 
 
History of the Mental Condition Defences of Insanity and Automatism  
 
 
5.1 Insanity Defence 
 
There are several reasons forwarded for the legal status of insanity. Historically, the 
insane were considered cursed by the gods and adding to their divine punishment was 
seen to be unjust (satis furore ipso punitur – literally “punished sufficiently by 
madness”). Or the insane lacked ‘discretion’; that is, they did not fully understand the 
consequences of their actions (a broader definition than many later insanity tests). Or 
the insane lack mens rea (actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea – “the act does not 
make [a person] guilty unless the mind should be guilty”). In more modern times, the 
specific insanity defence is seen by some jurists as a status excuse or a sui generis, 
that relates not to “what the actor did or believed, but to what kind of person he is”. This 
entails that the insanity defence is much more than a simple denial of mens rea (see re 
insanity defence and strict liability offences).  As Moore puts it 
‘the "unofficial" version of the insanity test-the test as actually applied by psychiatrists 
and jurors-restricts the excuse of legal insanity to those who are so lacking in 
rationality that they are popularly considered crazy. This is because those 
psychiatrists and jurors have glimpsed a moral truth: the very status of being crazy 
precludes responsibility.’1 
                                                     
1 MOORE, M.S. (1985) Causation and the Excuses. California Law Review, 73(4), pp. 1091-1149. 
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Insanity both deprives the actor of his pre-morbid character and leaves him unable to 
make free choices2. He is no longer a moral agent nor susceptible to deterrence. 
 
5.2 Prior to the 16th Century 
 
It has been appreciated from very early times that some people cannot be held 
responsible for their actions. The Bible contains the story of David feigning insanity to 
avoid the attentions of Achish, king of Gat3, and in Plato’s Laws insanity was 
exculpatory.  Similarly the notion that wicked intent (or dole as it is called in Scottish 
law) was required for full criminal responsibility was alluded to in the Code of 
Hammurabi, itself based on Sumerian antecedents. Justinian’s Digest (6th century) is 
the earliest context in which insanity is considered an excuse.4 The first specific mention 
of an insanity defence is in Mohammedan law, c. 622 AD.5  
Generally only those who were clearly insane to the layman’s eye were excused – the 
‘wild beast’ (in the sense of a dumb animal, lacking rationality - often understood as 
‘wild’ in the sense of raging) of Bracton or the simpleton with the moral understanding of 
a child under 14. A child under 12 or 14 (depending on the century) lacked ‘discretion’ 
(see above), although children over 7 (the age of first communion and the end of 
infancy in Roman law) were deemed to know right from wrong and could consequently 
                                                     
2It can be argued that the defendant with an arrest of mental development never loses the status excuse 
pertaining to childhood of doli incapax. 
3 1 Samuel 21:12-14 
4 WALKER, N. (1985) The Insanity Defence Before 1800. Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, 477(1), pp. 25-30. 
5 DEARMAN, H. (1961) ‘Criminal Responsibility and Insanity Tests: A Psychiatrist Looks at Three Cases’ 
47(8): 1388-98. Virginia Law Review, 47(8), pp. 1388-98. 
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be put on trial. Walker suggests therefore that insanity in the early second millennium 
was defined as not knowing the nature of one’s acts, rather than the later cruder notion 
of not knowing right from wrong. In modern times, it is also generally the first limb of the 
McNaughtan Rules that a defendant relies on - that he did not “know the nature and 
quality of the act he was doing” - rather than the second limb, that “he did not know he 
was doing what was wrong”.  
 In pre-Norman England the insane person’s relatives (or friends) would pay 
compensation for his crimes, even homicide6 (this option was available to all under the 
principle of ‘buy off the spear or bear it’). By the eleventh century certain wrongs could 
not be atoned for by compensation, but were ‘botless’ and punishable by death and the 
forfeiture of property. This was the first emergence of a separate criminal law. As a 
consequence of having emerged from civil law, these early crimes were strict liability.  
However, the Church had great influence on the law, and promoted the importance of 
mens rea.  The Church was involved in the process of trial by ordeal, and it may be that 
the insane were spared trial by ordeal. The tenth-century laws of Aethelred and Cnut 
emphasized leniency (although not exemption) for those committing misdeeds 
involuntarily or unintentionally. Interestingly, the ‘Laws of Henry the First’ mention a 
requirement of relatives of the insane not just to pay to compensation but to keep him 
from causing further harm (sometimes the insane were put in the care of the church). 
This is the first recorded measure for social control of the criminally insane in England. 
The lack of detailed comment in these early documents such as Glanville’s On the Laws 
                                                     
6 THORPE, B. (1840) Ancient Laws and Institutes of England. London. 
132 
 
 
 
and Customs of the Kingdom of England written in the twelfth-century7 may reflect on 
an informal mechanism where the priests or sheriffs made arrangements for the safety 
of the community – for example the case of Richard of Cheddestan in 1270 who was 
confined by the Sheriff in prison. The proper procedure was for the jury to decide on 
insanity and the King would decide on disposal, as pronounced in 1212 – 
‘The King must be consulted about an idiot who is in the prison because in his 
witlessness he confessed that he is a thief, although in fact he is not to blame.’ 
Throughout the 13th century this more formal mechanism was used increasingly often, 
in parallel with the establishment of trial by jury. The estates of the insane were not 
forfeited but managed on their behalf by the Crown. Somewhere between the 13th 
century and the 16th century it became the regular practice for the insane to be 
acquitted rather requiring the royal pardon. The defence of insanity appears to have 
only been applied to capital cases, although of course many crimes were so punishable. 
There was no formed concept of unfitness to stand trial (although some defendants had 
not ‘recovered their senses’ sufficiently to be tried),8 only the inability to plead on the 
basis of being deaf and/or mute.   
 
5.3 Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries 
 
The first clear case of an acquittal on grounds of insanity is in 1505 when a man 
accused of the murder of an infant was found to be of unsound mind at the time of the 
                                                     
7 DE GLANVILLE, R. (1812) Treatise on the laws and customs of the Kingdom of England. London. 
8 WALKER, N. (1968) Crime and Insanity in England Volume One: The Historical Perspective. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, at pp 219-20. 
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murder, and thus freed.9 It was recognized by the eminent jurists Coke and Hale that 
lunatics were capable of periods of lucidity, a fact also reflected in the thirteenth-century 
Statute of the King’s Prerogative. Coke and Hale also agreed that an insane person was 
unfit for trial (but they ought to be ‘absolutely mad’).10 It was also recognized that ‘partial 
insanity’, while not excusing, could be a mitigating factor. Hale also recognized the 
disorder of dementia affectata, or ‘induced witlessness’, mental states induced by drink 
or drugs. This was not an excuse to a crime unless induced by a negligent physician or 
caused by “the contrivance of his enemies” (c.f. R v Kingston), or where heavy drinking 
had caused ‘an habitual or fixed phrenzy’ (possibly the chronic neurological sequelae of 
chronic alcohol abuse such as alcoholic encephalopathy and Wernicke’s 
encephalopathy).  
By the sixteenth century a crude test was used to determine whether or not a person 
was an idiot,11 severe sub-normality being a reason for acquittal as per the trial in 1685 
of Francis Tims at the Old Bailey for theft.  
 
5.4 Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries 
 
The statutory special verdict was introduced at the very end of the 18th century as a 
reaction to the acquittal of Hadfield for attempting to kill King George III. This replaced 
the common law insanity defence (which results in a plain acquittal) for trial by 
                                                     
9 Walker (1968), see footnote 8 at page 26. 
10 Walker(1968), see footnote 8 at pp. 221-22. 
11 Walker (1968) see footnote 8: ‘He who shall be said to be a Sot and Idiot from birth is such a person 
who cannot account or number twenty-pence, nor can tell his Father or Mother, not how old he is &c so 
as it may appear that he hath no understanding of Reason what shall be his Profit or what for his Loss.”” 
(page 36) This test applied more to the management of his property. 
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indictment only. Thus when the insanity defence is successful in the magistrates’ court, 
there are no disposal options available. The Criminal Lunatics Act 1800 had only one 
disposal option – detention at His or Her Majesty’s pleasure.  
Hadfield was a veteran of the First War of the Coalition, and had been part of the 
bodyguard of the Duke of York at the battle of Lincelles, where he received a serious 
head wound from a sabre. It was clear that prior to the injury he had been a loyal and 
brave subject. It was likely that the visible head injury (counsel invited the jury “to 
inspect the membranes of the brain itself”) and his previous loyal service helped 
persuade the jury that this behaviour was contrary to his pre-morbid character. This was 
the first case where the concept of partial insanity was accepted as the basis of an 
acquittal. Hadfield’s counsel, Erskine, argued that delusion “unaccompanied by frenzy 
or raving madness [was] the true character of insanity”. Hadfield’s delusion was that he 
must die to save the world, but he could not die by his own hand. Thus he contrived to 
be killed in the course of an assassination attempt.12  
It is no coincidence that many of the early insanity acquittals involved charges of 
treason. It meant the accused had a mandatory 15 days before trial (Bellingham, whose 
victim was the Prime Minister, was hanged the same day) and the right to counsel.13 It 
has been speculated that the insanity defence was a way of discrediting assassins. 
Moran argues persuasively that the Chartist Daniel McNaughtan, who tried and failed to 
assassinate Robert Peel, far from being delusional, had a genuine and well-founded 
                                                     
12 MORAN, R. (1985) The Origin of Insanity as a Special Verdict: The Trial for Treason of James Hadfield 
(1800). Law & Society Review, 19, pp. 487-519. 
13 O’REILLY-FLEMING, T. (1992) From beasts to bedlam: Hadfield, the Regency crisis,M’Naghten and 
the ‘mad’ business in Britain, 1788–1843. Journal of Psychiatry and Law, 20, pp. 167-90, at p.169. 
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fear of Tory spies and was motivated by politics rather than psychosis.14 It is also the 
case that McNaughtan arguably fails to satisfy the McNaughtan Rules (nor does 
Hadfield). 
Prime Minister Gladstone stated that the removal of the threat of punishment for the 
insane was  
‘an inducement...to morbid minds for the commission of crime by an apparent 
declaration of innocence in the teeth of the facts.’15  
It was considered by many (and most influentially perhaps Queen Victoria) that the 
insane could still be deterred by the threat of punishment, and so the Trial of Lunatics 
Act 1883 replaced the special verdict of ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’ with ‘guilty of 
the act but insane at the time’ (reminiscent of the verdict in some US states of ‘guilty but 
mentally ill’). The previous wording was reinstated by the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) 
Act 1964, which still applies today. 
 
5.5 Automatism 
 
Automatism has several different definitions16. Medical automatisms are stereotyped, 
non-purposeful and repetitive behaviours, occurring during psychomotor seizures. They 
are most commonly oral (e.g. lip smacking or chewing) or manual (e.g. patting or 
fumbling). These behaviours would be unlikely to cause any difficulties for the court. 
                                                     
14 MORAN, R. (1981) Knowing Right from Wrong: The Insanity Defence of Daniel McNaughtan. New 
York: The Free Press. 
15 EIGEN, J. (2007) An Inducement to Morbid Minds. In: DUBBER, MD & FARMER, L (ed) Modern 
Histories of Crime and Punishment. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
16In this thesis, automatism refers to non-insane automatism, unless otherwise stated. Insane automatism 
is referred to simply as insanity. 
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Legal automatism, however, is defined as either total loss of voluntary control (non-
insane) or by the MacNaughtan Rules (insane), but there are a number of different 
formulations (see below). Fenwick defined medico-legal automatism as follows: 
‘An automatism is an involuntary piece of behaviour over which an individual has no 
control. The behaviour is usually inappropriate to the circumstances, and may be out 
of character for the individual. It can be complex, co-ordinated and apparently 
purposeful and directed, though lacking in judgment. Afterwards the individual may 
have no recollection or only a partial and confused memory for his actions. In organic 
automatisms there must be some disturbance of brain function sufficient to give rise 
to the above features.’17 
Yet another way to define medico-legal automatism would be mental absence, or the 
“missing defendant” as Eigen puts it - a defendant whose incapacity is not due to a 
partial delusion affecting their perception of their actions, but due to a partial or total lack 
of consciousness resulting in their actions being both unintentional and involuntary. In 
fact, non-common law jurisdictions often use the term “unconsciousness” to describe 
these states in their criminal codes. 
5.5.1 History 
Prior to 1800, the defendant might as well argue temporary insanity as “automatism” 
(the term was not in use at that time), since the common law insanity defence18 
available resulted in a plain acquittal. Eigen quotes John Hunter describing a patient 
who appeared to “want [a] connection between the mind and the body”. The description 
                                                     
17 FENWICK, P. (1987) Somnambulism and the Law: A Review. Behavioral Science and the Law, 5(3), p. 
343-57. 
18 Still applicable in the magistrates’ courts (see 5.9) 
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sounds more like a dissociative episode.19 In 1827 one defendant stated that 
‘My mind was overcome in a moment … and of my being at the time I did so 
misconduct myself in a way of total absence of thought, never contemplating such a 
crime.’20 
Another defendant stated  
‘It was like a dream to me, when I saw the deed was done it struck me with terror 
instantly.’21 
Eigen discusses how the Victorian jurors might have responded to the ‘missing 
defendant’, who did not fit the lay understanding of insanity. He describes the notion of 
crimes committed whilst sleepwalking or under hypnotic suggestion as being committed 
by another self, in a parallel with multiple personality disorder (MPD, also known as 
Dissociative Identity Disorder or DID). MPD/DID has created novel problems for the 
criminal justice system in the USA at least (discussed further at 6.2.2). Examples of 
crimes committed in a state of automatism include the sleep-related cases previously 
mentioned of Esther Griggs and Simon Fraser, but also the case of Elizabeth Carr who 
was found “not guilty on the grounds of unconsciousness” in 1857 after she cut her 
daughter’s hand off during an episode of “epileptic vertigo”22. She apparently mistook 
her daughter’s arm for a loaf of bread during an episode that sounds like dissociation or 
a complex partial seizure. 
5.5.2 As Windeyer J. commented in R v Ryan, 
                                                     
19 EIGEN, J.P. (1995) Witnessing Insanity: Madness and Mad-Doctors in the English Court. Yale 
University Press, at p.167. 
20 Eigen (1995), see footnote 19 at p.170. 
21 Eigen (1995, see footnote 19 at p.173. 
22Epileptic vertigo and the related entity larval epilepsy, neither of which are recognized now, manifested 
themselves in occasional bouts of violence. Epileptic vertigo or vertige epileptique includes complex 
partial seizures in Herpin’s classification (Eadie 2002). 
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‘That an act is only punishable as a crime when it is the voluntary act of the accused 
is a statement satisfying in its simplicity. But what does it mean? What is a voluntary 
act? The answer is far from simple, partly because of the ambiguities of the word 
‘voluntary’ and its supposed synonyms, partly because of imprecise, but inveterate, 
distinctions which have long dominated men’s ideas concerning the working of the 
human mind.’23 
There have been numerous attempts to define automatism in the case law, which attest 
to the difficulties: 
 ‘total destruction of voluntary control’ (Lord Taylor CJ in Attorney-General’s 
Reference (No2 of 1992)); 24 
 “acting involuntarily in the sense that his actions are independent of his will, and 
therefore not subject to any conscious control” (Tompkins J in R v Campbell );25  
 “an act which is done by the muscles without any control by the mind such as a 
spasm, a reflex action or a convulsion; or an act done by a person who is not 
conscious of what he is doing such as an act done whilst suffering from 
concussion or whilst sleepwalking” (Lord Denning in Bratty v. Attorney General 
for Northern Ireland);26  
 “the mind does not go with what is being done” (Viscount Kilmuir L.C. in Bratty v. 
Attorney General for Northern Ireland); 
                                                     
23 Ryan v R (1966-7) 121 Crim LR 205 at para 18 
24 [1994] QB 91 
25 (1997) 15 CRNZ 138 
26 [1963] AC 386 
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 “all the deliberative functions of the mind must be absent” (North P. in R v Burr).27  
 
As it can be seen, all these descriptions vary – in particular the last two seem to 
describe something far more like unconsciousness than involuntariness. They all tend to 
suffer from the use of terms like ‘will’ and ‘voluntary’, which are not defined satisfactorily 
in the law. The courts assume that the juror knows what these terms means, and so 
leave the issue to the realm of folk psychology. This assumption seems dubious, given 
the difficulties lawyers have in defining what they mean. As Windeyer J states in Timbu 
Kolian v R,  
‘one of the difficulties comes from the need to relate will to acts, and to define 
precisely the distinction, commonly accepted by lawyers, between intention and 
volition. These words are used glibly; and often with little definition of the sense in 
which they are used’.28  
The terms ‘voluntary’, ‘will’ and ‘act’ are largely defined with respect to each other - a 
‘willed act’ is voluntary, an act requires ‘will’, a ‘voluntary’ act is willed. This is perhaps 
one area where the recommendations of the Law Commission would (if adopted) bring 
some much needed clarity (see Chapter 9), as the proposed new mental condition 
defence does not rely on this distinction. 
5.5.3 The term ‘automatism’ was first used by lawyers in the case of Harrison-Owen.29 
Automatism has different meanings in medicine (stereotyped non-purposeful behaviour 
occurring during psychomotor seizures) and psychology (see 6.3.2) than it does in law. 
                                                     
27 [1969] NZLR 736 (CA) 
28 (1968) 119 Crim LR 47 at p.62 
29 (1951) 35 Cr App R 108 
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The basis of the legal defence of automatism is the requirement in the common law for 
a voluntary act. The decision in Woolmington v DPP30 was that the prosecution has the 
burden of proof for all the elements of the offence (except where reverse burdens are 
required by statute). It was also confirmed in Woolmington that all the common law 
defences except insanity required only an evidential burden to be satisfied by the 
defence31, but thereafter the burden is on the prosecution to disprove it beyond 
reasonable doubt. This exception is considered by some to be an historic anomaly.32 
The comprehensive nature of the automatism defence and burden of proof on the 
prosecution quickly led to limitations on the defence. In the important case of Hill v 
Baxter33  it was established that there was an evidential burden which must be 
discharged by the defence before the issue of automatism could be put to the jury. If 
there was no such evidence then the judge should tell the jury to ignore the defence. 
This means that medical evidence is nearly always required to get the automatism 
defence off the ground.34 Once the evidential burden has been satisfied, the burden of 
proof in the automatism defence is on the prosecution. The prosecution must prove that 
there was a voluntary act that satisfied the actus reus requirement for the offence. This 
is still the position today. 
The external factor doctrine also emerged in the case law (see below) in a policy-based 
attempt to limit plain acquittals to cases where there are only minimal public safety 
concerns. Hughes LJ states  
                                                     
30 [1935] A.C. 462 
31 This applies to self-defence, duress and the now obsolete defence of provocation. 
32 JONES, T. (1995) Insanity, automatism, and the burden of proof on the accused. Law Quarterly 
Review, 111, pp. 475-516. 
33 [1958] 1 QB 277 
34 The exception being an episode of sneezing (Woolley [1998] C.L.Y. 914) 
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‘It is well known that the distinction drawn in Quick between external factors inducing 
a condition of the mind and internal factors which can properly be described as a 
disease can give rise to apparently strange results at the margin.’35  
Automatism was described by Lawton LJ in Quick as a  
‘quagmire…seldom entered nowadays save by those in desperate need of some kind 
of a defence.’36 
Table 1 summarizes some of the differences between the automatism and insanity 
defences: 
Type of 
automatism 
Non-insane Insane 
Burden of proof Prosecution* Defence 
Standard of 
proof 
Beyond reasonable 
doubt 
On balance of probabilities 
Definition Total loss of voluntary 
control 
M’Naghten Rules‡ 
Verdict Not guilty Not guilty by reason of 
insanity 
Disposal Free without 
restrictions 
Can be supervised or 
detained in hospital 
*Once the evidential burden has been satisfied 
‡See 9.5.2 for further discussion about the definition of insane automatism 
 
Table 1 Differences between automatism and insanity/insane automatism 
 
 
                                                     
35 R v Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 223 
36 R v Quick [1973] QB 910 
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5.6 Limits to the Automatism Defence 
 
The limits to the defence of automatism are: 
 An ‘internal’ cause (which would lead to a finding of insanity instead) 
 Voluntary intoxication with drink or drugs 
 Prior fault 
5.6.1 An internal cause 
The internal/external dichotomy doctrine has strong roots in policy, and emerged with 
the cases of Charlson and Kemp37.  Charlson attacked his son, hitting him over the 
head with a mallet and throwing him out of the window. This behaviour was attributed to 
a brain tumour.38 The defence did not raise the defence of insanity, and he was 
acquitted by the jury. Kemp hit his wife over the head with a hammer. He suffered 
arteriosclerosis affecting the brain, and Devlin J, as he then was directed the jury that 
this must be considered a ‘disease of the mind’; the verdict of guilty but insane was 
returned (both cases were decided at the court of first instance). Bratty confirmed that 
Kemp was the correct decision.   
In Quick it was asserted that “disease of mind” applied to any internal cause, and thus 
individuals suffering epilepsy (Sullivan) and sleepwalking (Burgess) could not rely on 
the automatism defence, but must instead rely on the insanity defence39. The courts 
took the view that any internal cause might be liable to recur, and so poses a question 
of public safety. However, the opposite is not always true.  A blow to the head is likely to 
                                                     
37 R v Charlson [1955] 1 All ER 859; R v Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399 
38 The evidence for this was quite tenuous. 
39 R v Sullivan [1983] 3 WLR 123; R v Burgess [1991] 2 WLR 1206 
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be a one-off occurrence, but some other external causes (as defined in the case law) 
are quite likely to recur. The best example of this is hypoglycaemia40 produced by 
insulin administration, since most diabetics who take insulin need to take it for the rest 
of their life. This is ironic given that one of the motives behind distinguishing external 
causes was the desire not to detain diabetics in special hospitals. As Lawton L.J. 
commented in Quick 
‘No mental hospital would admit a diabetic merely because he had a low blood sugar 
reaction; and common sense is affronted by the prospect of a diabetic being sent to 
such a hospital, when in most cases the disordered mental condition can be rectified 
quickly by pushing a lump of sugar or a teaspoonful of glucose into the patient's 
mouth.41 
However, he acknowledged that this argument had its limitations, and felt that if the 
condition was a “disease of the mind”, it should still be considered insanity - regardless 
of whether the treatment required for the condition was physical or psychiatric, and 
regardless of how transitory the condition was: 
‘If an accused is shown to have done a criminal act while suffering from a "defect of 
reason from disease of the mind," it matters not whether the condition of the mind is 
curable or incurable, transitory or permanent: see per Devlin J. in Reg. v. Kemp 
[1957] 1 Q.B. 399, 407. If the condition is transitory, the Secretary of State may have 
a difficult problem of disposal; but what happens to those found not guilty by reason 
of insanity is not a matter for the courts.’ (p 918) 
                                                     
40 Hypoglycaemia is a state of low blood sugar, which when severe causes impaired consciousness. 
41 R v Quick [1973] QB 910 at p918. Although Quick might have succeeded in arguing automatism, his 
prior fault due to not eating properly, and drinking alcohol, might have persuaded the jury to convict 
nonetheless. 
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This comment demonstrates that his Lordship was explicitly rejecting continuing 
dangerousness as the deciding criterion between non-insane and insane automatism. 
Furthermore, he is contradicting his own inference that the sensible means of disposal 
should dictate the classification of a disorder. The crucial factor was the distinction 
between internal and external causes, because a 
‘malfunctioning of the mind of transitory effect caused by the application to the body 
of some external factor such as violence, drugs, including anaesthetics, alcohol and 
hypnotic influences cannot fairly be said to be due to disease.’ (p 922) 
This opinion presaged the decisions that epilepsy and sleepwalking are insane 
automatisms in Sullivan and Burgess respectively. Similarly hypoglycaemia due to an 
insulinoma would be an insane automatism. 
There are a number of other ways of assessing the need for continuing treatment and 
monitoring to protect the public. In Bratty Lord Denning commented that  
‘It seems to me that any mental disorder which has manifested itself in violence and 
is prone to recur is a disease of the mind. At any rate it is the sort of disease for 
which a person should be detained in hospital rather than be given an unqualified 
acquittal.’42 
This was an excellent formulation in this author’s opinion (bar the inclusion of ‘mental’ 
rather than ‘medical’), but it was disavowed in Quick by Lawton LJ for the reasons given 
above. The Canadian approach is to assess the condition in the round, as La Forest J 
states in Parks after citing Martin JA in Rabey with approval  
‘The internal cause approach has been criticized as an unfounded development of 
                                                     
42 Bratty v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386 at p412. 
145 
 
 
 
the law, and for the odd results the external/internal dichotomy can produce; see 
Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd ed. 1983), at pp. 671-76; Stuart, Canadian 
Criminal Law (2nd ed. 1987), at pp. 92-94; Colvin, supra, at p. 291.  These criticisms 
have particular validity if the internal cause theory is held out as the definitive answer 
to the disease of the mind inquiry.  However, it is apparent from the cases that the 
theory is really meant to be used only as an analytical tool, and not as an all-
encompassing methodology.  As Watt J. commented in his reasons in support of his 
charge to the jury in this case, the dichotomy "constitutes a general, but not an 
unremitting or universal, classificatory scheme for ‘disease of the mind'".43  
There are particular objections to characterizing everyday events as “external causes”. 
Take the example of a defendant sleeping with his usual bed partner, where their 
proximity triggers unwanted sexual activity. Characterizing this as an external cause is 
problematic, given the safety issues. A condition that is triggered so easily should be 
considered an “internal cause” (see 3.4.6). The search for an external cause, no matter 
how mundane or tenuous, can represent an attempt to divert the jury away from the 
special verdict.  
5.6.2 Voluntary intoxication with drink or drugs 
For policy reasons, voluntary intoxication with drink or drugs is not normally a defence - 
although it can in extreme and unusual circumstances be a defence to certain crimes 
(of so-called specific intent) when the effect of intoxication is so profound that the 
defendant could not form the intention required for the offence. An example of this is 
Lipman, who had taken LSD and hallucinated that he was being attacked by snakes. 
                                                     
43 R v Parks (1992) 95 Dominion Law Reports 27 
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During this episode, he killed a woman by stuffing sheets down her throat. He lacked 
the necessary intent for murder, but his recklessness in taking LSD satisfied the mens 
rea for manslaughter.44 Voluntary intoxication does not include all instances of voluntary 
ingestion of intoxicating substances, as the case of Hardie demonstrates. The 
defendant had taken some diazepam tablets on the advice of his partner, whose tablets 
they were. He set fire to the flat in which they lived whilst under the influence of the 
drug, and was charged with arson, contrary to section 1(2) and (3) of the Criminal 
Damage Act 1971. This offence requires intention or recklessness, and so is an offence 
of basic intent. His conviction was quashed on the ground  
‘that the jury should have been directed that if they concluded that by taking the drug 
a defendant could not appreciate the risks to property and persons from his actions, 
they should consider whether the taking of the drug was itself reckless.’45  
It is assumed by the courts that everyone knows about the effects of alcohol, but the 
reasonable man would not necessarily know the effects of prescription drugs – 
therefore Hardie was not objectively reckless.46 Virgo argues that 
‘Intoxication is not deliberate if the intoxicant is taken solely for medicinal, sedative or 
soporific purposes.’47 
In Bailey it was held that the defendant’s failure to eat food after administration of insulin 
was not to be treated in the same way as voluntary intoxication with drink and drugs, on 
the grounds that 
                                                     
44 R v Lipman [1970] 1 Q.B. 152 
45 R v Hardie [1985] 1 WLR 164 
46 Objective recklessness is where the reasonable man would have thought the act or omission was 
reckless. Subjective recklessness is where the defendant realised the act or omission was reckless 
(barring the effect of voluntary intoxication). 
47 VIRGO, G. (1993) The Law Commission Consultation Paper on intoxication and criminal liability: Part 1: 
Reconciling principle and policy. Criminal Law Review, pp. 415-25. 
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‘It is common knowledge that those who take alcohol to excess or certain sorts of 
drugs may become aggressive or do dangerous or unpredictable things, they may be 
able to foresee the risks of causing harm to others but nevertheless persist in their 
conduct. But the same cannot be said without more of a man who fails to take food 
after an insulin injection. If he does appreciate the risk that such a failure may lead to 
aggressive, unpredictable and uncontrollable conduct and he nevertheless 
deliberately runs the risk or otherwise disregards it, this will amount to recklessness. 
But we certainly do not think that it is common knowledge, even among diabetics, 
that such is a consequence of a failure to take food and there is no evidence that it 
was known to this appellant. Doubtless he knew that if he failed to take his insulin or 
proper food after it he might lose consciousness, but as such he would only be a 
danger to himself unless he put himself in charge of some machine such as a motor 
car, which required his continued conscious control.’48  
Bailey was decided on a subjective standard,49 as the court held that  
‘if the accused knows that his actions or inaction are likely to make him aggressive, 
unpredictable or uncontrolled with the result that he may cause some injury to others 
and he persists in the action or takes no remedial action when he knows it is 
required, it will be open to the jury to find that he was reckless.’ (p 765) 
This ruling also suggests that the standard depends on the offence, so carelessness or 
negligence with blood sugar management will be sufficient for prior fault in driving 
offences. However, in Quick Lawton LJ stated that  
                                                     
48 R v Bailey [1983] 1 WLR 760 
49 RUMBOLD, J. and WASIK, M. (2011) 'Diabetic drivers, hypoglycaemic unawareness, and automatism'. 
Criminal Law Review, pp. 863-72. 
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‘A self-induced incapacity will not excuse[], nor will one which could have been 
reasonably foreseen as a result of either doing, or omitting to do something, as, for 
example, taking alcohol against medical advice after using certain prescribed drugs, 
or failing to have regular meals while taking insulin.’ (p922) 
This suggests an objective test - something that “could have been reasonably 
foreseen”, rather than something that had actually been foreseen by the defendant. This 
quotation does not refer to the inference of negligence or recklessness, and suggests 
that all forms of self-induced capacity are no excuse (unlike in Bailey). These decisions 
were prior to the decision in R v G and R50, which restored the subjective 
(Cunningham51) standard for recklessness. It is also now the case that diabetic patients 
are well-educated on the risk of hypoglycaemia and the symptoms and signs to be 
aware of (so the defendant with diabetes would be more likely to be held objectively or 
subjectively reckless).  
Some experts strongly believe that alcohol-induced parasomnia ought not to be a legal 
excuse. Pressman cites the Scottish case of Finegan v Heywood in support of this 
position.  In this case Finegan had consumed alcohol, which he knew sometimes 
caused him to sleepwalk. He drove someone else’s car in a parasomnic state, and was 
charged with drink-driving and other offences. Pressman states that the case was 
“treated as a case of voluntary intoxication only”, and this interpretation is seemingly 
supported by the comments of the Lord Justice-General (Rodger), who stated  
‘Approaching the matter in that way and having reviewed the relevant authorities, the 
court held at p 46: ‘In the law of Scotland a person who voluntarily and deliberately 
                                                     
50 [2003] UKHL 50 
51 R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396 
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consumes known intoxicants, including drink or drugs, of whatever quantity, for their 
intoxicating effects, whether these effects are fully foreseen or not, cannot rely on the 
resulting intoxication as the foundation of a special defence of insanity at the time 
nor, indeed, can he plead diminished responsibility.’ Although their Lordships were 
not, of course, thinking of the situation where the voluntary consumption of alcohol for 
its intoxicating effect induced a transitory state of parasomnia, we consider that the 
same approach should be applied in such a case.’52 
Another reading of the case is that the basis of rejecting automatism was prior fault – 
the behaviour was due to a  
‘transitory state of parasomnia which was the result of, and induced by, deliberate 
and self induced intoxication.’ (para10) 
The immediate cause was recognized to be parasomnia, even if the trigger was alcohol. 
It would be superfluous for the court to declare that alcohol intoxication is no defence to 
drink-driving. In the case of Quick, the Court of Appeal held that the defence of 
automatism should have been left to the jury, even though the effect of his alcohol 
consumption on his blood sugar raised a question of prior fault (which the jury might 
have found sufficient ground for a conviction). Similarly, alcohol withdrawal leading to 
psychosis was not excluded as a cause of insanity in Harris53, nor the effects of a head 
injury resulting from alcohol intoxication in Stripp.54  Lord Birkenhead LC in Beard stated 
that: 
‘drunkenness is one thing and the diseases to which drunkenness leads are different 
                                                     
52 Finegan v Heywood [2000] S.L.T. 905 at para 10 
53 [2013] EWCA Crim 223 
54 (1978) 65 Cr App R 318 
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things, and if a man by drunkenness brings on a state of disease which causes such 
a degree of madness, even for a time, as would have relieved him from responsibility 
if it had been caused in any other way, then he would not be criminally responsible’.55 
Any state of automatism caused in whole or part by alcoholic intoxication should 
arguably be excluded from supporting the defence. This is what the Law Commission 
recommended, even when other factors were operating as in Pooley and Stripp56. In 
Pooley, automatism due to parasomnia could have been triggered by alcohol, stress 
and/or jet lag.57 In Stripp, the defendant was intoxicated, but had also suffered a head 
injury.58 The same principle applies with diminished responsibility, where intoxication 
due to drink or drugs is not fatal to the defence. An example is the case of 
Dietschmann,59 who had been drinking but argued diminished responsibility on the 
basis of an adjustment disorder. Despite the alcohol, the defence was still available if 
his abnormality of mind had substantially impaired his mental responsibility.  
The major issue in Finegan v Heywood was public safety, but Finegan’s reduced 
culpability was reflected in his successful appeal against sentence.60 Scotland is a civil 
law jurisdiction with a different approach to automatism from common law jurisdictions, 
so this decision might not be followed in England and Wales. Although sleepwalking is a 
legal automatism, and so is a complete defence even to crimes of strict liability, in 
several cases the driver has not been acquitted even when the fact of sleepwalking was 
                                                     
55 (1920) 14 Cr App R 160 
56 LAW COMMISSION. (1995) Legislating the Criminal Code: Intoxication and Criminal Liability. Law 
Comm No 229. London: HMSO, Recommendation 7, described at 6.40-6.45. 
57 BUCKS HERALD. (2007) ‘Man Cleared of Rape after Sleepwalking Defence’. Bucks Herald (Jan 18th). 
58 (1978) 65 Cr App R 318 
59 [2003] 1 AC 1209 
60It made little sense nor enhanced public safety to ban Finegan from voluntarily driving for an episode of 
involuntary driving. 
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accepted by the court.61 It is not clear what the legal bases of these decisions are; it has 
been argued that the insanity defence does not apply to strict liability offences, but see 
below at 5.9.1. 
5.6.3 Prior fault 
As pointed out in Quick, those who are responsible for their condition may not be 
permitted the defence of automatism. Even before the term ‘automatism’ had been 
used in the courts, the case of Kay v Butterworth was decided on the issue of prior fault. 
A man fell asleep at the wheel and drove into a column of American soldiers marching 
on the road. The bench had acquitted the defendant on the basis that he was 
temporarily unconscious, but on appeal to the High Court it was found that 
‘he was guilty of … driving dangerously and without due care and attention, it being 
immaterial that he was not conscious of his actions when the accident happened, 
since he was under a duty to stop as soon as he felt the onset of drowsiness.’62  
Similar principles apply in other cases involving driving, such as drivers who suffer 
hypoglycaemic episodes at the wheel or those who drive in the knowledge of a medical 
condition that may result in loss of control.63 The customary legal analysis is that the 
requisite mens rea is negligence in driving or continuing to drive. The actus reus may be 
getting behind the wheel or continuing to drive. The actus reus in driving offences is a 
continuous and continuing act during which period of time the relevant culpable failure 
occurred. The policy reasons for this approach are clear - public safety demands that 
                                                     
61 BBC NEWS, 2014-last update, 'Sleep driving' jockey Tom Queally banned. Available: <a 
href='http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-suffolk-30088748' 
target='_blank'>http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-suffolk-30088748</a> 
62 (1945) 61 Times Law Reports 452 
63 [2009] EWCA Crim 1533; [1997] RTR 457; EWCA Crim 921; RUMBOLD, J. and WASIK, M. (2011) 
'Diabetic drivers, hypoglycaemic unawareness, and automatism'. Criminal Law Review, pp. 863-72.  
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drivers take reasonable precautions to prevent accidents.  
The same analysis is difficult to apply to alcohol-related sleepwalking incidents. Where 
the person knows that alcohol triggers their sleepwalking, they will be taken to have the 
requisite minimal mens rea of negligence if they voluntarily ingest alcohol. If they know 
that alcohol triggers sleepwalking with harmful behaviour, they arguably satisfy the 
mens rea for recklessness if they drink. However, it is difficult to determine whether the 
relevant actus reus requirement is satisfied for the harm caused. For example, if they 
get behind the wheel whilst sleepwalking, there is no voluntary act of driving (unlike the 
untreated epileptic who gets behind the wheel, for example). Any other actions taken 
during a parasomnic episode that cause harm would also fail to constitute the actus 
reus of the relevant crime.  
 
5.7 Total Loss of Control 
 
This is a key issue, and is the other major hurdle to the success of the defence of 
automatism. It was affirmed in Attorney-General’s Reference (No2 of 1992) that 
automatism requires a “total destruction of voluntary control”.64  Although some might 
argue that this might only apply to driving cases, or strict liability crimes, as Herring 
comments  
‘there is nothing in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Attorney-General’s 
Reference (No. 2 of 1992) that explicitly restricts their discussion to driving 
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offences’.65 
The assumption that a successful defence always requires a total loss of control is 
clearly problematic. Bird, Newson and Dembny note 
‘Complete lack of consciousness and control rarely accompanies a potentially 
criminal act; hence, difficult judgments need to be made about the degree of loss of 
consciousness and attention at the specific time.’66 
 
Similarly Marks has noted in the context of the case of Clarke67 that the legal definition 
of automatism would, if taken literally, preclude the most basic human activities, even 
walking. For him, the episode of hypoglycaemia caused Mr Clarke to  
‘behave as an automaton able to perform certain habitual tasks but unable to 
appreciate their social consequences’.68  
Mackay contends that  
 
‘if this [total loss of voluntary control] was the true basis of automatism, then the 
defence would virtually be restricted to spasms, convulsions, and reflex acts which 
is clearly not the case.’69 
Husak states:  
 
‘The normative work thought to be done by the act requirement may be accomplished 
more effectively by supposing that criminal liability requires control.’70 
                                                     
65 HERRING, J. (2006) Criminal Law: Text, Cases and Materials. 2nd Ed. Oxford: OUP, p.709 . 
66 BIRD, J., NEWSON, M. and DEMBNY, K. (2009) Epilepsy and automatism. In YOUNG, S., 
KOPELMAN, M. and GUDJONSSON, G. (eds.). Forensic Neuropsychology in Practice. 1st Ed. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 165-91. 
67 [2009] EWCA Crim 921 
68From Professor Marks’ medical report on Mr Clarke; permission was given to access this and quote 
from it. 
69 MACKAY, R. (1995) Mental Condition Defences in the Criminal Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p63. 
70 HUSAK, D. (2006) Rethinking the Act Requirement. Cardozo Law Review, 28, pp. 2437-60. 
154 
 
 
 
We have to clarify what meaning of automatism we intend. Sometimes actions such 
eating and brushing our teeth are described as automatisms, and such analogies have 
been used at trial. However, this conflation of everyday motor activities that we 
ordinarily do without thinking about them, with the states associated with loss of 
capacity leads to confusion. Wigley talks about ‘automaticity’, the commonly recognized 
experience whereby we can automatically perform well-practiced tasks.71 This 
phenomenon can be observed with all ‘overlearned’ behaviours that arise from 
procedural memory rather than declarative memory. However a car driver who is in 
automaticity (or on ‘autopilot’) and thinking about other things whilst driving a familiar 
route will be brought out of his reverie when something untoward occurs. This is 
fundamentally different from the person in a state of automatism, who cannot do this. 
Legal automatism requires automaticity in combination with unconsciousness (in the 
sense of unawareness).72 
These distinctions are not purely theoretical - in the Australian case of R v Ryan,73 they 
were very relevant. The defendant was convicted of an armed robbery where he had 
shot and killed the garage attendant. He pleaded guilty to manslaughter, but in the state 
of New South Wales, there was a felony-murder rule which rendered any homicide in 
the course of a felony murder rather than manslaughter. This meant that any argument 
based on the lack of intent to kill was irrelevant. Ryan’s contention was that when he 
had the sawn-off shotgun trained on the garage attendant, a sudden movement by the 
                                                     
71 WIGLEY, S. (2007) Automaticity, Consciousness and Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Psychology, 
20(2), pp. 209-25. 
72 Levy and Bayne go further and differentiate agency into four categories: deliberative agency; conscious 
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attendant made him pull the trigger reflexly. He argued that this was an involuntary act. 
In support of his version of events, when the police recreated the scenario, the officer 
holding the gun reflexly pulled the trigger when the officer playing the garage attendant 
moved. It was argued that his action was non-voluntary, rather than involuntary. Elliott 
compared his reaction to “the sudden movement of a tennis player retrieving a difficult 
shot; not accompanied by conscious planning, but certainly not involuntary.” 74  
Given all this, on what basis was Ryan’s conviction upheld? The court held that by 
holding a gun on the garage attendant in this way, primed to react, Ryan’s act was  
‘a consequence probable and foreseeable of a conscious apprehension of danger, 
and in that sense a voluntary act.’(Windeyer J) 75  
Thus Ryan was guilty on the basis of pointing a loaded gun at the garage attendant, 
rather than the fact that he pulled the trigger. Just as the tennis player retrieving the 
difficult shot is praiseworthy for his reflex action, likewise Ryan was blameworthy for his 
reflex action. Further, if Ryan had had a legal reason for holding a gun on his victim (for 
example, if he was detaining a criminal), then the shooting would have been excusable. 
Neuroscientists describe Type 1 and Type 2 behaviour. Type 1 behaviour is fast, 
automatic and unconscious. It relies on heuristics derived from previous experience to 
allow fast reactions, which from an evolutionary perspective are vital for reflex actions in 
a survival situation. Type 2 behaviour is slow, deliberate and conscious. It allows for the 
evaluation of novel situations where a number of different factors are relevant to 
                                                     
74 ELLIOT, I.D. (1968) Responsibility for Involuntary Acts: Ryan v the Queen. Australian Law Journal, 41, 
pp. 497-508. 
75 Ryan (1966-7), see footnote 72 at para 20. 
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decision-making.76 Type 1 behaviour corresponds to Levy’s and Bayne’s latter 
categories of automatic and automatistic agency, and Type 2 behaviour corresponds to 
the former categories of deliberate and conscious agency.77 Ryan in this situation 
exhibited Type 1 behaviour, which involved no conscious intent to shoot the attendant, 
as Elliot emphasized above. Wigley examines how the agent can be held morally 
responsible even for automatic and automatistic behaviour, and the example of Ryan 
shows that we can also hold the agent criminally responsible. Automatic or automatistic 
agency alone is not a sufficient basis to deny criminal responsibility, because of the 
possibility of prior fault.  
Moore states that  
‘Cases of sleepwalking, post-hypnotic acts, and similar acts are often sufficiently 
complicated that they appear to be intelligently directed actions. In such cases, one is 
loathe not to attribute these acts to some agency, but if not to X [the defendant], then 
to whom?’ 78 
The Victorian answer to this dilemma was that the person has two souls, one being 
responsible for sleep behaviour. It has been argued by Bayne79 and others that agency 
is a marker for consciousness. However, we can easily find counter-examples from the 
animal kingdom that dispute the attribution of moral agency. Although we may punish a 
dog for running off with a string of sausages, we do not consider the animal a criminal. 
Even though chimpanzees can be trained to perform complex motor tasks such as 
                                                     
76 TALMI, D. and  FRITH, C.D. (2010) Neuroscience, Free Will and Responsibility. In SINNOTT-
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77 See footnote 71. 
78 MOORE, M.S. (1979) Responsibility and the unconscious. S Cal L Rev, 53, pp. 1563-1678. 
79 BAYNE, T. (2013) Agency as a Marker of Consciousness. In CLARK, A., KIVERSTEIN, J. and 
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driving80, they lack the deliberative functions to do so to socially acceptable standards - 
for example, they can be trained to stop at a red light, but they will drive off at a green 
light no matter whether it is safe or not.81 The question is not whether the sleepwalker 
has any level of consciousness at all, but whether this is the level and type of 
consciousness to which we would attribute criminal responsibility. 
Schopp and Moore both examined the issues of voluntariness and intentionality, and 
came to similar conclusions. Santoni de Sio analyzes the similarities in their models for 
criminal responsibility, and concludes that they 
‘seem to agree that the presence of a minimal belief-desire-behaviour combination is 
not in itself a sufficient condition for the presence of a voluntary action, i.e. the 
product of a person or an agent.’82  
As Schopp puts it, the actor who is a practical reasoner 
‘selects an action-plan through a causal process that allows access to the 
comprehensive set of wants and beliefs. In contrast, the actor who selects an action-
plan in a state of impaired consciousness acts without the benefit of the causal force 
that would ordinarily be exerted by certain wants and beliefs that constitute reasons 
for acting in a certain manner.’83 
Moore expresses very similar thoughts: 
‘volitions must be responsive to all (or at least a fair sample) of what one desires, 
                                                     
80Tony Zappone reported on a chimpanzee given a ticket in the state of Florida; however, a judge ruled 
that there was no requirement for a chimpanzee to hold a driving license.  
81 CALISHER, C.H. (2008) What do we know about anything? Croatian Medical Journal, 49(3), pp. 436-
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83 SCHOPP, R. (1991) Automatism, Insanity and the Psychology of Criminal Responsibility. Cambridge: 
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believes, and intends. And this is what being asleep, being unconscious, or being 
hypnotized prevents. These states seems to break the unity of consciousness that 
allows volitions to be formed that are responsive to all of one’s desires, beliefs, and 
intentions, and not just responsive to a small subset.’84 
The vital incapacity of automatism is the inability to evaluate one’s actions, rather than 
the inability to form the requisite intent. The sleepwalker can form the intention to eat or 
have sex, but this action is not truly voluntary. The concept of the practical reasoner 
displaces the intangible ‘will’ or ‘volition’ as the source of moral agency (for further 
discussion, see 6.3.3 and 6.4.3). The practical reasoner can weigh up choices and 
choose to comply with the law and/or the moral standards of his community. The person 
who has lost these capacities should not be held criminally responsible. This view is 
reflected in the Law Commission’s proposed new mental condition defence of ‘not 
criminally responsible by reason of recognized medical condition’ which focusses on the 
capacity for practical reasoning (see 9.6.5).  
 
5.8 Parasomnia Case Law  
 
Although the possibility of committing harmful acts whilst asleep has been recognized 
for centuries, it is only from the mid-nineteenth century in the British Isles that there are 
recorded acquittals. There are occasional examples of the same practical outcome 
being achieved by a different mechanism, such as the prosecution being stayed by the 
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court (Fraser)85 or the jury refusing to indict the defendant (Griggs).86 Even before the 
important modern case of Burgess, some sleepwalkers were found guilty but insane (in 
accordance with the special verdict which operated between 1882 and 1964)87  but 
generally they were simply acquitted. In Bratty the view was that sleepwalking cases fell 
within automatism and not insanity. After the decisions in Quick and Sullivan, however, 
which established that non-insane automatism always required an external cause, 
sleepwalking as a form of legal automatism was anomalous until Burgess was decided. 
However, juries often still return a plain acquittal even in cases where the illegal act is 
not disputed by the defence. The basis for this practice is unclear, but several expert 
witnesses report that juries were not directed on the issue of whether or not the 
parasomnia in question was insane or non-insane. It may well be the focus was on 
whether the defendant acted without intent (lack of mens rea rather than automatism, 
see 6.5.1). The author is only aware of one case where the judge correctly directed that 
the accused could only be acquitted on the basis of insane automatism if he was 
arguing sleepwalking as a defence (the Zack Thompson case presided over by Judge 
Milmo88). The case of Brian Thomas is another example where the current law 
appeared not to be applied by the trial judge, as he directed the jury to return a plain 
acquittal despite the evidence for insanity. 
The decision in Burgess is not straightforward, and it is notable that the Canadian 
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Supreme Court in Parks89 distinguished Burgess on the facts. The defendant assaulted 
a female friend during a dissociative episode: 
‘He remembered waking up, coming into focus and feeling confused. It then dawned 
on him that he was holding Miss Curtis down on the floor. He had no memory of 
hitting her at all, either with the bottle or with the video recorder. He had run away 
after the incident and had driven round the countryside.’90  
 The two defence experts concluded that this was somnambulism, but the prosecution 
expert, Dr Fenwick, believed that the episode was probably a hysterical dissociative 
episode rather than somnambulism. The jury returned the special verdict, but we do not 
know the basis for that decision. Although Burgess has been interpreted as holding that 
sleepwalking should be treated as an insane automatism, it is by no means clear. The 
Appeal Court stated 
‘It seems to us that on this evidence the judge was right to conclude that this was an 
abnormality or disorder, albeit transitory, due to an internal factor, whether functional 
or organic, which had manifested itself in violence. It was a disorder or abnormality 
which might recur, though the possibility of it recurring in the form of serious violence 
was unlikely. Therefore since this was a legal problem to be answered on legal 
principles, it seems to us that on those principles the answer was as the judge found 
it to be.’ (Lord Lane CJ)91 
This seems to be a very qualified decision: “on this evidence…this was an abnormality 
or disorder…due to an internal factor, whether functional or organic.” Burgess had not 
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argued that there were any external triggers for the episode. Fenwick states that 
although sleepwalking was likely to recur, violence was not: 
‘Serious violence fortunately is rare. Serious violence does recur, or certainly the 
propensity for it to recur is there, although there are very few cases in the literature - 
in fact I know of none - in which somebody has come to court twice for a sleep 
walking offence. This does not mean that sleep walking violence does not recur; what 
it does mean is that those who are associated with the sleeper take the necessary 
precautions. Finally, should a person be detained in hospital? The answer to that is: 
Yes, because sleep walking is treatable. Violent night terrors are treatable. There is a 
lot which can be done for the sleep walker, so sending them to hospital after a violent 
act to have their sleep walking sorted out, makes good sense.’92 
By contrast, the courts and Crown Prosecution Service in recent years (see 6.5.2 and 
the case of Brian Thomas at 3.4.2) have focussed more on the issue of continuing 
danger and benefit from treatment in deciding whether the insanity verdict should be 
considered. Mr Justice Nigel Davis directed the jury to return a plain acquittal, which 
seems contrary to the settled law on automatism and insanity, after the prosecution 
offered no further evidence following expert testimony.  
 
5.9 Parasomnias and Mental Condition Defences 
 
Although Burgess is quoted as clear authority that sleepwalking is an insane 
automatism because it has an internal cause, the ambiguities in the judgments make it 
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quite possible to try to distinguish many sleepwalking cases on the medical facts, just as 
the Canadian Supreme Court did in Parks. Often this is done on the grounds of an 
external trigger. Some forensic sleep experts consider that nearly all episodes of 
sleepwalking should be considered automatism, because serious violent sleepwalking 
episodes are due to an unique set of circumstances highly unlikely to recur rather than 
any particular propensity (which is supported by the extreme rarity of recurrent harm in 
sleepwalkers). Expert 29 comments that 
‘sleepwalking is part of the human condition – anybody can be induced to sleepwalk, 
I believe, under certain circumstances’. 
So despite the ruling in Burgess, in all bar two of the acquittals reported in the press 
from 1996 to date, the defendant received a plain acquittal rather than the special 
verdict (Lowe [2005] and Fallon [2013]).93 It is likely the reason for this in many cases is 
that the defence were arguing lack of mens rea rather than automatism per se (see 
6.5.1). Even where the mental condition is a disease of the mind, if it does not amount 
to legal insanity it can be used to argue lack of mens rea, as per Clarke94 (see further at 
6.5.1). However, if the defence is arguing lack of mens rea, the judge may direct that 
the issue of insanity needs to be considered because the McNaughtan Rules are 
satisfied.  
5.9.1 Sleepwalking is a marked exception in the examples of automatism. Revisiting 
Lord Denning’s comments in Bratty, he states  
‘an act which is done by the muscles without any control by the mind such as a 
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spasm, a reflex action or a convulsion; or an act done by a person who is not 
conscious of what he is doing such as an act done whilst suffering from concussion 
or whilst sleepwalking.’ [emphasis mine]95 
This is a bipartite definition, involving the two distinct concepts of involuntariness and 
limited or impaired consciousness (or awareness).  
The popular perception is that sleepwalkers are still sleeping, but this is not strictly true 
– they are in a state somewhere between wakefulness and NREM sleep (see 1.2 and 
Figure 1). Is there any objective basis for treating sleepwalking as legal automatism 
while excluding very similar conditions like dissociative states? It is arguable that the 
very term “sleepwalking” and a large dose of folk psychology explain its exceptional 
status in criminal law. In fact, it is often used as the archetypal example of legal 
automatism. Does sleepwalking really fit the legal definition better than other causes of 
automatism though? As we have seen, an essential requirement for legal automatism is 
“total destruction of voluntary control” (from Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 
1992)96 which confirmed the decisions in Watmore v Jenkins, Broome v Perkins (both 
diabetic drivers suffering hypoglycaemia), R v Isitt, and Roberts v Ramsbottom97[but 
contrast the civil case Mansfield v Weetabix98]).  
In the cases of R v Quick and R v T99 the defendants could not have committed their 
crimes if they had lost all voluntary control. Quick possessed the necessary control of 
his arms to assault his patient, and T was definitely aware of her actions in robbing her 
victim (for more details see 6.2.3). Nonetheless they lacked the necessary intention or 
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mens rea, due to hypoglycaemia and a dissociative state respectively. In R v Rabey 
where the triggering event was considered part of “the ordinary stresses and 
disappointments of life which are the common lot of mankind”100- such psychological 
vulnerability was considered to be a disease of mind (rightly in this author’s opinion). By 
contrast the reaction of a normal person to overwhelming events as in R v T (who had 
been raped) is deemed “psychological blow automatism”. Some commentators criticize 
the distinction between the defendants in Rabey and T. If acute post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) qualifies as non-insane automatism as per T, chronic PTSD is 
indubitably considered a disease of the mind. The differentiation between the two is 
hard to sustain, and even harder to precisely define. 
It has been confirmed that the insanity defence can be pleaded in the magistrates’ 
courts.101 The disposal options available under the statutory special verdict do not 
apply, so  (see above at 5.4). this defence, if successful, results in a plain acquittal (the 
McNaughtan Rules still apply). There is some debate as to whether or not the common 
law insanity defence can be pleaded for strict liability offences (which may explain the 
decisions in sleepwalker/drink driving cases). The decision in DPP v Harper was that 
the insanity defence is not applicable where the crime requires no mens rea.102 Herring 
comments 
‘it made no reference to an earlier decision, Hennessy, which had stated that insanity 
was a defence to a strict liability offence. Secondly, the reasoning used in DPP v 
Harper was suspect. It was claimed that insanity is a denial of mens rea; however, if 
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that was all insanity was there would be no need to have a special defence of 
insanity because any defendant who was legally insane would simply be able to 
claim they lacked the mens rea of the offence.’103 
Many legal commentators agree with this analysis (including this author). The problems 
of a lack of mens rea approach have been highlighted in US reforms of the insanity 
defence (see below). 
The number of plain acquittals suggests that the current law is not being applied. The 
issue of insanity appears to be bypassed. The reasons for this are not clear; it could be 
pragmatism, Crown Prosecution Service policy, judicial reluctance to consider the 
insanity defence for parasomnias, and/or expert witness or juror opposition to the 
insanity defence for non-psychiatric conditions. The Law Commission voiced concerns 
over the use of medical conditions to argue lack of mens rea in their discussion 
document (see further at 6.5.1).104 
5.9.2 Because of the difficulties in proving the sleepwalking defence, HHJ Milmo has 
suggested that the sleepwalking killer might argue diminished responsibility rather than 
automatism105. Denno has made a similar suggestion, a middle option which unlike the 
current plea of diminished responsibility would apply to all offences. Her argument is 
that this outcome is fairer than the lottery of guilty versus not guilty.106  Coles and Jang 
came to the same conclusion 
‘that public concern about offenders claiming to have committed a crime while in a 
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state of automatism107 could be ameliorated by recognition of diminished 
responsibility and a reduced sentence as an alternative to absolute acquittal.’108 
Morse suggested a general plea of guilty but partially responsible (GPR).109 Whether or 
not defendants would welcome this middle option to taking their chances between being 
found guilty and an outright acquittal is arguable. There would also be an issue with fair 
labelling for the victims and wider public. Diminished responsibility applies to a range of 
offences in California and South Africa, reducing the category of the crime.110 This relies 
on there being a lesser offence to fall back. 
 
5.10 Disposal 
The special verdict gave the courts the power to detain the insane defendant who had 
been acquitted by a jury. This meant detention at His or Her Majesty’s pleasure e.g. 
indefinite detention, prior to 1991. Prior to the acceptance of “partial insanity”111 as 
exculpatory, those found legally insane were so profoundly ill that civil confinement was 
routine. When capital punishment was the penalty for convicted murderers, pleading 
insanity may have represented a more attractive option for the defendant. When capital 
punishment was abolished, the prospect of indefinite detention became so unattractive 
that the insanity defence became practically obsolete - especially after the introduction 
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of the partial defence of diminished responsibility in the Homicide Act 1957.112 This 
inflexibility also made automatism an attractive option for those with a condition that 
posed no danger to the public such as diabetes or epilepsy. Judges were given flexible 
powers by the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991 as 
amended (see below) are: 
 Absolute discharge: person goes free without any restrictions. 
 Supervision order: supervision by a social worker or probation officer, and 
additionally the person must “submit” to treatment as an outpatient (this requires a 
Section 12 psychiatrist, but applies to medical conditions as well as mental 
disorders); however, the court has no powers to enforce compliance. 
 Hospital order (with or without a restriction order): a hospital order under section 
37 of the Mental Health Act 1983 allows the admission and detention of the 
patient in an appropriate hospital, with release when the clinicians believe the 
patient is suitable for discharge but no power of recall; a restriction order means 
that the patient cannot be released without the permission of the Justice 
Secretary and can be recalled to hospital at any time thereafter. 
Originally there was an option for a guardianship order, but that was abolished by 
Section 24 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004. There is still a 
mandatory hospital order with restriction order if the special verdict is returned in a 
murder case, but otherwise the trial judge has discretion over whether to impose a 
hospital order or use the other disposal options. It is important to note that the 
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provisions of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 also mandate that 
restriction orders and hospital orders imposed under the 1991 Act comply with the 
Mental Health Act 1983. There must, therefore, be a mental disorder requiring specialist 
treatment. It is not certain whether sleepwalking constitutes such a mental disorder, but 
considering that it is a ‘disease of mind’ and that it does respond to specialist treatment 
it could be held to be so. Sleepwalking responds to psychological therapies and 
hypnotic drugs. A Home Office circular asserts that “physical disorders” are limited to 
supervision orders or absolute discharge.113 Mackay and Mitchell argue 
‘Might this apply equally to findings of NGRI in respect of sleepwalking even where 
the charge is murder? This, however, is premised on accepting that such a condition 
is to be regarded in law as “a disease of the mind” within the M’Naghten Rules which 
is by no means clear cut.’114 
However, the likelihood is that it would not be considered a mental disorder.  
 
5.11 Mental Condition Defences in Other Common Law Jurisdictions 
 
5.11.1 USA 
The disposal under a plea of insanity in the USA is very much more punitive and less 
therapeutic than the UK. Especially post-Hinckley (although in fact the process of reform 
pre-dates his trial), many States dramatically limited or “abolished” the insanity 
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defence.115  In one challenge to the abolition of the insanity defence, the US Supreme 
Court denied certiorari, effectively ruling that it was not unconstitutional.116 It should be 
noted however that all States have some provision for evidence about lack of capacity 
due to mental health issues to be admitted, even if this is purely on the grounds of 
denying the relevant mens rea. In this author’s opinion a bar on the admission of mental 
health evidence for arguing lack of culpability more broadly than simple lack of mens 
rea ought to be deemed unconstitutional, being contrary to due process. Morse takes 
that view, but considers it unlikely that the US Supreme Court would strike down state 
insanity abolition measures as unconstitutional.117 
5.11.2 Canada 
Canada has since 1992 had the verdict of not criminally responsible due to mental 
disorder (NCRMD) under section 672.34 of the Canadian Criminal Code. This gives 
three options for disposal - an absolute discharge, a conditional discharge, and 
detention in custody in a hospital. One of the most interesting innovations of the 
enabling Act was that detention should be capped at the maximum tariff for the offence 
in question, unless there was proof that the interest of public safety demanded 
otherwise. This would make the plea a more attractive proposition compared to 
indefinite hospitalization, although this measure would arguably make little difference in 
the UK because of the existing flexible powers of disposal. This was the most 
controversial part of the Act; it was not proclaimed and eventually repealed on the 
advice of the 14th report of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, 
                                                     
115 MACKAY, R.D. (1988) Post-Hinckley insanity in the U.S.A. Criminal Law Review, (Feb), pp. 88-96. 
116 STIMPSON, S.C. (1994) State v. Cowan: The Consequences of Montana's Abolition of the Insanity 
Defense. Mont. L. Rev., 55, pp. 503-24. 
117 MORSE, S.J. (1985) Excusing the crazy: the insanity defense reconsidered. South California Law 
Review, 58, pp. 777-838 
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2002. This was largely due to concerns about the ability of the civil commitment system 
to protect the public. In Winko v British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute)118 the 
Canadian Supreme Court found that it was required to be shown that the individual was 
a significant risk to the public, but a recent Bill which has received its second reading 
(C-54, ‘Not Criminally Responsible Reform Act’) proposes more emphasis on public 
safety. The current situation is that those who plead NCRMD are detained longer on 
average than if they had been sentenced to prison.119 
 
5.12 Summary 
 
Mental condition defences have evolved under two main influences: 1) emerging 
scientific knowledge about the brain and mind; and 2) changing disposal options. The 
separate automatism defence arguably arose largely because of the inflexibility of the 
insanity defence at that time. Since then the options for disposal have made the case 
for a separate automatism defence less compelling. The law remains confusing for both 
the legal profession and juries, and may explain some of the apparently perverse 
acquittals. The evolution of mental condition defences needs to continue to ensure 
appropriate management of medical conditions whilst preventing inappropriate acquittal 
of potentially dangerous individuals. 
                                                     
118 [1999] 2 SCR 625 
119 CROCKER, A.G., NICHOLLS, T.N., SETO, M., CÔTÉ, G., CHARETTE, Y. and  CAULET, M. (2013 in 
preparation). The National Trajectory Project of Individuals found Not Criminally Responsible on Account 
of Mental Disorder in Canada: Part 2 – Process and outcomes. 
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Chapter 6: Criminal Law Theory and Moral Philosophy 
The issues surrounding the sleepwalking defence and automatism require some 
consideration of the wider issues surrounding medico-legal automatism. In particular, 
the legal and moral principles behind the exemption from criminal responsibility for acts 
committed during parasomnias and similar conditions need to be determined, and 
whether or not there are coherent and consistent principles underpinning the law in this 
area.  
 
6.1 Theoretical Issues in Automatism 
 
6.1.1 Involuntariness versus unconsciousness 
A large amount of the confusion surrounding the defence of automatism arises from the 
confusion between involuntariness and unconsciousness. As we have seen, 
involuntariness is a denial of the actus reus, and is applicable to any crime including 
those of strict liability (see below at 6.1.3). Unconsciousness is a denial of the mens 
rea.1 A lack of mens rea is easier to establish in most circumstances that go to trial than 
a lack of the actus reus, especially if the bar is set at the high standard of a total loss of 
voluntary control. Doghramji, Bertoglia and Watson assert that  
‘In cases where a violent act is committed during sleepwalking, it is often the actus 
reus requirement that first comes under fire, as the presence of an actus reus 
                                                     
1 YEO, S. (2001) Putting Voluntariness Back Into Automatism’. Victoria U. Wellington L. Rev., 32, pp. 
387-406. 
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element implies that the defendant’s action were voluntary.’2 
This is certainly not the way English cases would be argued, and it is possible the 
authors are confusing voluntary (and therefore intentional) action with possessing the 
necessary intent (c.f. the case of the bus driver confusing the accelerator and brake 
pedals3), see further below at 6.2.3). The negation of the mens rea is often the basis of 
the defence, rather than being merely theoretical. If this is established, there is no need 
to demonstrate that the defendant did not act voluntarily. Not all common law 
jurisdictions are settled on automatism being a denial of the actus reus however, so 
their argument may hold true for other jurisdictions.4 
Lord Denning acknowledges the two concepts that have been subsumed into 
automatism in his comment in Bratty: 
‘an act which is done by the muscles without any control by the mind such as a 
spasm, a reflex action or a convulsion; or an act done by a person who is not 
conscious of what he is doing such as an act done whilst suffering from concussion 
or whilst sleepwalking.’5  
The former part of the definition refers to involuntariness, the latter to limited or impaired 
consciousness (see further at 6.2.3). Whichever is being argued, if the cause of the 
condition is a disease of the mind and the defendant is found to be insane, then the 
special verdict is applicable. If however the defendant is not found to be insane, then 
the defence is either automatism (lack of actus reus) or lack of mens rea. However, if it 
                                                     
2 DOGHRAMJI, K., BERTOGLIA, S.M. and WATSON, C. (2013) Chapter 31: Forensic Aspects of the 
Parasomnias. In KOTHARE, S.V. and IVANENKO, A. (eds.). Parasomnias: Clinical Characteristics and 
Treatment. 1st Ed. New York: Springer, pp. 463-77. 
3 [Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 4 of 2000 ] [2001] EWCA Crim 780 
4 LAW COMMISSION. (2013) Criminal Liability: Reforming Insanity and Automatism. London: Law 
Commission. 
5 [1963] AC 386 at p. 409.  
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is wrongly posited that a total lack of control is required to negative mens rea, this is a 
clear error of law. 
It is assumed in law that the unconscious person cannot act voluntarily. Are there any 
grounds in neuroscience to dispute this? It is recognized that the person can perceive 
information without being consciously aware of it. The phenomenon of ‘blindsight’ ( also 
known as ‘cortical blindness’) illustrates this potential. When the cortical visual centres 
have been damaged, the person will be unaware of seeing anything. However, if they 
are asked to point to where a certain object is, they can do so. This peculiar 
phenomenon only occurs secondarily to a brain injury, but recent research on the “sixth 
sense” suggests that we may identify differences without consciously being able to 
identify them.6 These observations may have limited if any relevance to the area of 
criminal responsibility.  
Similarly the ideomotor effect could potentially pose a problem. This explanation for the 
unconscious movement of the planchette when using the ouija board posits that the 
person is acting on unconscious desires, also known as the Carpenter effect.7 Faraday, 
Chevreul, James and Hyman have demonstrated that many supposedly supernatural 
phenomena are due to this effect.8 There is no evidence to suggest the ideomotor effect 
is relevant to parasomnia. In any case, the effect of unconscious desires on criminal 
                                                     
6 HOWE, P.D.L. and WEBB, M.E. (2014) Detecting Unidentified Changes. PLoS ONE, 9(1), pp. e84490. 
7 CARPENTER, W.B. (1852) On the influence of suggestion in modifying and directing muscular 
movement, independently of volition.  Proceedings of the Royal Institution of Great Britain, (1), pp. 147-
53. 
8 FARADAY, M. (1853) Experimental investigation of table turning. Atheneum, (July), pp. 801-03; 
CHEVRUEL, M.E. (1854) De la Baguette Divinatoire et du Pendule Dit Explorateur (On the Divining Rod 
and the So-called Exploratory Pendulum). Paris: Maillet-Bachelier; JAMES, W. (1890) Principles of 
Psychology. New York, NY: Holt; HYMAN, R. (2003) August 26, 2003.-last update, How People Are 
Fooled by Ideomotor Action. Available: 
http://www.quackwatch.org/01QuackeryRelatedTopics/ideomotor.html. 
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responsibility is doubtful (see discussion below at 6.2.3) 
6.1.2 Involuntariness versus irresistible impulse 
Yeo makes a useful contrast between involuntariness and unconsciousness, but his 
analysis includes disinhibition and irresistible impulse as forms of automatism.9 This is 
not the current law in the UK, although disorders causing difficulties with impulse control 
may satisfy the partial defence of diminished responsibility. Many jurisdictions do have a 
volitional limb to their insanity defence, but not English law. The Law Commission’s 
proposed tests for capacity suggest an expansion of the special verdict to include a 
volitional limb, namely the ability: 
 to control his or her physical acts in relation to the relevant conduct or 
circumstances 
It appears from Chapter 4 of the discussion document that this is not just referring to the 
difficulties of motor control that would occur from Tourette’s syndrome or during an 
epileptic seizure or a hypoglycaemic episode. It also would cover the inability to refrain 
from an act, although the effects of a personality disorder would be excluded from the 
new defence. It might cover the situation of a defendant with hypersexuality from Kleine-
Levin Syndrome10 or dopamine agonist treatment, for example.  
6.1.3 Automatism and strict liability 
Non-insane automatism is a complete defence, applicable even to strict liability crimes. 
Whether or not insane automatism is a defence when there is no mens rea is debated 
(see 5.9.1). Some commentators state that strict liability crimes require no fault on the 
                                                     
9 YEO, S. (2001) Putting Voluntariness Back Into Automatism’. Victoria U. Wellington L. Rev., 32, pp. 
387-406. 
10A rare syndrome associated with episodes of hypersomnia, cognitive and mood disturbance, and 
frequently hypersexuality and hyperphagia.  
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part of the accused, but the requirement for voluntary action suggests otherwise. The 
position is surely clear – strict liability offences require no proof of mens rea but they do 
involve conduct and hence require commission of the relevant actus reus. Smart 
discusses a number of examples of the lack of criminal responsibility for failing to do the 
impossible, even where the offence is strict liability, e.g. failing to stop and report an 
accident where the driver was oblivious to the accident.11 Actus reus includes some 
mental elements - there is no sharp distinction between actus reus and mens rea. As 
well as the requirement for voluntariness, there are other subjective elements typically 
included under actus reus e.g. some knowledge in instances of possession, and the 
above example of failing to report an accident. Furthermore, as discussed below in 
6.4.3, acting often involves references to beliefs. As Holmes put it 
‘Even a dog knows the difference between being kicked and being stumbled over.’12 
 
 Robinson argues about the actus reus/mens rea distinction that 
‘this most basic organizing distinction is not coherent. Rather than being useful to 
criminal law theory, it is harmful because it creates ambiguity in discourse and hides 
important doctrinal differences of which criminal law should take account. I suggest 
we abandon this distinction in favour of other conceptualizations.’13 
Even in the problematic case of Larsonneur14  there was arguably a required mental 
element. Larsonneur had been deported from the Irish Free State in the custody of the 
police back to England, where she was convicted for being found in the UK despite 
                                                     
11 Hampson v Powell [1970] 1 All ER 929; SMART, A. (1987) ‘Criminal responsibility for failing to do the 
impossible’. Law Quarterly Review, 103(Oct), pp. 532-63. 
12 HOLMES, O.W. (1881) The Common Law. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 
13 ROBINSON, P.H. (1993) Should the Criminal Law Abandon the Actus Reus - Mens Rea Distinction? In 
SHUTE, S., GARDNER, J. and HORDER, J. (eds.). Action and Value in Criminal Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, pp. 187-211. 
14 (1934) 24 Cr. App. R. 74 
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being refused leave to land. Most commentators argue that she should not have been 
convicted for a situation over which she had no control. However, Lanham argues that 
Larsonneur was at fault for going to the Irish Free State, from where it was inevitable 
she would be deported back to England. She set into motion the chain of events.15 Of 
course there was not the usual close nexus between the mens rea and actus reus, but it 
can be argued that there was a fault element.  
The same principle applies to crimes of omission - where the accused is unable to fulfil 
their duties through no fault of their own, they should not be held liable.16  Thus parents 
and carers can be found guilty for injuries and illness due to wilful neglect (R v Stone 
and Dobinson),17 but not for failing to provide the appropriate level of care despite their 
best efforts (R v Sheppard, R v Hopkins18).  
 
6.2 Criminal Responsibility 
 
6.2.1 Amnesia 
The issue of amnesia, whilst problematic for the defendant, has been dealt with clearly 
by the court in Podola.19 There it was held that amnesia alone was not a sufficient 
ground for unfitness to plead, because the defendant could still direct his defence, even 
if he had to be informed of his actions by his defence counsel. That decision was based 
largely on policy issues, because of the difficulties in determining whether amnesia is 
                                                     
15 LANHAM, D. [1976] Larsonneur Revisited. Criminal Law Review, pp. 276-81. 
16 SMART, A. (1987) ‘Criminal responsibility for failing to do the impossible’. Law Quarterly Review, 
103(Oct), pp. 532-63. 
17 [1977] Q.B. 354 
18 [1981] A.C. 394; [2011] EWCA Crim 1513 
19 [1960] 1 Q.B. 325 
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genuine or not. There is also the issue that it is irrelevant to criminal culpability, if not 
criminal liability. An individual with dementia, for example, may not remember certain 
acts, but at the time clearly had moral ownership of them. Someone who has consumed 
large amounts of alcohol may similarly fail to remember his actions.  
The issue with amnesia is not so much about culpability, but whether the defendant 
should be liable for criminal punishment. Amnesia causes problems for the 
communicative model of criminal punishment. It could be argued that someone with no 
memory for illegal acts cannot have their wrongdoing effectively communicated to them. 
Duff argues that amnesia renders the accused unfit to plead, as he is unable to answer 
for his actions.20 Punishment of those who cannot recall their actions is permissible 
even under the communicative account of criminal justice, since they can be informed of 
their actions. For example, a defendant with sexsomnia accused of rape can be 
confronted with DNA evidence and will then able to take some ownership of his “act”. 
The person with dementia mentioned above would be a different matter - even if he 
were able to direct his own defence, if the communicative function of the law was 
impossible (although the two functions are unlikely to be independent) then arguably he 
should not be held criminally liable. It would be inhumane and morally wrong to punish 
someone who continued to be perplexed by his predicament.  
6.2.2 Ownership and psychological continuity 
As noted above, there have been parallels drawn between parasomnias and multiple 
personality disorder (MPD), which is also known as dissociative identity disorder (DID). 
In both conditions, there are issues about the ownership of the crime, as well as legal 
                                                     
20 DUFF, R.A. (1986) Trials and Punishments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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personality. In MPD/DID, there is a host personality, with one or more separate 
identities known as “alters” which control behaviour at different times. It is believed this 
condition may arise as a protective mechanism against past trauma. It must be noted at 
this point that the status of MPD/DID is contested, and  considered by many forensic 
mental health professionals to be either part of borderline personality disorder or a 
product of therapy, especially those trying to “recover” memories (also linked with the 
iatrogenic condition “false memory syndrome”). Saks describes the three distinct 
approaches which have been taken in the United States towards defendants with 
putative MPD/DID: 
‘The first view found in the courts is that a multiple is not guilty by reason of insanity 
(“NGRI”) if the alter that is in control at the time of the act meets the insanity test of 
the particular jurisdiction. Thus, experts are directed to look at the mental state of that 
alter. If the alter, for instance, were psychotic and did not know what she was doing, 
the multiple would be criminally insane. Or if the alter were a child who did not know 
what she was doing—which is not always the case since child alters are not actually 
children—the multiple would also be insane. Otherwise, the multiple would be guilty 
of the crime. 
The second view of courts is that a multiple is insane if any alter meets the insanity 
test. This view is less well grounded in the courts because the decisions that take this 
position also contain language suggestive of the first position. For example, in State 
v. Rodrigues, the court reviews the expert’s testimony about each of the three alters’ 
knowledge at some length. 
The third view of the courts is found in a Tenth Circuit case, United States v. Denny-
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Shaffer. This view suggests that a multiple is criminally insane if the host personality 
did not plan or participate in the offense. In essence, Denny-Shaffer takes the 
position that the “defendant” is the host personality. This view is quite plausible but, 
as I shall argue, does not go quite far enough.’ 
He goes on to propose a fourth test, that  
‘a person suffering from MPD should not be held responsible for a crime unless all of 
her alters knew about and acquiesced in the crime’.21 
If it was held that the sleepwalker’s actions were due to a repressed desire, it could be 
argued that this is very similar to a second, hidden personality, which only acts during a 
parasomnia. On any of the tests mentioned by Saks, the sleepwalker would not be held 
liable. The English courts have not heard any arguments that MPD/DID might exempt 
the defendant from criminal responsibility other than by satisfying the McNaughtan 
Rules in the usual way. The court agreed with the expert witness in one such case that  
‘A depersonalised intent is nevertheless an intent.’22 
However, Williams considered that dissociation could support an acquittal, but that the 
evidence should be tested by “skilled and deeply sceptical cross-examination”.23 The 
difference between dissociative states and fugue amnesia must be emphasized here, 
as there is some confusion and conflation in the literature. Simple amnesia for the 
reasons above does not have the same connotation of lack of ownership, but some 
authors use the term fugue for dissociative states where depersonalization occurs. An 
example of the latter from Australia is the case of Radford, where the defendant stated 
                                                     
21 SAKS, M. and KOEHLER, J. (2008) The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science. Vanderbilt Law 
Review, 61, pp. 199-220. 
22 RIX, K.J.B. (2011) Expert Psychiatric Evidence. London: RCPsych Publications, p.95. 
23 WILLIAMS, G. (1983) Textbook of Criminal Law. 2nd Ed. Stevens. 
180 
 
 
 
he felt like an observer, as if his “whole body was just a head about two feet above the 
shoulder – the right shoulder of the soldier”. This account is somewhat reminiscent of 
‘out of body’ experiences.24  Other dissociative experiences are less dramatic e.g. 
Burgess25 who had fragmentary amnesia for the attack on his friend (see 5.8).  
The issue of lack of psychological continuity is not a new one – it is common in folk 
psychology to speak of someone ‘not being himself’ or that certain behaviour is ‘not like 
him’, to mean that the person’s behaviour is uncharacteristic of him. When someone’s 
behaviour is dramatically transformed by a brain tumour or a medical treatment, often 
there is an intuitive reaction to excuse their actions as not indicative of intrinsically bad 
moral character. For example, there has been a case reported of a man who became 
suddenly interested in child pornography. A brain tumour was diagnosed, and this 
behaviour ceased when the tumour was resected. When the behaviour recurred, brain 
scans showed that the tumour had recurred also.26 People with brain tumours often 
have questions about identity and ownership of their acts - when the late Labour 
politician Mo Mowlam learned that she may have had her brain tumour for many years, 
she asked "[So] good old Mo, larger than life Mo... it could all be because of the 
tumour? [But] which part's the real me?"27 
It has been argued that even if the court does not accept that there is objective 
psychological discontinuity, the subjective psychological discontinuity experienced by 
the defendant entails that the communicative function of the criminal law is impaired 
                                                     
24 (1985) 20 A Crim R 388 
25 [1991] 2 WLR 1206 
26 BURNS, J.M. and SWERDLOW, R.H. (2003) Right Orbitofrontal Tumor With Pedophilia Symptom and 
Constructional Apraxia Sign. Archives of Neurology, 60, pp. 437-440. 
27 COOKE, R. (2010) Sunday 17th Jan, 2010-last update, Revealed: the real Mo Mowlam. Available: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/culture/2010/jan/17/real-mo-mowlam-channel-4. 
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(they do not have “ownership” of their acts) and so the person with DID should not be 
held criminally liable.28  
Do these issues really apply to the sleepwalker? The very limited studies of the brain 
during parasomnia suggest that (at least for some) the executive functions are disabled, 
and limbic system-driven behaviour becomes unrestrained. This could be likened to the 
fictional Dr Jekyll/Mr Hyde dichotomy.29 A proportion of people suffering sexsomnia 
exhibit different sexual behaviour during episodes compared to their waking selves - 
they may be rougher, gentler, or even assume a different sexual orientation. The 
partner of one man acquitted of rape on the grounds of sexsomnia described his 
behaviour: 
‘It’s like he’s hypnotised and someone’s got the remote control on.  He’s disgusted  
with himself.  He just can’t help it.’30 
Whether or not hypnosis/post-hypnotic suggestion could amount to legal automatism is 
a moot question. I could find no British judgment where this issue has arisen, but some 
US jurisdictions recognize the possibility. As noted above, Moore included post-hypnotic 
acts within the class of actions without agency. If the caricature of the hypnotised 
individual as someone whose will had been completely subsumed was true, this would 
undoubtedly qualify as automatism (although there would be considerable evidential 
difficulty and policy concerns about accepting such a defence). There are two main 
schools of thought about hypnosis - ‘state’ and ‘non-state’. The state school believe that 
                                                     
28 Discussion with Filippo Santoni de Sio 
29As described in Robert Louis Stevenson’s famous novel, allegedly based on the double life of Deacon 
Brodie. 
30 BENTLEY, P. (2013) 'Sexsomniac', 40, is cleared of raping a 21-year-old at Butlins because he had 'no 
control over his actions while asleep'. Daily Mail (May 6th) News. 
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hypnosis involves a special state of altered consciousness.31 The ‘non-state’ school of 
hypnotists believe that the hypnotised person is simply suggestible. There is little 
support from either school for the notion that a hypnotised individual has no control over 
their actions at all.32 
6.2.3 Intention and parasomnia 
The difficulty for laypeople (and of course juries) with the idea of the automaton is that 
very often there seems to be an agent; that is, there is an apparent author of the acts. 
As Moore puts it 
‘Cases of sleepwalking, post-hypnotic acts, and similar acts are often sufficiently 
complicated that they appear to be intelligently directed actions. In such cases, one is 
loathe not to attribute these acts to some agency, but if not to X [the defendant], then 
to whom?’33  
Bird, Newson and Dembny observe that the person committing the illegal act, whether 
whilst sleepwalking or in some other state, is rarely the stereotypical shuffling 
automaton: 
‘Complete lack of consciousness and control rarely accompanies a potentially 
criminal act; hence, difficult judgments need to be made about the degree of loss of 
consciousness and attention at the specific time.’34 
In this respect the work of Schopp is most helpful. In his monograph, he analyzes those 
                                                     
31 WHALLEY, M. (2014) 2014-last update, States of consciousness: The state - nonstate debate in 
hypnosis. Available: http://www.hypnosisandsuggestion.org/states-of-consciousness.html. 
32 WAGSTAFF, G. (2008) Hypnosis and the Law: Examining the Stereotypes. Criminal Justice and 
Behavior, 35(10), pp. 1277-94. 
33 MOORE, M.S. (1979) Responsibility and the unconscious. S Cal L Rev, 53, pp. 1563-1678. 
34 BIRD, J., NEWSON, M. and DEMBNY, K. (2009) Epilepsy and automatism. In: YOUNG,S., 
KOPELMAN,M. and GUDJONSSON, G. (eds.). Forensic Neuropsychology in Practice. 1st Ed. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 165-91. 
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capacities which distinguish automatism from moral agency. For Schopp sleepwalking 
is automatism because although the sleepwalker has some vague awareness, he does 
not will his actions. The executive functions of the brain are paralysed and he cannot be 
truly described as a moral agent.35 Children and animals can make purposive actions 
directed towards goals, but we do not attribute criminal responsibility to them (neither 
would we categorize them as automatons).   
Also we can draw on cognitive neuroscience, which describes actions as arising from 
either from the higher centres (responsible for executive functions) or elsewhere (limbic 
system, motor cortex, epilepsy in the frontal or temporal lobes). Thus actions during 
complex partial seizures may appear to be purposive, although they are stereotyped. A 
personal experience of the author involved being almost bowled over by a patient in a 
hospital corridor - the patient was having a temporal lobe epileptic seizure. 
In English law it is now settled that automatism is a denial of the actus reus rather than 
the mens rea (this is not true for all common law jurisdictions). For crimes where a 
particular intent is required, this distinction makes little practical difference in court. 
Intention has several distinct meanings, which are drawn out by Anscombe. She 
describes “intention-in-acting”, “acting intentionally” and “intention for the future”.36 
“Intention-in-acting” may describe the mens rea, the reason for an action (although 
many crimes require only recklessness, knowledge or negligence). In crimes of strict 
liability, all that is required is “acting intentionally” (or voluntary action). This is illustrated 
                                                     
35 SCHOPP, R. (1991) Automatism, Insanity and the Psychology of Criminal Responsibility. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
36 ANSCOMBE, G.E.M. (1957) Intention. Oxford: Blackwell. 
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by the case of Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 4 of 2000).37 Here a bus driver who 
was unfamiliar with the controls of the particular bus he was driving pressed the 
accelerator pedal instead of the brake pedal. Tragically the bus shot forward and 
travelled across a pedestrian island where it struck a number of pedestrians, two of 
whom died from their injuries. He did not do this intentionally; however, his action in 
pressing that particular pedal was intentional and deliberate, and therefore not an 
automatism. His actions were accidental, but not involuntary. His intention in pressing 
that pedal was irrelevant, because the aim of the law is to protect the public by ensuring 
that drivers take all necessary precautions. Clearly there is not the same level of 
recklessness and disregard for safety as a driver speeding around a blind corner on the 
wrong side of the road, but nonetheless there was a failure of the necessary care and 
attention. To take another example, in the film Lethal Weapon 3 Murtagh is practising a 
roundhouse kick at Riggs’s urging and kicks over the water cooler. Although he didn’t 
intend to kick the water cooler over, nonetheless his kick was intentional and so he was 
responsible (but probably less so than his partner).  
Another very similar distinction is between de re and de dicto, which can be broadly 
considered as distinguishing general intent from specific intent. Moore explains thus  
‘Sometimes the question of intentionality arises, not with respect to the 
consequences of our actions … but with respect to circumstances. Suppose I shoot 
and kill Bill, as I intended; if Bill is a police officer, did I intend to kill a police officer? 
Does the answer change if I knew Bill was a police officer? Or must I be motivated by 
that fact, as I would be if I were in a cop-killing contest, for example? Ordinary 
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language here is also indeterminate, even with respect to noun/verb usages of 
‘intend. In one sense (often called the ‘de re’ sense) of intend, if Bill is a cop and I 
intended to kill him, I intended to kill a cop; in another sense (often called the ‘de 
dicto’ sense), even believing that Bill is a cop is not enough - I have to represent the 
state of affairs I intend to bring about as the killing of a cop.[] 
Most crimes having some form of intentions as mens rea are general intent crimes, 
such as rape, arson, and murder; specific intent crimes tend to be inchoate crimes 
(where the evil the law ultimately seeks to prevent need not have occurred).’38 
General and specific intent is being used here in a slightly different sense to that 
employed in English criminal law, where murder is considered a crime of specific intent. 
The list of basic and specific intent crimes is based more on policy than principle - 
although one distinction is between crimes with a mens rea satisfied by proof of 
negligence and recklessness (basic intent) and crimes with a minimum mens rea of 
knowledge or intent. Lord Diplock in Caldwell quoted with approval Lord Elwyn-Jones 
LC in Majewski who stated that  
‘self-induced intoxication is no defence to a crime in which recklessness is enough to 
constitute the necessary mens rea.’39 
The Law Commission stated in 1995  
‘It is apparent … that there is no general agreement on the test which should be 
applied in order to distinguish offences of basic and of specific intent.’40 
 
                                                     
38 MOORE, M.S. (2013) Intention as a Marker of Criminal Culpability and Legal Punishability. In DUFF, 
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39 DPP v Majewski [1977] A.C. 443 
40 LAW COMMISSION. (1995) Legislating the Criminal Code: Intoxication and Criminal Liability. Law 
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Coles and Jang argue that intoxication cannot affect a person’s intent.41 The main effect 
of alcoholic intoxication is disinhibition, which does not affect intent in the eyes of the 
law (although it can nonetheless prevent the formation of a specific intent). It could be 
argued that the same principles should apply to risk-taking such as a sexsomniac 
sharing a bed with a stranger, or a sleepwalker drinking alcohol when he knows it 
triggers his sleepwalking. 
An English case that demonstrates the doctrine is Heard (Lee),42 where the defendant 
whilst intoxicated had intentionally rubbed his penis against a police officer’s leg. It was 
held that sexual assault was a crime of basic intent, and so it was only required that the 
defendant intentionally committed the actus reus. Voluntary intoxication was not a 
defence. This demonstrates that “basic intent” is the same as “general intent”, and so 
the basis of the decision hinges on the de re/de dicto distinction. His only defence would 
have been if his touching had been completely accidental or involuntary. Hughes LJ 
stated 
‘Because the offence is committed only by intentional touching, we agree that the 
judge's direction that the touching must be deliberate was correct. To flail about, 
stumble or barge around in an unco-ordinated manner which results in an unintended 
touching, objectively sexual, is not this offence. If to do so when sober is not this 
offence, then nor is it this offence to do so when intoxicated. It is also possible that 
such an action would not be judged by the jury to be objectively sexual, on the basis 
that it was clearly accidental, but whether that is so or not, we are satisfied that in 
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such a case this offence is not committed. The intoxication, in such a situation, has 
not impacted on intention. Intention is simply not in question.’ (para 23) 
However, the sense that his touching was intentional is slightly different from that in 
Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 4 of 2000). It could be argued that this is because 
the minimum mens rea for sexual assault is recklessness, whereas the minimum mens 
rea of causing death by dangerous driving is negligence. 
Wittgenstein defines actions as characterized by the absence of surprise (about the 
action, not the consequences). Thus Wittgenstein would agree that the bus driver’s 
depression of the accelerator was an action, even though the consequences were 
unwanted. This definition works well for examples like ‘Alien Hand Phenomenon’, 
‘Utilization Behaviour’ and ‘Environmental Dependency Syndrome’ where actions occur 
without conscious desires but in response to environmental cues. Certainly many of the 
actions during sleepwalking are reactions to the environment (although in this case the 
person has impaired consciousness). The earliest jurists when pronouncing on the lack 
of responsibility for acts committed during sleep added the proviso that the sleeper must 
not be shown to have planned these acts, e.g. by placing a weapon to hand prior to 
falling asleep. I have not come across any cases where this was an issue, and if there 
was any preparation it would raise questions about whether the episode was a genuine 
automatism or not. This would follow the precedent of Gallagher,43 who had drunk 
whiskey for ‘Dutch courage’ before killing his wife. The neuroscientist Blakemore 
considers there is no difference between such actions and intentional actions 
‘All our actions are the product of the activity of our brains. It seems to me to make no 
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sense (in scientific terms) to try and distinguish sharply between acts that result from 
conscious intention and those that are pure reflexes or that are caused by disease or 
damage or damage to the brain. We feel ourselves, usually, to be in control of our 
actions, but that feeling is in itself a product of the brain, whose machinery has been 
designed, on the basis of its functional utility, by natural selection.’44 
He specifically rejects the folk psychology on which the law relies. However he 
acknowledges that the two spheres of descriptive science and normative attribution of 
responsibility have little in common. 
Moore discusses the effects of unconscious mental states on responsibility. It has been 
posited in the past that sleepwalkers are acting on unconscious desires (see 2.5).The 
interviewees generally concluded that sleepwalkers were not acting on unconscious 
desires, but even if they were, they should not be held criminally responsible (see 6.1.1 
above). Reznek talks about “Quearthlings”, who are able to instruct their sleeping selves 
to perform acts during sleepwalking by reciting the instructions over and over.45 
Following the precedent of Gallagher, the Quearthling would be held criminally 
responsible. If the sleepwalker’s rumination on an intention to cause harm resulted in 
that harm being acted out during sleepwalking, this would pose the question of whether 
or not they should be found criminally responsible. 
There is an interesting contrast between the approaches to purportedly “repressed 
desires” and desires that the actor is consciously aware of, but which they suppress by 
an act of will or conscience (see below at 6.2.4 and the case of Kingston). In the case of 
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King v Cogdon, unreported but discussed by Morris and Eigen,46 the defendant was 
considered by the various mental health experts to harbour ‘subconscious emotional 
hostility’. Nonetheless, because the state arose out of sleep she was not held not 
responsible under the principle of ‘In somno voluntas non erat libera’ 47. However, if she 
had been judged to have been in a dissociative state (which is a reasonable possibility, 
given her history of neurosis), she might have been found culpable. Horder contrasts 
this repressed desire with the purportedly subconscious fetish that motivated the 
defendant in Court.48 When asked about his reason for spanking a young girl, he 
responded “I don’t know; buttock fetish”. Giving expression to this desire was evidence 
of bad character.49 
In the case of Kingston,50 the accused had paedophilic tendencies and committed a 
sexual assault. He claimed he had been drugged without his knowledge. The victim of 
the offence was also drugged, and Kingston’s co-defendant had videoed Kingston 
having sex with the boy for the purposes of blackmailing Kingston. The jury heard 
evidence about Kingston’s collection of hardcore pornography, which was allowed 
because it established a propensity for homosexual acts. The ratio of Kingston is that he 
was still able to form the requisite mens rea for indecent assault. It is not explicitly 
stated how the video evidence showed that Kingston had formed the mens rea for 
indecent assault, although it is asserted in cross-examination that “You are obviously 
enjoying yourself”. Are Kingston’s actions distinguishable from those of a sexsomniac 
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48 [1989] AC 28 
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except by the principle of ‘In somno voluntas non erat libera’? What exactly does it 
mean to “form the mens rea” in this case?  
Kingston argued before the Court of Appeal 
‘A vital distinction exists between mens rea and intent. Intent is only mens. The use 
of the term intent in modern authorities rather than evil intent effectively leaves 
offences requiring general intent only as offences of strict liability save in cases 
where it is clear that the actus reus was not willed. 
A distinction exists between voluntary intoxication, which is culpable, and involuntary 
intoxication, which is excusable. Excusable intoxication may be of three degrees: (1) 
a relaxation of inhibitions so that acts are committed or permitted which would not be 
committed if the person's mind were unaffected … contrast Reg. v. Davies [1983] 
Crim.L.R. 741); (2) a dulling of the mind and its functions so that a person cannot tell 
right from wrong….; and (3) an effective paralysis of the higher mind, namely, 
automatism, or no capacity to form intent. All three states should excuse the actions 
of the person affected. In regard to state (3) there has always been a requirement for 
mens rea in all offences except those of strict liability. There has never been any 
doubt that an intoxicated man may lack the necessary specific intent, implicit in the 
act of becoming intoxicated attracting culpability: see Reg. v. Majewski [1977] A.C. 
443.’51 
This argument was continued before the House of Lords Appellate Committee 
‘Even if the trial judge were right in equating mens rea with intent, his direction is still 
unsatisfactory. The jury could still be asked: did the accused intend the alleged acts. 
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That is unsatisfactory for there are very few cases where a person does not intend 
his acts.  
If intent is used in place of mens rea there must be a need to distinguish between the 
higher mind (the seat of reason, conscience, operative fear of retribution) and the 
lower mind (the basic motor/instinctive control of the body): see Jerome Hall, General 
Principles of Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (1960), p. 468. The Court of Appeal rejected an 
analysis of intent in terms of the higher and lower mind in favour of maintaining a 
distinction between intent and mens rea.’52 
Kingston’s argument hinges on the lack of culpability for intoxication which caused his 
lapse in controlling his paedophilic urges, thus making his intentional action or mens 
distinct from the mens rea. As Lord Taylor put it, 
‘the purpose of the criminal law is to inhibit by proscription and by penal sanction 
antisocial acts which individuals may otherwise commit. Its unspoken premise is that 
people may have tendencies and impulses to do those things which are considered 
sufficiently objectionable to be forbidden. Having paedophiliac inclinations and 
desires is not proscribed; putting them into practice is. If the sole reason why the 
threshold between the two has been crossed is or may have been that the inhibition 
that the law requires has been removed by the clandestine act of a third party, the 
purposes of the criminal law are not served by nevertheless holding that the person 
performing the act is guilty of an offence. A man is not responsible for a condition 
produced "by stratagem or the fraud of another". If, therefore, drink or a drug, 
surreptitiously administered, causes a person to lose his self-control and for that 
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reason to form an intent which he would not otherwise have formed, it is consistent 
with the principle that the law should exculpate him, for the operative fault is not his. 
The law permits a finding that the intent formed was not a criminal intent or, in other 
words, that the involuntary intoxication negatives the mens rea.’53 
The House of Lords ruled that the formation of mens rea was the deciding issue, and 
whether the intoxication was voluntary or not is irrelevant to this. The simple 
commission of a voluntary act was sufficient for liability. They quoted with approval the 
Court of Appeal in Sheehan 
‘the mere fact that the defendant’s mind was affected by drink so that he acted in a 
way in which he would not have done had he been sober does not assist him at all, 
provided that the necessary intention was there. A drunken intent is nevertheless an 
intent.’54  
This makes it clear that the lack of culpability for involuntary intention is irrelevant to the 
issue of intent. It was only necessary to prove that he intentionally committed the act 
(thus constituting the actus reus), because indecent assault where the act is 
unequivocally indecent is a crime of basic intent (where the act is equivocal as regards 
decency, it is an act of specific intent).  As the defence argued,  
‘The use of the term intent in modern authorities rather than evil intent effectively 
leaves offences requiring general intent only as offences of strict liability save in 
cases where it is clear that the actus reus was not willed.’ (Court of Appeal) 
This appears to make crimes of general or basic intent effectively crimes of strict liability 
(with the probable exception of accidental actions, as per Attorney-General’s Reference 
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(No 4 of 2000) - see above). The comments of Lord Simon in Morgan seem to support 
this  
‘By "crimes of basic intent" I mean those crimes whose definition expresses (or, more 
often, implies) a mens rea which does not go beyond the actus reus’55  
although his further explanation makes it clear that he is referring to the de re/de dicto 
distinction, where only crimes of ulterior (or specific) intent require an intention in acting, 
rather than simply intentionally acting. It also means there is little practical difference 
between voluntary and involuntary intoxication unless the involuntary intoxication is so 
profound as to result in automatism. This ruling emphasizes that voluntary intoxication is 
not a defence per se to crimes of specific intent, so the question is not whether or not 
the intoxicated person could form the necessary mens rea, but whether or not they did. 
Evidence of the effects of intoxication may support the argument that he did not. This 
ruling could be construed as meaning that the sexsomniac cannot argue lack of mens 
rea when he has committed an unequivocally indecent act; he must argue automatism. 
Schopp states 
‘The problematic cases of automatism are those in which the defendant acted in such 
a manner as to indicate that he not only knew what he was doing he acted in that 
way for the purpose of performing the act constituting the objective elements of the 
offence. 
The defendant’s mental states at the time of the offence are usually inferred on the 
basis of evidence regarding his behavior and speech … Automatism cases 
sometimes involve acts done in a skilful, coordinated manner, apparently for the 
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purpose of achieving some specific end…Other defendants have not only performed 
the act constituting the offense in an apparently purposeful manner; they have 
engaged in preliminary behavior apparently intended to arrange circumstances in 
such a manner as to facilitate the offence. For example, one defendant called the 
victim over to the window, ostensibly to see an animal swimming in the water below, 
then struck the victim with a mallet and threw him from the window.[refers to case of 
Charlson] 
These events simply do not provide evidence from which to infer the defendant did 
not know what they were doing…these actors apparently selected a projected act-
tree as their action-plan precisely because it was expected to produce an act-tree 
including the behavior constituting the offense. Unless this appearance is seriously 
misleading, these defendants knew what they were doing, and they performed their 
offenses purposely. Thus, neither a failure-of-proof defence regarding the culpability 
element nor the “nature and quality” disjunct of the M’Naghten test would apply.’56 
Actions during parasomnias that are satisfying the appetite for either food or sexual 
satisfaction can be seen as fulfilling a desire and therefore intentional. Indeed, Schopp 
and Moore would consider the sleep eater or sexsomniac to be acting intentionally, but 
not voluntarily. Alternatively, it can be argued that despite appearances the sexsomniac 
is not intentionally acting and so he can argue lack of mens rea. Sleep experts would no 
doubt argue there is a compelling case that in the case of parasomnias, appearances 
are seriously misleading. Again this is by recourse to the principle of ‘In somno voluntas 
non erat libera’. 
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It is also difficult to reconcile this decision with cases like R v T,57 who by the same 
criteria had clearly formed the mens rea for robbery. Here the defendant had been 
saying ‘I’m ill, I’m ill’ during the course of a robbery. She had been raped a few days 
prior to this incident, and was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. The 
distinction between Kingston and another case of involuntary intoxication, Hardie (see 
below), appears to rest on the effect of diazepam on judgment of risk in Hardie where 
the requisite minimum mens rea was objective recklessness.  
6.2.4 Disinhibition 
The issue of whether the connection between intention and mens rea was affected by 
disinhibition was the deciding factor in the case of Kingston. Kingston’s argument was 
that he would not have acted on his paedophilic urges if he had not been drugged, and 
in support of this contention he had not offended prior to this. The legal arguments were 
heavily dominated by issues of policy, with fears that an acquittal would “open the 
floodgates” of defendants claiming to have been involuntarily drugged. The ratio 
however was that despite the involuntary intoxication he was still able to form the 
requisite mens rea and on the basis of the video evidence did so. The decision by the 
House of Lords Appellate Committee is controversial, and many consider that the case 
was wrongly decided. It has the appearance of punishing bad character (see below re 
justification of act requirement).  
Contrast this case with Hardie where the trial judge held that “voluntary self-
administration of the drug was irrelevant as a defence since its effect could not negative 
mens rea”, but the appeal court quashed his conviction stating that 
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‘under section 1(2) of the Act of 1971 a defendant's state of mind had to be 
considered only when he did the relevant act and the requirements of the subsection 
were established if the defendant when doing that act created an obvious risk that 
property would be destroyed and life endangered and gave no thought to the 
possibility of either risk; that, in considering his state of mind, the self-administration 
of a sedative or soporific drug, even in excess, did not automatically raise a 
conclusive presumption that its effects could not negative mens rea in the way that 
self-induced intoxication by alcohol or dangerous drugs could; that the trial judge had 
misdirected the jury that the effects of such a drug leading to a defendant's incapacity 
were irrelevant; and that, accordingly, the conviction had to be quashed since the jury 
should have been directed that if they concluded that by taking the drug a defendant 
could not appreciate the risks to property and persons from his actions, they should 
consider whether the taking of the drug was itself reckless.’58 
However, the Appeal Court held in McGhee that a combination of temazepam and 
alcohol taken for the relief of tinnitus and causing disinhibition could not amount to 
automatism - Hughes LJ stated emphatically that  
‘Disinhibition is exactly not automatism.’59  
 
The fact that involuntary intoxication makes a choice harder is irrelevant - as Fitzjames 
Stephen put it 
‘If the impulse was resistible, the fact that it proceeded from disease is no excuse at 
all."60 
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The trial judge directed the jury in Hardie that “an intoxicated intent was still an intent”. It 
is not clear why diazepam could negative mens rea but temazepam (another 
benzodiazepine which has an identical effect) could not. It has been suggested that 
Hardie was decided per incuriam, as the effect of diazepam was misunderstood.61 
Certainly the decision to distinguish diazepam from “dangerous drugs” was opaque. 
Crosby suggests that Kingston could be excused based on character theory. Although it 
could be argued that it was his character to be attracted to young boys and so was 
culpable, it could also be argued that he showed good character in normally resisting in 
such urges – thus his offending was ‘out of character’.62 Involuntary intoxication was 
mooted as an excuse in Hale’s Pleas of the Crown, who classified “induced witlessness” 
as an excuse when induced by a negligent physician or “the contrivance of his 
enemies”. Sullivan’s ‘destabilisation’ defence63 would apply where 
‘D is blamelessly destabilised by exceptional circumstances to such an extent that he 
acts in a way that he would not otherwise have done.’64 
This would only be applicable in cases of ‘good character’, that is the absence of 
relevant convictions. Horder suggests an alternative solution to the problem of 
involuntary intoxication might be the extension of the diminished responsibility plea.65  
This is an area where the Law Commission’s proposed test for capacity would bring 
some welcome clarity. They suggest that the criminally responsible defendant should 
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have the ability to: 
● rationally to form a judgment about the relevant conduct or circumstances; 
● to understand the wrongfulness of what he or she is charged with having done; 
or 
● to control his or her physical acts in relation to the relevant conduct or 
circumstances.66 
Arguably those who are sufficiently disinhibited will be unable to rationally form a 
judgment about the relevant conduct or circumstance - they are no longer effective 
practical reasoners. Similarly the parasomniac may be able to perform complex motor 
tasks, but they have no access to the executive functions required to be criminally 
responsible as per the Law Commission’s test.  
 
6.3 Cognitive Neuroscience and Criminal Responsibility 
 
6.3.1 Neurolaw 
There is an increasing interest in the application of neuroscience to the law, dubbed 
“neurolaw”. This has been variously defined as:  
“An emerging field of interdisciplinary study that explores the effects of discoveries in 
neuroscience on legal rules and standards”;67  
“a relatively new and highly-interdisciplinary field that brings together researchers 
from the social sciences, mind and brain sciences, law and philosophy, as well as 
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public policy and law professionals to examine the potential for neuroscientific 
discoveries and techniques to address a range of pressing legal and social 
problems”;68 
and described in further detail as comprising 
“(a) techniques for the objective investigation of subjective states such as pain, 
memory, and truth-telling;  
(b) evidentiary issues for admitting neuroscience facts and approaches into a court 
proceeding;  
(c) free will, responsibility, moral judgment, and punishment;  
(d) juvenile offenders; (e) addiction; (f) mental health;  
(g) bias; (h) emotion; and (i) the neuroeconomics of decision making and 
cooperation”.69   
 Although neurolaw is most often concerned with the application of neuroscience to the 
assessment of defendants, it also includes the study of jurors and judges. There are a 
number of scholars devoted to the topic and there are regular conferences on the topic 
organized by the MacArthur Research Foundation Research Network on Law and 
Neuroscience70 , the European Association for Neuroscience and Law and others. 
Appendix I lists a number of neurolaw resources.  
The human brain comprises three levels of functionality according to the triune brain 
model of McLean. There is the reptilian complex or reptile brain - this is responsible for 
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aggression, territoriality and sexuality. These behaviours tend to be quite stereotyped. 
There is the limbic system - this becomes prominent in mammals and is responsible for 
drives, emotions, memory and social behaviour. There are also functions of the limbic 
system related to appetites, such as eating and sex. Finally there is the neocortex - this 
becomes prominent in primates, and is responsible for executive functions (planning, 
logical thought, decision-making).  There are problems with this model, but it does 
usefully illustrate the modular nature of the brain. However, all the systems interact and 
interconnect.  
One of the chief features of sleepwalking appears to be that the frontal lobe (neocortex) 
is not active, but the limbic system is. The frontal lobe is very important in conforming 
behaviour to social and moral standards, as demonstrated by the famous case of 
Phineas Gage. This 19th century US railroad worker was tamping down dynamite 
during blasting work for a railway tunnel, when due to his omission of the sand plug, the 
dynamite detonated prematurely and drove the tamping iron through his skull. The iron 
entered his left eye socket and exited through the top of his skull, passing through the 
frontal lobe. There is a lot of mythology surrounding Gage, and many of the wilder 
accounts contradict the first-hand witnesses of Gage’s behaviour.71 Nonetheless, it is 
accepted that lesions of the frontal lobe can lead to dramatic personality and 
behavioural change (see above at 6.2.2). Although there are different patterns of 
activation and deactivation of parts of brain during sleepwalking episodes, it is generally 
considered that sleepwalking is a single clinical entity. If this is the case, then the 
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studies of brain function suggest that sleepwalking has a similar effect to Gage’s 
injuries, albeit temporarily.72 The field of neurolaw has the potential to inform the 
criminal justice system of the functional deficits associated with parasomnias and other 
medical conditions causing incapacity, and so enable a consistent approach to 
assessing criminal responsibility. 
6.3.2 Classifications of Automatism 
Psychologists have a wider definition of automatism than either lawyers or medics. 
Coles classified automatism into five main types: 
Automatic behaviour: Behaviour where the conscious mind does not go with 
what is being done 
 
1) Absence of volition without conscious awareness for example, autonomic 
and central nervous system activity which would include: 
a) physiological processes 
b) neurological reflexes 
2) Absence of volition with clear conscious awareness 
a) neurological reflexes 
3) Volitional behaviour with constricted conscious awareness 
a) irrational behaviour while highly emotional 
4) Volitional behaviour with diminished conscious awareness 
a) inadequate responses to partially perceived stimuli 
b) habits and well learned skills 
5) Volitional behaviour with distorted conscious awareness 
a) responses to confused perception of reality 
b) responses to the content of dreams 
c) responses to hallucinations 
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From ‘Scientific Support for the Legal Concept of Automatism’ with kind permission of Michael Coles.73 
 
Type 1 and 2 automatisms are unlikely to cause any difficulty for the courts, as these 
actions would be easily recognized as involuntary. Type 3 behaviour is not generally 
considered legal automatism (but might come under insane automatism due to an 
hysterical dissociative state [”psychological blow automatism”] or the partial defence of 
provocation/ loss of control). Types 4 and 5 are the most likely to involve complex 
behaviour AND be caused by conditions that would be recognized as automatism or 
insanity. Type 4a behaviour could come from a sudden awakening from sleep, or 
‘confusional arousal’. Type 4b is classical sleepwalking behaviour. Type 5a and 5c 
behaviours are generally due to psychoses (drug-induced or otherwise), although 
parasomniacs also respond to confused perceptions of reality. Type 5b is the classic 
automatism due to sleep terror, RBD or even sleepwalking.  
The importance of this classification is the understanding that different levels of volition 
and consciousness underpin states that may be associated with diminution or lack of 
criminal responsibility. Thus it may be inappropriate to rely on one simple definition of 
automatism such as total loss of control. 
6.3.3 Voluntariness 
The law is replete with discussions of the will and voluntary action. Yeo states  
‘an accurate and comprehensive definition of involuntariness has thus far eluded both 
the courts and law reform bodies that have considered the issue’.74  
There has been more success in defining involuntariness than voluntariness however. 
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Additionally, there are actions that are non-voluntary (see Ryan above), but nonetheless 
may be blameworthy. It is noteworthy that the Law Commission’s proposals for a new 
mental condition defence (which would cover many conditions considered as legal 
automatism) omit any mention of voluntariness per se. As Windeyer J and others note, 
the doctrine of the will is problematic not least because of the difficulty of defining what 
it is. Ryle sees the concept of volition as  
‘just an inevitable extension of the myth of the ghost in the machine’.75 
 
Relying on ascriptive language to define voluntary actions can cause confusion for non-
lawyers - one expert witness recounts the judge saying of the defendant “he wasn’t 
driving”, and retorted “well he was behind the wheel!” Presumably the judge meant that 
the accused was not acting voluntarily, so was not driving in the sense that the 
consequences of the vehicle’s speed and direction could not be attributed to the 
accused. Hart classifies four types of responsibility – causal, role, liability and 
capacity.76 The hypoglycaemic driver who crashes into a pedestrian has causal 
responsibility for their injury or death, but may or may not have role-, liability-, or 
capacity-responsibility depending on his actions. In one sense, he is responsible for the 
crash by being in the car, but in another sense he may not be responsible if his 
incapacity was blameless. 
Another issue that is inextricably linked with voluntariness is practical reasoning. The 
actor’s beliefs about the likely effects of a particular muscular contraction or even 
complex action impact on whether or not those effects were intended. The Austinian 
concept of intention has these two essentials, a willed muscular movement and 
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foresight of the consequences. This entails that erroneous beliefs will not always 
excuse on the lack of grounds of intent, as seen in the case of Attorney-General’s 
Reference (No. 4 of 2000) (see above at 6.2.3). There are competing explanations for 
what causes actions and therefore it follows that there are different definitions of an 
action. When a person is not truly acting i.e. he is an automaton, he is neither morally 
nor legally responsible (except where there is prior fault). 
  
6.4 Doctrinal Issues 
 
6.4.1 Justification for the act requirement 
The traditional division of the elements of a crime in common law between actus reus 
and mens rea draws on Aristotle’s Rhetoric and is later supported by Descartes. The 
requirement for a guilty act serves the function of ensuring that people are not punished 
simply for their wrongful thoughts and desires, popularly described as “thought-crime” 
(from the novel ‘1984’). Similarly acts that are more than merely preparatory are 
required to make out criminal attempts, so as to distinguish those who are seriously 
attempting a criminal act from those who are not so committed to such action. 
Robinson considers that the actus reus requirement includes four distinct doctrines: 
● the act requirement; 
● substitutes for an act: omission to perform a legal duty or possession of 
contraband; 
● the voluntariness requirement; 
● objective elements of offensive definitions: conduct, circumstance and result. 
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He comments on the ‘thick’ concept of actus reus that: 
‘The act requirement and the voluntariness requirement, frequently treated as one 
actus reus requirement, are related but distinct doctrines. Several writers assure that 
the two are treated as one by defining an ‘act’ as a ‘willed movement’.77 
One example of this is Holmes, who stated that an action  
‘is a willed muscular contraction, nothing more’.78 
A better alternative to actus reus is arguably the “external element” (or “conduct 
element”), which would be synonymous with the illegal act. This would mean that the 
aspect of willing or voluntariness would fall under the “fault element” (see further 
discussion below at 6.5.3).  
6.4.2 Connection between mens rea and actus reus 
The traditional analysis is that mens rea and actus reus have to coincide in time to 
make out the offence. As a basic proposition this holds good in very many cases. An 
exception to this is when the person is so intoxicated that they cannot form the mens 
rea for a crime of specific intent; nonetheless their intoxication forms the basis of the 
mens rea for a crime of basic intent. Another exception is Gallagher, where the mens 
rea was formed before the actus reus.79 In the case of driving offences when the issue 
is the actus reus, driving is seen as a continuing act. Even when the accused is no 
longer “driving” (see comment in 6.3.3), the previous period of dangerous driving for 
example has a sufficiently proximal causal connection with the fatal accident that 
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results. By contrast, in the cases of Thabo Meli v The Queen and MPC v Fagan80, the 
criminal acts were viewed as a whole to maintain the connection between mens rea and 
actus reus. In Thabo Meli, the act that killed the victim was the disposal of the “body” 
over a cliff. The intent to kill did not coincide with the act of killing per se. In Fagan, a 
man was charged with assault after stopping his car on a policeman’s foot by accident 
and then refusing to move it. The maintenance of the car’s position was part of a 
continuing act.  
This analysis is difficult to apply in all cases. The issue of prior fault is often used to 
deny the defence of automatism to diabetics suffering a hypoglycaemic episode whilst 
driving. Here the requisite mens rea is continuing to drive when warning symptoms 
occur, and the actus reus is the continuing act of driving. In the case of someone driving 
with knowledge of a dangerous condition such as uncontrolled epilepsy or 
hypoglycaemic unawareness, the mens rea is recklessness in getting behind the wheel 
and the actus reus is again the continuing act of driving. Where the accused has self-
induced incapacity in other situations, this analysis breaks down. A diabetic who 
assaults someone whilst hypoglycaemic or a sleepwalker who commits a crime may 
have the requisite mens rea if their incapacity is self-induced, but what is the actus 
reus? There is no continuing act. The defence of automatism is ruled out by prior fault, 
but the offence still needs to be made out. This is not to argue that there is no criminal 
responsibility in these cases, simply that they do not fit the current model of legal 
analysis. This author agrees with Arenson’s assertion that it may be better to argue 
                                                     
80 [1969] 1 QB 439; [1954] 1 WLR 228 
207 
 
 
 
these cases on the principle of legal causation.81 
6.4.3 Schopp and Hart on automatism 
The work of legal philosophers Hart and Schopp is instructive on the legal concept of 
automatism. Hart in Punishment and Responsibility82  lays out his positivist justifications 
for punishment. Crucially he sees the punishment of people who cannot be deterred as 
generally unjustified. When the person cannot avoid breaking the law, punishment 
cannot be justified under positivist jurisprudence. Hart’s justification for mental condition 
defences rests on this lack of capacity to be deterred. The “policeman at the elbow test” 
arguably fails for the religiously or politically motivated fanatic, but it might be argued 
they have the capacity to be deterred. A practical reasoner can assess the law and his 
own circumstances, and come to a rational decision whether or not to break the law. He 
considers it the way to maximise freedom - for Hart, the law has no necessary moral 
content and so individuals may rationally decide to break the law. The threat of 
punishment is a relevant factor to deter law-breaking. For those who are not practical 
reasoners, the threat of punishment will not deter them, and so Hart reasons that there 
is no justification for punishing them (there is the general effect of deterrence on others, 
but again Hart considers this unjustifiable where the person is not a practical reasoner).  
Schopp deconstructs the automatism defence to try to define exactly what it is about 
automatism which excuses the individual.83 As per discussions above, the person 
arguing automatism typically is not unconsciousness, nor are they acting entirely 
involuntarily in the neurological sense. Further, given the current understanding that the 
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brain is modular, we should not be looking at global assessments of consciousness. 
Formulations like ‘effective loss of control’, whilst more appropriate than the absolute 
and inflexible standard of ‘total loss of control’, are rather difficult to define and apply in 
practice. Schopp turns to Goldman’s action theory approach to classify acts (for the 
purpose of the criminal law) as rather more than Austin’s ‘willed body movement’ or 
Holmes’s ‘willed muscular contraction’ (which would restrict legal automatisms to the 
narrow realm of “spasms, convulsions, and reflex acts”, which Mackay rejects.84 
Goldman distinguishes act-types from act-tokens.85 An act-type may be a willed 
muscular contraction, or series of them. An act-token is an example of an act-type by a 
particular actor at a particular type. Act-tokens may be basic, or part of an action plan or 
act-tree which links act-tokens by level-generations. The different levels are linked by 
the intentions and beliefs of the actor. Thus, the act-tokens of pointing a gun at 
someone and pulling the trigger may be either a tragic accident or murder, depending 
on the intentions and beliefs of the actor. In the case of Lamb, the accused was playing 
with a gun, again believing the firing pin would fall on an empty chamber.86 In this case, 
it could be said that Lamb did not fire the gun, because when he pulled the trigger he 
neither intended to fire the gun nor believed he would fire the gun. Similarly Ryan 
argued that he did not intend to shoot the garage attendant. However he intentionally 
held a loaded gun in the knowledge that this created the danger of shooting the garage 
attendant. The Goldman action theory accommodates the unintended consequences of 
actions, reflecting the generally accepted division of mens rea into intent, knowledge, 
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recklessness, and negligence (as per the US Model Penal Code).  
These distinctions are those encapsulated by the requirement for many crimes of the 
requisite mens rea. Where the crime is not a crime of strict liability, it is not the illegal 
act by itself that is punished - it is the illegal act committed for the designated, 
blameworthy reasons. Can these same principles be applied to crimes of strict liability? 
It is certainly difficult to consider the action plan relevant to certain motoring offences, 
where the issue is the loss of control - although it could be argued that the intentional 
creation of a risk can be considered part of the action-plan. Similarly, although harsh, it 
is possible to see the judicial reasoning behind holding the bus driver responsible in 
Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 4 of 2000).87  However, the driver’s action plan was 
to stop the bus, and he had no intention of creating any risk, unlike the stereotypical boy 
racer who deliberately takes a corner at excessive speed.  
Strict liability laws are often related to either the difficulties in proving mens rea to the 
requisite standard (eg drug and firearm possession offences), or the overriding public 
safety or public health concerns (e.g. environmental offences, selling of unfit food). 
There are concerns about prosecutions for failure to “do the impossible”.(Smart (1987)) 
Where the offence attracts custodial sentences as opposed to fines for the company, 
the argument for strict liability is weaker. 
Many legal philosophers and jurists have made similar comments about the qualities of 
a moral agent in law. Morse states  
‘For the law, then, a person is a practical reasoner. The legal view is not that all 
people always reason and behave consistently rationally according to some 
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preordained, normative notion of rationality. It is simply that people are creatures who 
are capable of acting for and consistently with their reasons of action and who are 
generally capable of minimal rationality according to mostly conventional, socially 
constructed standards of rationality.’88 
Hart in his essay ‘Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal Responsibility’ similarly 
considered that it was only right to hold someone criminally responsible for negligence if 
the following questions could be answered affirmatively: 
i. Did the accused fail to take those precautions which any reasonable person with 
normal capacities would in the circumstances have taken? 
ii. Could the accused, given his mental and physical capacities, have taken those 
precautions?89 
However, this is not the law as it stands. It seems wrong that someone should not be 
held criminally responsible for failing to consider the risks inherent in driving a particular 
way - however, if for some reason they were unable to appreciate or properly consider 
the risks because of hypoglycaemia or some similar condition, it is reasonable to 
excuse them if this condition was not self-inflicted. The emphasis above on the 
capability for rationality addresses the problematic lacuna of those who fail to use their 
practical reasoning and/or omissions. The essential ingredient for criminal responsibility 
with certain crimes is the capacity for practical reasoning. On these grounds we can 
distinguish the negligent or reckless driver from the driver with diabetes who suffers a 
hypoglycaemic episode. This to an extent involves merging the character theory of 
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excuse with the choice theory of excuse, as Crosby points out.90 
In summary, Hart, Moore, Morse, Schopp, Levy (see 5.7), and the Law Commission 
see the requirements for a voluntary act as hinging on the actor as a practical reasoner. 
This avoids the possibly insoluble dilemma of defining what voluntary action is, and how 
we can assess or define the will.  
 
6.5 Theory Versus Practice 
 
6.5.1 Denial of mens rea with a ‘disease of mind’ 
As discussed above, in most trials it is sufficient to establish a lack of mens rea. 
Professor Martin Wasik related to me a High Court judge’s ruling on a moot held at 
Keele University on the issue of manslaughter caused by a violent reaction during a 
confusional arousal. The judge commented that these cases were resolved on the basis 
of a lack of mens rea rather than trying to negotiate the ‘quagmire’ of automatism. It is 
undeniable that the conditions that cause automatism will enable the accused to argue 
lack of mens rea. This would be true in many cases where there is a disease of the 
mind. Nonetheless, it is problematic that these individuals could receive a plain acquittal 
if they satisfy the criteria for legal insanity, because as Jones put it  
‘The courts strive to keep the defence of insanity, with its distinctive burden of proof, 
separate from questions of mens rea and voluntariness…what underpins this 
approach is a concern with social protection. Potentially dangerous individuals could 
be unconditionally acquitted if it were possible to use evidence suggestive of insanity 
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as the foundation for an argument of lack of mens rea or voluntariness falling short of 
insanity.’91 
Lord Hutton concurs with this opinion in Antoine when he comments on the case of 
Attorney-General’s Reference (No3 of 1998)92  
stating that  
‘a man who had committed very violent acts at a time when he was insane and did 
not realise that his acts were wrong was set at liberty.’93 
Jones further states 
‘courts do not permit evidence suggestive of insanity to be used in considering an 
argument of lack of mens rea independently of the insanity defence. There would 
otherwise also exist “the possibility of using a bad case of insanity to make a good 
case of reasonable doubt”.’ (page 488) 
The data on the sleepwalking defence suggest that this is what is happening – bad 
cases of insanity are making good cases of reasonable doubt. The main caution for the 
defence counsel arguing either lack of mens rea or lack of actus reus due to a mental 
condition is the ability of the judge to direct the jury to consider the special verdict, 
whether non-insane automatism is argued or simply lack of mens rea, where he 
believes the McNaughtan Rules are satisfied (R v Thomas94). 
Similarly, when the defence is arguing diminished responsibility, the judge or the 
prosecution may raise the issue of insanity (s6 of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 
1964, in which case the prosecution would have the burden of proving insanity as per 
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Bastian).95  
In the recent case of Seun Oye v The Crown96 it was confirmed that where a delusion 
due to a disease of the mind caused a defendant to have a subjective but erroneous 
belief that he was being attacked to which he responded with excessive force, he was 
not entitled to a plain acquittal. The appeal court commented that 
‘An insane person cannot set the standards of reasonableness as to the degree of 
force used by reference to his own insanity.  In truth it makes as little sense to talk of 
the reasonable lunatic as it did, in the context of cases on provocation, to talk of the 
reasonable glue-sniffer.’  
They followed the case of Canns97 where a patient with paranoid schizophrenia had 
killed a nurse under the delusion the nurse had attacked him. His belief in the necessity 
for self-defence (and the degree of violence) may have been sincerely held, but it was 
mistaken - and the reason for the mistake was his mental disorder. It is unclear from 
these two cases whether or not a genuinely held belief in self-defence due to a delusion 
would lead to a plain acquittal or not. Can the McNaughtan Rules be applied to a 
subjective belief in the need for self-defence? 
Slobogin argues that 
‘mental disorder should be relevant to criminal culpability only if it supports an 
excusing condition that, under the subjective approach to criminal liability increasingly 
accepted today, would be available to a person who is not mentally ill’.98 
He is explicitly rejecting a status defence of insanity, arguing that an alternative 
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framework can accommodate all the justifications for excusing the mentally ill without a 
specific separate defence. The main practical difficulty in applying such a defence are 
that the lay jury will not be able to apply their own theories of mind to an accused whose 
mind may be functioning in an entirely different way. Thus for this version of the insanity 
defence to work, it would require testimony by forensic psychiatrists and it would 
therefore probably be little different from the current insanity defence in practice.  
In the states of the USA where the insanity defence has been abolished but defendants 
can argue lack of mens rea due to their psychiatric condition, there is concern. There is 
some academic debate about the nature, classification and justifications for the insanity 
defence. It has been argued that it is an excuse, a status defence or a sui generis.99 
The Law Commission debates the merits of these arguments in the recent discussion 
paper.100  
There are counter-examples against the position that mental conditions should not allow 
the defendant to plead lack of mens rea. An extreme example is given by Prowse, JA 
who states 
‘If a defence of insanity failed, evidence of brain injury that affected the accused’s 
eyesight would be relevant on the issue of whether the accused had the requisite 
intent or believed that he was shooting a moose.’101 
In Clarke in 1972102 it was accepted that the absent-mindedness caused by depression 
caused to her to walk off without paying, thereby denying the mens rea for theft. Is it 
possible to discern a legal principle on which to distinguish Clarke from Canns, rather 
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than simple policy considerations? Does it make a difference whether the requisite 
mens rea is objective or subjective in nature? In Stephenson, a tramp suffering with 
schizophrenia set light to a straw stack to keep himself warm; the fire grew out of 
control causing considerable damage to property. If Stephenson’s schizophrenia 
affected his insight into the risk from the fire he set, should he have received a plain 
acquittal or the special verdict?). The court stated 
‘the jury had not been left to decide whether the appellant's schizophrenia might have 
prevented the idea of danger entering his mind at all, and the conviction was unsafe 
and would be quashed.’103 
This implies that he should have received a plain acquittal, with no mention of the 
special verdict at all (this case was decided pre-Caldwell, so the test was subjective 
recklessness). 
The accepted rationale for distinguishing the cases is the simple fact that the mental 
disorder did not satisfy the McNaughtan Rules but merely affected their assessment of 
the facts. Clarke wasn’t arguing insanity, and the appeal court stated the evidence 
‘fell very far short of showing either that she suffered from a defect of reason or that 
the consequences of that defect in reason, if any, were that she was unable to know 
the nature and quality of the act she was doing. The M'Naghten Rules relate to 
accused persons who by reason of a disease of the mind are deprived of the power 
of reasoning. They do not apply and never have applied to a momentary failure by 
someone to concentrate.’104 
However, this leaves us with the problem of how judges decide not to leave the insanity 
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defence to the jury, when the condition involved would clearly satisfy the McNaughtan 
Rules. The case of Attorney-General's Reference (No. 3 of 1998)105 states that once 
insanity has been established, the Crown only has to prove the actus reus. Lack of 
mens rea will not result in an acquittal. So this suggests that if insanity is established, 
lack of mens rea is not available as a separate defence. If the accused’s mental state 
does not satisfy the McNaughtan Rules, then they are entitled to an acquittal on the 
grounds of lack of mens rea (like Clarke). 
In the case of Thomas, the appellant’s conviction was quashed because 
‘the jury may well have supposed that the appellant would only have been incapable 
of forming the necessary specific intentions if she had been legally insane…In our 
judgment, that first matter was a material irregularity which justifies the quashing of 
the appellant's conviction.’106  
So as the law stands a defendant who doesn’t satisfy the McNaughtan Rules can argue 
lack of mens rea on the basis of a mental disorder (or at least supported by evidence of 
a mental disorder), and there is no way to impose treatment, supervision or monitoring. 
The Law Commission also takes this view in their discussion document: 
‘1: That if a person is non-culpable because of mental disorder, then that 
should be the true ground for the verdict, not the presence or absence of mens 
rea 
We consider that the analysis which depends purely on whether the elements of an 
offence (the actus reus and mens rea) are satisfied can lead to unwelcome results, 
as described below, and also that it fails to reflect what a mental disorder defence is 
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about. Our analysis of the foundations of an insanity defence led us to conclude that 
it is essentially a denial of criminal responsibility due to a person’s lack of capacity. 
That effectively amounts to a plea: “I, the defendant, deny responsibility for what it is I 
have done. I do so on the basis of my medical condition at the time, irrespective of 
whether I could be said to have had any particular mens rea at the time”. If the 
accused’s medical condition explains why he or she either did or did not have the 
relevant mens rea for the offence, then the defence should apply. Similarly, if his or 
her medical condition was such that he or she did not have the capacity to avoid 
performing the proscribed conduct, then it does not matter whether the offence 
required any particular mens rea or not.’107 
Their conclusion is that 
‘there should be a defence which allows for a special verdict where the case is not 
proved against the accused because of his or her mental disorder as well as where it 
is proved because of the mental disorder.’108 
The expanded test for capacity would apply to more defendants pleading a lack of mens 
rea due to a medical condition (whether a mental disorder or not), and so a greater 
number of potentially dangerous people would be monitored and treated. This would 
have cost implications. There might also be implications for stigmatization of more 
people who pose only a minor risk. Further, the Law Commission’s proposals do not 
seem to prevent bypassing of social control mechanisms.  
6.5.2 De facto categorization on the basis of continuing dangerousness 
It seems to be implicit in some of the cases where lack of mens rea alone as the basis 
                                                     
107 Law Commission (2013), see footnote 3 at Ch 2.18. 
108 Law Commission (2013), see footnote 3 at Ch 2.34. 
218 
 
 
 
of the defence that a judgment has been made about lack of continuing danger to the 
public.  May Clarke was no danger, but Stephenson potentially was. There are cases 
where it seems likely that the McNaughtan Rules would be satisfied, and there seems to 
be no compulsion to try to prove insanity where the defendant is arguing a lack of mens 
rea due to a mental disorder. This appears to come under prosecutorial discretion. Roch 
LJ in Thomas quoted Watkins LJ in R v Dickie  
‘We have come to the conclusion that we are unable to say there are no 
circumstances in which a judge may of his own volition raise an issue of insanity and 
leave it to a jury, provided that if he chooses to do so there is relevant evidence 
which goes to all the factors involved in the M'Naghten test. We envisage, however, 
that circumstances in which a judge will do that will be exceptional and very rare.’109  
Roch LJ adds 
 
‘There may be cases, for example, cases of homicide, where an accused has raised 
a defence of, say, diminished responsibility where a judge would be entitled, of his 
own volition to raise the issue of insanity with the jury. However, it would have to be a 
rare and exceptional case. This was not such a case in our judgment.’  
This pragmatic approach was made more explicit in the case of Brian Thomas (see 
3.4.2). The two experts instructed by prosecution and defence agreed that Mr Thomas 
was suffering from a sleep disorder. They also agreed that Mr Thomas required further 
psychiatric treatment, more for his own wellbeing than public safety (he was suicidal 
following the incident), and so the insanity verdict was appropriate110. The prosecution 
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therefore did not pursue a guilty verdict, but required a special verdict for any necessary 
social control measures. The opinion of a psychiatrist approved under Section 12(2) of 
the Mental Health Act 1983 was required; this was given by Dr Jacob, who stated there 
would be no benefit from making a hospital order. The prosecution offered no further 
evidence, and the trial judge then instructed the jury to acquit. This decision was 
pragmatic and probably fair, but arguably legally incorrect - especially given the 
flexibility of disposal which would permit outpatient supervision or even an absolute 
discharge.  
As one interviewee made clear, the court did not apply the law in the case of Thomas. 
Since his parasomnia was an internal cause, any acquittal should have been by reason 
of insanity. The lack of consistency of the courts is a recurring theme in this author’s 
examination of parasomnia trials. The matter of whether or not Thomas could even 
have received a hospital order is a legal question - are sleep disorders a mental 
disorder under s.1 of the Mental Health Act 1983? If not, then a hospital order would not 
be permitted under the provisions of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 
2004. This is a separate issue from the question of legal insanity.  
6.5.3 Denial of actus reus versus denial of mens rea: a critique 
As discussed above, the current doctrinal basis for the defence of automatism in 
England and Wales is settled as a denial of actus reus on the grounds of the lack of a 
voluntary act. The illegal act alone does not constitute the actus reus, and hence 
automatism is a defence to even strict liability crimes. Another, and this author would 
argue better, way to categorize the effect of automatism is to consider that even strict 
liability crimes have an implicit mental element, such that the person without the ability 
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to avoid committing them, due to lack of control over their limbs for example, has a 
defence. Hawthorne in his analysis of strict liability crimes argues that the requirement 
of mens rea can and should be presumed even when the statute is silent about the 
necessary mens rea, and by this device it is possible to accommodate a minimal fault 
mens rea for many strict liability crimes.111 This approach was advocated by the House 
of Lords in Sweet v Parsley, although the case is not always applied.112 The current 
cases of automatism could then be categorized as purely a denial of mens rea and the 
actus reus would simply be the illegal act. The distinction between denial of actus and 
mens rea arguably results in a great deal of confusion in the criminal courts, which Yeo 
argues is down to the confusion between involuntariness and unconsciousness.113 This 
is discussed in detail above (see above at 6.1.1.). Both these causes of incapacity 
would be subsumed into automatism.  
Both Hart and Williams suggested that as a bare minimum for criminal liability, the 
individual should have been able to avoid the act or omission in question.  
Williams suggests the relevant question is: 
‘Whether the offender could have acted otherwise if he had willed?’114 
 
The Hart formulation is more expansive (see above at 6.4.3), arguably covering a 
subjective test for negligence where mental capacity is impaired.  
McSherry categorizes criminal offences as comprising the following elements: 
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This reflects the recognition that not all defences involve a negation of either actus reus 
or mens rea. She further categorizes the possible mental disorder defences thus: 
 
(Above diagrams from pp 582 & 583 ‘Voluntariness, Intention, and the Defence of Mental Disorder: 
Toward a Rational Approach’ by B McSherry, with kind permission) 
McSherry’s involuntary conduct and unintentional conduct correspond with Yeo’s 
involuntariness and unconsciousness. In this schema, internal or external cause is 
irrelevant. Insanity is a status excuse, necessary only when the actus reus and mens 
rea requirements are met.115 
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6.5.4 Policy Issues About False Defences 
Although it is undisputed that a genuine sleepwalker should be able in law to mount a 
defence based on that condition, the criminal justice system also has to consider the 
policy issues of the possibility of false defences. This is the justification for the reversal 
of the burden of proof for the insanity defence, where there is great difficulty for the 
prosecution to obtain the required proof to the criminal standard.116(Ashworth 2006, 
Jones 1995) Hart sums the problem thus: 
‘Any increase in the number of conditions required to establish criminal liability 
increases the opportunity for deceiving courts or juries by the pretence that some 
condition is not satisfied. When the condition is a psychological factor the chances of 
such pretence succeeding are considerable. Quite apart from the provision made for 
mental disease, the cases where an accused person pleads that he killed in his 
sleep [emphasis mine] or accidentally or in some temporary abnormal state of 
unconsciousness show that deception is certainly feasible. From the Utilitarian point 
of view this may lead to two sorts of ‘losses’. The belief that such deception is 
feasible may embolden a person who would not otherwise risk punishment to take 
their chance of deceiving a jury in this way. Secondly, a criminal who actually 
succeeds in this deception will be left at large, though belonging to the class which 
the law is concerned to incapacitate.’117 
Thus the application of Woolmington118 becomes problematic when it requires the 
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was not acting 
                                                     
116 ASHWORTH, A. (2006) Four threats to the presumption of innocence. International Journal of 
Evidence & Proof, 10(4), pp. 241-78; Jones (1995), see footnote 89. 
117 Hart (1968), see footnote 76, at Ch I, p.19. 
118 [1935] A.C. 462 
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voluntarily.  
6.5.5 Nearly all the expert witnesses agreed that accused persons indulging in 
behaviour known to trigger their parasomnia should be held criminally responsible. 
Some felt that the defendant should be held criminally responsible only where the 
behaviour triggered parasomnia associated with the harmful behaviour displayed e.g. 
sexsomnia. For example, Walker states in an interview for the Daily Mail 
‘[re parasomnias] it’s highly unlikely that somebody would get up, get dressed, find a 
knife and set out to kill, just as it is unlikely that a man would get out of his own bed 
and into somebody else’s to commit rape…I have to say I think some people have 
caught on to this as an alibi’ … Professor Walker stresses that anyone using 
sexsomnia as a defence must be carefully scrutinised.‘ There are certain things I 
think are required for this condition to be genuine,’ he says. ‘I’ve never seen anyone 
with sexsomnia and nothing else: usually they have got a history of night terrors or 
sleep walking or other activity like that, and often from childhood. Often there is a 
family history as well.‘ Although, I suppose, theoretically, someone could sleepwalk 
into someone’s room, get into bed with them and have sex with them, I’ve never seen 
a case with that many logical processes. I would think that would be vanishingly 
rare.’119 
There is concern among lawyers and professionals about the ubiquity of psychological 
and psychiatric testimony in the courtroom, and this is particularly problematic in light of 
Morse’s psycho-legal error, which is where the person believes that “causation, 
                                                     
119 HALE, B. (2012) Are men getting away with rape by pretending they were asleep? Rising number of 
attackers are trying extraordinary defence that they had 'sexsomnia'. Daily Mail (Dec 22nd) News. 
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especially abnormal causation, is per se an excusing condition”.120  There was 
particular concern about the evidence offered where defendants were advancing the 
defence of automatism in relation to alleged sexsomnia, partly because of the almost 
universal consumption of large amounts of alcohol by the defendant.  
 
6.6 Summary 
 
The Latin aphorism ‘In somno voluntas non erat libera’ (A sleeping person has no free 
will) sums up the legal approach to criminal responsibility and parasomnia. Although it is 
quite clear that folk psychology holds that the sleepwalker is not responsible for his 
actions, it is useful to deconstruct the basis of the sleepwalking defence and legal 
automatism more generally. This enables us to treat similar conditions such as 
hypoglycaemia consistently with sleepwalking. It also enables us to justify excusing 
people suffering parasomnias, even if it were shown that they are not in the strict sense 
“asleep” during these episodes.  
                                                     
120 MORSE, S.J. (2005-2006) Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note. 
Ohio St. J. Crim. L., 3, pp. 397-412 
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Chapter 7: Expert Evidence 
 
Expert evidence is the main concern of this thesis. There are general issues with 
scientific expert evidence, and some specific issues about expert evidence on the 
parasomnia defence. This chapter is concerned primarily with the legal rules on expert 
evidence, but also deals with some general principles of the sociology of scientific 
knowledge. Expert evidence is central to the defences of automatism and insanity, as 
these issues are nearly always outside the jury’s expertise1.  
  
7.1 Duties of an Expert Witness 
 
An expert witness’s primary duty is to the court, as per Part 33.2 of the Criminal 
Procedure Rules: Expert’s duty to the court: 
(1) An expert must help the court to achieve the overriding objective by giving 
objective, unbiased opinion on matters within his expertise. 
2) This duty overrides any obligation to the person from whom he receives 
instructions or by whom he is paid. 
3) This duty includes an obligation to inform all parties and the court if the expert’s 
opinion changes from that contained in a report served as evidence or given in a 
statement.2 
                                                     
1 R v Smith (Stanley) [1979] 1 WLR 1445; an exception is the effect of sneezing (Woolley [1998] CLY 
914); medical evidence always required for insanity as per the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness 
to Plead) Act 1991. 
2 Criminal Procedure Rules 2013 (SI 2013 No 1554). 
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Rix describes in greater detail the duties of a psychiatrist acting as an expert witness 
(most of which is applicable to forensic sleep experts). He states  
‘A psychiatrist who acts as an expert witness is: 
● a citizen 
● a doctor 
● a psychiatrist 
● an expert witness’3 
There are tensions between these different roles. As a citizen and expert witness, there 
is a duty to assist the administration of justice. The doctor may be unused to a 
consultation where it has to be explained to the person being examined that there is no 
confidentiality, and where the focus is not the examinee’s best interests. He may also 
feel a duty to protect the interests of the defendant as a doctor – some of the 
interviewees seemed to identify with the plight of the defendant. The expert witness 
should have no commitment to either the defendant or complainant. 
Rix also describes the drawbacks of being too ready to change a professional opinion 
without good reason: 
‘If you acquire a reputation among barristers as a ‘hired gun’ you may have some 
short term gains but when the barristers are sitting as recorders or have been 
elevated to the bench you should be not surprised if your opinions carry little weight 
with them.’ 
                                                     
3 RIX, K.J.B. (2011) Expert Psychiatric Evidence. London: RCPsych Publications. 
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The best efforts of an expert to avoid conscious bias may not eliminate the issue of 
partiality - a recent study showed that expert opinions were biased toward to the side 
that had instructed them.4 The expert witness’s freedom to express an opinion that 
helps the court, rather than their client, was until 2011 protected by immunity from civil 
action. However, in Jones v Kaney5 this immunity was partially revoked, at least for 
experts instructed by the party.  
The ruling is hard to square with the maxim that the expert’s duty is to the court. The 
majority argued that that the expert’s duties to the court and to his client were not 
incompatible, Lord Dyson asserting 
‘There is no conflict between the duty owed by an expert to his client and his 
overriding duty to the court. His duty to the client is to perform his function as an 
expert with the reasonable skill and care of an expert drawn from the relevant 
discipline. This includes a duty to perform the overriding duty to assist the court. Thus 
the discharge of the duty to the court cannot be a breach of duty to the client. If an 
expert gives an independent and unbiased opinion which is within the range of 
reasonable expert opinions he will have discharged his duty both to the court and his 
client.’6  
Baroness Hale dissented, arguing 
‘it is impossible to say what effect the removal of immunity will have, either on the 
care with which the experts give their evidence, or upon their willingness to do so. It 
                                                     
4 MURRIE, D.C., BOCCACCINI, M.T., GUARNERA, L.A. and RUFINO, K.A. (2013) Are Forensic Experts 
Biased by the Side That Retained Them? Psychological Science, 24(10), pp. 1889-97. 
5 [2011] UKSC 13 
6 See footnote 5 at para 99. 
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is certainly possible that it will reduce any tendency to act as a “hired gun” and that 
would be a very good thing; but it is also possible that it will increase the pressure on 
an expert to stick to her previous opinion for fear of being sued if she retracts or 
modifies it. It is possible that it will have no effect at all upon the willingness of 
experts to give evidence; it is also possible that, in certain fields at least, it will reduce 
their willingness to do so, or even to become involved in the particular field of practice 
at all.’7 
This decision may make experts more reticent about changing their opinion, and so 
make joint meetings a pointless exercise. The other effect of Kaney v Jones is an 
apparent greater willingness to permit parties to instruct a fresh expert, as happened in 
Stallwood v David. This should only apply in very limited circumstances according to 
Teare J. who states 
‘where a court is asked for permission to adduce expert evidence from a third expert 
in circumstances where the applicant is dissatisfied with the opinion of his own expert 
following the experts' discussion it should only do so where there is good reason to 
suppose that the applicant's first expert has agreed with the expert instructed by the 
other side or has modified his opinion for reasons which cannot properly or fairly 
support his revised opinion, such as those mentioned in the note in the White Book to 
which I have referred. It is likely that it will be a rare case in which such good reason 
can be shown. Where good reason is shown the court will have to consider whether, 
having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the overriding objective to deal 
with cases justly, it can properly be said that further expert evidence is “reasonably 
                                                     
7 See footnote 5 at para 18. 
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required to resolve the proceedings”.’8 
McDuff J in Singh v O’Shea disagreed with this restrictive approach, stating 
 
‘As a matter of principle the court has a wide discretion and a judge case managing a 
case uses that wide discretion to ensure that expert evidence shall be restricted to 
that which is reasonably required to resolve the proceedings. The judge was 
exercising that discretion in the court below when he made his decision.’9  
Whether this same approach would be taken in criminal trials is uncertain. 
 
7.2 Admissibility 
 
The English courts have been traditionally quite liberal about the inclusion of expert 
evidence. The requirements as laid out in the Australian case of Bonython (cited with 
approval in English cases10) are: 
 “whether the subject matter of the opinion is such that a person without instruction 
or experience in the area of knowledge or human experience would be able to 
form a sound judgment on the matter without  the assistance of a witness 
possessing special knowledge or experience in the area” 
 “whether the subject matter of the opinion forms part of a body of knowledge or 
experience which is sufficiently organized or recognized to be accepted as a 
reliable body of knowledge or experience, a special acquaintance with which by 
                                                     
8 [2006] EWHC 2600 (QB) at para 21.  
9 [2009] EWHC 1251 (QB) at para 9. 
10 HOOPER, A. and ORMEROD, D. (eds.). (2013) Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2014. Oxford: OUP; 
ROBERTS, A. (2008) ‘Drawing on expertise: legal decision-making and the reception of expert evidence’. 
Criminal Law Review, 6, pp. 443-62. 
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the witness would render his opinion of assistance to the court” 
 “whether the witness has acquired by study or experience sufficient knowledge of 
the subject to render his opinion of value in resolving the issues before the 
court”11  
The breadth of this definition has been criticized. On the other hand, it has the effect of 
excluding expert testimony in matters deemed to be the realm of the jury, like 
provocation (R v Turner ) which are considered to come under “common knowledge” or 
the veracity of a witness ( unless the witness is abnormal).12 As seen below, it can 
include the identification of the defendant where special technology is required. The 
effect of Turner is that  experts can testify in general about the effects of a sexual 
assault (for example, post-traumatic stress disorder) in order to counter possible jury 
biases based on ‘rape myths’, but they cannot attest to the veracity of the particular 
complainant as this would be considered ‘oath-helping’13. In effect, they can provide 
“group character testimony”. 
7.2.1 Reliability criteria and the gatekeeper function 
The test in English law for admissibility accords with the long-standing Frye test adopted 
in the USA, which requires that the findings or technique “be sufficiently established to 
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs”.14 However 
the USA requirements have evolved, with a trio of cases transforming the criteria for 
                                                     
11 The Queen v. Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45 
12 R v Turner [1975] 2 WLR 56; [1975] QB 834; this might exclude the application of fMRI and EEG “lie 
detection” techniques. 
13 Redmayne considers the comparison of evidence in Turner to ‘oath-helping’ or compurgation 
unconvincing (REDMAYNE, R. (2001) Expert Evidence and Criminal Justice. Oxford: OUP, at p.167). 
14 R v Strudwick and Merry (1994) 99 Cr App R 326; R v Gilfoyle [2001] 2 Cr. App. R. 5; HOOPER, A. and 
ORMEROD, D. (eds.). (2013) Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2014. Oxford: OUP. 
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admissibility of scientific and technical evidence - Daubert v Merrell-Dow 
Pharmaceutical, Inc, General Electric Co. v Joiner, and Kumho Tires Co. v 
Carmichael.15 These cases led to the amendment of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. This states that: 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: 
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; 
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the 
case. 
Rule 702 focuses on the methodology rather than the conclusion of the expert. It has 
been assumed by some commentators to be a stricter test than Frye, but in this author’s 
opinion it is not, as the general acceptance requirement is abolished. FRE 403 could in 
theory be more helpful in excluding unreliable evidence: 
‘Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading 
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence.’ 
This conclusion is shared by Brown and Murphy where they state 
                                                     
15 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc (1993) 113 S. Ct 2786; General Electric Co. v Joiner 
(1997) 522 US 136; Kumho Tire Co., Ltd v Carmichael (1999) 119 US 1167 
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‘we argue that Rule 403, rather than the Daubert (or similar) rules governing scientific 
evidence, provides both (a) the necessary individualized assessment of claims and 
(b) room to allow the technology, as well as the public understanding of the 
technology, to improve and adapt, rather than being defined by Daubert (or similar) 
rulings that may be categorically and too broadly applied.’16 
However, Edmond et al note  
‘Techniques deemed admissible under Rule 702 might, in theory, run afoul of Rule 
403. Courts reluctant to tangle with complex reliability debates might go directly to 
Rule 403 to make a determination on the admissibility of evidence … Because many 
jurisdictions maintain an explicit reliability standard, once expert opinion evidence is 
deemed admissible, and therefore implicitly reliable, there is limited scope for 
subsequently finding that the evidence will create unfair prejudice. Admissibility 
standards (such as Rule 702), in effect, almost always trump exclusionary discretions 
(such as Rule 403).’(italics mine)17 
The Law Commission’s preference is for an enhanced gatekeeper modelled on Rule 
702.18 Expert opinion could be excluded if it was not sufficiently reliable, based on the 
following considerations: 
(a) the opinion is soundly based, and 
(b) the strength of the opinion is warranted having regard to the grounds on which it 
is based. 
                                                     
16 BROWN, T. and MURPHY, E. (2010) Through a scanner darkly: Functional neuroimaging as evidence 
of a criminal defendant's past mental states. Stanford Law Review, 62(April), pp. 1119-1208. 
17 EDMOND, G., COLE, S., CUNLIFFE, E. and ROBERTS, A. (2013) Admissibility compared: the 
reception of incriminating expert evidence (i.e., forensic science) in four adversarial jurisdictions. 
University of Denver Criminal Law Review, 3(1), pp. 31-109. 
18 LAW COMMISSION. (2011) Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales. No. 325. 
London: The Stationery Office. 
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Reasons for excluding an opinion for being insufficiently reliable would include: 
(a) the opinion is based on a hypothesis which has not been subjected to sufficient 
scrutiny (including, where appropriate, experimental or other testing), or which has 
failed to stand up to scrutiny; 
(b) the opinion is based on an unjustifiable assumption; 
(c) the opinion is based on flawed data; 
(d) the opinion relies on an examination, technique, method or process which was not 
properly carried out or applied, or was not appropriate for use in the particular case; 
(e) the opinion relies on an inference or conclusion which has not been properly 
reached. 
The relevant facts for deciding these questions are detailed further by the Law 
Commission: 
(a) The extent and quality of the data on which the opinion is based, and the validity 
of the methods by which they were obtained. 
(b) If the opinion relies on an inference from any findings, whether the opinion 
properly explains how safe or unsafe the inference is (whether by reference to 
statistical significance or in other appropriate terms). 
(c) If the opinion relies on the results of the use of any method (for instance, a test, 
measurement or survey), whether the opinion takes proper account of matters, such 
as the degree of precision or margin of uncertainty, affecting the accuracy or 
reliability of those results. 
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(d) The extent to which any material upon which the opinion is based has been 
reviewed by others with relevant expertise (for instance, in peer-reviewed 
publications), and the views of those others on that material. 
(e) The extent to which the opinion is based on material falling outside the expert's 
own field of expertise. 
(f) The completeness of the information which was available to the expert, and 
whether the expert took account of all relevant information in arriving at the opinion 
(including information as to the context of any facts to which the opinion relates). 
(g) Whether there is a range of expert opinion on the matter in question; and, if there 
is, where in the range the opinion lies and whether the expert's preference for the 
opinion proffered has been properly explained. 
(h) Whether the expert's methods followed established practice in the field and, if 
they did not, whether the reason for the divergence has been properly explained. 
Most importantly in the application of this test, if there is any doubt about whether expert 
testimony is opinion or fact, it should be considered to be opinion. Whether or not this 
would make a substantial difference to the quality of biomedical expert evidence is 
debatable, although it would certainly seem capable of excluding the APT. The correct 
application of these criteria requires a level of scientific literacy which is arguably often 
lacking in the judiciary. There is a large role for expert opinion for two major reasons, 
both epistemological: firstly that medical knowledge may be limited in a particular field; 
and secondly that certain assessments are judgments, which can be based on current 
knowledge but never ascertained with any precision. Whether or not an episode was 
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parasomnia is a matter of opinion for both these reasons.  
7.2.2 Difficulties with biomedical evidence 
The range of actions possible during a parasomnia episode is reasonably well 
described, but it may be either incomplete or over-inclusive. Medicine does present 
particular difficulties in this regard as much of the scientific research is observational. 
LeFort, the French surgeon who classified three types of mid-face fractures, only used 
his club on the facial skeletons of cadavers19 – clearly it would be unethical to inflict 
injuries on living human subjects. These same difficulties do not apply to the physical 
sciences.  Generally “natural experiments” have to be relied on to determine the 
causation or likely effect of injuries or other lesions, like the unfortunate accident of 
Phineas Gage. Gage was an American railroad worker who had a tamping iron enter 
below his eye socket and exit through the top of his skull. He miraculously survived but 
his behaviour dramatically changed (there is some debate about the degree of 
impairment he suffered).20 These natural experiments only take us so far however, and 
the actual lesion is difficult to define precisely (whereas experimental lesions in animal 
experiments for example can be precisely delineated). The retrospective assessment of 
a parasomnic episode is intrinsically subjective, as the accused’s brain state cannot be 
determined in the absence of electroencephalographic monitoring. 
Cartwright’s hypothesis that a sleepwalker can be “primed” is an example of a theory 
which, if shown to be correct, would dramatically widen the spectrum of behaviours 
possible during somnambulism. The strongest assertion that an expert can validly 
                                                     
19 PATTERSON, R. (1991) The Le Fort fractures: René Le Fort and his work in anatomical pathology. 
Can J Surg, 34(2), 183-4. 
20 DAMASIO, H., GRABOWSKI, T., FRANK, R., GALABURDA, A.M. and DAMASIO, A.R. (1994) The 
Return of Phineas Gage: Clues About the Brain from The Skull of a Famous Patient. Science, 265(5162), 
pp. 1102-05. 
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advance about a parasomnia episode is that it is consistent with a particular 
parasomnia. They can also comment on the other circumstantial factors that will support 
automatism, such as a lack of motive and behaviour contrary to the accused’s 
character. These statements neither would nor should be excluded by a Daubert-type 
test.  
7.2.3 Application to expert evidence on forensic sleep disorders 
Both the quality of the observational data supporting an association between alcohol 
and sleepwalking, and the interpretation of polysomnographic data during an alcohol 
provocation test (APT), may well be brought into question. The support in the literature 
for the APT is not robust, with insufficient data from polysomnography on the effect of 
alcohol in sleepwalkers. 
Pressman believes that a Daubert-type test would exclude testimony about the effect of 
alcohol on sleepwalking, stating 
‘the hypothesis of alcohol-induced sleep-walking has no valid evidence-based 
scientific support and should be considered “junk science.” 21 
Whilst it might exclude the use of the APT, it probably would not exclude expert 
witnesses giving their opinion on alcohol and sleepwalking based on their professional 
experience. Again it can be argued that it should not - if we accept sleepwalkers’ 
accounts of what triggers their sleepwalking, we must accept sleepwalkers’ accounts of 
the effect of alcohol. Such testimony is absolutely appropriate, and does not fall into the 
ipse dixit22 fallacy. Wynne comments that in the legal sphere, deconstruction of expert 
                                                     
21 PRESSMAN, M.R. (2011) Preface: Common Misconceptions About Sleepwalking and Other 
Parasomnias. Sleep Medicine Clinics, 6(4), pp. xiii-xvii. 
22 This translates as ‘he himself said it’. 
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opinion can end in deconstruction of the basis of a field of knowledge.23 Thus if some 
experts deconstruct the attribution of sleepwalking episodes to alcohol consumption, 
they also deconstruct the entire basis for categorizing parasomnic episodes.  
 
7.3 Issues in the expert witness community 
 
The literature on alcohol and sleepwalking illustrates another fallacy. Where expert 
witnesses extensively cite self-authored review articles, they replace the ipse dixit 
fallacy with the ipse scribit24 fallacy. If peer review of the academic literature was 
influenced by a group of experts with a particular opinion, this would further complicate 
the application of the literature in expert testimony. There is evidence that this is the 
case with the issue of alcohol and sleepwalking - this author has had reports of this, and 
also personal experience when submitting a co-authored paper for peer review. Not 
only is it difficult to publish articles linking alcohol and sleepwalking, it is even difficult to 
get a major sleep journal to accept letters and short notes about the debate. This makes 
it even more difficult to mobilize the scientific community to obtain robust data to refute 
or support the hypothesis.  
The latest version of the diagnostic criteria for sleep disorders, the ICSD-3, again 
demonstrates the dominance of one body of opinion. It is now stated that 
‘Disorders of arousal should not be diagnosed in the presence of alcoholic 
intoxication. The behavior of the alcohol-intoxicated individual may superficially 
                                                     
23 WYNNE, B (1989) Establishing the rules of law. In SMITH, R. and WYNNE, B. (eds), (1989) Expert 
Evidence: Interpreting Science in the Law. London: Routledge. 
24 This translates as 'he himself wrote it'. 
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resemble that of the sleepwalker. However, the sleepwalker is typically severely 
cognitively impaired, but with only limited motor impairment. The alcohol-intoxicated 
individual’s level of cognitive functioning may be reduced, but not absent, whereas 
motor behavior is often severely impaired.’25 
There are some eminent forensic sleep experts who dissent from this assertion, for 
example Cartwright26. The ICSD-3 should be treated as an expression of the opinion of 
the authors, rather than scientific fact. However, such documents can be extremely 
influential, and might lead to the exclusion of all alcohol-induced parasomnias. 
 
7.4 Junk science 
 
The concept of “junk science” suggests that it is easy to differentiate between “good” 
and “bad” science. It has, however, proven remarkably difficult for the courts to 
distinguish between the two. As Mercer states 
‘The difficulty in actually defining simple legal rules for demarcating real science from 
junk science, and plausibly dismissing numerous scientific controversies and popular 
concerns with new science and technology as merely 'junk science'-led paranoia, has 
been difficult to convert into sustainable policies. Implementing simple demarcation 
criteria between science and non-science have proved more difficult in practice than 
advocates have anticipated.’27 
                                                     
25 AMERICAN ACADEMY OF SLEEP MEDICINE. (2014) International Classification of Sleep Disorders. 
3rd Ed. American Academy of Sleep Medicine. 
26 Personal communication. 
27 MERCER, D. (2002) The Intersection of Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) and Law: Some 
Themes and Policy Reflections. Law Text Culture, 6, pp. 137-58. 
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The Law Commission’s proposals contain a number of references to peer review and 
established practice, proving the point. Moreover it could be suggested that the most 
important distinction is how the science is used. Science can be valuable and proven, 
but nonetheless have greater prejudicial than probative value in the courtroom. 
Currently this can be excluded on a discretionary basis.28  Also evidence can be 
excluded under Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984  
‘In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution 
proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the 
circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the 
admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the 
proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.’ 
Both these measures only apply to prosecution evidence.29 In Robb it was noted that  
‘if the Crown are permitted to call an expert witness of some but tenuous 
qualifications the burden of proof may imperceptibly shift and a burden be cast on the 
defendant’.30  
These doctrines mean that the defence can rely on significantly weaker expert 
evidence, which is an issue observed with the parasomnia defence. The Appeal Court 
showed great faith in ability of cross-examination to refute dubious scientific evidence 
when it added that 
‘the appellant had ample opportunity to meet and rebut Dr Baldwin’s evidence, if he 
could.’ 
                                                     
28 R v Sang [1980] AC 402 
29 Lobban v The Queen [1995] 1 W.L.R. 877 
30 R v Robb (Robert McCheyne) (1991) 93 Cr App R 161 
240 
 
 
 
In Luttrell, the court commented that 
‘evidence might be so lacking in “prima facie reliability” that it has no probative force 
or its probative force is too slight to influence a decision: R. v Clarke [1995] 2 
Cr.App.R. 425 , 432.’31  
In the case of Clarke (Robert Lee), an expert in facial mapping gave evidence as to 
whether the defendant was the man on the video images captured by security cameras, 
as there were no eye witnesses to the bank robbery. The judge ruled that this evidence 
was admissible and 
‘[t]he matter was left to the jury on the basis that it was for them to assess that expert 
evidence and to decide whether the technique was reliable and whether it reliably 
demonstrated that the appellant was the man on the photographs taken in the 
bank.’32 
This puts great responsibility on the lay persons in the jury. This is arguably a matter for 
the field of science and technology studies rather than just the courts and scientists to 
resolve. Any judgment of the probative value of evidence versus its prejudicial value 
cannot ignore societal influences. For example, the feminist argument against the 
‘sexsomnia defence’33 is partially based on the perception that science which 
exonerates the accused is more likely to be believed within a “rape culture”, regardless 
of its intrinsic scientific worth.  
R v Turner is an example of the exclusion of psychiatric evidence in relation to the 
                                                     
31 R v Luttrell and Others [2004] 2 Cr App R 31 
32 R v Clarke (Robert Lee) [1995] 2 Cr App R 425 
33 XU, M. (2009) Sexsomnia: A Valid Defence to Sexual Assault? J. Gender Race & Just., 12, pp. 687-
712;_TWISTY (Dec 15th 2005), Raper's Delight [Homepage of I Blame The Patriarchy], [Online]. 
Available: http://blog.iblamethepatriarchy.com/2005/12/01/rapers-delight/. 
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partial defence of provocation.34 However there is rather more to Turner than just this 
aspect of ‘common knowledge’.35 The decision in Turner was also based on the low 
probative value of the psychiatric testimony, accompanied by the danger of the jury 
being misled about the objective standard for provocation. The use of expert evidence 
could add nothing to the jury’s deliberations, which are guided by their knowledge of the 
‘reasonable man’. On the other hand, cases like Emery demonstrate circumstances 
where the jury may require the help of psychologists or psychiatrists to understand the 
vulnerability of an individual to duress.36 Mitchell, Mackay and Brookbanks argue it is 
unjust that individuals that have certain conditions are held to the same standards as 
the general population, arguing  
‘The term “undesirable characteristics” is rather ambiguous and refers to two 
fundamentally different groups of individuals. First, there are those who share the 
same basic values as ordinary citizens but they suffer from a mental abnormality or 
personality trait. Dressler's argument is that such cases breach what he calls the 
“oxymoron principle”, that the jury should not, for example, be asked to consider how 
the “reasonable paranoid” would have reacted. But this problem only arises because 
of the misguided use of the reasonable or ordinary person test. The second major 
group of persons with “undesirable characteristics” do not share the same basic 
social values as the vast majority of ordinary citizens. The American Model Penal 
Code describes such characteristics as reflecting “idiosyncratic moral values”. 
Dressler cited by way of an example an assassin who believes it is right to kill 
                                                     
34 [1975] 2 WLR 56 
35 REDMAYNE, R. (2001) Expert Evidence and Criminal Justice. Oxford: OUP. 
36 R v Emery (1993) 14 Cr App R (S) 394 
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political leaders. Horder spoke of a racist who believes “it is the gravest of insults for 
a coloured person to speak to a white man unless spoken to first”. Unless such 
characteristics reflect a condition which brings the individual within a recognised 
category of legal excuse--some form of mental abnormality is perhaps the most 
obvious, but some individuals in this group will almost certainly have no excuse of 
this or any other sort which the law currently recognises--they should be excluded 
because they would effectively contradict the criminal law's attempt to maintain social 
values.’37 
Redmayne stresses that 
‘evidence which falls victim to the balancing process is nearly always, as in Turner, of 
minimal probative value, and that often the dangers of admitting it would be 
significant.’38 
These criteria apply in this author’s opinion to the APT. The weak claims that can be 
made for the APT can be contrasted with the dangers of admitting it in evidence. It is 
common knowledge that parasomnias are rare, but alcoholic intoxication and blackouts 
are relatively common; further, they are foreseeable consequences of alcohol 
consumption. The admission of the APT carries with it the arguably incorrect inference 
that it can tell the jury something about the episode in question.   
Psychological and psychiatric testimony should include consideration of the possibility 
of malingering, exaggeration or functional overlay, and the steps taken to detect it, both 
in the clinical assessment and in any tests performed. This should reduce the prejudicial 
                                                     
37 MITCHELL, B.J., MACKAY, R.D. and BROOKBANKS, W.J. (2008) Pleading for provoked killers: in 
defence of Morgan Smith. Law Quarterly Review, 124(Oct), pp. 675-705. 
38 See footnote 35, at p.148. 
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value of such testimony. The expert’s opinion about the character or guilt of the accused 
is irrelevant to the jury, and the courts are keen to exclude testimony that is based on 
these assessments which subvert the purpose of the jury. There is some evidence that 
expert witness testimony is in some instances influenced by these “gut reactions”.39This 
is impossible to eliminate entirely, but its encroachment into testimony is be resisted as  
‘a form of charlatanism that could mislead the court into according too much weight 
to the evidence.’40 
Despite all these safeguards, a review by Edmond et al found that the test for 
admissibility makes little difference to what evidence is accepted in court.41 They quote 
Moriarty and Saks who state 
‘The single most important observation about judicial [gate-keeping] of forensic 
science is that most judges under most circumstances admit most forensic science. 
There is almost no expert testimony so threadbare that it will not be admitted if it 
comes to a criminal proceeding under the banner of forensic science. . . . The 
applicable legal test offers little assurance. The maverick who is a field unto him- or 
herself has repeatedly been readily admitted under Frye, and the complete absence 
of foundational research has not prevented such admission in Daubert 
Jurisdictions.’42 
They compared the US, England and Wales, Australia and Canada, all common law 
jurisdictions. They noted the lack of evidence for reliability for many forms of forensic 
                                                     
39 Personal communication.  
40 ROBERTS, P. (1996) Will you stand up in court? On the admissibility of psychiatric and psychological 
evidence. Journal of Forensic Psychiatry, 7(1), pp. 63-78. 
41 Edmond (2013), see footnote 17. 
42 SAKS, M. and KOEHLER, J. (2008) The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science. Vanderbilt Law 
Review, 61, pp. 199-220. 
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science, most notably fingerprinting (cf the Scottish case of McKie43 where a latent print 
from a crime scene was misattributed to a police officer).  This points to a far more 
fundamental problem with how the courts deal with science, which admissibility rules 
can do little to address. 
7.4.1 Case Study 
There are a number of cases reported in the media that illustrate the weak medical 
evidence that has supported successful automatism and insanity defences. I was able 
to interview one lady who had been profoundly affected by the death of her brother, 
where the accused was found not guilty by reason of insanity. She approved the 
publication of this case study. SW was killed in a head-on collision by a driver who had 
veered onto the other side of the road. He was charged with causing death by careless 
driving, but was found not guilty by reason of insanity. The accused had exhaustive 
medical tests over a year, and one abnormality of questionable significance was found 
on an ambulatory electrocardiogram (ECG) - a three second run of non-sustained 
ventricular tachycardia44. This finding was not reproduced on other tests including a 
repeat ambulatory ECG. His heart was structurally normal on echocardiography45. This 
isolated finding, according to Dr Morley-Davies, cardiologist and cardiac electro-
physiologist at the University Hospital of North Staffordshire, is of little significance, 
since three seconds of arrhythmia would not result in a loss of consciousness (and this 
episode did not appear to be associated with any symptoms). In his opinion, the 
overwhelming likelihood was that an arrhythmia was not the cause of the crash.  
                                                     
43 McKie v Scottish Ministers [2006] CSOH 54 
44 This is an abnormal heart rhythm (or arrhythmia) that can cause loss of consciousness or even cardiac 
arrest. 
45 A scan of the heart using ultrasound. 
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As this was a case of insane automatism, the burden of proof was on the defence to 
prove a cause of insanity on the balance of probabilities. It is difficult to understand why 
the defence succeeded, and reform of the law on automatism probably would not help 
in cases like this. The issue of admissibility of evidence is more relevant. 
 
7.5 Accreditation 
 
There are often only a small number of experts in a particular field. This makes 
validation problematic, as acknowledged by the House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee who suggested the involvement of overseas experts in their 
report.46 It also may mean that experts are more deferential towards each other’s 
opinion, as the experts all know each other. This is not always the case, as public 
disagreements have shown - familiarity can just make the conflicts all the more heated. 
In the case of forensic sleep disorders, the divide appears to be largely trans-Atlantic. 
These differences of opinion have led to General Medical Council (GMC) involvement in 
some cases, although it is the courts that are the experts in deciding what the duties of 
expert witnesses are, and whether particular experts have fulfilled them or not. In this 
respect, it is perhaps regrettable that the decision of Judge Collins in the High Court in 
Meadow47 was overturned. He ruled that the GMC should not invoke disciplinary 
proceedings unless a trial judge commented on the quality of expert evidence given. 
Trial judges have criticized medical expert witnesses on rare occasions, with Sedley LJ 
                                                     
46 HOUSE OF COMMONS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE. (2004-2005) Forensic Science 
on Trial. London: The Stationery Office, at para 136. 
47 Meadow v General Medical Council [2006] EWHC 146 (Admin) 
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describing Dr Donegan’s evidence as “junk science” in Re B (A Child) (Immunisation: 
Parental Rights),48 an appeal from the Court of Protection relating to MMR vaccination. 
However, judges would be loath to criticize an expert witness merely on the basis of 
contested science, because this might dramatically affect the range of opinions experts 
might volunteer.  
The Court of Appeal in Meadow disagreed with Judge Collins, and ruled that the GMC 
was able to adjudicate where such issues impacted on fitness to practice.49 It is unclear 
when, if ever, a doctor’s expert witness work would impact on their fitness to practice. 
The fact that expert witnesses from overseas are not members of UK organizations and 
so not subject to UK professional regulation is a bone of contention with some who have 
been the subject of complaints. There are registers and organizations for expert 
witnesses but there are no mandatory requirements for registration or membership.  
The presumption of innocence may justify the requirements for medical expert evidence 
for the prosecution being different from those for the defence. For example, theories 
about a criminal cause for certain childhood injuries supporting a prosecution for child 
abuse need to meet certain standards to satisfy the presumption of innocence. The 
defendant on the other hand may be entitled to use less solid evidence to raise 
reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury. Certainly fanciful and far-fetched theories 
should still not be admitted, but lack of a rigorous research base should not be the sole 
ground for excluding exculpatory evidence. Another significant difference is that not 
uncommonly in child abuse cases there may be dispute about whether or not there was 
a crime – the post-mortem findings may be non-specific where smothering is suspected, 
                                                     
48 [2003] EWCA Civ 1148 
49 Meadow v General Medical Council [2006] EWCA Civ 1390 
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for example. In sleepwalking cases the illegal act is usually not disputed, and the issue 
is simply one of criminal responsibility. 
There is no easy solution to the controversy over alcohol and sleepwalking. This author 
considered a range of solutions, and the following were rejected for the reasons given 
below: accreditation; an enhanced test for admissibility; and peer review. The viable 
solutions included: an enhanced gatekeeper committee; an external review; and 
formulation of guidelines by a professional body.  
Accreditation was rejected for several reasons. It does not guarantee the validity of the 
opinion, merely the experience and qualifications of the expert witness. Accreditation 
may lead to less scrutiny of expert evidence, and so paradoxically exacerbate the 
problem. Accreditation may not address the persistence of attitudes and beliefs that are 
not grounded in objective scientific evidence. This is not to say that accreditation or 
registration is not a good idea, but it is only really a mechanism for excluding the 
unqualified rather than for ensuring the quality of evidence given. One participant who 
was not a sleep expert (he was a forensic psychiatrist) was involved in a case because 
the accused had not volunteered a history of sleepwalking to his solicitors. Nonetheless 
his expert evidence could not be faulted in this author’s opinion. There are voluntary 
registers of expert witnesses in the UK e.g. the Law Society Expert Witness Register. 
The Netherlands have a statutory expert witness register, the Nederlands Register 
Gerechtelijk Deskundigen (NRGD) which translates as ‘Netherlands Register of Court 
Experts’. Registration is not mandatory, but experts are assessed for suitability for 
admission. They have to reapply every four years and can be removed from the register 
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if they fail to meet the requirements laid down.50 This would be an excellent model to 
follow. There was an abortive attempt to establish an independent registration council, 
the Council for Registration of Forensic Practitioners. This closed down in 2009 after 
financial and professional support was withdrawn.51 
Linked to accreditation is the suggestion that only sleep physicians should be expert 
witnesses on forensic sleep disorders. Certainly sleep physicians would be better able 
to do a holistic assessment of the accused, but that is not sufficient reason to exclude 
the testimony of psychologists and other experts. In any case, it is for the courts to 
decide whose testimony would help the jury, and this author believes they would not 
accept this restriction.  
The approaches that focus on the process and reliability of evidence have much to 
commend them. However, in certain areas where there has been little research, this 
may present an insurmountable barrier to any evidence being adduced at all. This is 
particularly so in medicine for the reasons stated above. Gilson describes the 
demonstration by a prosecution expert witness of the force required to cause the 
injuries seen in the Louise Woodward case52 as “nothing less than a spectacle” (the 
defence rightly objected to the proposed use of a doll to demonstrate this).53 The degree 
of force required to produce shaken baby syndrome is simply not known. Rule 702 
                                                     
50 Website at http://english.nrgd.nl/ 
51 UK REGISTER OF EXPERT WITNESSES. (2009) April 2009-last update, CRFP - RIP... this time it's 
official! Available: http://www.jspubs.com/experts/ewire/itemtext.cfm?ewid=166. 
52 Louise Woodward was a British nanny convicted of manslaughter in the US for killing the baby she was 
looking after; BBC NEWS. (1997) Nov 10th 1997-last update, Special Report: Timetable of Woodward 
case. Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/louise_woodward_case/29232.stm. 
53 Personal communication; NEWBERGER, E. Commonwealth v. Louise Woodward, direct examination 
of Dr. Eli Newberger. Previously available at: 
http://www.elinewberger.com/articles/archive/shakenbaby/testimony.html. (Accessed June 2014, now 
unavailable) 
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might exclude any testimony about shaken baby syndrome given that no testimony 
would be “based on sufficient facts or data” or “the product of reliable principles and 
methods”. Some commentators might consider that this would be entirely appropriate. It 
is this author’s belief that enhanced admissibility rules should not be applied universally, 
and particularly in the very cases which the courts are concerned about. The exclusion 
of scientific evidence simply because of the existence of controversy would be to the 
detriment of the criminal justice system. 
Peer assessment may ensure that the opinion is mainstream, but excluding opinions 
simply on this basis is intuitively wrong – the orthodox opinion is often proved to be 
wrong over time. The peer review process may be unduly influenced by politics and in a 
small area of expertise affected by the close relationships of all those involved. Like 
accreditation, it may do nothing to challenge assumptions that inform expert opinion that 
may be simply perpetuated in the process of professional training. Certain memes may 
persist long after they have been discredited. The current situation regarding alcohol 
and sleepwalking is a good example of the difficulties (see 2.7, 4.2.5, 5.6.2).  
 
7.6 Science and the Law 
 
One interviewee commented that expert witnesses and lawyers “don’t see eye to eye”. 
One of the recurring themes of this thesis is the disjunction between the expert 
witnesses and the lawyers. McCord states  
‘Recently, psychologists have lambasted the legal system as "indifferent or even 
hostile" to psychology in that lawyers guard the courts as their private preserve and 
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"subconsciously resent the entry of experts." Psychologists view lawyers as 
"reactionary and closed minded." Not to be outdone, a representative jurist has 
countered with the assertion that "[a]t best a courtroom makes an awkward 
psychiatrist's couch."'54 
The apparently relentless intrusion of mental health professionals into courtrooms was 
criticized by Cole and Veiel in 2001.55 Their criticisms are often directed at all expert 
evidence, but one that is particularly confined to mental health and neuroscience related 
disciplines when applied to the law is improper causal attribution (see below for Morse’s 
‘fundamental psycholegal error’). Gilson analyzes in his monograph the more general 
difficulties that law and science have. The court wants scientific expertise to assist the 
legal decision-making process, rather than the court having to adjudicate in a scientific 
dispute. An example of this is the appeal by Pressman for the courts to exclude the 
Alcohol Provocation Test from expert evidence. 
Gilson comments about these difficulties that: 
‘Ironically in this predicament, law that operates only under legal/illegal codes is 
pressed for true/false conclusions, which constitutes a serious abuse of its 
processes. In terms of science, neither is it equipped for this, nor in law’s terms 
should there be such expectation, given that the opinion of an expert specifically is 
meant to inform tribunals and inquiries so that they can arrive at reliable conclusions. 
In the event, law has adapted its normal procedures to enable it to test the reliability 
of experts rather than true/false contentions in science but is still without a universal 
                                                     
54 MCCORD, D. (1987) Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the 
Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases. Oregon Law Review, 66(1), pp. 
19-108. 
55 COLES, E.M. and VEIEL, H.O.F. (2001) Expert testimony and pseudoscience: How mental health 
professionals are taking over the courtroom. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 24, pp. 607-625. 
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guarantee of certainty.’56 
However, there are many who disagree with this stark portrayal of a law-science chasm. 
The courts have no difficulties dealing with other types of ambivalent and unreliable 
evidence e.g. eye witness testimony, as Turnbull57 demonstrates. The trial process is 
entirely about giving weight to contradictory pieces of evidences in order to come to a 
conclusion. As Wynne put it 
‘Science, like life in general, involves creating adequate conclusions from inadequate 
premises.’58 
This indubitably applies to the criminal trial also.  
As seen with FRE Rule 702 and other enhanced gatekeeper tests, the law concerns 
itself with the processes involved rather than the conclusions. It cannot adjudicate on 
what is true and false, nor even what is good and bad science. It is important not to fall 
into the trap of ‘scientism’; that is to believe that only scientific methods can establish 
objective and meaningful knowledge and practices. Similarly it should be understood it 
is impossible to totally ‘depoliticize’ science to ensure reliable scientific opinion. Wynne 
and Smith describe the problems with using legal processes: 
‘Policy makers put forward the extreme formality of legal processes - what Tribe calls 
the law’s ‘rituals of precision’ - as an antidote to the procedural imprecision and 
inconsistency invariably found whenever science is subjected to detailed scrutiny. 
This development follows from the widespread belief, which we question, that a lack 
                                                     
56 GILSON, C.G. (2012) The Law-Science Chasm: Bridging Law's Disaffection with Science as Evidence. 
Quid Pro, LLC. 
57 [1977] 1 QB 224. 
58 Wynne (1989), see footnote 23. 
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of consistency in scientific knowledge must be due to a lack of procedural rigour.’59 
In essence, they reject the basis for the application of the principles of evidence-based 
medicine to expert evidence. The effect of prior assumptions, beliefs and/or policy goals 
can be seen in the different interpretations of ambivalent evidence of child abuse. An 
example is the different interpretations of maternal actions on covert video surveillance 
of mothers suspected of child abuse (Munchhausen’s syndrome by proxy aka factitious 
or induced illness).60 
7.6.1 Also, the law wishes to prevent psychologists and psychiatrists straying into areas 
that are the province of the jury (and therefore of folk psychology). Expert evidence 
seen as bolstering a witness’s credibility is excluded as per Robinson.61 This might 
seem to exclude the use of such testimony to support counterintuitive phenomena, as 
Colman and Mackay note in the case of Neeson.62 There has been resistance to the 
use of expert testimony to combat “rape myths”,63 which is a prime example of expert 
testimony which would serve policy ends well. However, since Turner, the courts have 
clarified that expert evidence is admissible where the condition “is complex and … is not 
known by the public at large” (Emery).64  
The parasomnia defence is an area where the folk psychology of the jury is drawn on to 
an extent - the sleepwalker cannot be held responsible because he is asleep. However, 
                                                     
59 SMITH, R. and WYNNE, B. (eds), (1989) Expert Evidence: Interpreting Science in the Law. London: 
Routledge. 
60 MORLEY, C. (1998) Concerns about using and interpreting covert video surveillance. BMJ, 
316(7144)(May 23rd), pp. 1603-05. 
61 [1994] 3 All ER 346 
62 R v Neeson, Belfast Crown 1990 (unreported); COLMAN, A.M. and MACKAY, R.D. (1991) Excluding 
expert evidence: a tale of ordinary folk and common experience. Criminal Law Review, (Nov), pp. 800-10. 
63 ELLISON, L. (2005) Closing the credibility gap: the prosecutorial use of expert witness testimony in 
sexual assault cases. International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 9(4), pp. 239-68. 
64 R v Emery (1993) 14 Cr App R (S) 394 
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expert testimony is permitted to demonstrate that, counterintuitively, the parasomnic can 
be asleep whilst performing various complex tasks.  
7.6.2 Some experts believe that the adversarial system is responsible for many of the 
issues (see Chapter 8) and propose the use of a single expert. Wynne points out the 
problems of this solution: 
‘critics of the adversary process argue that it introduces artificial polarization into 
scientific discourse, demeaning science in public by encouraging unseemly (and by 
implication, false) conflict. They argue that experts should be assigned to the court 
(as happens, for example, in France) not to competing parties, and that issues of 
technical fact can be resolved by expert consensus processes outside legal cross-
examination. Defenders of the adversary system argue that this is elitist and 
unreliable: left to themselves scientists are insufficiently precise, and prone to unseen 
bias. They believe that the truth can therefore be revealed only by exposing through 
adversary cross-examination which side of an expert disagreement is introducing 
covert, extraneous bias (including values or opinions) or incompetence.’65 
This author is of the view that the opinion of certain experts was demonstrably value-
laden e.g. with regard to alcohol and sleepwalking, and so concurs that the adoption of 
a single expert would introduce these biases into the trial.  
7.6.3 Particular issues with neuroscientific evidence and the law (neurolaw) 
Neuroscientific evidence can pose particular issues for the law that other forms of 
expert evidence do not. The area of neurolaw has been defined as an 
‘emerging field of interdisciplinary study that explores the effects of discoveries in 
                                                     
65 Wynne (1989), see footnote 23.  
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neuroscience on legal rules and standards.66 
There have been pleas for caution over the application of neuroscientific evidence in the 
courts, particularly by Morse. He describes the “fundamental psycholegal error”, which 
is  
‘to believe that causation, especially abnormal causation, is per se an excusing 
condition.’ 67 
Many of these complexities do not currently apply in the case of forensic sleep 
disorders; it cannot be doubted that evidence about the defendant’s brain state is pivotal 
to deciding criminal responsibility. Nonetheless, it is important to be cognizant of the 
role of normativity even in this uncontroversial application of descriptive neuroscience. 
Our current legal thinking is dominated by the Latin aphorism In somno voluntas non 
erat libera (A sleeping person has no free will). If it were established that this principle 
did not apply in all cases to all parasomnias, then this issue would need to be revisited. 
If the basis of parasomnia constituting an excuse were based on brain functioning for 
example, then there are questions about the neuroscientific correlates of criminal 
responsibility. Schopp’s monograph discusses this in depth (see for more detail section 
6.4.3). 
7.6.4 Resolution of scientific controversy 
One possibility this author has considered is the formation of a scientific committee, 
overseen by a scientist outside the field and appointed by a judge or lawyer, on the lines 
of the National Science Panel used in the breast implants litigation to address 
                                                     
66The original source of this definition could not be ascertained, but it is used in several articles on the 
subject. 
67 MORSE, S.J. (2005-2006) Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note. 
Ohio St. J. Crim. L., 3, pp. 397-412. 
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causation. Like the National Science Panel, its findings would be available to guide 
juries but would not be binding. However, the National Science Panel addressed an 
issue relevant to thousands of litigants with compensation of billions of dollars at stake. 
The issue of alcohol and sleepwalking is only relevant to perhaps a couple of dozen 
cases each year in the UK.  A more modest and practical proposal is the creation of a 
gate-keeping panel of three specially trained judges to evaluate new theories and 
techniques before they could be used in expert evidence.68 This would be an attractive 
approach for applying to the Alcohol Provocation Test and other new techniques prior to 
acceptance in court. Yet another solution is the establishment of “science courts”. A 
White House Task Force in 1976 proposed 
‘adversary hearing[s] ... governed by a disinterested referee, in which expert 
proponents of the opposing scientific positions argue their cases before a panel of 
scientist/judges. The judges themselves will be established experts in areas adjacent 
to the dispute. They will not be drawn from researchers working in the area of 
dispute, nor will they include anyone with ... [a predisposing] bias.... After the 
evidence has been presented, questioned, and defended, the panel of judges will 
prepare a report ... noting points on which the advocates agree and reaching 
judgments on disputed statements of fact. They may also suggest specific research 
projects to clarify points that remain unsettled.’69 
This format would approximate to a UK public inquiry or Royal Commission. Casper and 
Wellstone reported on the failure of science courts to live up to the ideal of  
                                                     
68 HARTSHORNE, J. and MIOLA, J. (2010) Expert evidence: difficulties and solutions in prosecutions for 
infant harm. Legal Studies, 30(2), pp. 279-300. 
69 TASK FORCE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY GROUP ON ANTICIPATED ADVANCES IN 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. (1993) The Science Court Experiment: An Interim Report. Risk, 4, pp. 
179 (Reprint from 193 Science 654 (1976)). 
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‘an objective, apolitical, value-free forum in which the authority of scientific experts 
could appropriately contribute to the resolution of public policy disputes’ 
in their description of its use to resolve a controversy over a high-voltage power line in 
Minnesota.70 The science court can represent an abrogation of responsibility for policy-
based decision-making to a technocratic institution. Scientists can address narrow 
science-based issues, but when as in Minnesota the questions the stakeholders have is 
a wider policy-based question, the solutions offered are often unsatisfactory. Thus a 
science court would be an unsuitable forum for deciding whether expert witnesses 
should testify about a link between alcohol and sleepwalking, as there are considerable 
policy issues involved. However, the narrow question of the validity of the APT might be 
an appropriate issue for a science court. 
Alternatively, particular scientific institutions could form committees to consider the 
provision of expert evidence in their field and produce consensus statements on the 
validity of certain theories and techniques. The members of these committees would 
have to be very carefully selected to avoid internal politics dominating the process. This 
consensus statement could be used by the courts and the jury to help evaluate expert 
evidence. Although these methods of enquiry facilitate a more detailed examination of 
the science than the criminal trial permits, they are not immune to the problems of 
politics, personalities and vested interests. Again this comes down to the belief that 
‘a lack of consistency in scientific knowledge must be due to a lack of procedural 
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rigour.’71 
The creation of an expert committee to formulate forensic sleep disorder assessment 
guidelines is something this author is pursuing with the main UK body, the British Sleep 
Society. The point about identifying specific research projects is particularly pertinent to 
alcohol and sleepwalking, but also other issues in forensic sleep medicine. Recognizing 
and accommodating entirely legitimate disagreements in expert evidence would be an 
important guiding principle of that committee. So would an acknowledgment of the valid 
policy issues that need to be taken into account. 
 
7.7 Knowledge, truth and the jury 
 
Mahowald asserts 
‘[You] can prove someone is a sleepwalker… But that is only Part 1 of a two-part 
question. The second question is whether he was sleepwalking on the night of the 
murder. Only God can answer that.’72 
In the absence of divine inspiration, the jury has to provide an answer. The expert is 
there to help them come to the best answer possible. The decision of the jury should 
not necessarily be seen as a reflection of the expert evidence given. It seems that peer 
opinions of expert witnesses are shaped by the reporting of trials, which is unfortunate 
because of both the quality of trial reporting and the uncertain status of an acquittal. 
Although an acquittal is often an assertion of innocence, it is not necessarily so - the 
                                                     
71 Smith (1989), see footnote 58. 
72 STRYKER, J. (1999) 1999-last update, ‘Sleepstabbing:The strange science of sleep  behavior and one 
verdict: Guilty!’ . Available: http://www.salon.com/1999/07/08/sleepwalking/. 
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criminal justice system is deliberately weighted in favour of the defendant and acquittal. 
The number of acquittals in sexsomnia trials where alcohol is involved may reflect 
societal problems (so-called “rape culture) rather than deficiencies in the expert 
evidence. 
Ideally all actors should understand the social construction of scientific knowledge if the 
courts are to deal with scientific evidence properly. There are a number of factors that 
contribute to the acceptance of a scientific theory or paradigm as “true”. An area 
common to expert evidence in jury trials is the issue of alethic pluralism. The jury may 
view truth as corresponding to reality and completely objective; this can give rise via TV 
representations of forensic scientific evidence to unrealistic expectations of what 
evidence should be provided, the so-called ‘CSI effect’ which has been widely reported 
and commented on in both the mass media and the academic literature (see below). 
Garfinkel’s classic study of how jurors arrive at decisions concluded that jurors reach 
the decision first and rationalise it later.73 This phenomenon is not unique to jurors. 
Constantinescu describes the hunch in judicial decision-making.74  Moral decision-
making involves reference to the emotional parts of the brain in the limbic system. The 
juror will find a dissonance between the rules of everyday decision-making and legal 
decision-making. The law calls on jurors to use their intuitions as peers of the accused, 
but the realm of parasomnias will be beyond the experience of the typical layperson. 
The defence will instruct an expert witness who will try to persuade the jurors that their 
intuition about what someone can do during sleepwalking is incorrect. The prosecution 
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will often instruct an expert witness who says something different. There are a number 
of different factors that will influence the juror’s preference for one expert’s view or 
another, other than the factual content - credentials and presentation style, for example. 
This author would argue the underlying philosophical position of the criminal justice 
system is social constructionism. Criminal justice is about labelling behaviour and actors 
as blameworthy, which is a socially constructed idea. This is the basis for the “objective 
test” of the “man on the Clapham omnibus” – it is in effect an intuition pump to draw on 
the jury’s knowledge of society’s construction of what is reasonable or honest. This is 
the underlying assumption in my normative analysis of the sleepwalking defence. This 
might not be true for other criminal justice systems based on natural law e.g. Islamic or 
Judaistic, but in particularly in a jurisdiction dominated by legal positivism this is correct. 
However the philosophical position that was taken on the issue of expert evidence and 
parasomnias was that of critical realism. It could be argued that in fact scientific 
knowledge is a social construction, being negotiated content. However, some go 
towards the positivist/realist position by relying on research evidence to positively 
support their expert evidence. Through this reliance on objective research evidence, the 
particular expert seeks to minimise any cognitive bias from the tensions between the 
clinician and expert witness roles. However, this position ignores the way that certain 
evidence is excluded or interpreted. This is illustrated well by the alcohol and 
sleepwalking controversy.  
Expert witnesses need to explain the reasons for their conclusions, as stated in Davie v. 
Edinburgh Corp (No. 2) 
‘Their duty is to furnish the Judge or jury with the necessary scientific criteria for 
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testing the accuracy of their conclusions, so as to enable the Judge or jury to form 
their own independent judgment by the application of these criteria to the facts 
proved in evidence. The scientific opinion evidence, if intelligible, convincing and 
tested, becomes a factor (and often an important factor) for consideration along with 
the whole other evidence in the case, but the decision is for the Judge or jury. In 
particular the bare ipse dixit of a scientist, however eminent, upon the issue in 
controversy, will normally carry little weight, for it cannot be tested by cross-
examination nor independently appraised, and the parties have invoked the decision 
of a judicial tribunal and not an oracular pronouncement by an expert.’75  
However the Court of Appeal in Luttrell didn’t consider it necessary that  
 
‘the methods used are sufficiently explained to be tested in cross-examination and so 
to be verifiable or falsifiable.’76 
Additionally it was stated that 
 
‘[t]he fact that an expert may be wrong is no reason to deprive the jury of such 
assistance as may be gleaned from the evidence.’77 
The case involved the admissibility of lip reading evidence. The court regarded its 
reliability as affecting not just admissibility of the evidence but also the weight that 
evidence should be given (which is an issue for the jury to decide). The Court of Appeal 
was satisfied that the lip reading evidence was sufficiently reliable to be admissible. The 
jury can be instructed about the weight that should be put on the evidence: 
‘Transcription by expert lip reading could provide intelligence and corroborative 
                                                     
75 1953 S.C. 34 
76 [2004] 2 Cr App R 31 at para 34. 
77 Luttrell [2004] see footnote 76 at para 17. 
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evidence, but, because of her [Jessica Rees] inaccuracies, her evidence was unlikely 
to be capable of standing alone. There was potential for unreliability in such 
evidence.’ (p530) 
There is an assumption that the jury is able to deal effectively and logically with these 
weighting exercises. This assumption seems difficult to sustain in the light of the award 
of $1,000,000 to a woman who claimed that she had lost her psychic powers during a 
CT scan. Donald Elliott, general counsel of the Environmental Protection Agency in the 
case, is quoted as saying that the law 
 ‘extends equal dignity to the opinions of charlatans and Nobel Prize winners, with 
only a lay jury to distinguish between the two.’78 
On the other hand, it has been suggested that the ‘CSI effect’ leads to jurors familiar 
with CSI and similar TV shows being more likely to reject evidence that does not meet 
their raised expectations of the reliability of forensic science.79 There is not good 
evidence for a straightforward relationship, and the ‘CSI effect’ does not necessarily 
lead to a greater tendency to acquit.80 
 
7.8 Summary 
 
There are valid concerns about some of the expert evidence given to support or refute 
the sleepwalking defence, although there is clear need of empirical research in this 
area. The introduction of an enhanced admissibility test may not be the answer - instead 
                                                     
78 The trial judge “threw out the verdict”, according to Huber; HUBER, P. (1991) Junk Science in the 
Courtroom. FORBES, (July 8th), p. 68. 
79 SCHWEITZER, N.J. and SAKS, M.J. (2007) The CSI effect: Popular fiction about forensic science 
affects the public's expectations about real forensic science. Jurimetrics, 47 (Spring), pp. 357-64. 
80 SHELTON, D.E., KIM, Y.S. and BARAK, G. (2007) A Study of Juror Expectations and Demands 
Concerning Scientific Evidence: Does the “CSI Effect” Exist? Vanderbilt J. of Entertainment and Tech. 
Law, 9(2), pp. 331-68. 
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a stricter application of the common law rules may achieve the desired policy goals. It is 
difficult to imagine the scrutiny of expert evidence improving without greater scientific 
literacy among the legal profession and judiciary regardless of the admissibility criteria 
used. There is also a need for more research on the most vexing questions, most 
notably alcohol and NREM parasomnias. The laxer requirements for defence evidence, 
combined with the prevalence of rape myths and the standard and burden of proof in 
non-insane automatism, pose a real concern in sexsomnia cases where weak medical 
evidence appears often to be sufficient to obtain acquittals for intoxicated defendants. 
Contrary to the feelings of some experts, the problem may not be due to the operation 
of the adversarial process distorting expert evidence but rather the lack of an effective 
adversarial process to examine the expert evidence. 
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Chapter 8: Empirical Research 
 
 
8.1 Research Questions 
 
The research questions focus on the provision of expert evidence about the possibility 
of parasomnia where this forms part of a criminal defence. It became apparent that 
there were complex interactions between the two fields of medicine and law, and the 
study was also designed to examine these issues. It was apparent that the opinions of 
non-specialists differed greatly from sleep experts (as demonstrated by Cosmo 
Hallstrom, see 0.2), but a comparative study was rejected as this finding was relatively 
facile.  
The project went through the Keele University ethical review process, and the project 
was improved as a result of that input. Medico-legal work is not part of the NHS 
workload, which meant that NHS ethical approval was not required so long as it was 
made clear that the interviews were to be about forensic sleep disorders and expert 
witness work, and no individual patient details were to be given. Signed consent was 
gained from all participants, with separate consent for the use of quotations. Most 
interviewees agreed to have their quotations attributed – where they have not, numbers 
have substituted for names. 
 
8.2 Research Training 
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The author’s research training requirements were determined by the qualitative nature 
of the research. The author attended Keele University modules on research design, 
socio-legal research methods, innovation in socio-legal research, and qualitative and 
quantitative data analysis (learning the use of NVivo 8 and SPSS software). The author 
also attended external courses on alethic pluralism (run by Northern Advanced 
Research Training Initiative), and questionnaire and survey design (both modules of 
Courses in Applied Social Sciences run by Southampton Statistical Sciences Research 
Institute), with the help of funding from the Research Institute for Social Sciences of 
Keele University. 
 
8.3 Methodology 
 
The subject matter has not been researched in any depth previously, and the pool of 
subjects was limited. For these reasons, a qualitative approach using semi-structured 
interviews was selected. This allowed exploration of a wider range of issues in a 
nuanced manner. The main method of analysis was grounded theory, but because of 
the author’s immersion in the world of sleep medicine and examination of the culture of 
the forensic sleep community there was an ethnographic element as well. The 
combination of medical and legal issues required different philosophical assumptions. 
The diagnosis of the episode was approached from a critical realist perspective. The 
blameworthiness of the defendant was approached from a social constructionist 
perspective. The examination of the culture of the forensic sleep community required an 
ethnographic approach. The ethnographic element included attendance at and 
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participation in British Sleep Society events. This suggested that a mixed methodology 
was best, using a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods. The author assumed 
the role of the “bricoleur”, who assembles different tools and techniques according to 
the specifics of a complex situation (Denzin).1 The most significant element missing 
from this research was access to expert testimony. The defendants did not consent to 
access of the expert witness reports, and attending trials or obtaining trial transcripts 
was not possible due to limitations of time and money. Neither was it possible to 
interview any defendants. This limits the conclusions that can be drawn.  
The project was very definitely interdisciplinary. Interdisciplinarity is an interaction 
between two or more disciplines which 
‘may range from simple communication of ideas to the mutual integration of 
organizing concepts, methodology, procedures, epistemology, terminology, data, and 
organization of research and education in a fairly large field…a common effort on a 
common problem with continuous intercommunication among the participants from 
the different disciplines.’2 
These different levels of engagement were apparent during the discussions at the 
medico-legal seminar held at Keele. Whilst it is important to share the language and 
ideas of medical and legal professions, there are deeper levels that need to be explored 
to conduct truly interdisciplinary research and collaboration. These deeper levels 
included the complex interactions between the disciplines, with the legal issues affecting 
the provision of the expert evidence, and vice versa. 
                                                     
1 DENZIN, N.K. & LINCOLN, Y.S. (2008) Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry. 3rd Ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
2 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT. (1972) Interdisciplinarity: 
Problems of teaching and research in universities. Paris: OECD. 
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8.4 Methods 
 
Qualitative interviewing was considered the best method because of the nature of the 
research question and the small pool of research subjects. The interviews needed to be 
focused on the area of forensic sleep, and so a semi-structured interview was more 
appropriate than a narrative or free-form interview. The initial contacts were identified 
via the literature and the help of Dr Martin Allen, a consultant physician in respiratory 
and sleep medicine at the local NHS hospital in Stoke. These exploratory interviews 
helped to identify the important themes and compose an interview schedule for 
guidance. Thereafter I used the snowballing sampling technique, because of the 
intensive nature of my research and the limited pool of subjects in a small community. 
The questions changed gradually over the course of the interview as part of the iterative 
process of grounded theory. The pool of participants was expanded to include lawyers 
and judges – unfortunately British judges were the only group that could not be 
interviewed, due to the refusal of the Judicial Office to grant permission. A member of 
the public, affected by the automatism defence personally (she had attended the 
medico-legal seminar), was also interviewed.  I did explore the possibility of interviewing 
accused persons, whether acquitted or convicted, but none gave the necessary 
permission. Due to the small number of experts in the UK, North American experts were 
also interviewed. The similarities in the legal systems made the inclusion of experts 
from these jurisdictions permissible. I contacted one South African expert witness, but 
he had had no forensic sleep cases and knew of no South African cases. For logistical 
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reasons, all of the North American sleep experts and some of the UK experts were 
interviewed via the telephone - the sound quality via Skype was too inconsistent. Most 
of the interviews were recorded and transcribed, but not all - in some cases there were 
technical problems which meant that note taking was required instead. Interviewees 
were informed that interviews would last between twenty minutes and an hour - some 
took slightly longer (at the behest of individual interviewees). The interviews were 
recorded on MiniDisc (first phase) and on a digital voice recorder (second phase), 
except where the recording set-up reduced the volume of the phone signal to an 
unacceptable level or for some follow-up interviews. In some cases there were technical 
issues with the MiniDisc recording so that some or all of the interview was lost. In those 
instances comprehensive and contemporaneous field notes were relied on, plus further 
interviews in three cases where clarification or amplification was required. 
The method of analysis was grounded theory, because of the incorporation of many 
different sources and the mix of both qualitative and quantitative data. The assumptions 
of both critical realism and social constructivism are compatible with grounded theory, 
although the former is more compatible with the Straussian approach, and the latter with 
the Glaserian approach, to grounded theory. Because the focus was relatively narrow, 
thematic analysis might have been considered more appropriate. However, grounded 
theory allowed more room for theories to emerge from the data. The themes were not 
really predetermined but arose out of the initial research, which is consistent with 
grounded theory. The methods used were more in line with the less prescriptive 
Glaserian approach. Glaserian ground theory would be against recording interviews, but 
it was felt it was useful to be able to quote individuals where possible. There was a 
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development of the interviews with sensitization to emerging themes and theories 
through the process of simultaneous data collection and analysis. For example, it was 
anticipated that the influence of certain leaders in the field might be important, but this 
did not appear to be the case. On the other hand, it emerged that the specialty that the 
sleep expert had trained in was influential in his or her views on whether sleepwalking 
was an insane or non-insane automatism. NVivo qualitative data analysis software was 
used as an aid in the analysis. The nodes that were used for coding and the 
relationships between nodes are recorded in Appendix E. 
As well as the material from the interviews and a small number of questionnaires, 
various documentary sources were included in the analysis. This is appropriate with the 
grounded theory method (all is data), and so material from many sources was used 
including the academic literature, conversations during conferences, and one cinema 
release (see 2.1.1). There is also some material from press articles where pertinent, 
although the main analysis of press reports is in Chapter Four. 
 
8.5 Results 
 
The bulk of the empirical work was a series of qualitative interviews, mainly of expert 
witnesses but including non-forensic sleep experts and lawyers. I also had some shorter 
unstructured interviews with other subjects, for example a Canadian judge (who had 
been an attorney in an important sleepwalking case) and a Canadian forensic 
psychiatrist (involved in the same case). The results of those interviews are presented 
here; the other sources have contributed to the development of the theories presented 
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elsewhere in the thesis, although some of that material is also used in this chapter. 
The interviews were semi-structured – there was an interview schedule which is 
included in Appendix A but this was only loosely adhered to. The interviews were 
‘funnel-shaped’; this means that the interview started off on general issues and then 
focussed down on the more sensitive areas. There was great variability between the 
spontaneity of the subjects – some only gave short replies to the questions and did not 
volunteer much information outside the remit of the questions asked, whilst others were 
happy to discuss their opinions and experience at great length and a few required more 
than an hour. There was little if any redirection of the participants if they wished to 
discuss a particular issue. Some participants were interviewed more than once, when it 
was clear that this would be useful or further clarification was necessary upon reflection 
on the material. The schedule was not used for those who were not forensic 
parasomnia expert witnesses - as well as twenty-one forensic sleep experts, two 
barristers, two sleep scientists, one forensic psychiatrist and one sleep physician who 
did not do any expert witness work regarding the parasomnia defence, one Canadian 
judge, and a member of the public whose brother was killed in a car crash (see case 
study at 7.4.1) were interviewed. Thirty-three research interviews were conducted, once 
repeat interviews were included. Correspondence was received from one British judge. 
A questionnaire was used in conjunction with the later interviews, which went through a 
few iterations (see Appendix A). It contained three vignettes, intended to be ambiguous, 
plus other questions using Likert-style scales. The vignettes were based on infamous 
but controversial cases of sleep-related homicide, but unfortunately they were still too 
recognizable to serve the intended function. This was partly due to the inability to 
270 
 
 
 
properly pilot the questionnaire, because the entire pool of subjects was small enough 
to begin with. This could be the subject of future research. Also the completion of the 
questionnaire was patchy. Although the questionnaire was not an unqualified success, it 
did save some time getting to the crux of certain issues and recording some of the more 
quantitative data like the number of cases an expert had been involved with. Most of the 
participants were National Health Service consultants with the time pressures one 
would expect. Nonetheless they were very happy to assist with the project – there were 
only a few refusals or people pulling out due to illness or bereavement. One expert did 
require some persuasion because he does not engage in expert witness work in the 
area – however his interview was very interesting and useful, partly because of his 
reasons for not getting involved. The participants were generally keen to learn about the 
results when the research was completed. The sample size was primarily limited by the 
pool of subjects, but saturation was achieved on many of the themes. Some participants 
divulged details during interviews they asked to be redacted from the transcript - for 
example comments about particular peers. This permitted greater frankness. It was 
explained to participants that due to the high level of detail in the interviews, re-
identification was possible if the transcripts were examined. Even where permission for 
quotes was granted, not all quotes have been attributed because it is not this author’s 
intention to vilify directly or indirectly any individuals. No quotes should be considered to 
be adopted by this author. 
The particular limitations of this study were that it was not possible to speak to any 
defendants, whether convicted or acquitted, nor get direct access to expert evidence. 
Several solicitors representing defendants were contacted; however, all but one 
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defendant refused to participate or let their solicitors discuss this case. This was due to 
the great amount of publicity the cases generated, and the defendants understandably 
wanted to put the episodes behind them (whether convicted or acquitted). The 
exception was Jason Jeal, and that proved to be a very interesting case (see 4.3.2). 
Due to time and financial constraints, it was not possible to get trial transcripts or attend 
any trials personally. This would have permitted an examination of how expert evidence 
is delivered, and this is the intended next phase of the ethnographic approach. In 
particular, it would be useful to hear exactly how evidence about alcohol and 
sleepwalking is presented to the jury. The following themes emerged from the grounded 
analysis of the data, illustrated by quotes from interview transcripts. 
8.5.1 Reasons for doing or not doing expert witness work 
Most of the participants were involved in medico-legal work, although some were not 
and others did very little. A few had done fifty or sixty cases; many had done just a 
handful of cases. Some of the reasons for not doing more or any medico-legal work 
included: dislike of the judicial process; medico-legal work took up too much time; newer 
consultants were still getting established in their role; and that the rewards were not 
proportionate to the time and effort involved. The consultants that were more reluctantly 
involved often mentioned that medico-legal work was part of the duty of a medical 
practitioner, both as a service to the accused (whether their patient or not), and to the 
court and wider society. Shneerson stated 
‘my main job is a doctor, so my main job is normally one to one with a patient, but I 
regard my medico-legal work as a similar thing, you’re working on behalf of a person 
who’s either had an injury or is accused of something, so I’ve a duty to that person 
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and to the justice system to make sure that justice is done, it’s a society 
responsibility, so I feel that’s what I’m there for, to help get the right answer’. 
Others considered that it was the jury that had the responsibility 
 
‘the court is asking for my expert opinion and advice and it’s not for me to decide one 
way or the other about the person’s guilt, that’s for the jury. Thankfully.’ 
One doctor (who did not do expert witness work) felt that it was a very heavy 
responsibility. Several experts were very selective in which cases they took. Walker 
commented 
I should think at least monthly I get asked whether I wish to take on a parasomnia 
case. Most of the time I don’t take on the case. 
[Interviewer] Is that because you have problems with the particular case, or is it 
simply workload? 
It’s largely a problem with workload, um and that ... parasomnia’s quite a difficult 
subject, difficult defence – I’ve been asked from both sides and most of the time I say 
no – I’ve said yes on just a few occasions.  
It was notable that some of the most prominent academics in forensic sleep medicine, 
do not get directly involved in medico-legal work. Their reason is the barracking, 
character assassination and other tactics in US courtrooms. However, the quality of 
expert evidence persuaded them they needed to be involved in some way 
‘initially we were not going to get involved at all. Because we said when we published 
our first papers on the forensics stuff issue that we were not going to get involved 
because the lawyers are not ever interested in the truth – they’re only interested in 
winning – and we’re just not going to get involved. And then so lawyers would call us, 
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and we would send them copies of our articles, we would try to provide them with 
information, but we would not ever get involved. And then what became apparent is 
that the people that were getting involved frankly were people who shouldn’t be 
getting involved because they had no credentials whatsoever, they were just medical 
whores, and the people that should be getting involved, namely people like us, who 
were doing the research, were not involved. So that’s when we decided to go ahead 
and we had an obligation to get involved.’ (Expert 29) 
Pressman prefers to provide expert testimony in the UK because of the milieu in British 
courts: 
 
‘Of course in the UK, you work for the court, you can really take any case and be an 
independent expert and even if you’re hired by the Crown you can come out with an 
opinion that’s consistent with the defence. That’s certainly not an American way to do 
things.’ 
8.5.2 Role of the expert witness 
Another very consistent theme was that the expert witnesses were acutely aware of 
their responsibilities. It was striking how many times the expert witnesses would use the 
same words that they were “witnesses to the court”. Walker commented 
‘the court is asking for my expert opinion and advice and it’s not for me to decide one 
way or the other about the person’s guilt, that’s for the jury. Thankfully.’ 
Williams echoed this sentiment 
‘you can only be truthful, and you have to be truthful, to the court. It’s not for the 
person or their accusers … over the past 3 or 4 years we’re repeatedly advised our 
duty is to the court and that makes one … tread on a firmer scientific ground and use 
literature references.’ 
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It is a mantra that all the experienced expert witnesses seemed familiar with, and so I 
had to disregard the restatement of it and go a little deeper to see whether the expert 
witnesses did more than simply pay lip service to this principle. However, there was one 
instance of a barrister getting an expert to essentially coach the prosecution: 
‘I was invited to a case conference in advance and I was a little bit naïve and wet 
behind the ears, I hadn’t done a lot of medico-legal work at the time, and I was asked 
to advise on … where the holes were in the defence’s evidence. And having given 
some advice in that respect, I realised I was no longer acting independently, I was in 
an advisory capacity to the prosecution which was compromising my role as an 
expert witness. I’d been told beforehand ‘don’t worry, I was not going to be asked to 
write a report’, but the prosecution barrister … then went via phone to the defence 
and said ‘oh we’ve spoken to a neurologist and you’re doomed!’ (laughs) So the 
defence then demanded they see the advice, they have a report from this 
neurologist, so then having given this advice I then had to somewhat backtrack in my 
report and make a much more balanced report, but I’ve never fallen into that trap 
again. I think I sailed quite close to the wind on that occasion.’ 
Firstly, I looked at whether all the expert witnesses appeared equally for both the 
prosecution and defence. It was apparent that this was not always the case. Pressman 
(who is a collaborator with Sleep Forensic Associates) appears almost exclusively for 
the prosecution (and indeed his name is on the Specialist Operations Centre database). 
The Sleep Centre group of experts3 appear more often for the defence. All the experts 
avowed that their default position with anyone who claimed to have been in a 
                                                     
3At the time of interview Dr Irshaad Ebrahim, Dr Peter Fenwick, Dr Chris Idzikowski and Professor Adrian 
Williams 
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parasomnic episode was scepticism, until there was evidence to the contrary:  
‘when I do the defence I’m always a little concerned that I’m being, I’m being used – 
to provide a defence when none other exists.’ 
‘As soon as you get a sleepwalking case, you say ‘ah, another malingerer!’ And I 
always go into my cases with that as the basic assumption - that the guy is in fact 
lying.’ 
‘[Problematic behaviour] is a small minority of cases of sleepwalking and 
parasomnias and to go from that to a very severe assault or murder or rape, I begin 
to have some degree of scepticism. I would if I saw those patients in a clinical 
scenario, if something very serious had happened, because usually the partner can 
wake the patient with time before anything majorly serious happens, so I think there 
is other psychopathology or maybe alcohol or drugs or that there is some degree of 
functional overlay going on. And the patient is trying to blame something on their 
sleepwalking, which may not be related.’  
Some experts saw themselves as detached commentators contributing neutral science 
to a process which was out of their control. Others took more responsibility for the 
outcome of the legal process, and so took on the role of trying to shape the course of 
the proceedings and the results. Some experts expressed a strong belief in the 
innocence of particular defendants, and were involved with the campaigns for them to 
be exonerated or pardoned. 
8.5.3 Differences by specialty/discipline of expert witness 
Two issues I wished to address were whether or not the specialty the sleep expert was 
trained in had a significant effect on: 1) their opinions about the complexity of 
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behaviours exhibited during parasomnia (particularly sleepwalking, sleep terrors and 
sexsomnia); and 2) whether or not parasomnias should be generally treated as non-
insane or insane automatisms. Sleep medicine is a multidisciplinary field, with experts 
drawn from the fields of psychology (experimental and clinical), psychiatry, 
neuropsychiatry, neurology and respiratory medicine. Inevitably each specialty has a 
slightly different perspective on parasomnias, especially sleepwalking. The tendency for 
sleep specialists to be specialists in respiratory medicine may be surprising to the 
layperson, but this is because sleep apnoea is the commonest sleep disorder seen in 
secondary care. There seemed to be a small effect of the specialty on their opinions, 
but given the small numbers from each specialty and the sampling method, statistical 
analysis of any differences was not warranted. In particular, the results were skewed by 
the members of the Sleep Centre group, who were outliers in many of their opinions, 
and the members of the American group, who often espoused the opposite view. 
Respiratory physicians tend to have a narrower view of the scope of the behaviour 
compatible with NREM parasomnias. They were also more likely to believe that 
parasomnia should be considered a non-insane automatism. By contrast, psychiatrists 
were more likely to have a wider view of the scope of behaviour, and believed that 
parasomnia should be considered an insane automatism. The differences are partly due 
to the greater experience of psychiatrists in assessing behaviour and responsibility, as 
Walker remarked 
‘I think generally psychiatrists are much more aware of the slightly sort of murky area 
of the law than are neurologists, or respiratory physicians, we tend to deal with things 
that are much more straightforward, and things like the defence of automatism – ok, 
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it’s something I meet in epilepsy but it’s not something I meet an awful lot – whilst I 
think psychiatrists meet it quite a lot more. So I think they have a greater knowledge 
of that area of law, so I think that may make a difference.’ 
One psychiatrist went further 
‘The forensic psychiatrists are used to dealing with it, they look at the case in the 
round, they have wide experience of the sorts of people who come before the law; 
but the respiratory physiologists or physicians don’t have that experience and so the 
result is that they actually don’t work their cases up in the same sort of way. ‘Cos 
again they’re not psychiatrists and what they’ll do, they’ll look at the respiratory 
principles and then they’ll say ‘well, I’ve had 4,000 cases, my Lord, pass through my 
hospital and not one of them has shown any violence at all’, and they’re not trained in 
the subject in giving forensic evidence in court.’ 
One neurologist commented 
‘it depends on the person but on the whole I think neurologists (I would say that) are 
probably more skilled to distinguish sleepwalking from for example frontal lobe 
epilepsy from functional behaviour and I think psychiatrists would come a close 
second, and respiratory physicians would not be so good – as a group.’ 
He did however emphasize that there were particular respiratory physicians who were 
as knowledgeable about sleep medicine as any other sleep physician. Some medical 
expert witnesses expressed concerns over the ability of non-medically trained experts 
to exclude other causes of automatism e.g. non-sleep related conditions and the effects 
of drugs and alcohol: 
‘there’s a really interesting question now and it’s whether psychologists should be 
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allowed to give evidence in sleepwalking cases. My view [is], I was opposite xxxxx 
xxxxx and um he ran into this problem. First of all he never examined the patient. 
Why? Because he can’t!… he knows nothing about epilepsy, he knows nothing about 
other medical conditions, what he knows a little bit about is sleep. But he can’t 
examine the patient. Now should in fact the court allow an expert who can’t examine 
the patient to give expert evidence on that patient?’  
On the other hand, one sleep scientist deplored the way juries would prefer the opinion 
of psychiatrists “because they’re medics”, which contributed to his reluctance to be an 
expert witness (although he emphasized that he deferred on clinical matters to 
clinicians). The feeling of many sleep experts is summed up by this quote 
‘sleep medicine is a natural interdisciplinary field, and interdisciplinary within 
medicine, but in practice the reality is that the most experienced clinicians who have 
got the broadest view and are interested in sleep more generally would probably do 
the best job and that isn’t the province of one subgroup. And if you take it to the 
professional level as a whole, then you could have a totally hopeless situation – that 
psychiatrists would completely miss sleep apnoea, they’ve no idea what it is, the 
respiratory physician would know a little about sleep-breathing disorders but nothing 
else, and the average neurologist and psychologist would be in the same kind of 
position.’ 
 
8.5.4 Ethnography of the expert witness community  
One of the rarer themes was criticism of other experts. This tended to come from (or 
about) the experts that occupied the two extremes of opinion (the Sleep Centre and 
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American groups). Words used to describe the opinions of other experts included “junk 
science” and “psychobabble”. Other experts were described in terms anywhere from the 
gentle description “a bit out there” to unrepeatable expletives. There were experts who 
felt that certain other experts should have been disbarred or struck off. There was some 
concern about the money that could be made from sleep studies (and also any 
mandatory follow up). I must emphasize these were the exceptions; most of the experts 
spoke about each other with mutual respect and an utterly professional attitude, even if 
they disagreed with a particular position intellectually. Shneerson stated  
“So I’m somewhere between the two, I can see both sides slightly, but I don’t quite 
like either side’s view as a whole picture”.  
This approach summed up the attitude of the majority of those interviewed. The general 
opinion was that generally the standard of expert evidence was high, as this interviewee 
agrees: 
[Interviewer] How confident are you in the quality of expert evidence given by sleep 
experts generally? 
‘I think it’s quite variable. I think the general standard is high, I think the problem with 
parasomnia is that if you look for good evidence, there’s very little good evidence for 
many of the things that are written or said. And so, because of that, there’s quite a 
latitude I think in what is said, and there are people who will say things or who have 
said things that I strongly disagree with. But that’s only because I can’t see that 
there’s good evidence in the literature to support it and I’ve not experienced patients 
in similar situations. ‘ 
There are some strong personalities in the field, and consequently there are conflicts 
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which have been played out in the literature, in the professional regulatory sphere,4and 
in all likelihood in court also. There was one particularly vituperative clash between two 
strong personalities, although the clash was ostensibly on scientific grounds. This has 
been played out via publications and letters to the editor. There was marked criticism of 
certain experts, who were variously described as “a crook”, a “disaster” and other 
epithets. Shneerson commented 
‘you know there’s quite a lot of politics in this area, are you aware of all that?’ 
There is some evidence from journal articles and textbooks that the position of the two 
sides of the argument on alcohol have become increasingly polarized. All mentions of 
any link between alcohol and sleepwalking have been removed from more recent 
editions of The Principles and Practice of Sleep Medicine. In a 1992 article by 
Mahowald et al they state alcohol may trigger sleep terrors or sleepwalking in 
susceptible individuals.5 In an article in 1998 Mahowald and Schenck accept the 
possibility of alcohol-induced sleepwalking as a defence to a first offence.6 In later 
letters and articles their position has changed. This may be due to the lack of any 
scientific evidence forthcoming supporting a link7.  
8.5.5 Credentials and quality of expert witnesses 
Expert 29 was particularly scathing about some of the US expert witnesses testifying on 
sleep disorder 
‘you look at many of the trials, and many of them we were not involved with at all, and 
                                                     
4 One expert complained to the GMC about the expert evidence of two expert witnesses. 
5 MAHOWALD, M.W., SCHENCK, C.H., ROSEN, G.M. and HURWITZ, T.D. (1992) The Role of Sleep 
Disorder Center in Evaluating Sleep Violence. Archives of Neurology, 49(June), pp. 604-7. 
6 SCHENCK, C.H. & MAHOWALD M.W. (1998) An Analysis of a Recent Criminal trial Involving Sexual 
Misconduct with a Child, Alcohol Abuse and a Successful Sleepwalking Defence: arguments supporting 
two proposed new forensic categories. Medicine, Science and the Law, 38(2), pp. 147-52. 
7 Personal communication from Dr Pressman. 
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you look at whose testifying and those people have absolutely no credentials 
whatsoever. It’s like they grabbed somebody from housekeeping and put them on the 
witness stand, you know, I mean who are these people to present information to a 
court? They have no credentials whatsoever.’ 
Fenwick had similar doubts about some of the expert witnesses in the UK 
 
‘I’ve come across people who are either prosecution or if I’m acting for the 
prosecution the defence have called in, some of them haven’t been trained in sleep 
at all, some of them are psychologists who really had very little understanding of 
sleep, looked as if they’d looked it up in the textbook before they came, so I think that 
the quality of evidence which is being given in some cases is actually very poor.’ 
Shneerson felt that credentials might not necessarily indicate a suitable expert 
 
‘in general the expert who’s instructed by the lawyers has to produce a CV, and has 
to demonstrate expertise in the area that he’s doing the report on. And that should 
definitely hold for these sorts of cases. Now the difficulty is that there’s very few 
experts around for these parasomnia cases, and it’s very hard for the lawyers to 
distinguish between a robust CV and one that’s been put together to make it look 
robust. And as you were saying, you may have someone who’s like a 
neuropsychiatrist who deals with disorders of alertness and abnormal behaviour 
might sound like he deals with a lot of parasomnias, but he never sees them. Or you 
might find a sleep person, who claims to have a lot of experience in sleep medicine 
but actually when it comes to it, hasn’t really had much experience in parasomnias or 
certainly forensic ones. So the mechanism of looking at people’s CVs is tricky, 
because you can cover things up on a CV and also there’s very few to choose from. 
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So maybe the usual methods don’t work so well in this area. Now if you go and say 
‘well, we’ll have some regulation, let’s have a judge look over these people’ or maybe 
some detailed tick box thing that the experts have to fill in, like how many patients 
have they actually seen in the last five years, or theatres, or some other questions, 
might be useful, but then this would be a bit of a precedent, and I think that would 
have to get through all the, I don’t know how the solicitors work on these things, but 
there must be some guidelines as to how they do the experts, so this would have to 
go through the general system of how they do the experts, you can’t just have an 
exception for sleep cases because you’ll say ‘well, there’s other situations where 
there must be some, I won’t say bogus experts but experts with greater or lesser 
expertise, putting themselves forward.’  
 8.5.6 Presentation Styles 
 
My main research question was ‘how do expert witnesses frame their evidence about 
sleepwalking and other parasomnias as a defence?’ Expert witnesses are there to help 
the court, rather than replace the jury. This task is made easier by the demise of the 
ultimate issue rule. If the defendant was sleepwalking at the time of the illegal act, that 
nearly always entails lack of criminal responsibility - although the aspect of prior fault 
must not be neglected. Further the expert may highlight possible internal and external 
causes. He may also be asked about whether or not mandatory supervision is 
advisable.  
A thorny question arises when the jury has two or more conflicting expert opinions - how 
does the jury decide between them? If both or all expert opinions agree, on what basis 
can the jury disagree with both? Some experts present a number of options to the jury 
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and detail why they believe one particular explanation is more likely. Theoretically, this 
is the best approach and leaves the jury with the greatest number of options. Practically, 
it may simply leave the jury confused and therefore likely to acquit because they cannot 
be sure what happened. Attwood explained to me 
‘Because the more complicated something gets, the more juries get confused – when 
they’re told at the end of the day ‘you must be sure’, if you have a mass of expert 
evidence, then it confuses them [and] a confused jury acquits.’ 
One interviewee was rebuked on one occasion for being too vague. Of course over-
simplification and overstatement also has its problems and can lead to expert evidence 
being dogmatic. One participant in particular framed his testimony as categorizing 
certain behaviours and factors as “typical of sleepwalking/parasomnia”. This 
emphasized the epistemological difficulties in pronouncing a particular episode 
parasomnic, best illustrated by this quote from Mahowald 
‘[You] can prove someone is a sleepwalker… But that is only Part 1 of a two-part 
question. The second question is whether he was sleepwalking on the night of the 
murder. Only God can answer that.’8 
8.5.7 Judicial Process 
One theme that emerged was the tendency of the criminal justice system (and the 
courts generally) to distort information. It was quite frustrating for some of the experts, 
as expert 29 relates 
‘what the legal profession wants is black and white answers like was this person 
                                                     
8 STRYKER, J. (1999) 1999-last update, ‘Sleepstabbing:The strange science of sleep  behavior and one 
verdict: Guilty!’ . Available: http://www.salon.com/1999/07/08/sleepwalking/. 
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awake or was this person asleep, or was this person conscious or was this person 
unconscious? Well the fact remains that both wake and sleep, and consciousness 
and unconsciousness, occur on a very broad spectrum. And you can have people 
who are half awake and half asleep, or you can have people who are half conscious. 
And the legal profession does not like to deal with that. They want “yes” or “no”, and 
they don’t want to hear about the fact that well, you can be half awake and half 
asleep.’ 
‘I was requested to give my report by the prosecution, I wasn’t invited to the trial, and 
they won the case – but my sense, and what I was trying to impart in my written 
evidence, was that one could not be certain. So I guess I was surprised when I learnt 
it went to conviction. When we came to discuss it between ourselves some years 
later, [P] and I, it wasn’t hard for me … to direct the joint report in his direction. So 
that’s slightly worrying in that aspect if you don’t actually get to be there, and you 
simply do a report (and you don’t get to do a joint report if there are conflicting 
reports) then somebody gets convicted where your own sense was that they weren’t 
guilty but it’s just that the word you used in your report wasn’t clear enough. …The 
prosecutor wants to win no matter what the person’s guilty or innocent, because it’s 
brownie points. So they will simply use the report – they don’t have the same 
obligation … to the court, an obligation to be fair.’ 
The drama of the courtroom, and the cut and thrust of cross-examination, can lead to 
experts making statements they would not make to their peers, experts commenting 
‘the barristers are in the driving seat and … can get one to say things that you might 
not have said if you’d given it a lot more thought’ 
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‘People will say things like, they’ll be asked ‘could this be anything else?’ and they’ll 
say ‘no’, and you know that they would accept that it could have been. Or the other 
thing is that quite often the over-interpretation of investigations is something that 
comes across in some of the things that I’ve seen.’  
‘it’s interesting how sometimes people will say things…when they’re giving expert 
witness testimony that I think they wouldn’t say if I were having a drink with them. 
And I think what happens is, they get into a situation where they feel that their 
expertise is being challenged and so they tend to say things in a slightly over-
confident fashion.’ 
‘there was a point when I was under very, very vigorous questioning, and yes, at that 
point you’re pressured in a situation, you can under a state of anxiety and pressure 
make a statement [that is not accurate]’ 
An example of this is where the expert instructed by the prosecution claimed that there 
was absolutely no possibility of an episode representing sleepwalking. This was 
apparently an attempt to prevent the jury being swayed by vague claims by the expert 
instructed by the defence, which he believed amounted to junk science. This assertion 
differed from his conversation with the other expert (according to that expert). This 
approach is understandable given the public interest in ensuring that defendants are not 
exonerated on the basis of pseudo-science, but strays into the territory of advocacy.  
Other experts felt that the adversarial process usually succeeding in getting to the truth 
 
[Interviewer] Do you find the adversarial nature of the criminal process and the way 
barristers ask questions, do you think that’s a way of getting at the truth or do you 
think it tends to distort the evidence and obscure the truth? 
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I don’t have a problem with it when it’s done properly, because if you take two 
opposite views, it often clarifies the situation rather than being too cosy in the middle 
and actually it’s not being explored properly. It only falls down if the judge doesn’t run 
the case properly – so if he feels that there’s unfair questions or something isn’t 
properly represented or balanced, the judge who’s running the case should intervene 
or explain or do something to make sure that the jury realise that...to get the balance 
back between the way the case, the questions that are being phrased. So no, I think 
it’s quite a good way of exploring the problems, it opens up the issues, the jury can 
hear the answers and then see which one they choose or prefer.’ 
Butler commented on the legal process that led to Parks’s acquittal 
 
‘My position really was that the defence expert underplayed what were features of his 
personality structure, arguably short of a diagnosis of personality disorder but he had 
significant difficulties with pathological gambling, and he had certain personality traits 
that had anti-social elements to it, and narcissistic elements. So he was not free of 
mental disorder, other than a sleep disorder. And further it was my position that the 
sleep disorder was a mental disorder, constituted in terms of the test at that time, 
which was “disease of the mind”, and met the definition for … insane automatism as I 
understood the law at that time. And that’s really where I came from. I found him … 
you know one could argue what was the strength and confidence in the opinion he 
was truly sleepwalking at the time? Well certainly a balance of probabilities, I was in 
that camp – beyond a reasonable doubt I wasn’t. So then you got into the issue of the 
proof required to prove whichever automatism defence he wanted, and the Crown did 
not want any of that stuff coming out to have the jury believe there was credibility to 
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all of it. So they of course did not want my position set out, and without it they had no 
argument for insane automatism and thus some social control over this guy – it was 
all or none. And that’s what they went with.’ 
Expert 29 commented 
‘It is discouraging in the courtroom, because people are just not interested in the 
truth; they’re just interested in winning.’ 
Some experts enjoyed the experience of the courtroom: 
 
‘I enjoy doing medico-legal work is because it brings up issues that interest me as a 
neuropsychiatrist. Being in court is an issue of performance, and I, I was actually 
started out thinking about my career at school, law was one of the, law and medicine, 
one of the two, and I’m managing to integrate the legal and the medical side of things 
here.’ 
‘a combination of enjoyment and extreme anxiety at some points but I seemed to 
make my points quite well, it was against quite a good QC on the other side, who had 
a few tricks up his sleeve, but er I found it a challenge. But no, it was, it was fun! But 
at times rather tense.’  
Another expert was concerned about cases where expert witnesses had been selected 
because their opinion favoured the prosecution: 
 
‘Well I don’t like that at all. That seems to me that they’re not looking for justice, 
they’re looking for somebody to get a conviction …That’s job preservation and 
keeping their numbers up, all that sort of things, that’s not what it’s about, they should 
be charging the right person rather than necessarily somebody they think they can 
wrongly find guilty.’ 
Some expert witnesses felt there was generally no pressure to testify a particular way, 
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as the interview with Walker showed 
 
[Interviewer] So it sounds like you didn’t have too many concerns about the 
adversarial nature – you found it was more inquisitorial? 
‘No, exactly – I think it was more about finding what actually went on. And my view is 
that it’s not my role to tell people what went on, it’s my role just to present about 
parasomnias and the criteria and whether people fulfil some or all of the criteria.’ 
However, he also remarked 
 
‘there have been cases where I felt… ‘this is not in parasomnia, but in other areas 
where I felt that the way the questions were going had been to try and question me 
as an expert witness, and then that tends to just make me very…even quite 
defensive, and then I start to become more certain of things that I would think out of 
court I’d maybe be not so certain. So I think the adversarial process tends to push 
you.’  
He added when asked he faced any dilemmas during the legal process 
 
‘No, not in the two that I’ve done, and in one case I was asked, where the defence 
asked for my opinion, and perhaps its why they didn’t use me, but why I didn’t think 
that it was a parasomnia, in fact I said it wasn’t a parasomnia but again I don’t feel 
that there’s any particular dilemma in so far as they’ve asked for my opinion and 
they’d rather know my opinion than for me to try and twist my opinion.’  
Nisbet responded in a similar vein: 
‘I think the big issue, that one can fall into a trap of, is the, is still despite the Wolff 
reforms, there is still an adversarial environment. And being instructed by one side, 
which you often are, you may be tempted to kind of um overplay your particular views 
rather than take a balanced view, and that would be encouraged, of course by the 
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side you’re working for. Or discouraged, if you’re saying something they don’t want 
to hear! I think provided you remain honest to your views and you don’t overstate 
them and you justify the view that you take, I don’t find that it’s a big problem for me.’ 
One expert witness went so far as to say that doctors and lawyers “don’t see eye to 
eye”. There were a few experts who felt that the appointment of an amicus curiae would 
be a better way for expert opinion to be presented. In some cases this preference may 
be based on a misunderstanding of the neutral status of the expert. On the other hand, 
this may be recognition of the conscious and subconscious biases at play. 
8.5.8 Legal Expertise 
Shneerson contrasted the knowledge and expertise of lawyers in sleepwalking trials 
with that of lawyers in other areas: 
‘I do quite a lot of spinal injuries and people can’t breathe, I do respiratory work in 
these what we call catastrophic injuries, there the lawyers are nearly always very 
switched on, they’ve done a lot of cases before and they know all the questions, they 
know what the issues are. Or if I deal with asbestos cases, they’re really switched on, 
because it’s common and they know what to but here it’s much more variable in the 
parasomnias than other parts of legal practice.’ 
 
He added 
 
‘Some of them are very well informed, almost too well informed – they almost like to 
prejudge the situation beforehand somehow – but others in my experience know it’s a 
minefield’. 
Fenwick related a particular trial where the legal counsel were unable to effectively 
cross-examine the expert witness 
 
‘there was a whole lot of technical evidence about brain scans, about his brain, where 
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the damage was and all that … one of the prosecution psychiatrists said to me ‘God, 
this is like a viva where you don’t actually know the subject properly’ because she 
was not a neuropsychiatrist, she was just an ordinary psychiatrist and so she was out 
of her depth in fact. But [] the other person who was there heard the prosecuting 
barrister say, ‘and the trouble is he knows damn well I can’t ask him any questions on 
this’, and this makes your point just perfectly.’  
Another expert offered qualified praise 
 
‘barristers in my experience are pretty well informed … but yeah, they don’t always 
ask the most pertinent questions.’ 
 Some other experts came across barristers who were very well prepared by prior 
research rather than experience. 
 
‘Well you go expecting to be totally in charge because it’s your own area, but 
barristers can become very knowledgeable.’ 
‘One of the things I have noticed, which has been a good thing, I don’t know whether 
it’s just that I’ve met with better barristers in more recent times, is that they tend to 
have some knowledge of some of the literature. Maybe it’s getting easier access to 
the literature. So they then can say ‘what about this paper stated the following?’ or 
‘you say this cannot happen, or this can happen during a parasomnia, but I have a 
paper which says here that says this’ or in fact for sexsomnia the number of 
publications is quite small, so you can read all the literature and the prosecuting 
barrister in the last case had read all the literature. And that was good. I think that 
made it a much more rigorous examination of that as a possibility.’  
8.5.9 Juries 
There was concern expressed by some experts about the ability of juries to understand 
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expert evidence: 
[Interviewer] How confident are you that the jury does understand and apply your 
evidence? 
‘Um, not very – but the cases I’ve been involved with, the judge takes quite some 
considerable effort to clarify points and obviously then the judge instructs the jury so 
I’d hope that between the two that they do.’ 
Others had more confidence in jurors.  
‘I haven’t actually faced a jury to explain [sleepwalking], but I do face my patients and 
explain it to my patients on a daily basis. And they’re a random selection of the 
population, not totally random, and I think they do understand when I explain this idea 
of … part of the brain being asleep and part being awake – so yes I think you can get 
the jury to understand the concept. But again the jury is going to have as much 
difficulty making the distinction in a particular episode whether a patient or an 
accused was sleepwalking or not at that particular moment. Probably more difficult 
than a neurologist, and a neurologist is going to have difficulty, or the sleep expert. 
But yes, you get them to understand the concept.’ 
One expert had experience of the sometimes capricious nature of juries: 
‘we thought we were going to win, but we lost in the end. As we were on the side of 
the prosecution and the jury decided to give er…the accused the benefit of the doubt 
in the end. But we thought we had an open and shut case.’  
A barrister commented 
 
‘the more complicated something gets, the more juries get confused – when they’re 
told at the end of the day ‘you must be sure’, if you have a mass of expert evidence, 
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then it confuses them [and] a confused jury acquits.’ 
8.5.10 Parasomnias and the law 
I looked at the understanding of the law of the expert witnesses. Not surprisingly, they 
generally found the law in this area confusing.  The vast majority incorrectly believed 
that automatism is a denial of mens rea, but given the evolution of the understanding of 
the defence this is not surprising. This confusion is reflected in the literature, with a 
number of articles talking about a denial of mens rea.9  Many understood that there 
were two distinct types of automatism, distinguished on the basis of internal and 
external causes, although most did not know the burden and standard of proof. They 
almost universally found the distinction nonsensical. Most importantly, the expert 
witnesses largely failed to appreciate that insanity is a legal term of art, rather than 
medical terminology (see further on disposal below at 8.5.13).  
Some participants were concerned about their ignorance of the legal principles. 
Idzikowski reflected on his initial confidence or even arrogance as an expert witness, 
followed by a later realization that knowledge of the law was important. One expert 
commented 
‘this sane versus insane automatism again is something for the lawyers to sort out 
and what my position would be is to say, so for example in a patient who’s 
sleepwalked and as a result of their sleepwalking had apparently attacked someone 
… and if I was convinced by my discussion with the patient then I would make the 
                                                     
9 FENWICK, P. (1996) ‘Sleep and Sexual Offending’. Medicine, Science and the Law, 36(2), pp. 122-134; 
DOGHRAMJI, K., BERTOGLIA, S.M. and  WATSON, C. (2013) Chapter 31: Forensic Aspects of the 
Parasomnias. In KOTHARE, S.V. and IVANENKO, A. (eds.). Parasomnias: Clinical Characteristics and 
Treatment. 1st Ed. New York: Springer, pp. 463-77; EBRAHIM, I, and FENWICK, P.B. (2010) Forensic 
issues of sleep in psychiatric patients. In PANDI-PERUMAL, S.R. and KRAMER, M. (eds.). Sleep and 
Mental Illness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
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point that from a medical point of view I don’t feel they had responsibility for their 
actions and therefore shouldn’t be prosecuted either from a criminal perspective or 
locked away from a perspective of being insane. So I would sort of argue against this 
distinction and try and get away from it. Although of course the law would not, but at 
the end of the day that’s the view I would put in court, I wouldn’t try and get caught up 
with this ‘are they sane/insane?’ because I would say they’re legal terms and I can’t 
comment! We don’t use the term sane or insane in medicine, so I would steer clear of 
getting caught up, like I am doing now! (laughs)’ 
Expert witness knowledge of the law could be problematic, as putative external triggers 
of parasomnia were apparently emphasized by some experts who wished to avoid the 
defendant receiving the special verdict.  
8.5.11 Desperate defences and malingering 
Some of the stories validated the opinion of Lawton that automatism is a  
‘quagmire…seldom entered nowadays save by those in desperate need of some kind 
of a defence.’10 
Particularly with respect to the intoxicated, they will often have no other defence - the 
illegal act may not be in question at all. Cramer Bornemann stated that in the US 90% of 
allegations are bogus. The proportion of referrals from lawyers perceived as bona fide 
varied from 10% to 90% - this spread is no surprise given the small numbers seen by 
most experts per year. This was also an entirely subjective assessment. One stated that 
he dismissed most of the requests fairly easily: 
‘I would expect that the majority of the ones that I get sent, I look and I think ‘this is 
                                                     
10 R v Quick [1973] QB 910, 922. 
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very unlikely to be ’, and I’m not usually particularly 
 interested in presenting evidence for those’. 
 
When asked if he was ever referred bogus cases, Williams responded 
 
‘That does happen, and it has happened about half a dozen times [out of 30-40 
cases] – again that’s a guess.’ 
 
Espie related two particular examples 
‘I’ve got a case recently which I refused to see, because I felt this was a complete 
waste of everyone’s time. There was no evidence from what I was provided with by 
the solicitor that this person had ever had any history of sleepwalking and another 
kind of fairly patently obvious facts that would account for why the person had no 
memory for the event um but the solicitor did persist in that for some time.’ 
‘I can give you [another] example, somebody I saw who clearly was a sleepwalker 
from the history but I said to the solicitor you just check one thing for me before I go 
any further with this – was the individual asleep at the time? Had they gone to bed? 
‘Oh, no, no they were in the pub’ he said, and this assault happened.’  
Other experts reported manipulation: 
 
‘certainly I have had patients that it’s no doubt at all they were trying to string me 
along and so I just point that out in my report that I found all these inconsistencies 
and someone in an automatism would not have behaved in that way.’ 
Shapiro reported one defendant whom he felt was not completely honest with him, and 
that the defence team had “put him up to” the defence.  Walker commented in an 
interview for the Daily Mail about sexsomnia that 
‘I think some people have caught on to this as an alibi,’ 
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cautioning that people raising the defence required careful scrutiny.11 The press reports 
provided some examples of a bogus sleepwalking defence, particularly the cases of 
Goldie and Freaney. Goldie actually did not argue sexsomnia in court; he only 
mentioned this excuse in an email to a victim’s husband. Freaney is a clear case of 
malingering, as when he was not supported in his parasomnia defence he later resorted 
to arguing that he killed his partner during a sex game done wrong. The latter case of 
Hessel12reveals a fairly ineffectual attempt to argue that he was sleepwalking: 
A man who denies rape yesterday told a jury at Oxford Crown Court he didn’t know if  
his memory loss was down to alcohol or sleepwalking; During cross-examination, 
Miss Gaunt asked if his memory loss could be because he was drunk, rather than 
asleep.  She asked “Is it possible that all of it could be related to alcohol?”  Hessel 
answers “I think there can always be such a possibility.”13 
Subsequently the jury were told they could disregard the defence,14 which presumably 
means that the evidential burden had not been satisfied. Nonetheless he was acquitted. 
Stephen Davies is another case where the defendant argued the defence of sexsomnia, 
but was acquitted on another ground. 
There are other circumstances where there were secondary gains, and so attempts at 
manipulation (by either “patient” or bed partner) - resisting extradition, custody disputes, 
divorce proceedings or simply interpersonal difficulties. Some experts reported extreme 
pressure by lawyers to support their client’s claims. 
                                                     
11 HALE, B. (2012) Are men getting away with rape by pretending they were asleep? Rising number of 
attackers are trying extraordinary defence that they had 'sexsomnia'. Daily Mail (Dec 22nd) News. 
12 Identified by Gethin Rees  
13 OXFORD MAIL. (2013) Rape defendant questioned over drink. Oxford Mail (Apr 13th). 
14 OXFORD MAIL. (2013) Judge directs jury in rape trial. Oxford Mail (Apr 16th) News. 
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8.5.12 Prior Fault 
Several experts commented on the issue of prior fault, Shneerson remarking 
‘there’s a question as we were saying earlier, did they put themselves in a situation 
when they might kill their partner by having too much to drink, not having enough 
sleep, all the things they knew would make them likely to behave in a dangerous 
way? So do they still have responsibility for being in a parasomnia? ‘Cos they knew, 
had prior knowledge and didn’t take responsible action to avoid putting themselves at 
high risk – and equally, will they do it again?’ 
Walker commented 
 
‘I think most of the cases in which I’ve been involved, the actual act of violence or sex 
has been a single act. And I think this is another important issue, it’s like the alcohol 
issues… if people for example having frequent sexsomnia, and I do have patients 
who have frequent sexsomnia, I think if you were then to share a bed with somebody, 
knowing that you have frequent sexsomnia, then I think that’s indefensible, there 
must be an assumed risk.’ 
One expert emphasized that the cause of the episode shouldn’t be a trigger previously 
known to the defendant:  
 
‘all of these cases, they have occurred as unique things – right. Fine, in the ****** 
case, there was one episode of him doing something and he had no clue what it was. 
Right, and that evidence of previous behaviour was deliberately quashed in the 
court.’ 
Another stated 
 
‘I think it would be important that they’re advised that they should not become sleep-
deprived and drink lots of alcohol and be in a situation in which they could commit a 
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crime.’ 
8.5.13 Verdict and Disposal  
What all the doctors agreed on was that the internal/external dichotomy for 
distinguishing insanity and (sane) automatism made no sense medically. A few could 
see the policy considerations behind the doctrine, but agreed that it didn’t address the 
desired goal of ensuring social control of only those likely to have a recurrence of their 
behaviour. Shneerson remarked on the legal distinction 
‘Well, I don’t know – this comes out of the McNaughtan Rules, 1843 … you can see [] 
the thinking behind it… it was intended to separate those who might re-offend from 
those who wouldn’t re-offend … [T]he insulin you produce normally, that’s an internal 
cause, but if you’re given insulin that’s an external thing. It’s artificial, I can see where 
it came from as I say trying to see whether after the head injury or wasp sting caused 
it, that’s probably not going to happen again, but an internal predisposition to 
behaving this way, you’re more likely to re-offend and so you should be out away, 
this is the thing. ... [However] in practice I don’t think it’s very helpful – it certainly 
doesn’t really fit with medical thoughts, where there’s usually a balanced multi-
factorial approach, somebody has a predisposition and then there’s a trigger factor or 
something which causes the thing to happen in that way on that evening. So it 
doesn’t fit with the biology or modern medicine, but of course you’ve got to remember 
law isn’t medicine, it’s looking for decisions rather than nice blurred holistic approach, 
all the factors merging into each other and interacting in a complex system to 
produce an event at the end of the day – the law wants to know ‘was this or that 
responsible?’ So there may have to be a different framework for the law and for 
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medicine, but at least the two in my opinion should be compatible – working on the 
same principles.’  
Fenwick stated 
‘it is nonsensical BUT by taking it from the point of view of the lawyers it’s actually 
really quite good – because what they’re concerned about is the protection of the 
public … if ever I’m on a sleepwalking case which I think is a genuine sleepwalking 
case I do not make the recommendation to the court that I think he’s OK to go back 
into the public, I make the recommendation that he must go to a medium secure unit, 
where in fact he can be, it can be seen whether or not a) he’s a sleepwalker and b) 
whether in fact he is violent. And if I’m really concerned about it then I’ll make sure 
that there’s a Section 41 [restriction order] as well.’  
He was quite critical of the acquittal of Brian Thomas 
‘Highly concerned – I think it’s quite wrong. The judge did not apply the law – I mean 
he couldn’t have applied the law.’ 
 
A related-theme was whether or not the sleep expert considered that sleepwalking and 
other parasomnias should be an insane or sane automatism. Many experts felt that the 
risk of recurrence was so low that the insanity verdict was not required, which shows the 
confusion about the status of insanity. Several sleep experts considered that whilst the 
special verdict was not appropriate, compulsory treatment and follow up was necessary 
(particularly the American experts). Pressman commented 
‘I don’t think that a sleepwalker necessarily needs to be an inpatient, admitted, but I 
do think they need to follow the treatment protocol, in that sense that I would like to 
be sure that they are followed.’ 
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However, when they were informed of the likelihood of an outpatient supervision order, 
roughly equal numbers were for and against sleepwalking being treated as an insane 
automatism. One expert felt that supervision was unnecessary because  
‘the sensible person who has done whatever they have done will presumably, 
assuming it’s out of character, blame themselves and do the right thing to avoid 
recurrence. Of course it may not always work, but most of the time it’ll have an 
impact.’ 
Butler commented on the case of Kenneth Parks15 and the need for social control 
‘To me, my view was that he should have been found insane, and subject to social 
control, although the control would of course led to him being in the community fairly 
quickly.’ 
Subsequent events vindicated this view 
‘when…the marriage ended and [Parks] went to the States, a few years after that he 
contacted Marlis Edwardh and … the forensic psychologist, because he was off 
meds, and he’d begun to have sleepwalking behaviours which were of concern. 
Nothing violent, but because he was now back to sleepwalking and given this 
previous history, it caused him huge anxiety. And I remember talking with Marlis 
about how they diverted him into some contact with an American psychiatrist around 
medication issues. They never heard anything more about him until the last few 
years, and I don’t know whether anyone you’ve talked to has filled you in – he came 
back to Canada, and he ran for the board of education a few years ago.’  
This opinion was limited to the situation of Parks (and the Canadian approach is more 
                                                     
15 (1992) 95 Dominion Law Reports 27 
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flexible than English criminal law). Some experts emphasized the extreme unlikeliness 
of a recurrence of violent behaviour. Walker commented 
‘with most of the cases, in fact all the cases I’ve been involved with, this has been a 
one off episode. Often precipitated by certain circumstances – there’s usually sleep 
deprivation – and in that respect I don’t think they should be treated in the same way 
as say people with mental illness of whatever cause. So I don’t think that would be 
necessary, I don’t think it’s possible to do anything specific for them that’s necessarily 
going to change the sleepwalking or the propensity to have it. I think it would be 
important that they’re advised that they should not become sleep-deprived and drink 
lots of alcohol and be in a situation in which they could commit a crime.’ 
Cartwright was strongly opposed to the insanity verdict: 
‘absolutely not - because they’re perfectly sane when you wake them up. You know, 
insanity doesn’t go away when you wake up in the morning. And so you know it’s an 
inappropriate diagnosis.’ 
Another issue with the insanity verdict for parasomnia is cost. Ebrahim commented 
‘So the internal/external debate is a problem … the court can direct that actually 
Bilton he should have a tonsillectomy and he should have repeat sleep studies under 
Dr Ebrahim [but] in that case, who’s going to pay the bill for the medical expense? 
Which is what it will boil down to. And why they might not want to change the verdict, 
because at the moment, yes, we’ve got lots of asylums but suddenly you send 
someone to a chest physician and he gets an order for the court to treat the patient 
and he’s got to look at this and he’s going to be very confused.’ 
Walker felt that generally these were isolated events 
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‘with most of the cases, in fact all the cases I’ve been involved with, this has been a 
one off episode. Often precipitated by certain circumstances – there’s usually sleep 
deprivation – and in that respect I don’t think they should be treated in the same way 
as say people with mental illness of whatever cause.’ 
Schenck considers that the sleepwalkers who commit serious crimes are victims of a 
“perfect storm” of contributing factors. He did concede the possibility that these 
sleepwalkers are different in some way. This was an idea raised by Reed, who stated  
‘the offence has still been committed and most people who sleepwalk don’t commit 
offences so it’s not like it’s an inevitable consequence of it. There’s something about 
that individual that means that they have a propensity to commit serious offences for 
whatever reason.’ 
Nisbet expressed a similar opinion 
 
‘there’s possibly something different about those ones that do eventually get to court 
and are accused of severe crimes.’ 
Espie felt that there may be something different in the coping styles of violent 
sleepwalkers 
‘I think one of the areas of research that is much needed is actually this if you like 
psychological profiling of these individuals – I don’t mean psychological in terms of 
criminal profiling but in terms of ‘how they tick’ … my operational practice and clinical 
practice suggests to me that a lot of people with these disorders are in the face of it 
appear to be very competent, people who are dealing with things well, the kind of 
person that someone else might go to for advice indeed, the kind of person who fixes 
things, who sorts things, um…..but in terms of their own emotional focus, they often 
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don’t seem to recognize very well when they’re stressed themselves.’  
Some experts mentioned the problems of the insanity label, for example Fenwick: 
 
‘YEAH! [with emphasis] It’s a real problem, in exactly the same way it was with 
Sullivan it is for sleepwalkers. And the answer to it is exactly the same that the 
appeal court gave in Sullivan, and that is that it’s not up to the courts to change the 
name - if the name should be changed then Parliament could do it. It has done before 
and it could do again. So yes – I think it’s awful to label a sleepwalker as insane.’ 
One expert brought up the problem of the failure to apply the insanity defence 
 
‘it is interesting how more recently the courts seem to have not chosen any of the 
previously established options, they’ve been quite reluctant to go down the insanity 
route even though as far as one would see that’s the legal precedent. But people 
seem to have chosen to find people not guilty without a clear rationale and not using 
an established defence, which is interesting. And kind of side-stepping the issue, I 
think, and I can see why they do it, but it doesn’t make the law any easier to 
understand, I suppose, because it seems to be establishing yet another option which 
isn’t clear.’  
He added 
 
‘I don’t think that current legislation suits either in many respects, because to find 
them insane…actually the finding of not guilty by reason of insanity is not necessarily 
the wrong one. It has some advantages, not least because the disposal options 
available to the court actually fit reasonably well especially with all the very recent 
changes. And I do feel it’s more a reluctance of the courts to say that somebody’s 
insane that’s led to it stopping, not that’s necessarily an inappropriate means of 
dealing with it.  
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I think it certainly would be wrong, thinking about it, if these people were to be found 
not guilty. Rather like patients I deal with, who either get insanity or more usually 
convictions for manslaughter, for example, whatever you may think the act has still 
taken place, the offence has still been committed … I think simply by finding 
somebody not guilty, rather encourages them not to take full responsibility for it 
perhaps. And also it’s not good for society because society generally would see as 
though somebody had got away with something. And finding them not guilty by 
reason of insanity has advantages as you know, because the court is empowered … 
to impose a supervision order which is meant to be a treatment framework and that 
might well be appropriate. You could imagine something involving regular 
supervision, perhaps attendance to see a sleep specialist, that kind of thing, would be 
very helpful in compelling the individual to seek some kind of help or take account of 
the fact that this has happened, and they are in theory potentially a high risk person. 
 I remember, the Fraser case is interesting because he was basically just told he had 
to sleep on his own in a separate room and that was about it and the case report of 
the day … even then comments that psychiatric experts of the time considered that 
was rather lenient and not very satisfactory from a risk management point of view, 
even back then. I think just finding somebody not guilty and letting them carry on may 
well not be good enough, because it doesn’t necessarily serve the public – ok, maybe 
it’s unlikely this individual will commit another offence but by no means impossible.  
 
Certainly the case I saw, looking back on it I don’t know what more one could have 
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done, but he presumably continues to be at risk of committing offences, maybe not 
like that or maybe slightly different, but certainly behaving in a strange manner whilst 
sleepwalking.’  
 
Nisbet agreed about the issue of public protection: 
 
‘I think anybody who’s committed something very serious has - I’m speaking as a 
layman - has to be monitored to some extent. If they’re claiming … reduced 
culpability due to some medical condition, particularly if that medical condition can’t 
be completely eradicated or treated, which is the case with sleepwalking … there is 
something to be said for the concept of insanity in the sense that the patients has 
moments of insanity, as a result of their medical condition where they could be a 
danger to others. Or the “public”. So yes, I think that having absolved them of their 
culpability, stopped them from necessarily going to prison, I’m not saying they should 
be committed to a psychiatric hospital for the rest of their life, but there should be 
some monitoring. Particularly if there’s been frequent episodes of sleep violence for 
example … you can’t just say ‘oh well they’re not guilty and that’s the end of that’. So 
does the law have a role in that – well I suppose it has to.’ 
There were concerns expressed about the stigma of the insanity label, with the 
suggestions of a specific verdict for sleepwalking or automatism: 
‘there could be even perhaps a new “not guilty by reason of automatism” sort of thing 
could be created perhaps, as a means of dealing with all these issues in a more 
straightforward manner and hopefully getting away from all these arguments about 
whether it’s insane or non-insane’ 
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8.5.14 Assessment of the putative parasomnic episode 
 
Several of the expert witnesses, especially the more experienced ones, stated they had 
refused cases based on the initial information from the lawyer. In some cases this was 
on the ground the “state” had not arisen out of sleep, in others because the medical 
history or the actions during the episode were incompatible with parasomnia. Once 
these obvious cases were excluded, generally the defendants required holistic 
assessment, with no one factor alone being determinative. Although one expert witness 
did not rule out the possibility of a parasomnia presenting for the first time with 
potentially criminal behaviour, it seemed to be an essential prerequisite.  
There were a few examples from the participants of defendants with a good history of 
parasomnia who nonetheless did not have a parasomnia episode on the night in 
question. This was usually in relation to sexual offences with atypical histories for 
parasomnia, with defendants who sought out their victim. All the experts emphasized 
that a corroborated history of parasomnia was essential: 
‘I would generally not accept somebody’s description of having parasomnias unless 
there was some witness evidence of it, either from parents when they were children 
or from present partners. I think it’s very dangerous just to take somebody’s word for 
it without that.’ 
All the experts agreed that it is impossible to know for sure if a particular episode was 
parasomnia or not. This is not a surprising problem, nor is it uncommon in the area of 
criminal justice. The jury are not required to have 100% certainty of guilty, just to be 
sure beyond a reasonable doubt. Expert 29 stated 
‘there’s always a two-part question – the first part of the question is “is it conceivable 
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that this behaviour could possibly have been related to sleepwalking, therefore 
without conscious awareness and without responsibility?” And the answer’s generally 
“Yes” – I mean people can do extraordinary things in their sleep. The second part of 
the question is “Is this what happened at that point in time?” And that is where the 
problem lies, because there is no way in determining retrospectively what was going 
on at the time of the incident, the crime the person committed.’ 
Shneerson’s views were on very similar lines 
‘Some people tend to deal more with the substantial evidence like if somebody was a 
sleepwalker in the past, more or less, documented by other people, then this would 
have predisposed them, therefore you can assume that any activity at night would 
have been sleepwalking therefore out of their control therefore they’re innocent. Well 
I don’t go along with that at all, I think it’s what happened on the night that matters, 
and the background history about sleepwalking is supportive and increases or 
reduces the probability of what happened that night. Basically I’m always looking 
much more for what actually happened and what was the response, the reaction 
afterwards.’ 
Many agreed that an expert witness could be fooled: 
‘How easy, how easy would it be to fool me? (indrawing of breath) Well one has to 
decide what one goes on here. In terms of the description of the history, the eye 
witness accounts…I think it would be quite easy, I think it’s quite difficult to 
distinguish effectively … if your accused person is genned up on this sort of thing, 
has read about sleepwalking and the information now is very much in the public 
arena, then if they’re intelligent, I think they could easily fool a medical expert. Myself 
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included.’ 
Walker felt that successful simulation was unlikely unless the crime has been pre-
meditated; otherwise, the behaviour observed was unlikely to be consistent with 
parasomnia:  
‘I think if you were going to plan for it to be a parasomnia, what you’d have to do was 
plan for it to be a parasomnia before you carried out the act. I think what usually 
happens is, people carry out the act, and then use the parasomnia as a defence 
thereafter. So I think if you had spent some time planning the parasomnia beforehand 
you could probably do a much better job.’ 
Reed doubted in the case he was involved in that the sexual assault was premeditated: 
 
‘Had it been a planned thing it would had to have been very well planned because it 
was just a split second where this opportunity arose so it didn’t seem particularly 
plausible and of course he was at great risk of being caught which is exactly what 
happened.’ 
Shneerson commented that 
 
‘it depends how gullible the expert witness is. Or maybe they’re looking for signs to 
support their view - some experts only work for one side or the other, and they’re 
always looking for evidence that somebody did have a parasomnia or didn’t have a 
parasomnia, they’re looking for only one side of the case. So those sort of people are 
easily fooled – but actually it’s part of the skill of being an expert witness is to ask 
questions where the person who is fabricating the evidence trips themselves up, 
because they’ve been through the documentary evidence, you have a clue as to what 
people are doing , you can ask people what did they see or what did they see or what 
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was so and so doing, and unless they’re really great minds with very good memories, 
you can usually tell if somebody’s evidence is inconsistent and likely to be fabricated, 
he’s trying to fool you.’ 
Pressman described his approach in the Falater case, which focussed on the 
assessment of conscious awareness: 
‘in the Falater case, I went at this very different than Dr Cartwright. I mean there was 
a lot of evidence about what he did and did not do that night – there was the next 
door neighbour witnessed the moving around. And so I actually had sixty pieces of 
evidence that I thought showed higher cognitive function: there was planning; there 
was social interaction; there was memory; there was the formation of memory during 
the episode, the apparent episode; there was concealment of evidence. I understand 
Dr Cartwright has her own view of these things, and she mainly, her testimony mainly 
had to do with the presence of factors that are known to prime or trigger sleepwalking 
– sleep deprivation, stress, I don’t know, she went off on a, she had an interesting 
idea about caffeine consumption. However these are all indirect factors. 
And so, I always look at what did the individual do? The guys who actually murdered 
their wives have actually potentially murdered the only real witness to whether they 
were sleepwalking or not. And there certainly are cases where the victim comes in 
and testifies for the defence – you know, because they were acting in a way that was 
inconsistent with being awake or being drunk or being anything else. And those are 
very valuable defence witnesses.’  
Ebrahim disavows this approach 
‘the problem with Mark Pressman’s testimony is that he puts himself at the scene of 
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the crime at the time of the event by saying this – that is a flaw. You cannot, because 
you were not there, you cannot say that this person was conscious. You can 
hypothesize about what was there, you can say one possibility is that he was 
conscious but the other possibility is…the other thing about the Mark Pressman 
testimony is he’s not a neuropsychologist, he’s not a neuropsychiatrist, he has no 
expertise in memory disorders, he’s got no expertise in dealing with people with 
various different levels of consciousness, other than sleep. He hasn’t worked with 
people with brain injury. And that is something you need, so if you’re a 
neuropsychiatrist you can comment on it, and a neuropsychiatrist will say ‘I was not 
there at the time of the crime, I was not standing next to Jules Lowe to do a mental 
state examination of him in real time during the, so I can’t say whether he was 
conscious or not’. 
There were different approaches about the interpretation of the facts of the case. As 
above, Pressman based his expert evidence on his interpretation of the actions of 
Falater. Others felt that this was more a job for the jury. 
[Interviewer] did you find in any of your cases there was certain actions that could be 
interpreted in different ways? 
‘Yes. Again the most recent one I can think about, exactly – if you interpreted the 
actions of the person to what had occurred, it could have been interpreted as a 
parasomnia or it could have been interpreted as just obfuscation. And again I don’t 
feel it’s my duty to distinguish these but merely point out that these are the 
possibilities – so again the questioning from the prosecution in that case asked me if 
there would be an alternative interpretation to which I said ‘there would be, there 
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could be, but it’s not for me to decide that’. 
There were different views about the relative importance of the academic literature and 
clinical experience. Pressman commented 
‘I’m an evidence-based expert. I mean we are now in the evidence-based era, of 
evidence-based medicine, and I believe that this is slowly extending to evidence-
based scientific evidence … in the United States at the Federal level, I believe in 
about half the states we have the Supreme Court decision of Daubert … this 
basically is very specific about how you determine what is solid and reliable scientific 
evidence.’  
Walker felt that the expert was there to given an opinion, particularly as the 
interpretation of the research is not straightforward: 
‘I think the first thing to say is that the evidence that’s presented in research, not all of 
it’s equal. So there’s research and research. Quite often people present research 
findings but I think the papers are often questionable and the conclusions they reach 
are questionable. So the fact that there is evidence, that doesn’t necessarily mean 
that’s correct or right or that there’s no controversy surrounding that. Furthermore I 
think, you know, if people just wanted a presentation of what was in the literature, 
then it would be possible to get somebody just to do a literature review and present 
that. What I think the court is after is your expert opinion. So it’s not only the 
literature, it’s also your clinical experience and your opinion of what is in the literature, 
whether it’s worthwhile or not worthwhile.’  
There were different opinions about the utility of sleep studies. Pressman commented 
 
‘I don’t do sleep studies in my forensic cases … they can’t tell you what happened six 
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months ago. You cannot recreate the circumstances that were present on the night of 
the criminal action – it’s impossible. And most of these people who are having sleep 
studies have spent six months to two years in prison – waiting for their trial, for their 
sleep studies, and obviously that would have a dramatic effect on whatever you 
found on the sleep study. There’s a big difference between saying ‘right now, this 
individual has some of the characteristics or some of the findings that we attribute to 
sleepwalkers’ and saying that ‘two years ago they were in a sleepwalking state when 
they committed a violent or sexual act’ – it’s not the same thing.’ 
Expert 29 had a similar opinion 
 
‘sleep studies are of absolutely no value whatsoever after the fact - period … sleep 
studies end up as in the Falater case just being a smokescreen. It just confuses 
everybody. And you get people arguing over things that are totally irrelevant, and the 
jury, how can they be expected to sort through all of this testimony about sleep 
studies, when in fact the sleep studies should not be allowed in the courtroom 
because they’re irrelevant.’ 
8.5.15 Complexity and duration of sleepwalking and parasomnic episodes 
There was debate over the level of complexity and duration consistent with 
sleepwalking episodes in particular. Williams commented 
‘I come from the position that sleepwalkers can do remarkable things. And the reason 
for that is I have the advantage of not being only forensic medicine, this clinic we 
have we see ten thousand patients a year and in amongst them are people who are 
not in an adversarial state, they’re there because they’ve consistently or repeatedly 
have attacked their partners. So I know it happens, so therefore I start with that 
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knowledge; and similarly sleep-driving, some people say that’s too complex but I’ve 
had people tell me and not in a court. So I start believing it can happen and therefore 
if all the circumstances look right in that list, which is in the forensic sleep medicine 
textbook, then I think it’s possible.’  
By contrast, Horne believes that there are two distinct phenomena in the forensic 
sphere: ‘true’ sleepwalking, where the person was a robot, navigating by memory and 
uncommunicative; and a dissociative state (he used the term “fugue”) where more 
complex behaviour is possible and even rudimentary conversations. The person has no 
memory for these dissociative episodes - whether or not they would have the requisite 
mens rea is a more difficult question to answer. Amnesia is no indication of the ability to 
form the necessary mens rea at the time in question. The Parks case was given as an 
example of such a dissociative state, with driving considered incompatible with true 
sleepwalking by this expert. Some other experts considered that the longer episodes 
resulted from sleepwalking merging into a dissociative state.  
Nisbet also had concerns about some of the more complex behaviour 
‘there’s possibly something different about those ones that do eventually get to court 
and are accused of severe crimes because I do begin to become a little bit sceptical 
because we do see patients sometimes grabbing their wife by the throat or shaking 
them or jumping on top of them or sometimes hitting them. That is a small minority of 
cases of sleepwalking and parasomnias and to go from that to a very severe assault 
or murder or rape, I begin to have some degree of scepticism. I would if I saw those 
patients in a clinical scenario, if something very serious had happened, because 
usually the partner can wake the patient with time before anything majorly serious 
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happens, so I think there is other psychopathology or maybe alcohol or drugs or that 
there is some degree of functional overlay going on. And the patient is trying to blame 
something on their sleepwalking, which may not be related.’  
Riha came to a similar conclusion 
‘if you see enough parasomnias, if you see enough people with these problems, then 
you come to realise that there’s different phenotypes of them, you know there’s just 
the simple people, people who simply just get up and have a night terror or who do a 
bit of a sleepwalking but not particularly, no complex behaviours, and what does 
come through importantly, and these people often respond very well to medications, 
and there are the ones who have either personality disorders or who have ongoing 
considerable stress or some kind of psychological or psychiatric problems who don’t 
respond for instance to simple medication and where the behaviour is probably 
confounding their degree of distress from other causes. Often they don’t have the 
insight to recognize that either. And these are a much more difficult group of people 
to deal with.’ 
The Parks case truly divides the expert witness community, and for this reason should 
not be held up as an archetypal forensic sleepwalking episode. Brian Butler, who was 
involved with the case, commented 
‘I think the vast majority of the profession who had nothing to do with the case will 
say “whoa, those boys were either quacks or really got taken for a ride!”’ 
Nonetheless he was quite convinced from his contact with Parks that he was genuine. 
He commented on the eye witness accounts of  
‘The kids who … hid in the closet while this act was unfolding and what they say 
314 
 
 
 
about the primitive guttural noises that were going on as he went up and down the 
stairs in this state, again quite persuasive of some primitive function, brain functioning 
state in my view’ 
He did comment that 
‘it probably makes more sense in terms of the complexity of driving a car and 
handling all of that that you’re looking at something other than sort of “normal” 
sleepwalking.’ 
Expert 19 found the presence of sensory dissociation (Parks was oblivious to the 
severed flexor tendons in his arm) persuasive evidence for sleepwalking. Cartwright 
was struck by Parks’s failure to recognize the faces of his father- and mother-in-law: 
Expert 29 emphasized the difficulties in his comments about the Falater case 
‘Mark Pressman … said it was too long for sleepwalking … my response to that is 
“who knows what is too long for sleepwalking?” You know, is thirty minutes too long 
but twenty-nine minutes OK? We don’t know that, and that’s one reason that we 
decided … to go down this route to collect information to see how we could 
characterise these sleepwalking episodes’. 
Walker agrees with this: 
‘there is a vacuum in terms of good evidence – most of it is anecdotal reports, um 
case series, questionnaires to people with parasomnias, questionnaires to people 
generally, and the evidence, good hard evidence about what occurs in parasomnias, 
is quite difficult to come by. And so you end up with controversy about precipitating 
factors, people disagree, how long a parasomnia can go on for, you even have 
disagreements about what people can and cannot do during parasomnia.’ 
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There were features that all the expert witnesses agreed on, for example where there 
was evidence of higher functions: 
‘in general, if there’s any purposeful actions, typically they have secondary gain like 
trying to conceal the crime or evidence about who did it, I would strongly suspect that 
the person was awake.’ 
8.5.16 Ontology of sleepwalking and sexsomnia 
The finding that experts disagreed in some instances about whether or not a particular 
episode represented sleepwalking, even when the facts were generally agreed, was not 
surprising. Perhaps more surprising was the fact that the experts could not agree on 
what exactly constituted sleepwalking. One particular sleep expert, who does not get 
involved with sleepwalking cases, believes that many of the more complicated episodes 
of longer duration are not sleepwalking, but something else – perhaps a sleep-related 
dissociative state. A similar suggestion was made by other experts that the longer 
episodes started off as sleepwalking and segued into a dissociative state. Whether or 
not this makes a difference depends partly on whether or not the expert believed that a 
dissociative state/fugue should be treated differently in law from sleepwalking. One 
participant commented on the distinction 
‘I think that’s difficult to say, and I suppose also boils down to what terminology you 
use, and I guess if you think that there are a number of different parasomnias, and … 
you can have a number of different symptoms off it. I say, it depends on what you like 
to call it. I’m not sure how big a difference it makes what you call it actually.’  
 
Espie agreed that the distinction between “sleepwalking” and “dissociative” episodes 
was not necessarily productive: 
316 
 
 
 
‘the majority of these sleepwalking events are self-contained, and self-limiting … for 
many people the events are actually quite brief – sometimes they can be quite 
prolonged … some people think ‘well, if it’s getting beyond just a few minutes, then 
this is like dissociative’ or if it involves going out the house, walking long distances or 
something like that, then it’s more like a dissociative episode. I think the truth of the 
matter is if you like is these are dissociative episodes in themselves, the whole thing 
is dissociative – but because we regard those as separate [] in law we try and make 
hard and fast differentiations, between one thing and another – we do a bit of the 
same with psychiatric disorders, or sleep disorders, and say ‘well, you know, that’s a 
separate disorder from that [but] I would tend to from clinical experience say that the 
same sort of cognitive emotional factors that can make people vulnerable to 
sleepwalking can also make people vulnerable to dissociation.’ 
There is some evidence that sleep facilitates the transition between alters in dissociative 
identity disorder (DID). One expert reported a patient who exhibited complex nocturnal 
behaviour where he would be left-handed, but was right-handed during wakefulness. 
This is suggestive of DID. During sexsomnic episodes the person’s sexual behaviour is 
often different, and this may include their sexual orientation.  
8.5.17 Intention 
As previously discussed (see 2.5, 6.2.3), the Freudian view of sleepwalking as an 
expression of repressed desires has fallen from favour for a variety of reasons. 
However, some experts considered that conscious thoughts affected sleep behaviour 
via different mechanisms: 
‘Yeah – I don’t think there’s…..blame and…I don’t think people are in control of what 
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they’re doing. However, it’s certainly my experience that people will often carry out, in 
parasomnias, acts that they would perhaps want to do if they were awake. So I have 
had people for example who are dieting, sleep-eating.[] it’s obviously a subconscious 
desire to eat, and when they’re in a sleepwalking state, they don’t have control over 
that.[] I think there’s different degrees of motivation during acts … I think that there is 
lighter and deeper sleepwalking and certainly children I think tend to be much deeper 
so they tend to have less awareness of what they’ve done, have less recall, they 
don’t usually describe dream mentation, whilst adults will … not infrequently describe 
dream mentation, and so it may be a slightly different phenomenon.’ 
Fenwick was of a similar opinion 
‘Do I think that um people can do motivated things during sleepwalking? Well I mean 
the evidence is very strong that they can and they do. I mean, think of the people 
who uh go and raid the fridge in the middle of the night. There’s a piece of motivated 
sleepwalking. So the answer is ‘yes, you can’, but it – one of the things that I think is 
important is it has to in fact be out of character for the individual. A fat lady raiding the 
fridge is one thing, but a guy who isn’t violent, has never been violent, has no violent 
fantasies etc etc picking up a knife and sticking it into somebody else is different.’ 
It is quite plausible that the association gained credence from examples of sleep-related 
dissociative disorder. One interviewee pointed out 
‘violent behaviour is almost never ever been reported more than once in the same 
individual, where it’s felt to be truly sleepwalking. So clearly these behaviours that 
occur, if they are sleepwalking, are not a sleep-related or state-dependent release of 
a waking personality characteristic, because otherwise these would be recurrent, and 
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they are virtually never recurrent.’ 
The presence of a motive makes the defence much less tenable, but the absence of a 
motive is ambiguous - as one expert stated 
‘do people do crazy things for rational reasons that none of the rest of us 
understand? Of course they do’. 
Experts often commented on the character of a defendant or any possible motive (or 
lack thereof):  
‘Cos there was no evidence of any previous sexual interest in this woman at all, he’d 
known her all his life, he’d grown up with his friend, she’d always been around. She 
said there’s never been any problem with him, he said he had no sexual interest in 
her of any description, it was the last thing he could imagine himself doing. You’ve 
only got his word, but there’s nothing in the witness statements from her to suggest 
that this was the case.’ 
Pressman remarked 
‘You’re not required to have a motive, but if you’ve got someone … like in the 
Thomas case … it was a loving relationship; there was nothing anyone could report 
that would indicate his wish to kill her. Or for that matter even any problems between 
them.’ 
Nisbet highlighted the epistemological difficulties where there is a plausible motive 
‘if someone is a sleepwalker and a genuine sleepwalker and genuinely has 
automatisms but having discovered that their partner has been sleeping with their 
best friend and then in the night murders them, the question is ‘are they using their 
sleepwalking as an excuse?’ Were they really fully awake and trying to get away with 
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a defence of sleepwalking? And that’s a value judgment, and I think there are ways 
by which you can help make a judgment on those things, by taking a very careful 
history. Although there’s always going to be uncertainty in that situation.’ 
 8.5.18 Alcohol and sleepwalking 
Alcohol and sleepwalking is the most contested issue in forensic sleep disorders. Some 
participants were quite forthright in their opinions, expert 29 commenting 
‘what’s going on in England with ******* and ******* is just outrageous with their 
alcohol defence that they use, they get involved with cases where people are so 
fucking drunk that there’s no way that in my opinion you could even seriously 
consider sleepwalking. And they’re saying that this incredible amount of alcohol 
triggered sleepwalking – well I mean that is just I think total bogus.’ 
The American experts I spoke felt that alcohol consumption to the point of intoxication 
precluded the sleepwalking/sexsomnia defence. Pressman remarked 
‘as far as I’m concerned people who were, you know drank excessively and 
recklessly, basically don’t have a defence because of course voluntary intoxication is 
not a defence – I’m not sure in the UK but in the United States in most locations it’s 
either not a defence at all or it’s certainly not a complete defence. So basically these 
people have no defence’. 
This echoes the sentiment in the article by Pressman et al  where they state 
‘Claims of alcohol-induced parasomnias presented solely to circumvent the laws of 
voluntary intoxication should be understood for what they are and rejected.’16 
                                                     
16 PRESSMAN, M., MAHOWALD, M.W., SCHENCK, C.H., and CRAMER BORNEMANN M. (2007) 
Alcohol-induced sleepwalking or confusional arousal as a defense to criminal behavior: a review of 
scientific evidence, methods and forensic considerations. Journal of Sleep Research, 16, pp. 198-212. 
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The reaction of Reading (also a sceptic about the effect of alcohol) was that this position 
is Puritanical -  
‘as soon as alcohol is mentioned, they blame it all on alcohol.’ 
 
Ebrahim was of a similar opinion 
‘This is the evangelical route of where sleep medicine is going. It’s now evangelism. 
The president of the British Sleep Society also thinks this. Go and speak to Paul 
Reading and ask his opinion.’ 
Another sleep expert felt that neither position was correct 
‘[the Sleep Clinic group’s] theory is that alcohol is a very common factor and they 
play down the intoxication, the change in behaviour due to intoxication, whereas the 
Americans play that up and deny the alcohol has an effect on parasomnia. So my 
view is yes, alcohol does trigger the parasomnia in some people, about 20% but that 
varies, but I don’t really trust the alcohol provocation test, I think that when you get 
someone that’s drunk a lot, that often happens in these situations that we’re talking 
about, about ten pints or more, quite a few units they’ve had, twenty, twenty-five 
units, there you’ve got to make some sort of judgment … was the behaviour more in 
keeping with somebody who was drunk, or somebody who was in a parasomnia 
state? [] I would go more on the individual circumstances – but obviously the more 
somebody has drunk, the more likely they are to be intoxicated and to be disinhibited 
and behave in a way which is related to the alcohol. Whereas if it’s someone with a 
moderate alcohol consumption with other trigger factors such as extreme tiredness or 
stress, then it may well have been a factor causing a parasomnia. So I’m somewhere 
between the two, I can see both sides slightly, but I don’t quite like either side’s view 
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as a whole picture.’ 
Many experts commented that a small proportion of their patients reported an 
association of their parasomnia with alcohol consumption. The sceptics about alcohol 
emphasize the lack of reliable scientific evidence that alcohol triggers sleepwalking. 
Pressman commented 
‘there IS NO scientific evidence to support the defence that someone who goes out 
and gets roaring drunk and then commits a heinous crime, violent or rape or whatnot, 
was sleepwalking or having sleepsex. There’s no relationship in the science between 
alcohol and sleepwalking. It’s just something that’s left over from …. the time before 
modern sleepwalking medicine when people really couldn’t tell the difference 
between sleepwalking and someone who was just severely intoxicated. I mean now 
we can, we know that they’re completely different states, they may look superficially 
similar to some people but they’re not similar. And actually there’s never been a 
single published study in which somebody gave alcohol to a clinically diagnosed 
sleepwalker to see what happened.’17 
 Shneerson points out the epistemological difficulties: 
 
‘[the sceptics] emphasize to a great degree the absence of evidence, but that doesn’t 
mean to say that the situation isn’t true, it just means the evidence hasn’t been 
collected.’ 
Reading pointed out that there are confounding factors that are more likely contributors; 
late nights, a full bladder, and stress (which is often the trigger for increased alcohol 
                                                     
17 This is not strictly true, as Hartmann administered alcohol during a PSG (HARTMANN, E. (1983) Two 
Case Reports: Night Terrors With Sleepwalking - A Potentially Lethal Disorder. Journal of Nervous and 
Mental Disease, 171(8), pp. 503-5). 
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consumption).  
Shneerson commented that 
‘It is an important issue - you see a lot of these events do involve some degree of 
alcohol consumption in fact. So it is something where some clarification of the 
situation, of the issues anyway, which could be referred to so the barrister could ask 
questions against this guideline, an explanation of the effects of alcohol on people’s 
behaviour, would help.’ 
Walker summed up the current state of knowledge about alcohol and sleepwalking 
neatly 
‘there’s controversy surrounding the effects of alcohol on parasomnia. And plenty of 
people describe their parasomnias being more elaborate or worsened by alcohol, and 
plenty of my patients do, but then when you start to look at the hard evidence that 
alcohol necessarily does do that, I think it’s a vexed question. And I think the best 
way of presenting that is to present, as I have done, present it as a question that still 
remains unresolved.’  
Pressman argues that the cause of nocturnal behaviour after alcohol consumption is not 
known, so to attribute it to parasomnia is presumptuous.  
There was concern about the alcohol provocation test among the experts that didn’t use 
it, even if they agreed that alcohol seemed to be a trigger for some patients. Shneerson 
remarked 
‘They’ve also developed an alcohol provocation test, which has been the subject of a 
lot of discussion, but the criticism of this is that there’s no normal values – so if they 
get a positive or negative result, what does it mean? And also doing the alcohol 
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provocation test 6 months later, in different circumstances, may or may not translate 
to the circumstances of the night, where the person might be more sleep-deprived or 
stressed … my personal view is that the test hasn’t been validated sufficiently … it 
wouldn’t be used in clinical practice, because there’s no normal values, there’s no 
ways or protocols of making it relevant to producing information you want … I don’t 
really trust the alcohol provocation test, I think that when you get someone that’s 
drunk a lot, that often happens in these situations that we’re talking about, about ten 
pints or more, quite a few units they’ve had, twenty, twenty-five units, there you’ve 
got to make some sort of judgment.’  
Often the victim in sexsomnia cases had been drinking too. In some cases, the victims 
were plied with drink by their assailants 
‘what the defendant did, really under the eyes of his trusting wife, was nip out and nip 
upstairs, and he was plying this girl with drink and he got her, because she was not 
used to drinking much, he got her really drunk, so much so that she was sick. And he 
got her up, cleaned her up and took her into the bathroom and everything … he’d 
gone to bed with his wife, had clearly got up, leaving the bed with the wife in, and it 
was a comfortable house, a number of bedrooms, and he’d clearly selected this 
bedroom … he’d had sex with the other girl. His partner was keen to say “oh, yes, he 
sleepwalks”, all the rest of it – what I was saying was “look, he was doing a lot of 
things behind your back”. “What do you mean?” “Well, he was plying the girl with 
drink.” “No.” “Would you have approved of the fact that not only did he ply her with 
drink, but he got her so drunk she was sick?” “No.”’ 
This account is totally inconsistent with parasomnia and legal automatism. 
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8.5.19 Policy issues and victim concerns 
Policy issues were acknowledged by some experts. One noted the judge in the 
Thompson case commented about “opening the floodgates”, if alcohol-induced 
parasomnia could be the basis of a plain acquittal. However, it seems the floodgates 
have already been leaking. Comments about victims (generally the illegal act was not in 
question so this term is more appropriate than complainant) included: 
‘I prefer to be sure … that I’m not doing something that might cause problems … for 
either side.’ 
Idzikowski felt that a general partial defence of diminished responsibility would address 
the issue of the victim’s experience. Judge Milmo considers that diminished 
responsibility would be an option for somnambulistic homicide.18 
Many participants were concerned about defendants who had drunk large amounts of 
alcohol arguing the parasomnia defence, which occurred most often with sexual 
offences. This was a particular issue because a few experts provided the expert 
evidence in support of parasomnia in many of the cases. However, there were several 
occasions when other experts outside that group instructed by the defence agreed with 
their conclusions. Some of the participants considered this practice to be either 
unethical or unscientific or both.  
8.5.20 Controversies  
I have studiously avoided taking sides in the dispute between certain sleep experts and 
not just out of a desire to preserve academic integrity – I genuinely believe both sides 
have valid points. Also both sides have tended to distort the position of the other at 
                                                     
18 Personal communication 
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times. One expert stated that the criteria of some experts (especially with regards to 
alcohol-induced states) could be satisfied by any defendant. This seemed an 
exaggeration, although this is not a statement I could definitely refute due to the 
limitations of my methodology. Certainly none of the experts would support the defence 
where there was not a good history of parasomnia. There was some polarization on 
certain issues, but generally there was a spread of opinion. This reflected the general 
uncertainty in this field.  
8.5.21 Criminal Responsibility 
I also explored whether or not expert witnesses felt that establishing the diagnosis of 
parasomnia resolved the issue of whether or not the accused was an automaton. There 
was a general consensus that the question of legal responsibility largely hinged on the 
question of whether or not there was a parasomnic episode, although Cramer 
Bornemann and Mahowald have stated  
‘In the developing field of sleep forensics, a medical expert will have to do more than 
just evaluate for a possible sleep disorder because, ultimately, the defendant’s state 
of consciousness will prove pivotal.’19  
Further Schenck commented on the possibility of ‘islands of lucidity’, and the variability 
of sleepwalking episodes.  Expert 19 agreed that sleepwalking episodes are 
heterogeneous, and so the expert witness needs to assess capacity on an individual 
basis. Nisbet voiced a similar opinion: 
‘sleepwalking is a continuum – all non-REM parasomnias are a continuum from deep 
                                                     
19 CRAMER BORNEMANN, M.A. and MAHOWALD, M.W. (2010) Chapter 63 Sleep Forensics. In 
KRYGER, M., ROTH, T. and DEMENT, W.C. (eds.). Principles and Practice of Sleep Medicine. 5th Ed. 
Philadelphia: Saunders, pp. 725-733. 
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sleep through to wakefulness. And that even during any individual sleepwalking 
episode, at the beginning of the sleepwalking episode the patient is more asleep and 
less culpable than towards the end when they’re more awake and more culpable … 
It’s not a simple ‘you’re either sleepwalking or you’re not’ – because sleepwalking, as 
I say to patients there’s a state of partial wakefulness and partial sleep, and 
depending on where you are on that continuum will depend on your culpability – that 
really doesn’t fit in with ‘are they sane or insane?’  
As mentioned in Chapter Three, Mckenzie and Matthaeus qualified the sleepwalker’s 
excuse with the rider that he should not have enmity towards the victim. Also the usual 
criteria require behaviour without motive and out of character. The interviewees were 
asked whether or not the sleepwalker (or parasomniac) acts out unconscious, 
subconscious or conscious desires in their sleep. Most thought that this was not the 
case, although they could not rule it out. Some pointed it out that due to the nature of 
parasomnia, that even if this was the case the accused should not be held criminally 
responsible.  
 
8.6 Analysis of results 
 
The experts agreed on most issues. They all agreed on the general clinical features and 
the approach to the clinical assessment of the patient. They understood the 
responsibilities of the expert witness. The main areas of disagreement were alcohol and 
sleepwalking, the utility of sleep studies, and the complexity and duration of parasomnic 
episodes. Some experts tended to work for one particular side. Whilst this does not 
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mean that the experts involved tailor their opinions to the requirements of the instructing 
counsel (otherwise they would be equally used by defence and prosecution), it does 
suggest that their perspective on sleepwalking cases as a whole might be known and 
affect which side hires them. The opinion of the experts about whether or not 
sleepwalking should be treated as a sane or insane automatism depended on the 
flexibility they believed the courts had. There was a common perception that a hospital 
order was the automatic result of the special verdict, and this belief tended to result in 
rejection of the insanity label for parasomnia. The American literature reflects their 
courts’ approach to the insanity defence, as this quote from Schenck and Mahowald 
illustrates: 
‘We believe it would be very inappropriate to consider somnambulism (or any 
parasomnia) with continuing danger as an insane automatism requiring indefinite 
psychiatric hospitalization. Instead, a parasomnia with continuing danger should be 
regarded as a non-insane automatism requiring non-psychiatric partial hospitalization 
for the express purpose of monitoring overnight sleep until the parasomnia can be 
reliably controlled with treatment.’ 
There were other considerations, including the problems of the label of insanity per se 
(due to stigma or inappropriateness). Apart from this and the role of alcohol, there was 
relatively little appreciation of policy issues.  
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Chapter 9: Discussion 
 
9.1 Expert Evidence 
 
9.1.1 Approach of the experts 
All of the expert witnesses I interviewed were well aware that their duty was to the court, 
rather than the party instructing them. None of them could be accurately described as 
“hired guns”. All of them described turning down work as an expert witness instructed by 
the defence where the account of parasomnia was not credible. However, it was 
apparent that certain experts’ approaches might innately favour the prosecution or 
defence. Indeed Nottingham detectives attributed a successful prosecution to obtaining 
the right expert. Smith comments that  
‘[m]any expert are open to the suggestion that working regularly for one side … may 
foster ‘prosecution mindedness’ or defence mindedness’.1 
For example, an expert who had a restrictive definition of behaviour compatible with 
parasomnia would be more helpful for the prosecution. Empirical study has shown that 
the source of an expert witness’s instructions will influence the court report consciously 
or subconsciously.2  
There have been a number of cases in recent years that have eroded the immunity of 
                                                     
1 SMITH, R. (1989) Forensic pathology, scientific expertise, and the criminal law. In SMITH, R. and 
WYNNE, B. (eds.). Expert Evidence: Interpreting Science in the Law. London: Routledge, pp. 56-92. 
2 MURRIE, D.C., BOCCACCINI, M.T., GUARNERA, L.A. and RUFINO, K.A. (2013) Are Forensic Experts 
Biased by the Side That Retained Them? Psychological Science, 24(10), pp. 1889-97. 
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expert witnesses – Meadow v General Medical Council, Kaney v Jones.3  As Thorpe LJ 
remarked in Meadow v General Medical Council concerning medical expert witnesses 
‘The majority will be employed under NHS consultant contracts. By contrast to the 
other justice systems this is a market in which demand exceeds supply. It is thus very 
sensitive to increasing or newly emerging disincentives. This factor is compounded 
by a paucity of incentives.’ (para 27) 
This author would say there is a good possibility that fewer sleep experts will do 
medico-legal work if further inroads are made into expert witness immunity. There is 
already a perception that medico-legal work takes up a disproportionate amount of time 
compared to the rewards. Combine this with the proposed reductions in fees, and it will 
become increasingly more difficult for a sleepwalker to find an appropriate expert to 
instruct. The potential liability issue identified for experts changing the thrust of their 
evidence in joint statements might result in such discussions becoming pointless 
exercises.  
The controversy about alcohol and sleepwalking revolves largely around what kind of 
medical evidence is acceptable to support expert testimony. Even the most vocal critic 
of the use of the Alcohol Provocation Test (APT), Pressman, is happy for expert 
witnesses to adduce their clinical experience as to the effects of alcohol on 
sleepwalking. The vast majority of British forensic sleep experts believe that alcohol 
triggers sleepwalking in a minority of patients. Pressman takes issue with the claims 
made about APT results, arguing it is unvalidated and a test that is impossible to fail. 
This dichotomy resembles the approach of the Law Commission, who proposed that  
                                                     
3 [2006] EWCA Civ 1390; [2011] UKSC 13 
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‘the trial judge should have a number of guidelines to help him or her determine 
whether or not the test was satisfied, with one set of guidelines for scientific (or 
purportedly scientific) evidence, and another set of guidelines for experience-based, 
non-scientific expertise. We suggested that guidelines of this sort could be 
incorporated into legislation.’4 
Contrary to my initial impressions from the literature, all the forensic sleep experts I 
have spoken to appeared to be quite sceptical about claims of sleepwalking by 
defendants as a whole, due to the large number of referrals that are speculative 
(between 75 and 90%).  
There is a potential problem where expert witnesses place too much emphasis on 
evidence-based medicine and academic rigour, as this has the effect of potentially 
denying the defendant the benefit of the doubt that the criminal justice system rightly 
enshrines as part of the presumption of innocence. The lack of definitive research 
should not deny the accused the defence of sleepwalking. However, this does not mean 
that junk science should be tolerated. The prosecution has certain duties to exclude 
evidence which do not extend to the defence – as the Law Commission notes 
‘It should also be noted that any manifestly unreliable evidence tendered by the 
prosecution can at present be excluded at common law or by the application of s 
78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.’5 
Additionally in non-insane automatism there is an evidential burden on the defence, but 
the burden of proof is on the prosecution. By contrast, in insane automatism the onus is 
                                                     
4 LAW COMMISSION. (2009) The Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England 
and Wales. 190. The Law Commission. 
5 See footnote 4. 
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on the defence team to prove insanity on the balance of probabilities. The 
concatenation of these doctrines allows relatively weak medical evidence to be adduced 
and successfully support the defence of non-insane automatism. 
9.1.2 Admissibility 
The issue of admissibility of expert evidence has recently been examined by the Law 
Commission. They were concerned about the contribution of flawed expert evidence to 
miscarriages of justice. The Law Commission in Expert Evidence in Criminal 
Proceedings in England and Wales6 quoted several organizations’ concerns about the 
provision of expert evidence and the need for reform. The General Medical Council 
stated  
‘it is because juries and other lay tribunals tend to afford a special status to [scientific 
medical] evidence that a robust assessment of its admissibility prior to trial is critical.7 
(para 1.1.6) 
The Criminal Bar Association noted that  
‘rightly or wrongly, [expert evidence] is often ‘trusted’ like no other category of 
evidence’. (para 1.18) 
The persuasiveness of medical tests for juries varies - studies suggest, perhaps 
surprisingly, that juries were not particularly swayed by neuroimaging.8 Nonetheless, 
caution is advised as admitting tests infers that they have probative value. 
Given the impact of unreliable expert evidence, the Law Commission have proposed the 
                                                     
6 LAW COMMISSION. (2011) Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales. No. 325. 
London: The Stationery Office. 
7 One interviewee noted this phenomenon for juries to defer to medical expert witnesses over scientists.  
8 SCHWEITZER, N.J., MURPHY, E.R., ROSKIES, A.L., SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, W. and GAUDET, L.M. 
(2011) NEUROIMAGES AS EVIDENCE IN A MENS REA DEFENSE: No Impact. Psychology, Public 
Policy, and Law, 17(3), pp. 357-93; SCHWEITZER, N.J. and SAKS, M.J. (2012) Neuroimage Evidence 
and the Insanity Defense. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 29(4), pp. 592-607. 
332 
 
 
 
adoption of a statutory enhanced admissibility test for expert evidence on the lines of 
Rule 702 in the Federal Rules of Evidence (see Chapter 7.2). Their proposed test is 
(1) The opinion evidence of an expert witness is admissible only if the court is 
satisfied that it is sufficiently reliable to be admitted. 
(2) The opinion evidence of an expert witness is sufficiently reliable to be 
admitted if:– 
(a) the evidence is predicated on sound principles, techniques and 
assumptions; 
(b) those principles, techniques and assumptions have been properly applied to 
the facts of the case; and 
(c) the evidence is supported by [that is, logically in keeping with] those 
principles, techniques and assumptions as applied to the facts of the case. 
These tests have been considered by judges before, for example by the Court of Appeal 
in Luttrell9 (see 7.5). Even though absolute accuracy and reliability are not required, 
expert evidence requires the use of techniques or knowledge that are accepted by the 
scientific community to be the basis for sufficiently accurate and reliable opinions.10 Not 
everyone would agree that the fundamental problem is the expert witnesses involved. 
Some would say that it is the lawyers’ fault11 because the advocates are not testing the 
evidence sufficiently rigorously. Judge Andrew Gilbart QC, Honorary Recorder of 
Manchester, commented on  
                                                     
9 [2004] 2 Cr App R 31 
10 R v Gilfoyle [2001] 2 Cr App R 5 
11 Comments of Mr Graham Cooke on the Sally Clark case at the BAFS Conference ‘Science and Justice: 
The Criminal Court’’, Saturday 22 Sept 2012.  
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‘how ill equipped advocates are to challenge [poor quality scientific evidence] when 
they have no experts of their own to advise them’. ([see above] at 1.19) 
The practicality of improving the scientific literacy of judges and advocates is uncertain. 
The current common law for admissibility of expert evidence is summarized in the 
Australian case of Bonython, where three requirements are related: 
(1) “whether the subject matter of the opinion is such that a person without instruction 
or experience in the area of knowledge or human experience would be able to form 
a sound judgment on the matter without the assistance of a witness possessing 
special knowledge or experience in the area”; 
(2) “whether the subject matter of the opinion forms part of a body of knowledge or 
experience which is sufficiently organized or recognized to be accepted as a 
reliable body of knowledge or experience, a special acquaintance with which by the 
witness would render his opinion of assistance to the court”; and 
(3) “whether the witness has acquired by study or experience sufficient knowledge of 
the subject to render his opinion of value in resolving the issues before the court”12 
 
Mark Pressman is a strong advocate for the use of evidence-based medicine (EBM) 
principles in expert testimony on forensic sleep disorders. It has been stated that 
including “anecdotal” or “opinion-based” evidence about possible triggers for 
sleepwalking is contrary to the principles of EBM, particularly a positive association 
between sleepwalking and alcohol. EBM certainly allows such evidence, although it 
categorizes it as level 5, possibly 4 at best (CEBM Levels of Evidence - see Appendix R 
for further details). The principles of EBM cannot necessarily be transferred to expert 
                                                     
12 The Queen v. Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45 
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testimony, as it is for the courts to decide what evidence is admissible. The recent 
publication of a case-control study brings the evidence for a link between alcohol and 
sleepwalking up to Level 3, whereas the evidence against a link remains at Level 5 
(working from first principles and physiology). It is also relevant that there are 
considerable ethical obstacles to research, given the potential safety issues for 
researchers. Mark Pressman believes that the substance of Rule 702, Federal Rules of 
Evidence, should be adopted here in the UK, as per the Law Commission 
recommendations.13 
There are two main problems with this approach: firstly, the evidence base for diagnosis 
of forensic sleep disorders (and sleep disorders generally) is not good. The field of 
forensic sleep medicine is still highly opinion-based, because of the dearth of reliable 
research. One study found that none of the case studies included the minimal set of 
medico-legal key features (defined as (1) legal issues (charge, defence, verdict); (2) 
defendant and victim characteristics (sex, age, relationship); (3) circumstantial factors 
(timing of the event, proximity, psychophysical condition of the defendant at the time of 
the event); and (4) forensic evaluation (clinical sleep assessment, polysomnography 
(PSG) findings, other medical evaluations)).14 A further criticism that has been levelled 
at Pressman’s own expert evidence is that he relies too much on his own publications - 
instead of the ipse dixit15 fallacy, he arguably commits the ipse scribit fallacy16. It is a 
contention of some forensic sleep experts that it is difficult for their own papers about 
alcohol and sleepwalking to be published, due to peer reviewers excluding evidence 
                                                     
13 See footnote 6. 
14 INGRAVALLO, F., POLI, F., VIGNATELLI, L., PIZZA, F. and PLAZZI, G. (2013) Sleep forensic case 
reports. Sleep medicine, 14(Supplement 1), pp. e233. 
15 He himself said it 
16 He himself wrote it. 
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linking alcohol and sleepwalking.17 Secondly it potentially has the effect of overturning 
the presumption of innocence and burden of proof.  
The “Sleep Clinic” group of expert witnesses18 has the biggest share of the forensic 
sleep work in the UK. The members work for either the prosecution or defence, 
although they appear more often for the defence. Their approach has been refined 
through years of experience. Their practice is to present the different possible scenarios 
to the jury, with the probability of each and the supporting reasons, so that the jury can 
make its own mind up. Mark Pressman, an American expert witness, is instructed 
frequently by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). He has not appeared for the 
defence in any British trials. He is known for his robust rebuttals of the sleepwalking 
defence, especially when the defendant has consumed a large amount of alcohol. His 
approach is more sceptical than most of the UK forensic sleep community, particularly 
where alcohol is concerned, and thus he is highly critical of the approach of Fenwick 
and Ebrahim. There are a number of contradictory statements on the selection of 
prosecution expert witnesses. The Daily Mail stated that  
‘Nottinghamshire Police … spent months seeking expert advice about Thompson's 
sleepwalking defence. The National Policing Improvement Agency eventually put 
lead investigator DC Paula Winfield in touch with Dr Pressman at the Lankenau 
Institute for Medical Research in Pennsylvania.’19 
 Graham Buchanan for the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) stated  
‘Prosecutors have worked long and hard to make this happen, including securing 
                                                     
17 I have had experience of this difficulty personally when co-author of a review article. 
18 Peter Fenwick, Irshaad Ebrahim, Chris Idzikowski and Adrian Williams of the London and Edinburgh 
Sleep Clinics at the time of my research. 
19 DOLAN, A. (2012) Jail for rapist who said he was sleepwalking. Daily Mail (Mar 30th). 
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evidence from the scene from the Portuguese authorities and identifying and 
assessing necessary medical experts to show that a defence of sleepwalking was not 
valid in this case.’20 
This reference to the extensive search for a suitable expert witness implies that his 
selection was crucial to this success. However, the CPS stated that the selection of 
Pressman was down to lack of availability of other experts. There are only a small 
number of forensic sleep experts in the UK, and at this time two of the most 
experienced forensic sleep experts were still under investigation by the GMC (see 
above). I had a second hand account from an expert witness that the CPS does have a 
list of forensic sleep expert witnesses, but this was officially denied: 
 ‘The CPS does not hold a register of experts. As an independent prosecution service 
it would be inappropriate to appear to endorse any expert by entering them on an 
internal list.’21 
It is this author’s belief that there probably is a mechanism in the CPS for selecting 
appropriate expert witnesses, even if there is not an official list. In any case, the NPIA 
database must be for the purpose of assisting prosecutions as the above quote 
demonstrates, and DC Paula Winfield alluded to the importance of securing the right 
expert. She stated 
“Sleepwalking as a criminal defence had never been successfully challenged in a 
sexual offence case before. But we could not let that discourage us from doing all we 
could to achieve justice for a young woman who has been through such a 
                                                     
20 FURNESS, H. (2012) Rapist jailed after "sleepwalking" claim rejected in legal first; A man has been 
jailed for raping a 17-year-old girl after his claim to have been sleepwalking was rejected by international 
experts in a landmark case. Telegraph (Mar 30th) News. 
21 Response from Karen Squibb-Williams, Strategic Policy Directorate, CPS dated 19th February 2010 
(see Appendix J). 
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traumatising ordeal.”22 
The assumption from the start appeared to be that the defence was bogus. There is a 
perception, partly fuelled by media accounts, that this is the latest defence on the block. 
The selection of expert witnesses for the prosecution from a database for which the 
criteria are not known, and indeed could not be divulged (when the Specialist 
Operations Centre  became part of the Serious and Organised Crime Agency rather 
than the National Police Improvements Agency), seem contrary to the principles of open 
justice. There is no apparent operational justification for not disclosing the criteria for 
placing expert witnesses on the SOC database. If experts are being chosen on the 
basis of their likely opinion (which the comments of DC Winfield and Graham Buchanan 
for the CPS suggest may be the case), this is arguably contrary to the prosecutorial 
duty of fairness. One argument is that this approach guarantees rigorous testing of the 
evidence; however, this is not the customary practice of the court.  
It is doubtful that there is a solution that can mould the messy business of expert 
evidence into the reliable “black box” that the legal system might be more comfortable 
with. As Gilson put it 
‘law has a high expectation of science and scientists in this regard owing to the 
objectivity, rigour and precision extolled in its methods. It is disappointed when its 
evidence is doubtful, experts disagree or prove unreliable.’23 
A lawyer sent me his opinion online on expert evidence re automatism 
‘So here is my in-depth analysis of automatism, which I offer free, gratis and for 
                                                     
22 HENESY, B (2012) US expert shreds sleepwalking defence of teen holiday rapist; A Notts man claimed 
he was sleepwalking when he raped a teenage girl, as Bryan Henesey reports. Nottingham Evening Post 
(Mar 30th), p.4. 
23 GILSON, C.G. (2012) The Law-Science Chasm: Bridging Law's Disaffection with Science as Evidence. 
Quid Pro, LLC. 
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nothing. Every so often some dozy twat of a driver falls asleep at the wheel and 
crashes into another vehicle, perhaps causing a death or two. When prosecuted, he 
will then try his hardest to argue that he didn't fall asleep at the wheel, no, perish the 
thought, he was suffering from narcolepsy or a rare attention deficit disorder or an 
unexplained quasi-epileptic attack.  And after all, nobody can possibly see what was 
going on in his mind at the time and there are many rare neurological disorders of an 
intermittent nature. He may then find a gullible neurologist willing, for a fee, to 
prepare a convincing report that will enable the jury to acquit because there is a 
reasonable doubt.’24 
The case study I relate in 7.4.1 of SW would lend a certain amount of support to this 
cynical and pejorative view.  
In this author’s opinion, the ideal way to proceed is to ensure that lawyers and judges 
are better educated in the principles and philosophy of science. This will ensure robust 
testing of the evidence. Alternatively, the counsel for both sides should be permitted to 
have coaching by a suitable expert to help them with the testing of evidence in specific 
complex areas. This might be done by a neutral expert appointed by the court, but this 
would have cost implications. Another approach that has been adopted in Australia is 
“hot-tubbing”, where the expert witnesses for both sides give evidence concurrently. It is 
used more in civil cases than criminal trials before juries. British expert witnesses did 
not consider the practice would be beneficial and might lead to “more heat than light”. 
The amicus curia was proposed by several experts. This approach is not without its 
problems, as discussed at 7.4. One expert had encountered the use of a single sleep 
                                                     
24Personal communication from user with nym ““The Todal” on uk.legal newsgroup on usernet 
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expert at trial. 
The subject of forensic sleep disorders is undoubtedly complex and highly specialized.  
The expert witness is generally: 
‘expected simply to educate the jury, to pass on the relevant aspects of their 
knowledge and expertise so that the jury itself can properly assess the evidence to 
which it relates.’  
Juries can and do disagree with expert witnesses - there are occasions where the 
psychiatrists instructed by both prosecution and defence have agreed on that the 
defendant is insane, but nonetheless the jury have convicted. There will usually be 
expert witnesses appearing for both sides, and if they disagree then the issue becomes 
which evidence to accept and which opinion to believe, rather than whether to accept 
scientific evidence or believe scientific opinion at all.  The Law Commission recognizes 
the problems with complex evidence where it may be  
‘quite impracticable to provide the jury with sufficient expertise of its own to avoid the 
possibility of deference.’25 
If juries are unable to evaluate the quality of the expert evidence given, then a ‘gate-
keeper’ role is very important. The number of referrals per year to forensic sleep experts 
seems to indicate an increasing awareness of the sleepwalking defence. However, it is 
still rarely argued, and it would be very difficult if not impossible to find specialist 
lawyers for parasomnia cases. Thus the advocates may not be in a position to help the 
jury very much.  
The courts have commented on many occasions about the strong influence expert 
                                                     
25 See footnote 4. 
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evidence has on jurors. The Law Commission Consultation contains several quotes 
about the “aura of infallibility”26, whilst recognizing that the empirical evidence is lacking. 
Given this lack of such evidence, it may seem a little surprising that the Law 
Commission recommends ‘special rules’ for expert evidence – typically evidential rules 
dictate only the admissibility of expert evidence, with the lay jury left to judge how much 
weight to be given.  
Forensic sleep medicine certainly is a complex area, so although the practice of the 
Sleep Clinic group is well-intentioned, it may not achieve the desired result. The jury 
may end up confused by too much information, and as one barrister asserted to me “a 
confused jury acquits”. Since the demise of the ‘ultimate issue rule’ in the UK, the expert 
witness can give his opinion on the likelihood that the episode represented a 
parasomnia, giving his reasons.27The more purposeful the behaviour, the more 
persuasive the expert may have to be – so in cases of sexsomnia it is often more 
difficult to convince the jury that the defendant was effectively asleep. 
 9.1.3 Provision of expert evidence 
In the area of parasomnia, expert witnesses are often guided by their clinical 
experience. Although there were concerns expressed over non-medically trained 
experts missing important potential contributors to an episode, this author found no 
                                                     
26 See footnote 4: “United States v Addison 498 F 2d 741 (1974) 744 (“scientific proof may in some 
instances assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen”) and Mohan [1994] 2 
SCR 9, 21 (“Dressed up in scientific language which the jury does not easily understand and submitted 
through a witness of impressive antecedents, [expert] evidence is apt to be accepted by the jury as being 
virtually infallible and as having more weight than it deserves”). See also: JW Strong, “Language and 
Logic in Expert Testimony” (1992) 71 Oregon Law Review 349, 367, n 81 (“There is virtual unanimity 
among courts and commentators that evidence perceived by jurors to be ‘scientific’ in nature will have 
particularly persuasive effect”); and CT Hutchinson and DS Ashby, “Redefining the Bases for Admissibility 
of Expert Scientific Testimony” (1994) 15 Cardozo Law Review 1875, 1879, n 23 (American judicial and 
academic comments in the same vein)” at footnote 9, page 16. 
27 There is some dispute over whether this is the case in criminal trials (REDMAYNE, R. (2001) Expert 
Evidence and Criminal Justice. Oxford: OUP). 
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evidence of this being a live issue at trial. The most important issue is experience of 
patients with parasomnias outside the forensic setting, who will tell them about their 
behaviour during sleep in circumstances where there is no reason for them to fabricate 
details (it should be noted that not all nocturnal behaviour in a parasomniac will 
necessarily be due to parasomnia). The more extreme accounts are often written up in 
the academic literature, but there are not exhaustive lists of the behaviours that are 
consistent with sleepwalking or other parasomnias. The forensic sleep experts with a 
wider experience of sleep patients tended to have broader criteria for what is possible 
during a parasomnic episode. Working backwards from the legal definition of 
automatism does not necessarily help for two reasons: firstly, the special status that 
sleepwalking is given in the law as an example of automatism; secondly, the difficulties 
already covered in 5.7 in defining voluntary action. There are specific concerns about 
the increasing involvement of mental health professionals in the criminal justice system.  
One issue which applies to many areas of expert opinion is the internal politics of the 
field. There are considerable tensions between certain parties, and I mention this 
because this dynamic probably has an effect on the provision of expert evidence. The 
conflict led to a complaint to the GMC, which took about three years to resolve and led 
to the two experts involved not taking on any medico-legal work during that time28. I had 
a vivid illustration of the strength of feeling when I happened to include people from both 
sides in the same emailing – I received a terse email asking me to never put the two 
parties on the same email lists ever again. Similar situations have occurred in the areas 
of child abuse expert evidence, both on Munchhausen’s Syndrome by Proxy (or 
                                                     
28 Personal communication from parties involved. 
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factitious or induced illness as it more properly known) and shaken baby syndrome, 
where complaints to the GMC has been made by one side or another of a dispute.  
Judgments made about other expert witnesses often rely on newspaper reports and trial 
verdicts. Newspaper reports as discussed in Chapter 4 are a poor source of details 
about putative parasomnic episodes, and jury verdicts are not provided with the details 
of why the jury reached that verdict. It would be difficult to find out the specifics of expert 
testimony without either transcripts of the trials (which would not reveal all the details) or 
permission of the accused (which is rarely forthcoming in the author’s experience during 
this study). In this author’s opinion, a large scale study of transcripts is necessary to 
make any definitive judgments about the quality of expert evidence. Several participants 
emphasized about particular trials that they would not have believed the story if they 
had not interviewed the accused themselves.  
Although it is for the lawyers to know and explain the law, I believe knowledge of the law 
is in practice important for expert witnesses to frame their testimony appropriately. A 
forensic psychiatrist would not dream of testifying about a defendant’s capacity without 
reference to the McNaughtan Rules. This author’s impression is that knowledge of the 
law did influence the expert witness’s attitudes e.g. towards non-insane and insane 
automatism, which might well be expected to affect their expert testimony. 
 
9.2 Assessment of the episode 
 
The experts generally agreed in most areas. In the areas where they disagreed, the 
scientific evidence was not sufficiently robust to state whether one opinion was right or 
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not. There was great reliance on corroborating factors, because accurate assessment of 
the forensic episode was often impossible. Generally parasomnic episodes were seen 
as automatically constituting automatism, which was based on two considerations - 
biomedical understanding of parasomnia, and the folk psychology of sleepwalking. This 
raises the possibility that as our understanding of the nature of parasomnia evolves, the 
folk psychological view of sleepwalking could be proven wrong. Currently sleepwalking 
without legal automatism is a “black swan”. If the person is not in a state of automatism, 
then they aren’t having a parasomnic episode - just like it was considered that a black 
swan-like bird could not be a swan. Swans are always white, and sleepwalkers are 
always automatons.  
9.2.1 Alcohol and sleepwalking: the scientific issues 
The most bitterly contested area in forensic sleep is probably the role of alcohol in 
sleepwalking. Many of the criminal cases reported in the press (over 40%) have 
involved alcohol (see 4.2, Appendix F). There was a fairly acrimonious exchange in 
Medicine, Science and the Law over a paper reporting the case of Lowe.29 Lowe killed 
his father after consuming a considerable amount of alcohol (blood alcohol at the time 
of the offence was estimated to be 215mg/dl). This was the most contentious aspect of 
the case, with Mark Pressman (a clinical psychologist from the USA) considering that 
the amount of alcohol involved made the defence of sleepwalking “untenable”. 
Pressman criticized the APT used as unvalidated. He also points out the atypical 
features of the case – prolonged assault, seeking out his victim and attempts to conceal 
                                                     
29 EBRAHIM, I.O. and FENWICK, P. (2008) Sleep-related automatism and the law. Medicine, Science 
and the Law, 48(2), pp. 124-136. 
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his crime by mopping up blood.30 Pressman is a leading advocate for evidence-based 
medicine with reference to forensic sleep expert testimony. Evidence-based medicine31 
is not a requirement of the criminal courts, and the application of its principles is 
particularly problematic in the case of forensic sleep disorders, because there is a 
dearth of good quality research (see further discussion in Chapters 2 and 7). He 
dismisses the observation data supporting an association as weak, since it is not proven 
that any episodes after alcohol consumption are parasomnic. This same caveat applies 
to most data about parasomnia episodes. For example, the known sleepwalkers who 
drive automobiles were not being monitored during episodes. 
Characterization of the actions of the putative sleepwalker according to the current 
incomplete understanding arguably contradicts Daubert32 and evidence-based 
principles. In addition, it appears that the position of some of the critics is not that 
alcohol cannot trigger sleepwalking per se, but rather that it cannot be proven to trigger 
violent sleepwalking and that it should not support the defence of sleepwalking: 
‘In our opinion, claims of alcohol-induced sleepwalking violence or sleep sex lack any 
reliable scientific basis.’33 
Note the precise language used - that there is no experimental evidence that alcohol 
causes sleepwalking violence or sleep sex. As noted previously, the position of 
                                                     
30 PRESSMAN, M.R., MAHOWALD, M.H., SCHENCK, C.H., CRAMER BORNEMANN, M.A., 
MONTPLAISIR, J.Y., ZADRA, A., PILON, M., GRUNSTEIN, R., BUCHANAN, P.R. and TACHIBANA, N. 
(2009) Sleep-related automatism and the law (letter to the editor). Medicine, Science and the Law, 49(2), 
pp. 139-43. 
31 Evidence-based medicine or EBM categorizes the evidence available to support medical practice. It 
should be noted that it does not exclude the role of expert opinion in formulating practice guidelines. 
32 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc (1993) 113 S. Ct 2786 
33 PRESSMAN, M.R., MAHOWALD, M.W., SCHENCK, C.H., CRAMER BORNEMANN, M.A., 
BANERJEE, D., BUCHANAN, P. and ZADRA, A. (2013) Alcohol, sleepwalking and violence: lack of 
reliable scientific evidence. Brain, 136(2), pp. e229. 
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Pressman and Sleep Forensic Associates have changed over time (see 8.5.4). Expert 
29 stated to me 
‘we feel very strongly that alcohol really precludes the use of sleepwalking as a 
defence – which is not to say that it might not actually be, but you just can’t tell. If 
there’s that much alcohol involved, if you just look statistically at the violence, alcohol 
causes a lot more violence than sleepwalking does. And so I think that alcohol just 
should preclude the consideration of sleepwalking as a defence.’  
Pressman states 
 
‘the hypothesis of alcohol-induced sleep-walking has no valid evidence-based 
scientific support and should be considered “junk science. In cases of severe alcohol 
intoxication, no other explanation for behaviors is required. In most jurisdictions 
voluntary intoxication is not a complete defense for criminal behavior and in many it 
provides no justification whatsoever. A suggestion - or legal defense in which alcohol 
intoxication is reported to cause sleepwalking - often appears to be a way of trying to 
sidestep the fact that the alcohol intoxication was voluntary and sometime reckless.’34 
He finishes by quoting a review article by himself and Mahowald and Schenck  
‘Claims of alcohol-induced parasomnias presented solely to circumvent the laws of 
voluntary intoxication should be understood for what they are and rejected.’35 
Certainly if it is impossible to distinguish alcohol intoxication from sleepwalking, this 
position is understandable. This emphasizes the potential importance of the APT, if it 
can truly distinguish between the two conditions. 
                                                     
34 PRESSMAN, M.R. (2011) Preface: Common Misconceptions About Sleepwalking and Other 
Parasomnias. Sleep Medicine Clinics, 6(4), pp. xiii-xvii. 
35 PRESSMAN, M., MAHOWALD, M.W., SCHENCK, C.H., and CRAMER BORNEMANN M. (2007) 
Alcohol-induced sleepwalking or confusional arousal as a defense to criminal behavior: a review of 
scientific evidence, methods and forensic considerations. Journal of Sleep Research, 16, pp. 198-212. 
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The users of the APT argue that their position has been misrepresented. They respond 
that they are not purporting to be able to recreate the conditions nor the events of the 
evening. A positive APT simply means that the accused had the potential to have a 
particular reaction to alcohol. It does not prove that he had that reaction on the night in 
question. It helps to distinguish the acknowledged minority where alcohol exacerbates 
sleepwalking from the majority where it does not. Exploring the specifics of how the 
results of the APT are presented to the court was not within the remit of my thesis. What 
is even more controversial than alcohol as a trigger for sleepwalking is the possible 
effect of alcohol on the quality of sleepwalking episodes. Again the Sleep Centre Group 
experts are the dissenters36 - they believe that alcohol can make sleepwalking episodes 
more complex. They too do not believe that alcohol should be an excuse where the 
accused knows that it triggers sleepwalking and harmful behaviour.  
The experts who support the link between alcohol and sleepwalking also complain that 
it is very difficult to get articles discussing the role of alcohol in forensic sleepwalking 
episodes to be accepted by the major journals. This author encountered this difficulty 
when submitting a co-authored review article - the section about any possible link 
between alcohol and sleepwalking had to be removed before it would be accepted for 
publication.  
The position that alcohol consumption should preclude the sleepwalking defence is 
based more in dogma than scientific fact, and encroaches into the jury’s remit. There 
are two distinct issues here. Whether or not alcohol triggers sleepwalking is a 
descriptive question. Whether or not alcohol-triggered putative sleepwalking episodes 
                                                     
36Except Adrian Williams 
347 
 
 
 
should be an excuse in criminal law is a normative question. The former is an issue for 
medical science to answer. The latter is a question for the law to answer.  
9.2.2 Alcohol and sleepwalking: the legal question 
There is widespread concern about the acquittal of individuals who are intoxicated on 
the basis of flimsy medical evidence in some cases. The exact reasons for this are not 
known, but may include a combination of these factors:  
● the confusing law on automatism; 
●  the standard and burden of proof for non-insane automatism and lack of mens 
rea defences;  
● the nature of some of the expert evidence on the probability of alcohol causing 
sleepwalking  
● problems with the directions to the jury 
● lack of application of the strict law on alcohol and culpability 
● reluctance to apply the special verdict 
● reluctance to convict intoxicated defendants for serious crimes 
There is probably no need for legislation to solve most of these problems. Burgess 
provides the precedent for sleepwalking being considered an insane automatism37. 
Since sleepwalking is an insane automatism, once the defendant has been found to be 
a sleepwalker, any examination of the cause of the particular episode is irrelevant to the 
legal question. Fault is irrelevant to insanity, whereas prior fault is an important bar to 
the defence of automatism. 
There is an issue that the intoxicated individual is considered to have the mens rea for 
                                                     
37 [1991] 2 WLR 1206 
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crimes of basic intent merely by the fact of voluntarily becoming intoxicated. There is 
mismatch between the fault element and the label (and also the punishment), and the 
Butler Committee suggested an alternative of ‘dangerous intoxication’ to remedy this.38 
The Law Commission in 1995 recommended there be no defence  
‘where the automatism is caused partly by voluntary intoxication and partly by some 
other factor.’39 
This doctrine would remove the difficulties for the jury in determining criminal 
responsibility where both alcohol and another trigger for sleepwalking are operating in a 
particular case. 
9.2.3 Prior Fault 
As discussed above, the issue of alcohol and sleepwalking is at least an issue of prior 
fault in most cases. Some experts believed that the requisite prior fault was 
sleepwalking triggered by alcohol. Others believed that that only sleepwalking 
associated with harmful behaviour triggered by alcohol satisfied the fault element. It 
may be that either answer is correct, depending on the fault element for the offence. 
There were other instances where prior fault was an issue, but it was either not raised 
or did not persuade the jury. Brian Thomas had omitted his medication for the weekend, 
as he felt it made him impotent (Riha reported the same issue with one of her patients). 
Machin, despite his longstanding history of sexsomnia, fell asleep next to a girl so drunk 
she could not stand. Nonetheless the jury acquitted him. 40 There is a need to ensure 
                                                     
38 BUTLER COMMITTEE. (1975) Report of the committee on mentally abnormal offenders. Home Office 
Department of Health and Social Security, Cmnd, 6244. 
39 LAW COMMISSION. (1995) Legislating the Criminal Code: Intoxication and Criminal Liability. Law 
Comm No 229. London: HMSO. 
40 BENTLEY, P. (2013) 'Sexsomniac', 40, is cleared of raping a 21-year-old at Butlins because he had 'no 
control over his actions while asleep'. Daily Mail (May 6th) News. 
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that parasomniacs with problematic sleep behaviour are aware of the dangers that they 
may pose to others (although most parasomniacs pose a very low risk) and themselves. 
 
9.3 Scientific Controversies 
 
It can be seen above that there are a few scientific controversies in the area of 
parasomnias and criminal responsibility, and that this has resulted in open conflict 
between expert witnesses. The resolution of these controversies, like many other 
scientific controversies, may not lie simply with future scientific research – rather there 
are political, ethical and social issues at stake. The ethical barriers may prevent 
research to demonstrate whether or not alcohol can precipitate sleepwalking, the effects 
of alcohol on the PSG, and to validate (or invalidate) the APT. The autopoietic model of 
the relationship between law and psychiatry would predict that the results of such 
research would make little difference. If there is a strong relationship between alcohol 
and sleepwalking, then resultant harmful behaviour during sleepwalking will be seen as 
a predictable result of voluntary intoxication.  
If the best research designs are not possible on ethical grounds (and it must be 
remembered that the APT is already being administered to defendants, in 
circumstances where there must be exactly the same safety issues), then there are 
other studies which would be possible. An observational study of known sleepwalkers 
who drink with the use of Zeo unattended sleep monitors to confirm sleep stage would 
be possible and should confirm whether particular episodes of sleep behaviour are due 
to drunkenness or sleepwalking. Zeo sleep monitors are marketed directly to 
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consumers, but their accuracy in staging sleep has been validated41 and various sleep 
departments in the UK use them, especially when a full sleep study is not warranted.  
9.3.1 The application of science in the court-room 
Although scientific disciplines seek to obtain “ultimate truth” about “reality” through the 
scientific method, nonetheless scientific knowledge is a social construction with various 
influences on the production and acceptance of scientific knowledge. Although their 
ontology is realist, there are epistemological difficulties in knowing the true nature of 
reality. Thus the provisional scientific knowledge we have is shaped by individual 
interpretation, as theories are under-determined. The literature on alcohol and 
sleepwalking illustrates this social construction vividly. The process of knowledge 
production and dissemination is subject to considerations other than the pure science. 
Peer review in small specialized areas can be subject to the influence of a few powerful 
academics. The philosophy of science describes different models for how scientific 
beliefs come to be both accepted and changed.  
One area where the emphasis of the expert was crucial was the cause of the 
sleepwalking episode. Some experts focus on possible external triggers, which would 
point the jury towards a plain acquittal. These external triggers include the proximity of 
the victim in cases of sexsomnia. This definition of an external cause is arguably 
contrary to the policy issues behind the external cause doctrine, which depends on an 
unusual event occurring to an individual without a particular vulnerability. If we take the 
Canadian case of Rabey,42 it is clear that ordinary events were not considered causes 
                                                     
41 SHAMBROOM, J.R., FABREGAS, S.E. and JOHNSTONE, J. (2012) Validation of an automated 
wireless system to monitor sleep in healthy adults. Journal of Sleep Research, 21, pp. 221-30. 
42 (1981) 79 Dominion Law Reports 435 
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of non-insane automatism. This author would argue that parasomnias triggered by 
normal events like touching should not be considered non-insane automatisms. 
9.3.2 Difficulties in interpreting the Alcohol Provocation Test 
The use of the APT is a major bone of contention in UK forensic sleep practice. It is only 
used by one group of experts. The controversy over its use resulted in a General 
Medical Council investigation instigated by another expert witness. It has been criticized 
as unvalidated, as there has not been an investigation of the effects of alcohol on video-
PSG of control subjects. This means that its probative value is unknown. However, its 
critics also concede that it’s highly unlikely that ethical approval would ever be granted 
for such a study. Those critics also argue that there is a strong public policy reason for 
rejecting the parasomnia defence when alcohol intoxication is present. Pressman et al 
state 
‘A conservative estimate would be that alcohol alone is five million times more likely 
than sleepwalking or confusional arousals to be the cause of violent 
behavior.’43  
This is a pertinent observation, but it would be fallacious to apply these statistics to the 
individual case; purely on the grounds of statistical likelihood, the sleepwalker might 
have no defence at all, given the apparent rarity of forensic sleepwalking episodes. The 
issue with alcohol and the sleepwalking defence is a decision for the jury, the court and 
the legislature to resolve. The role of the expert witness is to describe and apply the 
science, and not to address normative questions. However, the decision of Sleep 
Forensic Associates not to provide expert evidence about parasomnias in support of 
                                                     
43 See footnote 35. 
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intoxicated individuals is principled and hard to criticize.  
9.3.3 The means of resolving scientific controversy 
It is apparent that the court is not the venue for resolving scientific controversy, even if 
judges are empowered and trained to take on the enhanced gatekeeper role as per the 
Law Commission’s recommendation. Neither are the professional bodies well-equipped 
for such a task. However, scientific controversy is not an insoluble problem for the 
courts, and in the short term at least the legal process has to accommodate the 
uncertainties in the science. The major problems are the admissibility of weak medical 
evidence on behalf of the defence, and the burden and standard of proof required for 
the automatism defence.  
 
9.4 Public and Parliamentary Debate on Automatism and 
Sleepwalking 
 
9.4.1 Public Debate 
The defence of automatism is rarely raised, so reporters are often unfamiliar with the 
relevant law, the concept or even the correct spelling of automatism in some cases. In 
Chapter 4 the media coverage of trials where the accused has relied on parasomnia in 
his defence has been described and analyzed. The sleepwalking defence has attracted 
increasing media attention, partly because it is becoming more common as defendants 
and lawyers are more aware of the possibility. There is also some wider debate about 
the automatism defence, with one example being the acquittal of Arnold Burton for 
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causing death by dangerous driving being reported in the press44 and debated in online 
fora45. The case study at 7.4.1 illustrates the very real difficulties that victims and 
relatives have with the automatism defence. 
9.4.2 Parliamentary debate 
Harry Cohen, former MP for Leyton and Wanstead, proposed a Private Member’s Bill to 
ban the sleepwalking defence, or non-insane automatism full stop, in cases of rape. It 
passed unopposed through its first reading, but lack of parliamentary time prevented its 
further passage. He had visited Australia where there has been similar public concern 
over the sexsomnia defence. His dismissal of sexsomnia full stop seems based on the 
opinion of Dr Cosmo Hallstrom whom he quotes in his speech in the Commons. Dr 
Hallstrom is not a specialist in either forensic psychiatry or sleep medicine (see 0.2). His 
comments reflect the general reaction of many lay people to the sleepwalking defence - 
they believe that it is incredible and a product of an over-liberal justice system. The 
Ministry of Justice responded that in automatism  
‘There must be clear evidence to substantiate the claim that the conduct was 
involuntary and unintentional.’46 
It appears from other comments that the change he intended might have been to ensure 
that sleepwalkers could only be acquitted by way of the special verdict, rather than 
denying them any defence at all.47  
 
                                                     
44 DAILY MAIL (2007) Death driver walks free due to 'automatism' condition. Daily Mail (Feb 21st). 
45 SAFE SPEED FORUMS. (2007) Death driver walks free due to ‘automatism’. [online] Available at: 
http://www.safespeed.org.uk/forum/viewtopic.php?f=5&t=12519. Accessed: Aug 9th 2014. 
46 KOSTER, O. (2008) ‘How could the man who ‘raped’ me be cleared because he was sleepwalking’. 
Daily Mail (Nov 15th). 
47 BBC NEWS. (2008) 15th Oct 2008-last update, End sleepwalk rape defence - MP. Available: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7671963.stm. 
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9.5 Criminal Law Theory 
 
9.5.1 Definition of automatism as ‘total loss of control’ 
This definition is quite problematic. It has been described as “harsh”, “very harsh” and 
“unduly harsh” by legal commentators. As Mackay notes 
‘[A]s the Law Commission remarked, the governing principle should be that a person 
is not guilty of an offence if, without relevant fault on his part, he cannot choose to act 
otherwise than as he does’. Such an approach, as the Law Commission openly 
recognises, would ensure that the defendant such as the one in Broome v Perkins 
would not be convicted merely because, despite his hypoglycaemic state, he was 
able to ‘drive’ erratically for some five miles. Clearly his condition had not deprived 
him of all control of the motor vehicle which is why the Divisional Court refused to 
regard the case as one of automatism. However, if this was the true basis of 
automatism, then the defence would be restricted to spasms, convulsions, and reflex 
acts which is clearly not the case.’48 
One way to try to partially reconcile the case law is to argue that the strict definition of 
“total loss of control” only applies to driving cases49 – however, as Herring states, there 
is nothing in the decision in Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 1992)50 that restricts 
it to such cases.51 Further, in Coley it is stated that a total loss of control is required for 
automatism; in the case of Coley this was due to an external cause, namely cannabis. 
                                                     
48 MACKAY, R. (1995) Mental Condition Defences in the Criminal Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p 
49 SIMESTER, A. & SULLIVAN, G.R. (2003) Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine. Oxford: Hart; WILSON, 
W. (2003) Criminal Law. 2nd Ed. Harlow: Longman. 
50 [1994] QB 91 
51 HERRING, J. (2010) Criminal Law: Text, Cases and Materials. 4th Ed. Oxford: OUP. 
355 
 
 
 
This definition has been shaped by decisions like Isitt52 and Attorney-General’s 
Reference (No 2 of 1992) that would arguably be better decided on the basis of the lack 
of an external cause. The replacement of ‘effective lack of control’ would be a 
satisfactory solution. The Law Commission’s proposed new mental condition defence 
would not eliminate this problem as total loss of the relevant capacities is required.53  
9.5.2 Directions to the Jury 
The factors that influence judges in directing the jury to consider insanity or not need to 
be studied. Does the fact that there were no recorded special verdicts in parasomnia 
cases after Lowe up until 2013 reflect the directions given to the jury? There are two 
issues with the directions given by the judge to the jury. The first is that the combination 
of directions for insane and non-insane automatism becomes quite complicated for both 
the jury and judge. There is no specimen direction in the Crown Court Bench Book for 
cases where the findings of both insanity and sane automatism are open to the jury. 
The direction given by HHJ Henriques in Lowe (see Appendix C) was incorrect - insane 
automatism comes under the McNaughtan Rules, and so this would not require that “his 
state of mind was such that his ability to exercise voluntary control was totally 
destroyed”. It would only require that he was affected by sleepwalking so “as not to 
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not 
know he was doing what was wrong”.54 A total loss of control would be more difficult for 
the defence to prove. HHJ Henriques is not the only judge to make this mistake as 
                                                     
52 (1978) 67 Cr App R 44 
53 LAW COMMISSION. (2013) Criminal Liability: Reforming Insanity and Automatism. A Discussion 
Paper. London: Law Commission, p.93. 
54 (1843) 10 Cl & F 200 at 210 
356 
 
 
 
demonstrated by the Court of Appeal in Roach55 – it did not comment on the same 
incorrect direction by the trial judge, that insane automatism requires a total loss of 
control. There is a comment in the Law Commission discussion document about both 
insane and non-insane automatism being defined as a total loss of control.56 The New 
Zealand case of Cottle is cited; however, the comments of Gresson, P., do not diverge 
from the English understanding of automatism: 
‘automatism [is] a condition resulting in the doing of an act without conscious volition’, 
that might occur due  
(a) to a healthy mind as in somnambulism 
(b) to a mind temporarily affected by a drug, an intoxicant or a blow 
(c) to a mind where there is present an abnormal condition capable of designated a 
mental disease in which case the McNaghten rules would apply. 
It was pointed out by Leigh that 
‘the McNaghten rules were originally formulated in answer to a question dealing with 
insane delusions, and indicated that in his view they were never intended to apply to 
a case in which an act was done without conscious volition. In His Lordship's view, 
the McNaghten formula is addressed only to a warping of the 
cognitive faculties and presupposes that the doer was conscious of his actions. 
Gresson, P., viewed with apprehension any attempt to extend the rules in application 
to cases of lack of volition.’57 
However, the Law Commission elsewhere confirms that as per Sullivan and Burgess, 
                                                     
55 [2001] EWCA Crim 2698 
56 LAW COMMISSION. (2013) Criminal Liability: Reforming Insanity and Automatism. A Discussion 
Paper. London: Law Commission, p.99. 
57 LEIGH, L., 1962. Automatism and Insanity. Criminal Law Quarterly, 5, pp. 160, 166. 
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insane automatism is defined by the M’Naghten Rules. At Para 5.19 it states: 
‘if the defendant claims that his or her loss of control was due to a condition which 
constitutes an “internal” malfunctioning of the body amounting to “a disease of the 
mind”, as very widely construed, that constitutes a plea of insane automatism within 
the M’Naghten Rules.’ 
Similarly at Para 5.30 where it states: 
‘One problem with this narrow approach remains, which is that the level of loss of 
control for sane automatism is quite different from that for insanity. This is a 
consequence of the different kind of capacity that is at issue. For insanity, the 
relevant loss of capacity must be either that the defendant did not know the 
nature and quality of his or her act, or that if he or she did, he or she did not know 
that it was wrong. Clearly, there will be cases in which a defendant continues to 
exercise some degree of control over his or her movements while lacking these 
capacities. He or she will nevertheless be entitled to rely on a defence of insanity. 
With that same lack of capacity he or she would not be entitled to rely on a plea 
of sane automatism. The courts would no doubt justify that distinction on the 
basis of the different verdicts that result.’ 
The trial judge in Burgess stated 
‘the medical evidence adduced concerning automatism amounted to evidence of 
insanity within the M'Naghten Rules and was not merely evidence of non-insane 
automatism.’ 
Similarly, in Sullivan it was stated that epilepsy was an internal cause and therefore an 
insane automatism: 
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‘a disorder which so impaired the appellant's mental faculties of reason, memory and 
understanding, that at the time of the commission of the act he did not know what he 
was doing or, if he did know, that he did not know that it was wrong, was a " disease 
of the mind " causing a " defect of reason " within the M'Naghten Rules, whether the 
aetiology of the impairment was organic or functional and whether it was permanent 
or transient and intermittent; and that, accordingly, despite a reluctance to attach the 
label of insanity to a sufferer from psychomotor epilepsy, the proper verdict on the 
evidence was the special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity’.(p 156) 
The confusion caused by the usage ‘insane automatism’ is apparent, and hence this 
author’s preference for simply using ‘automatism’ and ‘insanity’, rather than ‘non-insane 
automatism’ and ‘insane automatism’. 
The second is the issue of why the precedent of Burgess is not followed and juries 
restricted (in cases where the illegal act is not in dispute) from returning a plain 
acquittal. Since 2011 there have been some special verdicts returned in parasomnia 
cases, and it would be interesting to find out why this is the case. In the case of Brian 
Thomas, the issue of the special verdict was left down to the opinion of the forensic 
psychiatrist, authorized under Section 12 of the Mental Health Act 1983, who deemed 
that hospitalization was inappropriate. The prosecution offered no further evidence and 
the jury was then directed to acquit. In the case of Zack Thompson, the judge ruled that 
if the defendant was relying on sleepwalking, then a plain acquittal was not possible. 
This led to the defendant pleading guilty. This author was not able to explore this further 
without access to judges.  
In particular, this author wonders if juries are given instructions about the criteria for 
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judging whether an automatism has an internal or external cause. On the basis of 
Rabey and policy concerns, this author believes that external events that are 
commonplace should not be the basis of sane automatism, as they reveal an abnormal 
propensity to react to normal stimuli. The proximity of another person as a trigger for 
sexsomnia should not be regarded as an external factor. For policy reasons, alcohol-
induced sleepwalking should arguably either not be the basis for an automatism 
defence or should be strictly an insane automatism. 
 
9.6 Policy issues 
 
9.6.1 Proposals for reform: review of previous proposals from the Butler 
Committee and the Law Commission 
The Butler Committee proposed that non-insane automatism be restricted to 
‘transient states not related to other forms of mental disorder and arising solely as a 
consequence of a) the administration, maladministration or non-administration of 
alcohol, drugs or other substances or b) physical injury’.58  
This definition covers among other conditions iatrogenic hypoglycaemia and delirium 
tremens. They also proposed the defence of ‘not guilty on evidence of mental disorder’. 
The Law Commission rejected the expansion of the definition proposed by the Butler 
Committee, which would have included cases like Clarke59. They were concerned that 
this  
‘this might be to subject too many acquitted persons to a possibly stigmatising and 
                                                     
58 See footnote 38. 
59 (1972) 56 Cr. App. R. 225 
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distressing verdict and to inappropriate control through the courts’ disposal power’. 60 
Interestingly, this type of expansion is what the Law Commission now proposes (see 
below). Further the Butler Committee recommended flexibility of disposal, which was 
implemented by the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991.  
The Law Commission’s Draft Criminal Code proposed that ‘mental disorder’ should 
include 
 
‘a state of automatism (not resulting only from intoxication) which is a feature of a 
disorder, whether organic or functional and whether continuing or recurring, that may 
cause a similar state on another occasion’ (Clause 34). 
Clause 33(1) states that a person will not be convicted: 
 
‘if he acts in a state of automatism, that is, his act:- 
  (i) is a reflex, spasm, or convulsion; or 
  (ii) occurs while he is in a condition (whether of sleep, unconsciousness, impaired 
consciousness or otherwise) depriving him of effective control of the act.’61 
 
So both bodies proposed that incapacity due to a condition likely to recur come under a 
new mental condition defence to ensure social control. Additionally both would ensure 
that the diabetic driver would have recourse to a mental condition defence (albeit via 
different means). The most recent Law Commission proposals which are in the same 
vein are discussed below in detail. 
9.6.2 Policy Issues 
Many of the concerns raised in public and parliamentary debate are based on 
                                                     
60 LAW COMMISSION (1989).Criminal Law: A Criminal Code for England and Wales. Report and Draft 
Criminal Code Bill. Law Comm No 177. London: HMSO, at Para 11.27. 
61 See footnote 58. 
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reasonable policy grounds. As Hart states,  
‘Any increase in the number of conditions required to establish criminal liability 
increases the opportunity for deceiving courts of juries by the pretence that some 
condition is not satisfied.’62 
The press reports often pick up on the issue of the amount of alcohol consumed before 
the episode in question. Virtually all the forensic sexsomnia cases this study identified 
involved alcoholic intoxication.  
Other criticisms are less well founded, of course. The complainant (or other eye-
witness) often states that the accused did not appear to be asleep. This may or may not 
be significant. Many people have not witnessed sleepwalking, and do not know the 
spectrum of behaviours possible. Also the person in a NREM parasomnia is not 
sleeping as such, they are in a state somewhere between NREM sleep and 
wakefulness. By contrast, during an episode of RBD, the person remains asleep. 
9.6.3 Disposal 
Most psychiatrists feel that the insanity defence is not appropriate for sleepwalkers 
because they do not feel they have a role in the management of sleepwalkers and that 
a hospital order would have no other benefit. It is questionable whether or not a 
sleepwalker could be disposed of via a hospital or a restriction order. It would be for the 
courts to decide whether or not sleepwalking was a ‘mental disorder’, but the opinion of 
psychiatrists would no doubt be influential.  
By contrast most non-psychiatrists were opposed to the special verdict because they 
consider it is only for those with psychiatric disorders, and they tended to be unfamiliar 
                                                     
62 HART, H.L.A. (1968) Punishment and Responsibility. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
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with the option for outpatient supervision. Medico-legal training is the key to overcoming 
this, as this attitude probably affects the testimony given. The US experts were firmly 
opposed to the insanity verdict, because of the more punitive and inflexible approach 
towards the person acquitted on grounds of insanity in the USA. The UK does not have 
the same inflexibility of disposal (see Chapter 3), so their arguments do not apply to the 
sleepwalker on trial in the UK.  
The tension between the role of a clinician towards patients and the role of an expert 
witness to the court is something the courts have been alive to since the emergence of 
‘alienists’ in the 19th century. Where the expert witness feels that the accused genuinely 
has no recollection for the events and that they are out of character, there may well be a 
desire to help the individual. In some cases this may result in an incremental extension 
of the range of sleepwalking behaviour to cover all the accused’s actions, which may 
well be plausible given the gamut of behaviour demonstrated outside the forensic 
setting. However, whilst possible the actions may be very improbable. 
Some of the expert witnesses felt sympathy for those who had no memory of the 
criminal act in question, and were in a Kafka-esque situation. These individuals did not 
deny their actions and sought an explanation which in the circumstances was more 
likely to be alcohol-related than parasomnic. As one interviewee pointed out, when the 
average person gets drunk, they don’t believe they will commit a major crime, and the 
level of culpability may be low. Since these defendants have no alternative defence, 
they argue that they were sleepwalking. It is arguably wrong to state that these 
individuals are “trying it on” where parasomnia cannot be ruled out.  
9.6.4 Proposals for Reform 
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The law on automatism is both confused and confusing. As discussed above, the 
current definition of automatism as a total loss of control is inconsistent with many of the 
cases that have been decided. One approach to reconcile these contradictions is to 
divide cases classified as automatism into “true” automatism, or involuntariness, (a 
denial of the actus reus) and unconsciousness (a denial of mens rea). This confusion is 
partly down to the evolving understanding of automatism in the common law. The early 
articles about automatism use phrases like ‘conscious volition’63 that demonstrate no 
separation between consciousness and voluntariness and often refer to a denial of 
mens rea. In Quick,the prosecution counsel  comment that  
‘When mens rea is required, somnambulance would be automatism, and the Crown 
would have to prove mens rea.’64 
Viscount Kilmuir LC commented in the earlier case of Bratty that  
‘if, after considering evidence properly left to them by the judge, the jury are left in 
real doubt whether or not the accused acted in a state of automatism, it seems to me 
that on principle they should acquit because the necessary mens rea - if indeed the 
 actus  reus - has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.’65 
 
This suggests that the denial of the actus reus was considered. However, in the case of 
Sullivan, it was commented that  
‘The unusual feature of the present case is that the whole of the actus reus occurred 
within a period of unconsciousness’. 66 
                                                     
63 LEIGH, L. (1962) Automatism and Insanity. Criminal Law Quarterly, 5, pp. 160-74. 
64 [1973] QB 910, p.913. 
65 Bratty v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386, p. 407. 
66 [1984] AC 156,  p.166.  
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This implies that automatism was still not seen as a denial of the actus reus. Smart in 
1987 states that  
‘The difficulty is that voluntariness of conduct is not invariably accepted as part of the 
actus reus but is sometimes thought to relate to mens rea.’  
She adds 
 
‘Another view enquires whether the doctrine of voluntary conduct is itself accepted.’67 
 
One of the issues which unexpectedly arose was the definition of sleepwalking. The 
limits of sleepwalking behaviour have not been defined – which is an epistemological 
rather than ontological issue. Partly because of the legal baggage associated with the 
term ‘sleepwalking’ and partly because of the current state of sleep science, in the 
forensic arena certain episodes are included under the umbrella of ‘sleepwalking’’ which 
are debatable. It is uncontested (and not unique to forensic sleep episodes) that the 
ultimate truth of what happened on the night in question is often impossible to ascertain 
with any certainty. A further difficulty is that there are several different definitions of 
automatism, both in the case law and in the scientific literature.  
9.6.5 Law Commission Proposal on Automatism and Insanity 
The Law Commission examined the law on insanity and automatism as part of the tenth 
programme of consultations. A scoping paper was published in July 2012 after it 
became apparent that the issues required further definition with legal practitioners. A 
discussion paper was published in 23rd July 201368. They acknowledge the same 
difficulties as my interview data demonstrate: 
                                                     
67 SMART, A. (1987) ‘Criminal responsibility for failing to do the impossible’. Law Quarterly Review, 
103(Oct), pp. 532-63. 
68 LAW COMMISSION. (2013), see footnote 53.  
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● the law lags behind psychiatric understanding, and this partly explains why, in 
practice, the defence is underused and medical professionals do not apply the 
correct legal test; 
● the label of “insane” is outdated as a description of those with mental illness, and 
simply wrong as regards those who have learning disabilities or learning 
difficulties, or those with epilepsy; 
● the case law on insane and non-insane automatism is incoherent and produces 
results that run counter to common-sense. 
The Law Commission proposes a new test for capacity. The accused must be able: 
● rationally to form a judgment about the relevant conduct or circumstances; 
● to understand the wrongfulness of what he or she is charged with having done; 
or 
● to control his or her physical acts in relation to the relevant conduct or 
circumstances. 
Further, once the evidential burden had been satisfied, the burden of proof would be on 
the prosecution to prove that the accused had the requisite capacities beyond 
reasonable doubt,. The new special verdict for the defendant acquitted on the basis of 
the proposed statutory defence would be ‘not criminally responsible by reason of 
recognized medical condition’. Thus both psychiatric and medical conditions will be 
assessed by the same functional test. The defence of automatism would be retained, 
but for very limited circumstances; the “spasms, convulsions, and reflex acts” mentioned 
by Mackay (see 5.7) when not caused by a chronic condition as per Pull (who had 
multiple sclerosis),69 and other rare occurrences like a head injury or a swarm of bees 
                                                     
69 GUARDIAN. (1998) News in brief: Disabled driver cleared. Guardian (March 21st). 
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attacking.70  
There is an argument that more modest reform would be more likely to become law. As 
was suggested in the Law Commission’s Draft Criminal Code, simply changing the 
definition of automatism from “total loss of control” to “effective loss of control” would 
eliminate some of the problematic decisions with diabetic drivers. This could be 
achieved through the common law. Instructions to the judiciary about the greater use of 
the special verdict in cases of parasomnia would mean that weak medical evidence 
would be less likely to secure an acquittal. The main difficulty with the special verdict is 
the term “insanity”, which would require statutory change. There are valid objections to 
the expansion of the remit of the special verdict. One objection is increased cost - the 
risk of recurrence of harmful behaviour is extremely low, so supervision and treatment is 
not cost-effective from a harm prevention perspective. Another objection concerns the 
potential for state abuse of powers for social control, which echoes the concerns of the 
Law Commission above. A final objection relates to the impact of the special verdict; 
despite being nominally an acquittal, being not found not guilty by reason of insanity has 
the same effect as a conviction as regards the Sex Offenders’ Register and it is 
discoverable on an enhanced criminal records check.  
                                                     
70 Obiter dicta by Humphreys J in Kay v Butterworth (1945) 61 Times Law Reports 452. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusions 
 Review of Themes of Thesis 
10.1 Difficulty of Diagnosing Sleepwalking  
Sleepwalking and sexsomnia are diagnosed primarily on the clinical history. Many of the 
other parasomnias have diagnostic features on video-PSG. Although the sleepwalker 
may have some fragmented memory of his activities or come to full wakefulness away 
from where he fell asleep, he will not have a full recollection of his activities. The 
detailed sleep history will be from other people - bed partners, family, friends and 
housemates/flatmates.  This also provides valuable corroboration for the defendant’s 
condition. It is rare for full sleepwalking episodes to occur during sleep studies - there 
are non-specific markers whose significance is questionable. The other parasomnias 
tend to have particular features during sleep studies, e.g. lack of atonia with RBD.  
It is common that the importance of nocturnal episodes is only appreciated once the 
index forensic episode occurs. As mentioned in 1.11, sleepwalking is probably much 
underreported and only a small proportion of sleepwalkers present to doctors. It is not 
considered necessary for most sleepwalkers to seek medical attention (and the NHS 
could not cope with the numbers of patients). It is recommended where the behaviour is 
problematic. Although there are risk factors for violent sleepwalking, there is no 
“personality type”.  
10.2 Difficulty of Determining Parasomnic Episode 
As previously noted, the defendant who claims a parasomnic episode has two hurdles: 
firstly, he has to prove that he suffers from a parasomnia; and secondly, that he was 
368 
 
 
 
suffering from a parasomnia at the time of the illegal act. It was emphasized many times 
to me that it is impossible to determine for sure what happened on the night (usually) in 
question, but this is not an unique nor even uncommon issue in criminal law (usually 
because of lack of evidence).   However in the case of parasomnias, even when there 
are reliable eye-witness accounts of the behaviour, it can be impossible to state 
definitively whether or not the episode was parasomnia or not. This author found 
marked disagreement between eminent colleagues about the most contentious cases. 
The difficult situation for the parasomniac is often his actions are not in question - but he 
will rarely be able to contradict the prosecution’s version of events. This is even more 
problematic in cases of homicide where the only witness is dead. So he is in the 
situation described by Moore: 
‘Cases of sleepwalking, post-hypnotic acts, and similar acts are often sufficiently 
complicated that they appear to be intelligently directed actions. In such cases, one is 
loathe not to attribute these acts to some agency, but if not to X [the defendant], then 
to whom?’1 
The victim will often express frank disbelief that the accused could have “been asleep”. 
This is unsurprising given that even experienced clinicians cannot say with any certainty 
in borderline cases whether or not the episode in question was sleepwalking or not.  
10.3 Difficulty with Alcohol and Sleepwalking 
There are two distinct questions relating to alcohol and sleepwalking. The first question 
is: ‘can alcohol precipitate sleepwalking?’ If this is answered in the positive, the second 
question is: ‘is alcohol-induced sleepwalking a valid legal excuse?’ Despite the lack of 
                                                     
1 MOORE, M.S. (1979) Responsibility and the unconscious. S Cal L Rev, 53, pp. 1563-1678. 
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definitive scientific evidence to prove or disprove a link between alcohol and 
sleepwalking/sexsomnia, there is a general consensus that: 
● The more the accused has to drink, the less likely sleepwalking/sexsomnia and 
the more likely intoxication is the explanation for any behaviour 
● There are considerable policy issues to allowing the defence of alcohol-induced 
sleepwalking/sexsomnia 
● The law already excludes self-induced conditions from forming the basis of an 
excuse 
● The burden and standard of proof in non-insane automatism or lack of mens rea 
defence is problematic 
● The lack of social control where non-insane automatism or lack of mens rea is 
argued is concerning 
The Alcohol Provocation Test (APT) cannot be said to have any probative value in 
ascertaining whether an episode was triggered by alcohol. 
10.4 Difficulties with Public Perception 
The media coverage of sleepwalking trials is often superficial and sensationalist. 
Although justified concerns about the role of alcohol are often raised, often there is little 
balance in the inclusion or exclusion of relevant medical details. The emphasis on the 
victim’s narrative may reinforce the incredibility of the defence. Additionally there are 
examples of gross misreporting. This has made the sexsomnia defence so 
unacceptable that one defendant forcefully denied arguing it.  
10.5 Difficulties with Expert Evidence 
The quality of expert evidence could not be reliably judged in this study, as detailed 
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assessments of putative parasomniacs were not generally available to me.  The 
judgments of expert witnesses on their peers was more often based on secondary 
sources, rather than seeing or hearing their expert evidence. The newspaper reporting 
is not a reliable basis for assessing an expert witness, although it is valid to look at the 
spread of an expert witness’s cases. There were some comments about experts making 
assertions in court that they would not make to a peer, which does support the need for 
further research of expert evidence (see conclusion 1 below). The major issue was the 
APT which, despite being unvalidated and not generally accepted, was being admitted 
as evidence.  
There was largely a consensus about the principles of assessment of forensic sleep 
disorders. Any efforts to produce guidelines need to avoid being influenced by internal 
professional politics, whilst bearing in mind genuine policy issues. Failure to recognize 
policy issues results in a flawed technocratic process that ignores the needs of the 
courts. 
10.6 Difficulties with the Law 
The difficulties with the law have been apparent for some time. If the law on 
sleepwalking is settled, it is certainly not being applied. Alcohol-induced sleepwalking 
often persuades the jury to acquit. Untried scientific techniques are being admitted in 
evidence. Prior fault appears to be frequently ignored. Burgess is not being applied as 
the case of Brian Thomas illustrates. Since sleepwalking does constitute legal insanity, 
the defence should not be permitted to argue lack of mens rea without the jury 
considering the special verdict. External triggers are being confused with an external 
cause. 
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The Butler Report and the Law Commission Draft Criminal Code included 
recommendations for reform in this area. The current consultation has been conducted 
meticulously, and the recommendations have been bold and imaginative. The 
commission has drawn on the work of Hart, Schopp and Bratman in recognizing the 
importance of practical reasoning to criminal responsibility. Most importantly, the legal 
position with regards to medical conditions would be clarified and appropriate measures 
for social control guaranteed if the Law Commission’s proposals became law.  
 
10.7 Conclusions 
 
1. The core of forensic sleep expert witnesses work to a high standard. 
The experts I interviewed were generally the core of the expert witnesses, so this author 
cannot make general comments about all expert witnesses in the field (however, even 
the expert witnesses I interviewed who had just appeared in one case were of a similar 
standard). Without exception they were very thoughtful about their expert witness work, 
and were acutely aware of their responsibilities to the court. The majority held a position 
somewhere in the middle on the contentious issues. There were people with positions to 
either extreme, and they tended to work together – however I found no evidence of 
“group think”. In both cases there was, in my opinion, a reasonable basis to their 
positions. However, the bulk of the medico-legal work appears to go to experts holding 
one of the two extreme positions. It is important to note that extreme is being used in 
the descriptive rather than normative sense – it is not in the interest of the courts or 
justice to exclude expert testimony simply because it does not conform to the 
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consensus position. There are no easy solutions to resolving conflicts over 
controversies like the role of alcohol and sleepwalking. 
One major issue is that the fact that the expert witness instructed by the defence 
counsel is often denied access to the main witness to the actions of the defendant, the 
victim. Without eyewitness accounts, it is impossible to give a proper assessment of 
whether or not the accused was in a parasomniac state. Witness statements gathered 
by the police will not be directed to the important issues as an interview by a sleep 
expert would be.  
The main caveat is that I was not able to get access to confidential medico-legal reports 
nor court transcripts, so I could not examine the quality of the evidence given directly. 
There is no reason to suspect that their responses at interview were disingenuous, but it 
would be useful to examine the specifics of how they present their evidence to the jury. 
This is particularly true when testifying about controversial issues like alcohol and 
sleepwalking.  
2. The expert evidence largely revolves around expert opinion. 
Sleep science is still a relatively young field, and it is remarkable how much about 
sleepwalking and other parasomnias are as yet unknown – even the phenomenology of 
sleepwalking is still under-researched. This is why it is important that the forensic sleep 
expert witness should generally be a clinician who sees a large number of patients with 
parasomnias. The tests rarely provide concrete evidence for a clinical diagnosis of 
sleepwalking in particular – they only support the clinician’s findings and rule out other 
causes or contributing factors e.g. sleep apnoea. 
The main problem relates to the issue of alcohol and sleepwalking. The APT is 
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unvalidated and so its use in criminal trials is problematic. If its ability to sway juries 
exceeds its probative value, then it should not be allowed in expert testimony. Given 
that its probative value is unknown, then it should be excluded.  
It is right to consider the policy issues of alcohol and sleepwalking, as in most cases 
where sleepwalking is raised the defendants would have no other defence. They do not 
contest the illegal act, for which they have no memory, and voluntary intoxication is no 
excuse. The defence does not succeed that often, but nonetheless it may well damage 
public confidence in the criminal justice system. The fact that alcohol is an ‘external 
factor’ and so may increase the likelihood of a plain acquittal under the current law only 
exacerbates the problem. 
There are other issues relating to the complexity and duration of episodes that would be 
consistent with parasomnia, and whether or not there could be “islands of lucidity”. 
These complex episodes are certainly not typical of the average sleepwalker, but this 
does not mean that sleepwalking should be automatically ruled out. Pressman points 
out that the accumulation of unlikely events makes the defence increasingly tenuous. In 
those circumstances, the standard of proof becomes very much a live issue.  
Even where it can be proven that the accused suffers from a parasomnia, the key issue 
is whether or not the illegal act in question was committed during an episode. This will 
always be a matter of opinion. The expert can state whether or not the behaviour is 
consistent with parasomnia, on the basis of the facts that are known or assumed.  
3. All expert witnesses acknowledge their duties to the court. 
All the expert witnesses I interviewed were acutely aware of their duty to the court rather 
than a particular party. I heard the mantra many times, and it has been impressed on 
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them many times no doubt. For that reason it was necessary to go beyond simple 
avowals. Certainly there was nobody who was a “gun for a hire”, ready to take whatever 
position counsel required of them (although this accusation was made of others by 
some experts). However, when certain experts are known to take particular views that 
will favour defendants or the Crown, it then becomes a matter of the parties selecting 
the correct expert witness. This seems to be the case with the trial of Zack Thompson at 
Nottingham Crown Court, where the spokesperson for the police announced that their 
success in securing a conviction was down to finding the right expert. If an expert 
consistently appears for one side or another, this may be an indication that their 
testimony is not impartial. An alternative perspective would be that each side should 
choose the expert that will test the evidence most effectively. However, that does lead 
to the “hired gun” model. 
The suggestion from the Minnesota group and others that a single expert be appointed 
would require a major shift from the current adversarial system. It would also create 
problems of its own, with fewer opportunities to effectively challenge scientific evidence 
(see 7.4). This proposition should be seen in light of the US system, where it appears 
that character assassination trumps a proper assessment of the scientific evidence 
being given. UK-based experts do not have the same level of concern about the 
adversarial system. This suggestion is unlikely to be adopted, and also unlikely to 
resolve the issues with expert evidence. 
4. The GMC is not the appropriate venue for deciding the professional standards 
for expert witnesses. 
In this author’s opinion, the GMC is not equipped to address whether or not a doctor is 
375 
 
 
 
performing his duties as an expert witness properly. It also seems ill-suited to issue 
sanctions, given that a doctor’s expert witness work generally does not reflect on his 
clinical competence (unless it is a case of inadequate clinical assessment related to 
expert witness work). This author would argue that the decision of the High Court in 
GMC v Meadow2 is correct; that unless a judge refers an expert witness, professional 
bodies should not intervene in issues relating to expert evidence. Sadly the Appeal 
Court overturned this decision. 
5. Regulation of expert witnesses is practically non-existent. 
The courts’ approach to expert evidence was described by the Law Commission as 
‘laissez-faire’. The Law Commission clearly considers that recent miscarriages such as 
Clark and Cannings were due to this attitude3. It also mentions other cases where 
expert evidence was found to be flawed, notably Dallagher (ear print evidence) and 
Harris and others4. 
Most of the expert witnesses belong to professional bodies – however, regulation of 
their expert witness work per se has no specific body and an expert witness is not 
required to belong to any professional body. For there to be any consistency, this 
should change and all expert witnesses should belong to a UK professional body – 
preferably one specific to the field in which they claim to be experts. This need not be a 
statutory body as such, but certainly one which carries out sufficient scrutiny of the 
members’ qualifications. The current system is unable to exclude even the unqualified 
                                                     
2 Meadow v General Medical Council [2006] EWHC 146 (Admin) 
3 [2003] EWCA Crim 1020; [2004] EWCA Crim 1 
4 [2002] EWCA Crim 1903; [2005], EWCA Crim 1980 
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posing as experts.5 The Netherlands scheme, although a voluntary register, enables 
assessment of expert witnesses and revalidation.  
This should not be a mechanism for excluding experts from overseas, whose input may 
be essential in a small field of expertise. An appropriate professional body could also 
help the courts by deciding on protocols for investigating forensic sleep disorders, 
criteria for the public funding of sleep studies, and guidelines for the necessary data to 
satisfy the evidential burden in cases of sane automatism. Expert witnesses may belong 
to the medical Royal Colleges, the Royal Society of Medicine, the British Psychological 
Society and the British Sleep Society, among others. The latter three are not involved in 
the regulation of expert witnesses, although the British Psychological Society does 
produce guidelines and run courses for expert witnesses.  
It is for the courts to determine the standards to which expert witnesses must adhere 
and them alone. However, this puts the onus on the criminal justice system to have 
scientifically literate judges and lawyers. Sleepwalking cases are rare, and it is unlikely 
a lawyer will be involved in more than one case in his lifetime, so I believe that coaching 
of counsel would improve the standard of representation and the testing of the scientific 
evidence. This could be done either by a single joint expert, the experts instructed by a 
particular side, or a third, court-appointed, expert. 
It would be expected that the courts would defer to the professional bodies on matters 
of scientific validity, with certain caveats. It would be important to ensure that regulation 
by professional bodies did not degenerate into a peer review that simply enforced a 
consensus position, becoming an exercise in internal politics rather than science. In a 
                                                     
5 LAW COMMISSION. (2009) The Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England 
and Wales. 190. The Law Commission. 
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small field, where all the experts know each other and have a vested interest in 
accrediting and supporting each other, input from overseas may be essential.6   
6. The disposal of defendants and medical opinions about sleepwalking has an 
effect on expert testimony. 
The beliefs, correct and incorrect, of expert witnesses about the options for disposal had 
an effect on their feelings about the appropriateness of the insanity verdict. There was 
an awareness of the stigma related to the label of insanity. There was some evidence 
that expert evidence was affected by these considerations, with some experts 
emphasizing certain triggers for parasomnias as external factors. The number of special 
verdicts returned suggests this may have affected jury verdicts. 
Another alternative for those who are in a sleep-related state, but appear to have some 
level of consciousness and therefore responsibility e.g. sleep-related dissociation, is the 
suggestion of a third way of a diminished or partial responsibility plea for all offences 
(not just homicide). This could be seen as an unsatisfactory fudge, given that a 
sleepwalker is generally seen as unequivocally not criminally responsible, a malingerer 
as very definitely criminally responsible, and someone in a dissociative state as 
probably legally insane. Given the options for disposal available to judges in England & 
Wales under the special verdict, this reform may be irrelevant in England & Wales. 
7. Sleepwalking is seen as a classic automatism yet it is treated differently from 
every other cause of automatism. 
For historical and linguistic reasons, the status of sleepwalking as an automatism has 
always been protected, even when the case law has excluded  other states which 
                                                     
6 HOUSE OF COMMONS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE. (2004-2005) Forensic Science 
on Trial. London: The Stationery Office, at para 136. 
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resemble sleepwalking from the ambit of legal automatism. In essence, sleepwalking is 
a status defence, with the Latin maxim ‘in somno voluntas non erat libera’ (a sleeping 
person has no free will) summing up the folk psychological view. This is especially 
problematic given the difficulties in differentiating sleepwalking from other causes of 
nocturnal or sleep-related behaviour e.g. sleep-related dissociation or a fugue state. 
There are potential public safety issues due to Burgess being elided. Although the risk 
of recurrence of sleep-related violence is minimal, outpatient supervision seems 
advisable to ensure compliance with treatment. 
8. The law on automatism and insanity is confusing and confused and causes 
many of the problems related to the sleepwalking defence. 
In the case of psychiatric disorders, there are a set of cogent and accepted rules for the 
legal concept of insanity to guide the expert testimony of psychiatrists. This is not the 
case for medical disorders which cause sane automatism. Additionally the expert 
witnesses on parasomnia will generally not be as familiar with the courts as forensic 
psychiatrists. There was often confusion about what automatism is - many forensic 
sleep experts believe that it is a denial of the mens rea, rather than the actus reus. This 
misconception was also repeated in the literature (see 9.6.4 for further discussion).  
The law is confusing for lawyers and the judiciary too. There is no specimen direction in 
the Crown Court Bench Book for directing the jury in cases where the findings of both 
insanity and sane automatism are open to the jury, and there are examples from major 
trials of incorrect directions being given (see Appendix C). The effect of these faulty 
directions is not known (and jury research is effectively forbidden under section 8 of the 
Contempt of Court Act 1981), but it is reasonable to surmise that the laypersons of the 
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jury would find the law confusing. 
9. The definition of automatism as total loss of control is problematic and 
inconsistently applied 
The two concepts of involuntariness and unconsciousness are conflated by the courts. 
Additionally, simple lack of mens rea appears to be commonly argued in practice. The 
solution to the difficulties would be two reforms (both incorporated in the Law 
Commission’s proposals): 
● Incorporating both “internal” and “external” causes of lack of incapacity into a 
new mental condition defence, with the remit of automatism being much narrower 
● Mandating that defences based on a lack of mens rea due to a mental condition 
must rely on the new mental condition defence  
 
10. Reform of the law would enable greater consistency and might improve public 
confidence. 
Despite the precedents of Quick, Sullivan and Burgess,7 defendants pleading the 
sleepwalking defence when exonerated nearly always receive a plain acquittal rather 
than the special verdict. If all cases of automatism (bar possibly the “classic” examples 
of a clear external cause like a swarm of bees attacking) were subsumed into the 
special verdict, the flexibility of disposal options under the Criminal Procedure (Insanity 
and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991 (as amended by Section 24 of the Domestic Violence, 
Crime and Victims Act, 2004) mean that there should not be inappropriate detention of 
those suffering with a parasomnia. Also the different burden and standard of proof with 
                                                     
7 [1973] QB 910; [1983] 3 WLR 123; [1991] 2 WLR 1206 
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the insanity defence would mean that the defendant could not rely on simply raising a 
reasonable doubt. There has been academic debate about this historical exception to 
the presumption of innocence, but it is in the instance of sleepwalking justified on policy 
grounds. However, it may be that the defence is lack of mens rea rather than non-
insane automatism. Again, this is an issue for judges to address, who have the power to 
order that the issue of insanity must be considered whether non-insane automatism or 
lack of mens rea is being argued. 
Given the public attitude to the insanity defence, restricting juries to this mode of 
acquittal may not affect public confidence. It would ensure that there was some 
monitoring of individuals who may pose an increased risk to the public (although there is 
no good evidence to suggest that they do). Again, the change in the burden and 
standard of proof may or may not improve public confidence, but it would certainly 
ensure that there is a firmer basis to acquittals.  
Another more controversial possibility for reform would be the criminal responsibility of 
the voluntarily intoxicated. It has been suggested in the past that there be specific 
statutory offences covering those committing illegal acts whilst intoxicated, rather than 
simply relying on the distinction between crimes of basic intent and specific intent. This 
would match the punishment more closely to the level of culpability; that is, punishing 
the conduct rather than the result. 
The Law Commission’s proposals are wide-ranging and ambitious, but this is necessary 
to bring the law into line with modern scientific thinking and provide for appropriate 
labelling and disposal. The proposed new mental condition defence would cover all 
cases where parasomnia is the basis of the defence to ensure social control. That is this 
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author’s preferred solution, although he recognizes there is a good argument for 
deciding on a case by case basis, e.g. on an assessment of continuing danger, whether 
a plain acquittal or the special verdict is appropriate, on the grounds of cost and 
stigmatisation.  Alternative possibilities if the necessary legislation is not forthcoming 
would include: changes through case law, particularly re-defining automatism as 
“effective loss of control”; excluding alcohol-induced parasomnia as an excuse; and 
consistent direction to juries to consider parasomnias as insane automatisms.  
 
10.8 Recommendations 
 
This author’s recommendations are: 
● formation or recognition of a body that will hold a register of expert witnesses and 
formulate forensic sleep disorder assessment guidelines (the current  multi-
disciplinary body, the British Sleep Society, could not take on the latter function 
without at least some initial funding); 
● a statutory register of expert witnesses, or at least a requirement for membership 
of a professional body in the UK (this would be self-funding);  
● extension of  the special verdict to cover all medical conditions; 
● introduction of a test for criminal responsibility that is related to capacity, rather 
than diagnosis or the current definition of ‘total loss of control- at the very least, 
substituting ‘effective loss of control’;  
● changing the name of the special verdict to reduce stigmatization; 
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● re-examining the legal issues about alcohol and sleepwalking; and 
● further research into the effects of alcohol on sleepwalking. 
Many of these recommendations coincide with the Law Commission’s proposals. 
 
10.9 Directions for future research 
 
The particular difficulties faced when addressing the sleepwalking defence require 
continuing commitment to research. There is ongoing research particularly by the 
Montreal group (led by Jacques Montplaisir) into improving the diagnostic utility of the 
video-PSG for sleepwalking. Forensic sleep research has otherwise been relatively 
static in recent years, with Mark Pressman decrying the paucity of original research.8 
Case reports are the most frequent type of publication, but they only tend to expand the 
possibilities of sleepwalking behaviour. What is needed is more research to study the 
sleep behaviour of typical sleepwalkers. Ohayon’s telephone studies are an excellent 
example of such research, but have the inherent limitations of the method.9 There 
should be more prospective research to follow up sleepwalkers and determine what 
kinds of problematic behaviour occur and how frequently. Research to directly examine 
any link between alcohol and sleepwalking would be extremely valuable for the courts, 
given the frequency that defendants are intoxicated, but the ethical barriers are 
considerable. Further study of the pathophysiology of parasomnias is needed; studies of 
                                                     
8 PRESSMAN, M.R. (2009) Sleepwalking deja vu. Sleep, 32(12), pp. 1542-1543. 
9 OHAYON, M., CAULET, M. and PRIEST, R. (1997) Violent Behavior During Sleep. Journal of Clinical 
Psychiatry, 58, pp. 369-76; OHAYON, M.M., and SCHENCK, C.H. (2010) Violent behavior during sleep: 
prevalence, comorbidity and consequences. Sleep Medicine, 11(9), pp. 941-946. 
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N=1 cannot be generalized to the entire population of those suffering sleepwalking or 
sleep terrors. In particular confirmation of different phenotypes of sleepwalking would 
potentially help the courts with risk assessment.  
The probative value of particular evidence needs to be evaluated, so that the value of 
expert testimony can be more objectively assessed. This means that dubious 
techniques could be excluded, and testimony would be based less on opinion and 
expert “prestige”. 
My future plans include:  
● further analysis of press reports of parasomnia trials 
● studying trial transcripts and attending trials to study the provision of expert 
evidence directly 
● studying trial transcripts to examine the directions given to juries  
● review of trial transcripts by expert witness panel  
● qualitative semi-structured interviews of sleepwalkers and bed partners   
● sleep diary study of sleep behaviour and precipitating factors 
● postal survey of sleep behaviour 
● website for sleepwalkers 
● formulation of guidelines for forensic sleep experts 
● studies on alcohol and sleepwalking 
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Glossary 
I have divided the glossary in medical and legal sections for ease of use. Some words 
are in both sections. 
Legal 
Actus reus 
- Literally ‘guilty [or blameworthy] act’, the actus reus is the conduct element of the 
crime. The actus reus depends on the offence. The actus reus requires that the 
act be voluntary, although with some crimes the voluntary act may not be 
simultaneous with the harm. An example is where the person drives whilst being 
aware of a condition like epilepsy which during the course of the journey causes 
him to lose control. Here the voluntary act is starting the journey, even the 
involuntary actions which caused the crash occurred later. Legally, driving is 
seen as a continuing act. 
Automatism 
Legal automatism has been defined in similar terms in several different cases. All the 
definitions mean either involuntary or unconscious behaviour. It has variously been 
defined as: 
- ‘total destruction of voluntary control’(Lord Taylor CJ in Attorney-General’s 
Reference (No2 of 1992) 
- “acting involuntarily in the sense that his actions are independent of his will, and 
therefore not subject to any conscious control” (Tompkins J in R v Campbell ) 
- “an act which is done by the muscles without any control by the mind such as a 
spasm, a reflex action or a convulsion; or an act done by a person who is not 
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conscious of what he is doing such as an act done whilst suffering from 
concussion or whilst sleepwalking” (Lord Denning in Bratty v. Attorney General for 
Northern Ireland); 
- “the mind does not go with what is being done” (Viscount Kilmuir L.C. in Bratty v. 
Attorney General for Northern Ireland); 
-  “all the deliberative functions of the mind must be absent” (North P. in R v Burr) 
The US Model Penal Code excludes from criminal liability: 
A reflex, convulsion, movements during unconsciousness or sleep, conduct during 
hypnosis or due to hypnotic suggestion, and any movement that otherwise is not the 
product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual. 
Burden of proof 
- The burden of proof in criminal trials is on the prosecution – they have to prove the 
accused’s guilt. The defence has the burden of proof with the insanity defence. 
The prosecution has the burden of proof with the sane automatism defence (once 
the evidential burden has been satisfied). 
Evidential burden 
- In sane automatism, the defence must present sufficient evidence for the defence 
to put before the jury. Generally medical evidence is required.  
Illegal act 
- The illegal act is generally the actus reus e.g. homicide, although a further 
requirement relevant to crimes of strict liability is that the act be voluntary. An act 
does not constitute a crime without the necessary mental element and 
voluntariness. 
432 
 
 
 
Mens rea 
- Literally ‘guilty [or blameworthy] mind’, the mens rea is the mental element of the 
crime. Mens rea may be categorised as intention (or purpose), knowledge, 
recklessness and negligence (US Model Penal Code Section 2.02). A crime of 
strict liability requires no mens rea, just an actus reus.  
Obiter dictum/dicta (plural) 
- Literally a ‘saying by the way’. It is an observation on a legal question arising out of 
a case, but not one that applies to the actual decision. It is persuasive, but is not 
binding, for other judges. 
Objective standard 
- The standard of the reasonable man, or the “man on the Clapham omnibus”. An 
example of an objective standard is dangerous driving, which is assessed by the 
standards of the reasonable man, not the standards of the defendant. Compare 
subjective standard. 
Ratio or ratio decidendi 
- The reason for the legal decision in a case. Compare obiter dicta. 
Section 12 psychiatrist 
- A psychiatrist approved under Section 12 of the Mental Health Act 1983, whose 
opinion is necessary for a Hospital Order to be made.  
Special Verdict 
- The statutory special verdict must be returned by a jury (so trial by indictment in a 
crown court). The jury returns a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, and the 
accused is acquitted but subject to the disposal powers of the Criminal Procedure 
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(Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991 (as modified by the Domestic Violence, 
Crime and Victims Act 1984). The verdict is ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’. 
Strict Liability Offence 
- Strict liability offences only require an actus reus, not a mens rea. This makes 
automatism one of the few defences available, since automatism is a denial of 
actus reus. Many driving offences are strict liability, on the ground that their main 
purpose is to protect the public.   
Subjective standard 
- A subjective standard relies on the individual perspective or assessment. An 
example of a subjective standard in law is recklessness. The defendant is 
assessed on the risks as he saw them. Some legal tests are a mixture of 
objective and subjective standards. The test for the level of force required in self-
defence is objective, but the assessment of the risk posed to the defendant is 
subjective.  
 
 
 
 
 
434 
 
 
 
 
Medical 
 
AASM 
- American Academy of Sleep Medicine ( http://www.aasmnet.org/ ). Its website 
states: “Headquartered in Darien, IL, the American Academy of Sleep Medicine 
(AASM) is the only professional society dedicated exclusively to the medical 
subspecialty of sleep medicine. As the leading voice in the field of sleep medicine, 
the AASM sets standards and promotes excellence in health care, education and 
research. Established in 1975 as the Association of Sleep Disorders Centers, 
10,000 physicians, researchers and health care professionals and 1,500 sleep 
centers are currently members of the American Academy of Sleep Medicine. 
Members specialize in studying, diagnosing and treating disorders of sleep and 
daytime alertness such as insomnia, narcolepsy and obstructive sleep apnea.”739 
Alien hand phenomenon aka the alien hand syndrome, the alien-limb syndrome and 
the alien-limb phenomenon 
- There is a number of alien hand phenomena associated with different neuropathologies. It can 
affect upper or lower limbs, with complex reflex movements or dyspraxias ( Alters 
- These are alternative personalities to the host personality in dissociative identity 
disorder (aka multiple personality disorder). 
Automatism 
Medical automatisms are: 
- Stereotyped non-purposeful behaviour occurring during psychomotor seizures.  
Body Mass Index (BMI) 
                                                     
739 http://www.aasmnet.org/aboutaasm.aspx (accessed Oct 8th 2012)  
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- A measurement which is used as a proxy for body fat measurement, it is 
calculated by the weight in kilogrammes divided by the height in metres squared. 
The normal range is 18.5 – 25. A high BMI or collar size (17 or over) is associated 
with obstructive sleep apnoea/hypopnoea syndrome, because obesity increases 
the tendency of the airway to obstruct.   
  
Continuous positive airways pressure (CPAP) 
- A treatment used for obstructive sleep apnoea/hypopnoea syndrome (OSAHS). 
A snug-fitting mask provides constant pressure to prevent collapse of the upper 
airway due to relaxed muscles and the pressure of the soft tissues of the neck. 
The mask may go over the mouth and nose or the nose only. It is very effective 
for the treatment of OSAHS, but the main problem is toleration of the treatment. 
Compliance with treatment can be monitored, and is required for HGV drivers, for 
example.  
Electrocardiogram (ECG) 
- The electrocardiogram or ECG (EKG in USA) is a recording of the electrical 
activity of the heart.  
Electroencephalogram (EEG) 
- The electroencephalogram or EEG is a recording of the electrical activity of the 
brain. Different electrode combinations look at different parts of the brain. 
Environmental dependency syndrome 
- The individual affected by environmental dependency syndrome relies on cues from 
his environment to adjust his behaviour or to accomplish certain tasks.  
Evidence-based medicine 
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- Evidence-based medicine has been defined as “the judicious use of the best 
current available scientific research in making decisions about the care of 
patients”. It involves four steps:  
 formulate a clear clinical question from a patient's problem 
 search the literature for relevant clinical articles 
 evaluate (critically appraise) the evidence for its validity and usefulness 
 implement useful findings in clinical practice 
 
- One characteristic is reference to meta-analyses and databases of systemic 
reviews such as the Cochrane Collaboration. Attention is paid not just to the 
published evidence but also the quality of that evidence. The different grades of 
evidence are detailed in Appendix R. 
General Medical Council (GMC) 
- The General Medical Council is the professional regulatory body for the medical 
profession in the UK. Until 2012 the GMC provided panels and ran disciplinary 
proceedings, but this is now the purview of the Medical Practitioners Tribunal 
Service (see below) since June 2012. 
Kleine-Levin Syndrome 
- A syndrome of excessive sleepiness and cognitive and mood changes. It is often 
associated with increased appetite and libido. It is cyclical, with patients usually 
completely normal between episodes. It is sometimes referred to as “Sleeping 
Beauty” syndrome. 
Malingering 
- This is the deliberate simulation of a condition for a secondary gain e.g. monetary 
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gain or escaping criminal punishment. 
Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service (MPTS) 
- The MPTS was launched in June 2012. According to their website: 
“The establishment of the MPTS is part of GMC’s wider programme of reform of 
medical adjudication. It was set up to: provide better separation between the 
GMC’s complaints and investigation functions and adjudication, and to take over 
responsibility for the day to day management of hearings, panellists and their 
decisions.  
The MPTS is funded by the GMC but we are accountable directly to Parliament, 
to which we will report on an annual basis. We will report to the Council of the 
GMC twice a year.” (Available at http://www.mpts-uk.org/about/1603.asp; 
accessed 15th Aug 2014) 
Obstructive sleep apnoea/hypopnoea syndrome (OSAHS); related terms obstructive 
sleep apnoea/hypopnoea (OSAH), obstructive sleep apnoea (OSA), obstructive sleep 
apnoea syndrome (OSAS) 
- Obstructive sleep apnoea/hypopnoea syndrome (also known as obstructive sleep 
apnoea syndrome) is a syndrome of reduced or absent breathing during sleep 
causing excessive daytime sleepiness. It is characterised by collapse of the upper 
airway (throat) during inspiration. Various substances will exacerbate this by 
relaxing the muscles e.g. alcohol and sedatives.  
 
Parasomnia 
- ‘unpleasant or undesirable behavioral or experiential phenomena that occur 
predominantly or exclusively during the sleep period’ 
- ‘a group of sleep disorders broadly defined as undesirable physical or experiential 
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events that occur within entry into sleep, within sleep, or during arousals from 
sleep’ (AASM) 
Parasomniac 
- A sufferer from parasomnia 
PSG or polysomnography 
- Polysomnography – a procedure used for the diagnosis of sleep disorders which 
involves monitoring of brain activity, breathing, heart rate, movement of legs, eyes 
and chest. The exact number of electrodes varies between units, particularly the 
number of electroencephalogram leads. Often simultaneous video recording takes 
place.  
Rapid eye movement (REM) sleep 
- A form of sleep characterised by paralysis of most of the muscles, except the eye 
muscles and the muscles of respiration. This is when complex dream mentation 
occurs. 
Sleep-disordered breathing 
This is an umbrella term covering: 
- OSAHS (see above) 
- Central or mixed apnoea  
- Upper airway resistance syndrome (UARS) 
- Snoring 
Upper airway resistance syndrome (UARS) 
- Patients with UARS present with increased respiratory effort and airflow limitation 
during sleep associated with an increase in the upper airway resistance. Patients 
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usually complain of daytime sleepiness, fatigue, snoring, and difficulty to maintain 
sleep. However, they do not satisfy the criteria for OSAHS. Their arousals on 
EEG are related to an increasingly negative oesophageal pressure during 
inspiration demonstrating an increased resistance in the upper airway.   
Utilisation behaviour 
- Utilisation behaviour is similar to environmental dependency syndrome, except 
that it is the use of a particular tool or object, which is triggered by its presence 
within sight of the sufferer. If, for example, the person sees a toothbrush, he will 
involuntarily start to brush his teeth. 
Video-polysomnography (video-PSG) 
- The combination of video recording of the patient with polysomnography. Used in 
diagnosing sleep disorders by monitoring the patient, usually during a night’s 
sleep. Sometimes the patient is deliberately sleep-deprived to improve the 
diagnostic accuracy. Arousals during sleep, by a sudden loud sound for example, 
will also help the diagnosis of disorders of arousal. The procedure takes about an 
hour to set up, because of the application of a number of sensors and testing of 
them. Different units may have slightly different protocols, particularly the number 
of EEG electrodes used. Analysis is time-consuming, and some units use 
computerised analysis. This is not considered sufficiently reliable for forensic 
use.  
Zeo 
- Zeo sleep monitors are devices marketed primarily to consumers for assessing 
their sleep patterns. However, their accuracy of assessing NREM sleep stage 
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has been validated, and they are being used in sleep medicine when a full 
polysomnogram is not necessary.
441 
 
 
 
 Appendices 
 
A) Research Materials (information sheet, consent form, interview schedule and 
questionnaire for forensic sleep experts) 
B) Sample Interview 
C) Direction to the Jury in Lowe 
D) Material from Mark Pressman re Falater 
E) Nodes Used in NVivo 
F) Press Reports Database 
G) List of UK Sleep Centres 
H) Sleep Research Time Line 
I) Neurolaw Web Resources 
J) CPS Response re Expert Witness Register 
K) Sample Epochs and Hypnogram 
L) Basic Neuroscience 
M) Hansard 15th Oct 2008 
N) Rape (Defences) Bill 
O) Early Day Motion 463 
P) Savarin’s Account of the Monk in “Physiologie du Gout” (from Paradox Lost) 
Q) My Comments on reform of the Law on Insanity and Automatism 
R) Levels of Evidence in Evidence-Based Medicine 
S) Publications Arising From My Research 
442 
 
 
 
T) Seminal Sleepwalking Cases 
A) Research Materials 
Information sheet for participants: 
 
Semi-structured interview of sleep experts about the framing of expert 
evidence to parasomnias in criminal trials 
 
This research involves the administration of a qualitative questionnaire incorporating 
vignettes and subsequently the administration of a qualitative semi-structured 
interview, using the results of the questionnaire as a focus for discussion, to forensic 
sleep experts from various base specialties to discuss their expert evidence to 
support or refute parasomnias where this is the basis for a mental condition defence. 
This study is for a PhD project and it is being administered by Dr John Rumbold, a 
PhD candidate with the School of Law, Keele University. The subjects are those who 
have been an expert witness or prepared a report for at least one prosecution where 
sleepwalking was alleged and was the basis of a defence, other experts on 
parasomnias, and lawyers who have been involved in sleepwalking trials. 
 
You will have been contacted beforehand for permission to be interviewed and the 
questionnaire sent to you for completion and return before the interview. Where a 
telephone interview has been arranged, I would ask you to return the enclosed 
consent forms by post, as this is an ethics committee requirement. The interview 
typically takes 30 minutes (but if you can spare up to an hour this would be useful in 
case it takes longer) and will be exploring how expert evidence is given. The 
interviews will be recorded and the interviewer will be taking short notes to aid 
administration. There may be follow-up questions (by follow-up interview in person or 
by telephone, or via email) in some instances if the interviewee is amenable, where 
there are particular issues that need clarifying or expanding on. 
 
The interviews will not require any facts about the defendants which aren’t in the 
public domain, only your opinions and previously aired facts. If you have any 
concerns after the interview that you may have divulged confidential information, this 
can be erased from the transcript which will be sent to you after the interview. You 
will be asked to sign two copies of a consent form, one for you to keep and one for 
our records. The data will be used for a PhD thesis on the provision of expert 
evidence in criminal trials where a parasomnia is alleged. In addition if we intend to 
use an anonymised quote from your interview in a publication, it will only be with 
your further express and specific permission. 
 
Biographical details, and details of trials, will be removed from transcripts where 
possible to preserve anonymity – however the aggregation of data can result in re-
identification so absolute anonymity cannot be guaranteed with qualitative 
interviews. The recordings and the transcripts will be kept securely for at least 5 
years – the recordings in a locked cabinet and the transcripts in password-secured 
memory. The data may be kept long-term for future research. 
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My PhD supervisors are Professors Martin Wasik (School of Law: 
m.wasik@law.keele.ac.uk) and Clive Hawkins (School of Medicine, Neurology: 
c.p.hawkins@pmed.keele.ac.uk). Please feel to raise any issues at any time, 
including after the conclusion of the interview. 
 
 
What if there is a problem? 
 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should speak to the 
researcher who will do their best to answer your questions.  You should contact Dr 
John Rumbold on j.rumbold@ilpj.keele.ac.uk 
If you remain unhappy about the research and/or wish to raise a complaint about any 
aspect of the way that you have been approached or treated during the course of the 
study please write to Nicola Leighton who is the University’s contact for complaints 
regarding research at the following address:- 
 
Nicola Leighton 
Research Governance Officer 
Research & Enterprise Services 
Dorothy Hodgkin Building 
Keele University  
ST5 5BG 
E-mail: n.leighton@uso.keele.ac.uk 
Tel: 01782 733306 
Investigator: 
Dr John Rumbold, MB, ChB, GDL (Keele) 
PhD Candidate 
Research Institute of Social Sciences, Claus Moser Building 
Keele University, Keele ST5 5BG 
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Consent form: 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of Project: Semi-structured Interview of Forensic Sleep Experts 
Name of Principal Investigator: Dr John Rumbold 
 
Please tick box 
1 I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above 
study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
□ 
2 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time. 
□ 
3 I agree to take part in this study. □ 
4 I understand that data collected about me during this study will be 
anonymised before it is submitted for publication. 
 
□ 
5 I agree to the interview being audio recorded and transcribed. □ 
6 I agree to allow the data collected to be used for future research projects. □ 
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I agree to be contacted about possible participation in future research projects. □ 
 
________________________ 
Name of participant 
 
___________________ 
Date 
 
_____________________ 
Signature 
 
________________________  
Researcher 
 
___________________ 
Date 
 
_____________________ 
Signature 
 
1 copy for interviewee, 1 copy for researcher 
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CONSENT FORM (for use of quotes)  
 
Title of Project:  Semi-structured Interview of Forensic Sleep Experts 
Name of Principal Investigator: Dr John Rumbold 
 
Please tick box 
1 I agree for any quotes to be used 
 
□ 
2 I don’t want any quotes to be used 
 
□ 
3 I want to see any proposed quotes before making a decision 
 
□ 
 
 
________________________ 
Name of participant 
 
___________________ 
Date 
 
_____________________ 
Signature 
 
________________________  
Researcher 
 
___________________ 
Date 
 
_____________________ 
Signature 
1 copy for interviewee, 1 copy for researcher 
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Interview Schedule 
Possible questions that will be asked: 
 
How many times have you given expert evidence about parasomnias or written 
reports for criminal proceedings? (where there is more than one episode, ask for 
responses relating to last case) 
How did you find the experience? 
Did you have any concerns about how your evidence was received? (if the case 
went to trial) 
 
Does the nature of the criminal trial present any problems or dilemmas for you? 
Did you find it easy to fit your medical knowledge of parasomnias and assessment of 
the accused to the demands of the criminal trial? 
What did you think of the evidence given by the expert witness for the other side? (if 
read/heard) Were there any issues producing an agreed report? 
 
Was the illegal act in question (as opposed to the crime)? If so, what was your 
assessment of whether or not the accused committed the illegal act in question? 
What was your assessment of his mental state and which mental condition defence 
(if any) he/she could legitimately present? Will you present expert evidence if you are 
not certain that the accused was in a parasomniac state? Do you think that possible 
but not probable sleepwalking should be the basis for an acquittal? (Ask for reasons 
for their answer) 
What was your assessment of whether or not the accused committed the crime in 
question? If you’re confident that the accused was sleepwalking at the time of the 
illegal act, are you confident that they are not criminally responsible? Do you believe 
that a sleepwalker is always blameless for his actions? 
 
What is your opinion of the division between insane and non-insane automatism? Do 
you have any opinion about the different directions and burdens of proof? 
Do you believe that sleepwalkers who commit illegal acts should be treated as sane 
or insane by the courts? (Ask for the reasons for their answer)  
Do you find the label of insanity problematic? Do you think that sleepwalkers who 
have committed illegal acts need to be confined, for either the safety or the 
confidence of the public? 
 
How confident are you in your evidence? Do you share that confidence in the wider 
sleepwalking expert witness community? Is the quality of expert testimony 
consistent? What criteria do you think forensic sleep expert witnesses should meet? 
Do you think it makes any difference if the expert witness is a respiratory physician, 
forensic psychiatrist, clinical psychologist or neurologist by training? 
 
How easy would it be for someone to fool an expert witness about a sleepwalking 
defence? 
How confident are you in the jury’s ability to understand and apply your evidence 
during the trial? What elements of expert testimony (if any) most influence juries? 
Do you think that the forensic sleepwalking expert community in the UK is polarised 
at all? Do you think there is any polarisation across the Atlantic? Do you feel there 
are any issues about experts from other jurisdictions providing expert testimony? 
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Research Questionnaire (reformatted to fit portrait) 
This qualitative questionnaire aims to find out the attitudes, perceptions and beliefs of 
forensic sleep experts by recording Likert-type scale responses on vignettes based on 
reported case histories. 
These responses will inform the subsequent questions in the semi-structured qualitative 
interviews, whether in person or by telephone. Where a telephone interview has been 
arranged, I would ask you to return the enclosed consent forms by post, as this is an ethics 
committee requirement. 
The questionnaire should take about 10 - 20 minutes to complete. 
Professional experience: 
What is your specialty by training? Please tick appropriate answer. 
- Respiratory physician…… 
- Psychiatrist….. 
- Neuropsychiatrist….. 
- Forensic psychiatrist….. 
- Forensic neuropsychiatrist….. 
- Neurologist….. 
- Psychologist….. 
- Other (please specify): ……………………………………………. 
How many cases of forensic sleepwalking have you been involved with (whether preparing 
reports for criminal proceedings or giving expert evidence at trial)?...................... 
How often do you get enquiries from solicitors about forensic sleep assessments?  
……….per week/month/year (delete as appropriate) 
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In what proportion of the enquiries you receive is sleepwalking is a genuine 
possibility?....................% 
How many patients with parasomnias do you see in your clinical (non-forensic) practice per 
year, roughly?............................. 
 
Hypothetical Scenarios (based on reported cases) 
Vignette No. 1 
A man drove 10 miles through at least one set of traffic lights and then assaulted his 
parents-in-law with a knife he found in the house, killing them both. He did not remember 
anything about the episode, but went to the police station saying “I think I’ve killed 
somebody”. He had a strong history of sleepwalking, and had been under considerable 
personal stress. The night of the episode he had been drinking, consuming 4 cans of beer. 
He was normally a gentle person and had a good relationship with his in-laws. He had been 
due to visit them the next day to ask for a loan to cover his considerable gambling debts. 
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Please tick the appropriate boxes for the likelihood in your opinion: 
  
Not at all likely - 
beyond reasonable 
doubt that it wasn’t 
the case 
 
Possible but unlikely - 
would provide 
reasonable doubt that 
it wasn’t the case 
 
Reasonably likely, but 
not on the balance of 
probabilities 
 
Likely on balance of 
probabilities 
 
Very likely 
 
Extremely likely -
beyond reasonable 
doubt 
 
That this situation represents a sleepwalking 
episode? 
 
      
 
That this is sleepwalking if the accused had 
drunk 12 cans of beer instead of just 4? 
 
      
 
That this is sleepwalking if the accused had a 
poor relationship with his in-laws and had 
argued with them on the night of the episode? 
 
      
 
Another cause such as a dissociative episode 
or an alcoholic black-out is more likely than 
sleepwalking. 
 
      
 
The accused is potentially dangerous to the 
public. 
 
      
 
The accused has no responsibility for his 
actions at all. 
 
      
. 
 
Vignette No. 2 
The accused went to the house of his father and subjected him to a prolonged assault, for which 
he had no memory. The injuries resulted in death. There were poorly organised attempts at 
mopping up blood. The accused had drunk a considerable amount. 
The accused had a history of alcohol abuse and violence related to alcohol. He also had a 
history of night time wandering after alcohol, which had not been violent in the past. Video-
polysomnography supports the diagnosis of sleepwalking. 
Please tick the appropriate boxes for the likelihood in your opinion: 
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Not at all likely - 
beyond reasonable 
doubt that it wasn’t 
the case 
 
Possible but 
unlikely - would 
provide 
reasonable doubt 
that it wasn’t the 
case 
 
Reasonably likely, 
but not on the 
balance of 
probabilities 
 
Likely on balance 
of probabilities 
 
Very likely 
 
Extremely likely -
beyond reasonable 
doubt 
 
That this situation represents a sleepwalking episode? 
 
      
 
That the complexity of his actions rules out sleepwalking as a 
cause? 
      
 
Another cause such as a dissociative episode or an alcoholic 
black-out is more likely than sleepwalking. 
 
      
 
The accused is potentially dangerous to the public 
 
      
 
The accused has no responsibility for his actions at all. 
 
      
 
General questions about the sleepwalking defence 
Please tick the appropriate box expressing your degree of agreement with the following 
statements as per this 7 point Likert scale:  
  
Strongly 
disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Somewhat 
disagree 
 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Automatism is a denial of 
mens rea (guilty mind or 
fault element). 
       
 
Sleepwalking should be 
treated as a sane 
automatism and thus 
acquitted, as sleepwalkers 
do not pose any danger to 
the public. 
 
       
 
Legal automatism is 
defined as a total 
destruction of voluntary 
control. 
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Strongly 
disagree 
 
 
Disagree  
 
 
Somewhat 
disagree 
 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Whether or not the acts of 
the accused are purposeful 
is irrelevant to determining 
whether or not he was 
sleepwalking 
       
 
Expert witness testimony 
about sleepwalking must 
only be based on scientific 
evidence 
       
 
The normal character of 
the defendant is never 
relevant to the acts 
committed whilst 
sleepwalking 
 
       
 
Complex tasks rule out 
sleepwalking. 
 
       
 
Public safety and 
confidence demands that 
there must be follow-up 
and monitoring of people 
acquitted of crimes on the 
basis of sleepwalking. 
 
 
       
 
The sleepwalker ought to 
have the burden of proving 
that he was sleepwalking 
at the time of the act. 
 
       
 
The acts of the accused 
must have no plausible 
motive, to be excused as 
genuine sleepwalking. 
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Strongly 
disagree 
 
 
Disagree  
 
 
Somewhat 
disagree 
 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Most claims of 
sleepwalking in the 
criminal setting are bogus. 
 
       
 
The unconscious 
motivations of a 
sleepwalker are irrelevant 
to determining whether or 
not they were 
sleepwalking at the time of 
the act. 
       
 
Substantial alcohol 
consumption makes the 
defence of sleepwalking 
impossible to prove 
reliably. 
       
 
Sleepwalking is a defence 
of unconsciousness rather 
than involuntariness 
       
 
Sleepwalking should be 
treated as an insane 
automatism and therefore 
sleepwalkers not acquitted 
but found not guilty by 
reason of insanity. 
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Multiple response options: 
Please put the letter pertaining to the correct answer by each question (each answer may be 
used more than one or not at all). 
A: Providing sufficient evidence for the issue of automatism to be put to a jury (evidential 
burden) 
B: Providing medical expert evidence for a cause of automatism 
C: The burden of disproving the defence is on the prosecution 
D: The burden of proving automatism is on the defence 
E: The defence must prove the defence on balance of probabilities 
F: The prosecution must disprove the defence beyond reasonable doubt 
G: The defence must prove the defence beyond reasonable doubt 
 
1. Before the defence of sane automatism can be put to the jury, this is always required of 
the defence:……… 
 
2. Before the defence of sane automatism can be put to the jury, this is nearly always 
required of the defence:…….. 
 
3. In the defence of sane automatism, the burden of proof is where?........ 
 
4. In the defence of insane automatism, the burden of proof is where?......... 
 
5. In the defence of insane automatism, what is the standard of proof?......... 
 
6. In the defence of sane automatism, what is the standard of proof?....... 
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Ethics Review Panel Approval Letter 
4 February 2011 
 
Dr John Rumbold 
c/o RI – LPJ 
Claus Moser Building 
Keele University 
 
Dear John 
 
Re: ‘Qualitative interviews of forensic sleep experts to examine the framing of evidence 
supporting mental condition defences’ 
 
Thank you for submitting your revised project for review. 
 
I am pleased to inform you that your project has been approved by the Ethics Review Panel. 
 
Amendments to your project after a favourable ethical opinion has been given or if the fieldwork 
goes beyond the date stated in your application (February 2013) you must notify the Ethical 
Review Panel via Michele Dawson.  
 
If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact Michele Dawson in writing to 
m.dawson@uso.keele.ac.uk 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
 
Dr Nicky Edelstyn 
Chair – Ethics Review Panel. 
 
cc  RI Manager 
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B) Sample interview 
Transcript No 8 
Sleep physician with base specialty neurology in a DGH with a large catchment area 
(the sleep unit has 5/6 beds). 
(sound check) 
Have you made assessments [for the courts] of parasomnias? 
I haven’t done a medical report on anyone with a parasomnia.  
But you have about other sleep disorders? 
I have, yes. I’ve done one case of a patient who fell asleep at the wheel of a car - well 
that was my view, the other neurologist took a slightly different perspective and thought 
she’d had a solitary epileptic seizure – and that case went to court. We had a bit of fun 
with QCs and so on and so forth in the Brighton County Court and I’ve done one or two 
other cases – most of the cases I do are general neurology cases but I’ve done one or 
two other sleep cases. I suspect with time I might get more, because I’ve been doing 
sleep medicine as a sub-speciality for about 3 years now.  
You said to me earlier that you steer clear of sleepwalking cases – why’s that? 
I don’t steer clear of them, I just keep my head down for all medico-legal stuff at the 
moment um…because it’s very time-consuming and I’m very very busy clinically at the 
moment. I’m doing about 7 clinics a week, so I just haven’t got the time to do it. I don’t 
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steer clear of it for any other reason. I think if my clinical workload dropped down a bit 
more, I’d probably do a bit more medico-legal work.  
There seems to be a problem sometimes of getting expert witnesses for that reason, I 
had a diabetologist who just didn’t want to do it because of the amount of time it takes – 
what do you think would be the solution to that? If there is one. 
Well I don’t think there is – I think, you know, the more expert one is, it implies you’re 
seeing a lot of patients, so you’re not going to have so much time to do it. What does 
sometimes happen is that people get a taste for doing it, and having been a busy 
clinician they then make a switch and become a very busy medico-legal physician or 
what have you. Yes, I haven’t made that switch at the moment, not sure I will, but if an 
interesting case of sleepwalking was offered me, I wouldn’t turn it down (smiles). 
Because I think, I don’t think there can be many people in the country who’ve seen 
more cases of sleepwalking than I have. I reckon I’ve seen getting on for 200 since I’ve 
started this clinic, because that’s my particular interest. There’ll be a few, I mean I’m 
sure Irshaad Ebrahim has seen a lot,  
Adrian [Williams of St Thomas’ Hospital] as well 
Adrian Williams, of course Adrian’s seen a lot but of the mid-generation I don’t think 
there’s many, there aren’t many neurologists into sleep medicine, and sleepwalking as 
an area within sleep medicine, it’s not been a big area until recently.  
I think in America, neurologists are much the main specialty… 
Yeah, yeah.  
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Because certainly Mark Mahowald is probably the guy and he doesn’t get involved in 
expert witness work at all, as a matter of principle.  
Yes. Interesting. What particular principle’s that? 
Um…he thinks it’s ‘prostituting the science’.  
Right… 
I haven’t spoken to him, although I will be as he’s agreed to an interview 
Does he think the same about private medicine?  
Probably not, being American, I don’t know… 
So when you gave evidence about this sleep case, there was obviously this 
disagreement….how did you find the overall experience of that? What was your 
impression? 
Impression of what? 
Oh, of the whole sort of process? The criminal process – appearing at the trial and 
having to give evidence.  
Well it’s not the first time I’ve given expert evidence at a trial – I’ve probably done 5 or 6 
cases, where I’ve had to appear. Um…..a combination of enjoyment and extreme 
anxiety at some points but I seemed to make my points quite well, it was against quite a 
good QC on the other side, who had a few tricks up his sleeve, but er I found it a 
challenge. But no, it was, it was fun! But at times rather tense.  
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And um, do you think that your evidence was received well? 
Oh it was received well. And we thought we were going to win, but we lost in the end. 
As we were on the side of the prosecution and the jury decided to give er…the accused 
the benefit of the doubt in the end. But we thought we had an open and shut case. [non-
applicable conversation] 
Did you find any dilemmas when you were an expert witness about the whole process? 
Your role in the… 
I think the big issue, that one can fall into a trap of, is the, is still despite the Wolff 
reforms, there is still an adversarial environment. And being instructed by one side, 
which you often are, you may be tempted to kind of um overplay your particular views 
rather than take a balanced view, and that would be encouraged, of course by the 
side you’re working for. Or discouraged, if you’re saying something they don’t want to 
hear! I think provided you remain honest to your views and you don’t overstate them 
and you justify the view that you take, I don’t find that it’s a big problem for me. 
Do you think the barristers keep you on the straight and narrow, do you think they’re 
good at testing the honesty and that of your opinion? 
NO! (quite emphatically) (laughs) I think barristers do quite the opposite! Barristers try, 
as do solicitors on the side they’re working for, they will try and get you to support their 
particular prosecution or defence, and I have experienced sort of more insidious tactics 
in that respect, used by the prosecution in fact, on one particular occasion. I probably 
shouldn’t mention the name of a very famous barrister, who invited me to chambers, but 
let’s just say I was invited to a case conference in advance and I was a little bit naïve 
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and wet behind the ears, I hadn’t done a lot of medico-legal work at the time, and I was 
asked to advise on how the prosecution should deal with the um er….in fact I was 
asked over the phone initially, and then I was asked to a case conference which I 
willingly went to, and I was really asked my advice on where the holes were in the 
defence’s evidence. And having given some advice in that respect, I realised I was no 
longer acting independently, I was in an advisory capacity to the prosecution which was 
compromising my role as an expert witness. I’d been told beforehand ‘don’t worry, I was 
not going to be asked to write a report’, but the prosecution barrister having got this 
evidence from me, or this advice from me, then went via phone to the defence and said 
‘oh we’ve spoken to a neurologist and you’re doomed!’ (laughs) So the defence then 
demanded they see the advice, they have a report from this neurologist, so then having 
given this advice I then had to somewhat backtrack in my report and make a much more 
balanced report, but I’ve never fallen into that trap again. I think I sailed quite close to 
the wind on that occasion.  
That’s quite disingenuous of the barrister 
Oh very disingenuous, but that is their game…and I realised I’d been tricked. Quite 
cleverly, and used effectively but I think the whole idea of the, you know, you write 
honestly, you don’t give advice on how the prosecution or the defence should carry er 
frame their case or attack the other side because that is not your role, that is actually 
the role of the prosecution team, to decide how to do that, and your advice, your being a 
doctor, you have to set limits to what you can comment on and what is within your 
expertise as a doctor and given your best opinion on those matters, and if you stick to 
that – and you may have a strong view, and that’s fine, as long as you support it and it’s 
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an honest view – and so that’s been the principle and the way I’ve done medico-legal 
cases.  
Do you think there’s any problem with the thing of automatism, do you know about the 
difference between sane and insane automatism? 
Hmmm, hmmm. 
If the condition is judged to be sane automatism, then it’s on the prosecution to disprove 
that. Do you think there’s a problem there, because the defence only have to put a little 
doubt in the jury’s mind?  
Ummmm….yes. Just tell me, just elucidate that further and I’ll comment on it. 
Well, when it judged to be sane automatism, which should really only be when it’s an 
external cause,  
Yes, yes. 
…although it’s a bit up in the air at times, then the defence have to present some 
evidence that there was some sort of automatism, to satisfy the evidential burden that 
the jury should have this put to them, and then the prosecution have to disprove that, 
they have to prove that the person was acting voluntarily. Therefore the defence only 
have to raise a reasonable doubt. When it’s an insane automatism, it’s an internal 
cause, it’s the MacNaughtan Rules and the defence have to prove that the defendant 
lost their capacity, their voluntariness, on the balance of probabilities. So the onus is on 
them, and they also have to satisfy a higher standard of proof.  
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Yes…um…I mean, I know what you’re talking about. I’ve not actually been in that 
situation, so um…it’s difficult for me to comment on that, from experience 
anyway…um…I’d have to give it some thought.  
In your opinion, do you think that um sleepwalkers should be treated as sane, and 
therefore just to be acquitted and go free, or treated as insane, and then be liable to 
some form of control – not sanctions, they’re not guilty by reason of insanity, but they 
could be supervised? 
Yeah…um….obviously this sane versus insane automatism is artificial, isn’t it? This is 
the problem, trying to force people into one or other category. Um, I think there should 
be a change in the law, to make it a bit more of a flexible situation, so that rather than 
forcing the teams, the prosecution and defence, to take these two opposing 
positions….um…the thing is I, whether it prevents justice being done, I’m not sure. I 
think….this sane versus insane automatism again is something for the lawyers to sort 
out and what my position would be is to say, so for example in a patient who’s 
sleepwalked and as a result of their sleepwalking had apparently attacked someone, 
maybe attacked even their partner, or assaulted or sexually assaulted their partner, if I 
am reasonable convinced in my own mind that the patient was indeed in a confusional 
state because they were, their brain was effectively in a confusional arousal, in other 
words their brain was partially awake and partially asleep, which is what happens in a 
slow wave non-REM parasomnia, and if I was convinced by my discussion with the 
patient then I would make the point that from a medical point of view I don’t feel they 
had responsibility for their actions and therefore shouldn’t be prosecuted either from a 
criminal perspective or locked away from a perspective of being insane. So I would sort 
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of argue against this distinction and try and get away from it. Although of course the law 
would not, but at the end of the day that’s the view I would put in court, I wouldn’t try 
and get caught up with this ‘are they sane/insane?’ because I would say they’re legal 
terms and I can’t comment! We don’t use the term sane or insane in medicine, so I 
would steer clear of getting caught up, like I am doing now! (laughs) 
That’s fair enough. 
So I just try and present things honestly… and the problem is of course that in medicine 
we would see patients with a disorder who then exaggerate their disorder. And we see it 
in epilepsy and we see it in anything from back pain to seizures to sleep disorders. Now, 
if someone is a sleepwalker and a genuine sleepwalker and genuinely has automatisms 
but having discovered that their partner has been sleeping with their best friend and 
then in the night murders them, the question is ‘are they using their sleepwalking as an 
excuse?’ Were they really fully awake and trying to get away with a defence of 
sleepwalking? And that’s a value judgment, and I think there are ways by which you can 
help make a judgment on those things, by taking a very careful history. Although there’s 
always going to be uncertainty in that situation.  
Would you talk to family and friends and eyewitnesses as well as the patient? 
Very much so. I think that’s very much the….when you say eyewitnesses, if there were 
eyewitnesses you’d very much want to take that into account when preparing a medical 
report. In terms of getting the background history of the parasomnia of course you’re 
going to take the history from the relatives. In fact you’re not going to be able to if the 
relatives are the one who’s been murdered, or attacked, you’re going to have to rely on 
15 
 
 
 
medical evidence from the notes and so forth. But yes, very important to get 
circumstantial evidence – even when taking a history from patients here we insist that 
patients bring their partners with them, sleeping partners, so that we can get both sides 
of the coin. So it’s important just from a medical point of view, not just from a medico-
legal perspective.  
Have you ever had sleeping partners make allegations about a person’s behaviour in 
the night that you wonder if there’s some other agenda? ‘Cos I’m come across a case 
where the patient’s sleeping partner kept saying he was doing things in the night, and 
there was a possibility of divorce and child custody and all that sort of thing, and there 
was never any, they could never substantiate her allegations. Have you ever come 
across that? 
There is a syndrome, isn’t there? What’s it called? 
Munchhausen’s by proxy? 
No. No, not Munchhausen’s by proxy…..oh, it’s got a name, um…it was based on a 
historical case of somebody who tried to prove that their partner was mad. And 
described all sorts of behaviour which never actually happened, and it was named after 
that case, I can’t remember the name of the syndrome. Anyway…you need to look it up 
because it’s quite important [I believe it is called “Gaslighting”]. Yes, it’s rare. But I think 
I have seen, in sleep medicine I think I’ve seen one case where a patient with REM 
sleep behaviour disorder and memory problems whose wife, they were having…I 
wouldn’t necessarily say she was angling for a divorce, she was so angry with him, she 
was exaggerating the condition and making it worse than it was and so one had to…it 
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took 2 or 3 times of seeing them before one could fully appreciate there was that going 
on. The dynamic. 
Yes. I might talk to you more about that, because myself and Martin are hopefully going 
to be writing a paper about this case…. 
Right, this is Martin? 
Allen.  
Martin Allen, OK. Yep. 
Do you think that it makes any difference whether the evidence about sleepwalking is 
being provided by a respiratory physician or a psychiatrist or a neurologist or a 
psychologist?  
Yes…um….the trouble is there are some very good respiratory physicians who’ve made 
a study and you know really understand sleepwalking – John Shneerson, Adrian 
Williams being two prime examples. But the average sleep physician who runs an 
obstructive sleep apnoea clinic will not know very much about sleepwalking and can’t 
really give an opinion. I would trust an opinion from John Shneerson as much as I would 
from Matthew Walker, the neurologist at Queen’s Square, because he is quite clearly, 
he’s studied it, he’s had lots of patients and he’s written a fair bit about all sleep 
disorders. So I think it depends on the person but on the whole I think neurologists (I 
would say that) are probably more skilled to distinguish sleepwalking from for example 
frontal lobe epilepsy from functional behaviour and I think psychiatrists would come a 
close second, and respiratory physicians would not be so good – as a group.  
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What about the ability of especially forensic psychiatrists to assess risk, the risk from 
the patient, do you think that is an important part of expert testimony about 
sleepwalking? 
Risk – what to the partner? 
Well, to the wider community. 
Oh risk to the community. We’re talking about sentencing now, presumably? 
Um…and disposal.  
Disposal as in how  
Well whether or not they’re acquitted or found not guilty by reason of insanity, and if 
they are (found not guilty by reason of insanity) there’s various options – you can be 
supervised or have to go to a special hospital or even an absolute discharge. It 
depends. 
So you’re asking me do I think psychiatrists are good at making those judgments. Well I 
think they’re the most skilled in those sorts of judgments, in their own work they have to 
make those sorts of judgments about schizophrenics in particular, and other mad 
patients. So I think they probably are the best at making those sorts of judgments. I…as 
a whole I have to say that sleepwalkers are not a dangerous population. And there’s 
possibly something different about those ones that do eventually get to court and are 
accused of severe crimes because I do begin to become a little bit skeptical because 
we do see patients sometimes grabbing their wife by the throat or shaking them or 
jumping on top of them or sometimes hitting them. That is a small minority of cases of 
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sleepwalking and parasomnias and to go from that to a very severe assault or murder or 
rape, I begin to have some degree of scepticism. I would if I saw those patients in a 
clinical scenario, if something very serious had happened, because usually the partner 
can wake the patient with time before anything majorly serious happens, so I think there 
is other psychopathology or maybe alcohol or drugs or that there is some degree of 
functional overlay going on. And the patient is trying to blame something on their 
sleepwalking, which may not be related.  
So, following on from that, would you say that it’s not enough to say whether or not the 
person was sleepwalking then and if they’re sleepwalking they’re not guilty, that maybe 
there should be some element of, by whatever mechanism, follow up and monitoring of 
people who’ve been found guilty of these serious offences, corrections people that have 
performed these serious acts. 
There’s a number of questions embedded in that, so ‘what should you do with them’ is 
the last question, which I’ll leave to the end. The next question is ‘when you’re 
assessing them, because they’re sleepwalking does it mean that they’re therefore ipso 
facto not guilty?’ In relation to the first question, what I would say is that sleepwalking is 
a continuum – all non-REM parasomnias are a continuum from deep sleep through to 
wakefulness. And that even during any individual sleepwalking episode, at the 
beginning of the sleepwalking episode the patient is more asleep and less culpable than 
towards the end when they’re more awake and more culpable. 
 It’s not a simple dichotomy? 
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It’s not a simple ‘you’re either sleepwalking or you’re not’ – because sleepwalking, as I 
say to patients there’s a state of partial wakefulness and partial sleep, and depending 
on where you are on that continuum will depend on your culpability – that really doesn’t 
fit in with ‘are they sane or insane?’  
In that sense, would you have a problem with the criminal justice system and its 
simplistic view that.. 
Yes. But it’s not my problem.  
Yeah. 
There is a problem – I don’t have that problem, they have that problem.  
Sure. Well, hopefully things will be changing as there is a current Law Commission 
consultation about reform of the law, so…I’m actually going to be speaking to the chap. 
So, what you’re saying will possibly have changed things – we don’t know. We don’t 
know. 
We don’t know. 
Sorry, I’m digressing. 
That’s all right. Yes, the other question is how you should dispose of, what you should 
do….you know, I think anybody who’s committed something very serious has - I’m 
speaking as a layman - has to be monitored to some extent. If they’re claiming it’s been 
done as a , they’re claiming reduced culpability due to some medical condition, 
particularly if that medical condition can’t be completely eradicated or treated, which is 
the case with sleepwalking. So that brings in the concept of there is something to be 
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said for the concept of insanity in the sense that the patients has moments of insanity, 
as a result of their medical condition where they could be a danger to others. Or the 
“public”. So yes, I think that having absolved them of their culpability, stopped them from 
necessarily going to prison, I’m not saying they should be committed to a psychiatric 
hospital for the rest of their life, but there should be some monitoring. Particularly if 
there’s been frequent episodes of sleep violence for example I think you can’t um you 
can’t just say ‘oh well they’re not guilty and that’s the end of that’. So does the law have 
a role in that – well I suppose it has too.  
Yes. Well now there’s more flexibility of disposal I think it’s easier to make the argument 
for saying that sleepwalkers are insane. Because before 1991 it was ‘detained at Her 
Majesty’s Pleasure’ in a special hospital.. 
IF? 
If you were found not guilty by reason of insanity, but they’ve got all the different 
options, so I think that makes the argument for insanity stronger. 
So you don’t have to be detained at Her Majesty’s Pleasure? You could be subject to 
some kind of?... 
Outpatient supervision, that kind of thing.  
That’s fair enough. 
Except for when it’s homicide, which is the exception. How easy do you think it would be 
for somebody to fool an expert witness about their sleepwalking, to malinger and claim 
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they were sleepwalking during the offence. Not that they were a sleepwalker per se but 
that they were sleepwalking during whatever they did. 
Right. Are we asking this question on the basis that they have a known history of 
sleepwalking?  
Yeah – they’ve got a known history of sleepwalking but they weren’t sleepwalking at the 
time.  
How easy, how easy would it be to fool me? (indrawing of breath) Well one has to 
decide what one goes on here. In terms of the description of the history, the eye witness 
accounts…I think it would be quite easy, I think it’s quite difficult to distinguish 
effectively. I mean if you see a child, I don’t know if you haven’t got any children, but I 
have children and if they sleepwalk even as a sleep expert sometimes I have difficulty in 
determining looking at them whether they’re awake or asleep. And it very much 
depends on then the history I get from them ie ‘do you remember getting out of bed, 
darling?’ And when I ask them ‘why are you in our room?’, if they then say ‘well I don’t 
know’, then it’s much more obvious they sleepwalked but it can appear, they have their 
eyes open…if someone is, generally they will behave in a different fashion – they’ll 
either be confused and rummaging through things or running away from something, 
where you have this overlap between sleep terror and sleep walker, or they will be 
wandering in a confused state but sometimes if you just see them briefly and they just 
come up to the bed, at that point they have actually then woken up. So you’re trying to 
work out did they sleep walk into the room? Or did they not? And it depends on the 
history that you get from them. So if your accused person is genned up on this sort of 
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thing, has read about sleepwalking and the information now is very much in the public 
arena, then if they’re intelligent, I think they could easily fool a medical expert. Myself 
included.  
If somebody doesn’t have a history of sleepwalking, would you entertain the notion that 
they’d been sleepwalking during their crime? Or do you think that rules it out? 
I think that pretty much rules it out. 
Yeah. How confident are you that the jury understands the expert evidence that you 
give about sleep disorders? Digesting it and applying it. 
Which particular sleep disorder – sleepwalking in particular? 
Just sleep disorders full stop. 
That’s a big question. Let’s focus it down on sleepwalking – I haven’t actually faced a 
jury to explain it, but I do face my patients and explain it to my patients on a daily basis. 
And they’re a random selection of the population, not totally random, and I think they do 
understand when I explain this idea of being, part of the brain being asleep and part 
being awake – so yes I think you can get the jury to understand the concept. But again 
the jury is going to have as much difficulty of making the distinction in a particular 
episode whether a patient or an accused was sleepwalking or not at that particular 
moment. Probably more difficult than a neurologist, and a neurologist is going to have 
difficulty, or the sleep expert. But yes, you get them to understand the concept. And 
hopefully you can get the solicitors to understand it and change the law as well.  
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There’s certain sleep experts who come across from the USA to provide testimony, 
particularly for the Crown Prosecution Service – what do you think about that? Do you 
think it’s a problem? 
 A problem in what sense? In that it costs a lot of money or that it’s ‘why should they be 
any different from the UK specialists?’ or… 
Does it serve justice well or do you think there’s issue with having somebody from 
another country? 
No, I think medicine’s fairly international. And you know some of the, sleep medicine is, 
has been pioneered in America where they’re more ahead of the game, there’s many 
more sleep specialists per head of population, they’ve also got a bigger population, and 
there’s a lot more research being done on sleep medicine, particularly sleepwalking in 
America and Canada, well Montreal Neurological Institute. So I don’t have a problem 
with it…if the legal process is happy to pay for the sleep experts to come over. I think it 
probably is right, because I don’t think, if I think about my colleagues, there’s very few 
neurologists I know who have any interest or least a big experience of sleepwalking 
patients – you know I count them on the fingers of one hand. So I think it’s probably 
appropriate that Americans are wheeled in.  
Roz Cartwright’s done a few papers, she’s advised on the Parks case and the Falater 
case, and she believes that sleepwalkers at a certain stage on this, we were talking 
about this continuum, she very much agrees with that idea, that they can’t recognize 
faces. So Parks when he was coming out of this state, he could see it was a woman but 
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he couldn’t recognize it was his mother-in-law. Do you think that’s a correct 
interpretation? 
Um, I’ve not read that paper, um….when was that published? 
I think it was 2000, or 2004. 
OK, I haven’t actually read that but I think that’s an interesting idea. I think that I would 
definitely agree that there’s some evidence to support that from just the clinical 
situations that the patients get themselves into, so they don’t recognize their partner, 
they think, they misattribute their partner, they think it’s somebody else. So I think there 
is an issue of facial recognition. I’m not so sure it’s the case in all sleepwalking, or 
whether facial recognition is selectively involved, because I think there is generally a 
problem with integrating information and forming a full concept or accurate concept of 
reality. They are clearly in a confused state – they get lost…they often will think there’s 
a door where there isn’t one…so I don’t think it’s necessarily selective, it’s probably a 
product of not being able to integrate information and there is some evidence, it’s not 
brilliant evidence, but it’s a very interesting piece of evidence, there was a paper 
published by I think Schenck or Mahowald’s group or was it by Montplaisir’s group? No, 
it was Bassetti!  
The Lancet study? 
The Lancet study SPECT study where they got a patient as you know sleepwalking and 
they’d given him HMPAO (I think), technetium-labelled HMPAO and it was the fronto-
parietal cortex that is the integrating areas of the cortex was not, were not lighting up as 
much as the occipital regions, which is the basic primary visual area, and the primary 
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motor and sensory cortex, which seemed to be acting. It was a sort of integrative cortex, 
the association cortex, particularly the fronto-parietal lobe, which wasn’t switched on – 
which I thought was very interesting. Facial recognition is thought to be anterior 
temporal, sorry posterior temporal probably in the right side, as in ‘The man who 
mistook his wife for a hat’ [a popular book about neurological disease by Oliver 
Sacks]….um, that is more towards the association areas of the temporal cortex, so I 
think that would generally fit with that. I think it’s an interesting proposition and I think it 
rings true, with patients I’ve spoken to don’t seem to recognize their partners in 
particular during an episode, although they will sometimes interact and speak to them 
as if they were somebody else, so…interesting. A failure of integration of reality I think, 
it’s all part of that. 
Yes. I don’t think I’ve got any more questions but that’s been really useful and helpful. I 
think I’ve got some interesting insights. 
I’m sorry I was little slow on the insane and non-insane automatism, it’s probably 
because I haven’t faced, done a case yet. I’m sure I’d have to revise and think about 
those issues 
Like you say, it’s really a legal question 
It is a legal question, but I dodged it. And I dodged it because a) it’s a legal question 
and b) I haven’t really given it really had to deal with that issue. 
I thought what you had to say about it was really interesting. 
[end of recorded interview] 
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Field notes: had a very instructive chat after stopping the formal interview.  
We talked about the Thomas case. I related the details to AN, and he asserted very 
confidently that the episode as described definitely wasn’t REM sleep behavior disorder 
(RBD) but probably a non-REM sleep disorder e.g. night terrors. This was because RBD 
although commonly violent is limited to simple actions and strangulation was 
inconsistent with RBD. What is seen as a dream may be a confused remembrance of 
reality in the slow emergence from non-REM sleep. In non-REM sleep disorders 
impressions and hallucinations e.g. hypnopompic hallucinations are commonly 
interpreted as dream mentation.  
We also discussed the degree of criminal responsibility sleepwalkers. AN was of the 
opinion that diminished responsibility (rather than no responsibility) might be more 
appropriate, as the sleepwalking state segues into full wakefulness that is there is a 
gradient between sleepwalking and the waking state. For both this reason and the 
possibility that there is some qualitative difference between violent and non-violent 
sleepwalkers he favours the special verdict in light of the flexibility of disposal. He 
doesn’t favour compulsory hospitalisation or the stigmatic label of insanity.  
He considered that the longer episodes may be sleepwalking states that merge into a 
dissociative state. We discussed compartmentalisation in multiple personality 
disorders/PTSD and whether sleepwalkers are more prone to dissociative disorders.  
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C) Direction to the Jury in Lowe 
(kind courtesy of Paul C. Reid, QC - transcribed by myself from his notes) 
Ask yourself these questions: 
1. Have the Prosecution proved so that you are sure that the Defendant caused the 
death of Edward Lowe [the Defence agree this element is proved] 
2. Consider non-insane automatism [forcible awakening] 
Have the prosecution proved so that you are sure that the Defendant’s state of 
mind was not so affected by a forcible awakening that at the time of the killing his 
state of mind was such that his ability to exercise voluntary control was totally 
destroyed. 
N.B a forcible awakening is an internal factor [a confusional arousal would be 
regarded as an external cause] 
If ‘yes’ – the prosecution have excluded non-insane automatism. Consider question 
3. 
If ‘no – consider question 4 (omitting question 3). 
3. Consider insane automatism 
Have the Defence established on the balance of probabilities that the Defendant’s 
state of mind was so affected by an inbuilt tendency of the Defendant’s to 
sleepwalk that at the time of the killing his state of mind was such that his ability to 
exercise voluntary control was totally destroyed. 
N.B. The inbuilt tendency of the person to sleepwalk is an insane automatism. 
If ‘yes’ – verdict not guilty by reason of insanity 
If ‘no – consider question 5 (omitting question 4).  
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4. The Prosecution having failed to exclude non-insane automatism – the 
Defendant is not guilty of murder but consider manslaughter. 
Have the prosecution proved  
(1) that the killing was the result of the Defendant’s unlawful act  
(2)  that the unlawful act was one which all sober and reasonable people would 
inevitably realise must subject the victim to at least the risk of some harm resulting 
there from albeit not serious harm. 
N.B. It is immaterial whether the Defendant himself knew that the act was unlawful 
and dangerous and it is immaterial whether or not the defendant intended harm. 
If ‘yes’ – guilty of manslaughter 
If ‘no – not guilty 
5. If the Prosecution have excluded non-insane automatism (question 2) and the 
Defence have failed to establish insane automatism (question 3) consider intent. 
Have the prosecution proved so that you are sure that at the time of the killing he 
intended either to kill or to cause really serious injury. 
If you think he was so drunk that he did not intend or may not have intended to kill 
or cause really serious injury then you must acquit him. But if you are sure that 
despite his drunkenness he intended either to kill or cause really serious injury then 
this part of the case is proved against him. A drunken intent is still an intent. What is 
more it is not a defence for the defendant to say that he would not have behaved in 
this way had he not been affected by drink.  
If ‘yes’ – guilty of murder 
If ‘no’ – not guilty but guilty of manslaughter 
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D) Material from Mark Pressman re Falater 
 
List of Observed and Inferred Behaviors  Cognitive Skills Required 
 
Start 9:15 PM?? 
 
Defendant Statement 
 
Go upstairs to bed 
Change into pajamas 
 1. Leave contact lenses in   Planning-needed them later?? 
2. Change from pajamas into  
undergarments?, Jeans, ASU t-shirt,  
socks, boots     Oriented to time, place 
3. Descend stairs 
4. Retrieve knife     Oriented to place, planning, Memory 
5. Locate mouthpiece and place in  
Mouth??     Oriented to place, planning,Memory 
6.  Locate and retrieve flashlight Oriented to place and time (knew it was 
nighttime), planning,  memory 
7. Exit home 
8. Aim flashlight at pool pump   ? 
9. Stab wife 44 times 
10. Ignore cries of wife    unarousable vs.  murderous intent  
  Absence of social interaction vs. ignores wife’s cries 
11.  Exit pool area and enter garage  planning, intent, oriented to place 
12.  Undress  
13.  Locate keys to car    planning, intent, concealment 
14.  Unlock/open trunk of Volvo station 
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Wagon      planning, intent, oriented to place 
15. Locate Tupperware container, plastic 
Garbage bag? Already in place??  Advanced planning, intent, concealment 
16. Place bloody jeans, ASU t-shirt 
Undergarments, socks, boots 
Knife, knife sheath, mouth piece 
In Tupperware container    Advanced planned, intent, concealment 
17.  Seal Tupperware container and  
Place in black plastic garbage bag  Planning, intent, concealment, double 
sealed, not visible. 
18.  Place garbage bag with Tupperware  
Container in spare tire wheel well of 
car.    Ready for disposal?? Planning  
19.   Close wheel well and trunk of car  Tidy? 
20.  Put on pajamas. Pajamas ready  
in garage?  Or walked naked through 
house to bedroom to find pajamas??  Advanced preparation/planning, oriented to 
place 
21. Exit garage  
22.Go upstairs to bedroom  
23. Turn on bedroom light   Oriented to time 
24.  Exit bedroom to bathroom 
25. Turn of light in bedroom    Oriented to time 
26. Wash blood off    Self awareness, aware of appearance 
27. Clean cut on finger of right hand  Aware of pain, cut  
28.  Locate band aids Aware of need for treatment, Aware of 
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proper treatment, memory where to find 
treatment 
29. Remove band aid from wrapper  excellent fine motor coordination 
30. Place properly on right hand   Good motor coordination, planning 
31. Turn bedroom light off   Oriented to time, very thrifty 
32. Turn bathroom light off   Oriented to time, very thrifty  
33. Go down stairs 
34. Enter kitchen area 
35. Washing hands (wringing motion of Hands)  
36. Enter room next to Arcadia doors 
37.Opened Arcadia doors partially  
And gestured to barking dog to be 
Quiet – dog stopped barking Social interaction.  He didn’t respond to 
wife’s cries, but did respond to dog barking! 
38. Exited Arcadia doors 
39. Walked over to body of wife Memory, planning – neighbor saw her 
moving 5minutes after stabbing,  
was she still alive?? 
40.  Stood over body for several mins.  Planning?? 
41. Looked over shoulder in direction  
Of neighbor      orienting to sound??, attention 
42. Re-enters home via Arcadia doors 
43. Locates gloves 
44. Several minutes later exits garage door 
45. Pulls on gloves while walking   planning, good physical coordination 
46. Walks towards wife’s body 
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47. Steps over body 
48. With back to pool, bends over, grabs 
Wrists of victim and drags body to  
Edge of pool without looking back excellent planning, maintained mental 
image of distance to pool – did not fall in   
49. Move to feet and grabs and 
with back to pool drags 6 ft. to pools 
edge without looking back excellent planning, maintained mental 
image of distance to pool – did not fall in   
50. Move behind body 
51. Place arms under body   Good planning 
52. Flip body into pool 
53. Move to edge of pool where body is floating 
54. Repeatedly hold head of victim under water Victim still alive. Finish job?? 
55. Leave body in pool 
56. Walk to and enter garage 
57. Open trunk of car with key Complete concealment of incriminating 
evidence. 
58. Open spare tire well  Complete concealment of incriminating 
evidence 
59. Remove black garbage bag   “      “ 
60. Place wet gloves in garbage bag   “      “ 
61. Replace black garbage bag in spare tire well “       “ 
62. Close spare tire well cover 
63. Close car trunk 
64. Leave garage 
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65. Go upstairs 
66. Come downstairs 
Arrested by police. 
 
E) Nodes Used in NVivo  
 
Episode Characteristics 
- Behaviour out of character and motiveless 
- Causative factors 
- Consciousness 
- Corroboration 
- Malingering 
 
Expert Evidence 
- Admissibility 
- Anthropology 
- Evidence-Based Medicine 
- Expert Witness Credentials 
- Reasons for doing or not doing expert witness work 
 
 
Legal Issues 
- Automatism dichotomy 
- Definition of automatism 
- Disposal 
- Juror understanding 
- Legal process 
- Legal reform 
 
Legal Responsibility 
- Prior fault 
 
Policy Issues 
- Alcohol and sleepwalking 
- Feminist and victimology issues 
- Insanity label 
- Social control 
 
Sleep Studies 
-  Alcohol Provocation Test 
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F) Press Reports Database 
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Name Age Year Date Juris. Court Type Offence Forces Expert Witness
Kieran O'Callaghan 24 1997 April EW Salisbury Magist Drink driving Yes
Dean Sokell 27 1998 EW Exeter Crown Murder
Graham Finegan 33 1998 Scot Dundee Sher. Drink Driving Colin Espie; I Oswald (appeal)
Allan Kellman 33 2000 Sep 1st Scot Dunfermline Sher. Indecent Assault Ex I Oswald
Iain Tarkenter 32 2000 EW Newcastle Crown Indecent Assault
Stephen Hearn 41 2003 EW Warwick Crown Drink Driving
Jonathon Collier 44 2004 Sept. EW Snaresbrook Crown Indecent Assault
William Bough 48 2004 Oct EW W Allerdale & Keswick Magist Drink Driving Ex Elspeth Desert
Colin McSkimming 28 2004 Sep 1st Scot Stonehaven Sher. Drink Driving
Matthew Sadler 33 2005 March EW Andover Mag Drink Driving Irshaad Ebrahim
James Bilton 22 2005 Dec EW York Crown Rape I Ebrahim
Jules Lowe 32 2005 March EW Manchester Crown Murder I Ebrahim; P Fenwick
Michael Catling 28 2006 Feb. EW Winchester Crown Murder
Christopher Davies 26 2006 Feb EW Burnley Crown Sexual Assault
Virginia Bramwell 59 2006 Sept. EW Lincoln Magist Drink Driving
Referred for tests prior to 
pleading
Terry Hind 41 2006 June Scot Ayr Sher. Sexual Assault
Kenneth Ecott 26 2007 Aug 6th EW Bournemouth Crown Rape Yes
David Pooley 34 2007 Jan 18th EW Aylesbury Crown Rape Ex P Reading; G Stores
Alan Ball 35 2008 22nd Dec EW Preston Crown Sexual assault <13
Jason Jeal * 37 2008 Nov. EW Portsmouth Crown Rape n/a
Paul James Morrin 43 2008 April NI Coleraine Crown Murder
Jamie Trigger 20 2008 Dec EW Birmingham Crown Indecent Assault Yes J Reed (D)
Mark Phillips 44 2008 EW Middlesbrough Crown Sexual Assault A Williams (P); P Reading (D)
Jack Browne 42 2008 Oct. EW Exeter Crown
Rape, Sexual Assault and 
Indecent Assault <13
Nick Walker 21 2009 Oct. EW Snaresbrook Crown Rape
Warren Kelly 28 2009 Mar. EW Newcastle Crown Sexual Assault
Donna Sheppard-Saunders 33 2009 Jun. EW Lewes Crown Attempted Murder
Edward Leung 46 2009 Nov. EW Maidstone Crown Sexual assault
Brian Thomas 59 2009 EW Swansea Crown Murder C Idzik
Anthony Burridge 22 2009 Sept. EW Swindon Crown Rape
Darren Greenwood 33 2010 Oct 29th EW Chelmsford Crown Sexual assault M Walker
Shehram Saeed 35 2010 Nov 26th EW Leicester Crown Sexual assault
James Thomas 22 2011 Jan 14th Scot Edinburgh High Ct Rape Yes C Espie
Michael Rumsey 56 2011 Jan 31st EW St Albans Crown Criminal damage
John Docherty 56 2011 March Scot Glasgow High Ct Attempted Murder C Espie
Sean Freaney 51 2011 March EW Oxford Crown Murder
M Pressman (P) but didn't 
have to appear
Donald Clegg 59 2011 March EW Bury Mag Drink Driving
Matthew Lucas 2011 April EW Crown Murder
John Goldie 58 2011 June Scot Cupar Sher.
Lewd, libidious and 
indecent practices
Stephen Davies** 43 2011 July 6th EW Swansea Crown Rape C Idzik
Bradley Clayton 31 2011 July EW Maidstone Crown Drink driving C Idzik (D)  
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Parasomnia Prior Hx Fam Hx PPT EtOH Verdict Verd. 2 No Repts
SW Y Y - PTSD Y C 
(admitted guilt) 
Absolute Discharge 3
n/s; ? CA N Y C
Admitted carrying on 
hitting wife after 
waking up 4
SW Y Y C 
sleepwalking accepted 
(driving ban 
overturned on appeal)
SW Y Y - Gulf War experience A 1
SW or SxS N Y A Jury directed to acquit
SW Y Y A
Prosecution offered no 
evidence at trial 2
SxS N N N N C Admitted guilt
SW Y Y - PTSD - Gulf War veteran Y A 1
NS Y C Admitted guilt
SW Y Y - stress of pub fire Y A
SxS Y Y Y - stress and sleep apnoea Y A
SW/CA Y Y NGRI
SW
Y - sleeping tablets and anti-
depressants Y C
SW A 1
SW Y C Admitted guilt
n/s Y A Not Proven 1
SxS Y Y A
SxS Y Y A
SW Y Y Y A
Prosecution offered no 
evidence at trial
n/a Y Y A 
on grounds of mistake 
as to consent
SW N N Y C
SxS Y Y A
Prosecution offered no 
evidence at trial
SW Y Y - jetlag Y A
Convicted at CFI, 
acquitted on appeal 
2008
SW/CA C
SxS Y Y A
SW Y A Jury directed to acquit
SW Y Y - Snoring of mother A Jury directed to acquit
SW Y in retrospect Y - Stress Y A
Night terror +/- 
sleepwalking Y
Y - Disturbed by hooligans 
plus off medication A Jury directed to acquit
SW Y Y C
SxS Y A
SW - but changed plea to 
guilty Y C Admitted guilt 1
SW Y Y A
Not proven (majority 
verdict)
SW/automatism Y - Depression, medications C
SW Y Y - Stress/jealousy N C
Wife supported the 
sleepwalking defence
SW - but changed defence 
to one of erotic 
asphyxiation C
SW Y
Y - Stress of father's 
dementia Y C Admitted guilt
SW - but changed plea to 
guilty C Admitted guilt 1
SxS N C
SxS (but act not due to SxS) Y A
subsequently has 
claimed that he was 
not arguing the 
defence of sexsomnia
SW Y Y C
claim of sleepwalking 
accepted
28 12  
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G) Regional UK Sleep Centres 
 
NORTH EAST  
James Cook University Hospital - Middlesbrough 
Newcastle General Hospital - Newcastle upon Tyne 
NORTH WEST  
Wythenshawe Hospital - Manchester 
Blackpool Victoria Hospital – Blackpool 
City General Hospital - Stoke-on-Trent 
Sheffield Neurological Sleep Clinic, Royal Hallamshire Hospital – Sheffield 
EAST MIDLANDS  
Kings Mill Hospital - Sutton in Ashfield 
Leicester General Hospital - Leicester 
Bassetlaw Hospital - Worksop 
Kettering General Hospital - Northampton 
WEST MIDLANDS  
Birmingham Heartlands Hospital - Birmingham 
The Birmingham Sleep Clinic - Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham 
SOUTH EAST  
Papworth Hospital - Cambridge 
Conquest Hospital - East Sussex 
Queen Victoria Hospital - East Grinstead 
Lister Hospital - Stevenage 
Epsom General Hospital - Epsom 
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John Radcliffe Hospital (West Wing and Oxford Children's Hospital) - Oxford 
Hertford County Hospital - Hertfordshire 
SOUTH WEST  
Frenchay Hospital - Bristol 
Royal Devon and Exeter Hospital - Exeter 
Musgrove Park Hospital - Taunton 
Plymouth Hospitals, Department of Respiratory Medicine - Plymouth 
LONDON  
St Thomas' Hospital - London 
King's College Hospital - Denmark Hill 
Imperial College Healthcare Sleep Centre - Charing Cross 
The Evelina Children's Hospital - Lambeth 
National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery - Queen's Square 
SCOTLAND  
Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh - Edinburgh 
Royal Hospital for Sick Children - Glasgow 
WALES 
 Royal Gwent Hospital - Newport 
 
H) Sleep Research Time Line (modified from American Sleep Medicine 
Foundation website) 
1875 Caton records the brain electrical activity of animals in England. 
1929 Berger discovers and reports the “electroencephalogram (EEG) of man” in 
Germany. 
39 
 
 
 
1937 Loomis documents the EEG patterns of what is now called non-rapid eye 
movement (NREM) sleep. 
1953 Kleitman and Aserinsky at the University of Chicago describe the rapid eye 
movement (REM) stage of sleep and propose a correlation with dreaming. 
1957 Dement and Kleitman describe the repeating stages of the human sleep cycle. 
1968 Rechtschaffen and Kales publish a scoring manual that allows for the universal, 
objective comparison of human sleep stage data. 
1974 Holland gives the name “polysomnography” to the overnight sleep study. 
1986 Schenck, Mahowald and colleagues publish the first formal description of REM 
sleep behavior disorder (RBD). 
2007 American Academy of Sleep Medicine reclassifies stages of non-REM sleep into 3 
categories. 
 
I) Neurolaw Resources on the Internet 
 
MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience (Vanderbilt 
University): http://www.lawneuro.org/ 
The Initiative on Neuroscience and the Law (Baylor College of Medicine): 
http://neulaw.org/index.php 
Moral Cognition, Neuroethics and Neurolaw Research Cluster of the Center for Agency, 
Values and Ethics (Macquarie University): 
http://cave.mq.edu.au/research_clusters/neuroethics/ 
Stanford Center for Law & the Biosciences: http://lawandbiosciences.wordpress.com 
The Oxford Centre for Neuroethics: http://www.neuroethics.ox.ac.uk/ 
Australian Law and Neuroscience Project: http://www.neurolaw.com.au/ 
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There are a number of blogs on the topic: 
Neulaw Blog (Baylor): http://neulaw.org/blog 
Neuroethics & Law Blog (Brooklyn Law School): 
http://kolber.typepad.com/ethics_law_blog/ 
Law and Neuroscience Blog (Vanderbilt): http://lawneuro.org/blog/ 
Nicole Vincent (Macquarie University): http://nicolevincent.net 
Law & Biosciences Blog (Stanford University): 
http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/lawandbiosciences/ 
 
J) CPS Response re Expert Witness Register 
 
Register of Expert Witnesses – Responding to Enquiries 
The CPS does not hold a register of experts. 
As an independent prosecution service it would be inappropriate to appear to 
endorse any expert by entering them on an internal list. We are not in a 
position to quality assure individuals or organisations who provide expert 
witness services to the CJS, other than in exercising our duty on a case by 
case basis. The assurance of quality standards has become particularly 
import in the field of forensic science as the provision of scientific products 
and services for the CJS has now been commercialised. In addition all police 
forces now operate under full procurement procedures and contracts with 
suppliers. CPS is therefore mindful of the obligations upon public 
organisations to tender for the provision of any commercial service, this would 
include the provision of expert evidence. 
The National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA) can provide information 
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about experts in certain fields. In addition the Forensic Science Regulator is 
now responsible for setting applicable validation (for scientific processes) and 
accreditation (for individuals) quality management standards, although this will 
not be fully implemented until 2013. 
Some of the principal commercial organisations in England and Wales 
representing the interests and services of a variety of expert witnesses can be 
found on the Internet and specialist libraries. Information on experts should be 
found perhaps via their professional representative / regulatory body, eg; 
dentists, forensic accountants, forensic psychologists and the like. Via the 
internet access is available to huge amount of information for those searching 
for experts who do not belong to any profession.  
Further information about the use of expert witnesses in the CJS can be 
found on the CPS website in the publication “Guidance Booklet for Expert 
Witnesses”. When selecting an expert, It may also be useful to consider the 
requirements of Rule 33 of The Criminal Procedure Rules 2005 (as amended) 
to ensure you are able to explain exactly what will be required of them in 
giving their evidence. 
If you have any further questions please contact 
Karen.squibbwilliams@cps.gsi.gov.uk .  
Karen Squibb-Williams 
Strategic Policy Adviser 
CPS Policy Directorate 
Domestic Affairs Division 
19February 2010  
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K) Sample Epochs and Hypnogram 
 
These sample epochs show how the EEG patterns vary between the different stages of 
sleep. Different EEG leads will show the different features of particular sleep stages 
better than others e.g. delta waves and K spindles are seen better in frontal and central 
regions, and alpha waves are seen better in occipital regions.  
This hypnogram shows the progression through sleep stages (this hypnogram uses the 
R&K scale), which often reverts to a lighter stage of sleep as well as progressing to 
deeper stages of sleep. 
 
Used under Creative Commons License: CC-BY-SA-2.5,2.0,1.0; CC-BY-SA-3.0-
MIGRATED 
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Sample epochs of sleep stages  
 
 
 
Wake eyes closed, alpha waves. 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage N1 (NREM sleep) 
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Stage N2 (NREM) showing K spindles 
 
 
 
 
Stage N3 (NREM) showing delta waves (slow wave sleep) 
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REM sleep  
(Sample epochs kind courtesy of Ann Cooper) 
 
L) Basic Neuroscience 
 
 
Functional diagram of connectivity between limbic system and prefrontal cortex 
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This diagram shows the interaction between the limbic system and the prefrontal cortex. 
The brain function tests indicate that during sleepwalking, the limbic system is still 
active, but the prefrontal cortex is suppressed. This would result in loss of executive 
control over more instinctive behaviours mediated by the limbic system. 
 
 
Neuroanatomy of the limbic system (Creative Commons License image from 
http://humanmemory2007.wikispaces.com/Limbic+System) 
 
Distribution of functions of the brain between areas of the neocortex 
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(Creative Commons License image from 
http://grey.colorado.edu/CompCogNeuro/index.php/CCNBook/BrainAreas) 
 
 
M) Hansard 15th Oct 2008 
 
Col 799 
Rape (Defences) 
12.32 pm 
Harry Cohen (Leyton and Wanstead) (Lab): I beg to move, 
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to prohibit 
the use of a defence of sleepwalking in proceedings relating to the offence of rape; and 
for connected purposes. 
I think of this as my rape and sleepwalking Bill, because it deals with what has become 
a loophole in rape law. My Bill says that it shall not be a defence for a defendant 
accused of an offence of rape to claim that he was sleepwalking or suffering from non-
insane automatism or other similar condition when the offence was alleged to have 
taken place. 
This matter came to my attention during a Select Committee on Work and Pensions visit 
to Australia to obtain evidence for our excellent carers report. During the stopover at 
Hong Kong airport, I was reading in an Australian newspaper of an ongoing court case 
where the defendant, Leonard Spencer, was claiming as a defence for rape that he had 
been sleepwalking. I thought, no chance! To my amazement, on the journey back I saw 
a report in The Australian on 16 May that he had been acquitted on those grounds and 
that it was the first time in an Australian court that “sex-sleep” had succeeded as part of 
a defence. 
The article said: 
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“It is not hard to imagine that more cases will come to light, as defence lawyers ask 
clients facing sex charges: ‘Do you have any strange episodes in your sleep?’ 
It should be pointed out that Spencer’s lawyer, Jon Tippett QC, did not ask his client any 
such leading questions. It was the police, curiously, in what seemed a throwaway 
question, who asked Spencer whether he had sleep issues. Spencer, who was on 
medication for depression, replied that he did.” 
From then on, the sexsomnia angle was played strongly through the trial. The article 
continued: “Spencer did not deny being in the woman’s bed. The defence argued that 
he did not remember being there. A person cannot be found guilty if there is no intent 
involved. That’s why the sleeper defence is a ripper.” 
I was then astonished to see not only that the defence had been used internationally—
the 2005 judgment of a Canadian man, Jan Luedecke, is one sexsomniac acquittal—
but that the cases of two British men were also referred to. The first was that of London 
man James Bilton in 2005, and the second was from 2007, when RAF mechanic 
Kenneth Ecott was acquitted of raping a 15-year-old girl despite admitting to having 
committed the act. Some experts now think that those cases have set a precedent in 
the law. 
I sought a House of Commons Library briefing on the subject, and it brought my 
attention to several other cases. In 1994, Robert Burnett, a prison officer from 
Newcastle upon Tyne, was found not guilty of attempted rape after the court accepted 
that he was sleepwalking at the time. In 2006, Terry Hind, a gay race trainer—I am not 
sure what that is—committed a sexual assault on another man in Scotland when 
sleepwalking and the jury gave the verdict of “not proven”, which is part of the Scottish 
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law. In 2006, Christopher Davies initially denied and then admitted sexually assaulting a 
woman, but was found not guilty because he was sleepwalking at the time. In 2007, 
David Pooley, a former RAF corporal, was found not guilty of rape after he successfully 
proved that he was suffering an episode of parasomnia, which can include 
sleepwalking. 
The law provides defences of insanity and non-insane automatism. The distinction 
between the two is crucial. According to English criminal law, the former requires a 
disease of the mind and is decided on the balance of probabilities. When it results in a 
not guilty criminal verdict, other powers can be invoked, such as the provisions under 
the Mental Health Act 2007. In the cases of non-insane automatism, the onus is on the 
prosecution to exclude it beyond reasonable doubt, or the result is an outright acquittal. 
My Library briefing says: 
“English law lacks a satisfactory method of dealing with defendants who, although 
lacking fault, pose a potential threat to the public...The law in this area was described in 
1973 as a ‘quagmire’ and recent cases have only made matters worse.” 
As I have said, automania [sic] is increasingly being used as a defence in rape cases in 
the UK, Canada and Australia, and defendants are being acquitted. There must now be 
serious doubt that the Crown Prosecution Service would bring such a case to court if it 
thought that that defence would be used, as it has become extremely difficult to get a 
conviction. 
Just 6 per cent. of rape cases result in a conviction and such loopholes make a 
conviction even harder to obtain. That is a harsh injustice to the victims of rape and 
treats that serious crime as though it is of little consequence in the legal system. I think 
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that the loophole has widened following recent cases. My briefing said: 
“Automatism...is a complete defence (unless it is self-induced, for instance by voluntary 
taking of drugs and alcohol). In a couple of the recent cases, prior consumption of 
alcohol was admitted but the juries still deemed it not a factor in accepting the 
automatism defence.” 
There was one case of extreme violence back in 1991—the case of Burgess. The 
expert medical opinion presented evidence that sleepwalking was a mental abnormality 
and could deem the defendant legally insane. The judge accepted that, but the series of 
more recent cases to which I have referred have overridden that decision as far as rape 
is concerned. Rape is obviously not deemed to be serious enough. My Library briefing 
says that English law lacks a satisfactory method of dealing with defendants who, 
although lacking fault, pose a potential threat to the public, and the court will have a 
sentencing discretion including absolute discharge, guardianship and supervision only if 
a disease of the mind is established. 
The law in this area is a case of political correctness gone mad. I think that it defies 
common sense. Sleepwalking is not a reasonable excuse for rape that should lead to 
acquittal. Dr. Cosmo Hallstrom, a fellow of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, has said: 
“People do sleepwalk and they do strange things in their sleep, but it usually is no more 
complex than grinding the teeth or smacking the lips—at most they may get up and 
make a cup of tea. I would think it was extremely difficult to perform such a complex 
manoeuvre as having sexual intercourse while asleep—especially if the other person is 
unwilling”. 
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N) Rape (Defences) Bill  
A Bill to amend the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to prohibit the use of a defence of 
sleepwalking in proceedings relating to the offence of rape; and for connected 
purposes. 
BE IT ENACTED by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present 
Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:— 
1 Amendment of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 in relation to rape 
(1) Section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (c. 42) (rape) is amended as 
follows. 
(2) After subsection (3) insert— 
“(3A) It shall not be a defence for a defendant accused of an offence under this 
section to claim he was— 
(a) sleepwalking, or 
(b) suffering from non-insane automatism or other similar 
condition when the offence was alleged to have taken place.” 
2 Short title 
This Act may be cited as the Rape (Defences) Act 2008. 
 
O) Early Day Motion 463 
AUTOMATISM AS A DEFENCE IN LAW 
Session: 2009-10 
Date tabled: 14.12.2009 
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Primary sponsor: Cohen, Harry 
That this House considers current UK law which provides sleepwalking as a defence for 
rape or murder to be grossly unreasonable following recent cases, including a not guilty 
verdict on a man who killed his wife; notes that the jury in this recent case were 
presented with the option of not guilty by way of insane automatism or not guilty due to 
non-insane automatism; further notes that sleep specialist Dr Chris Idzikowski is quoted 
in The Guardian on 5 December 2009 as saying that insane automatism is intrinsic to 
the person's behaviour, whilst non-insane automatism is used if a person has had a 
blow to the head, or is withdrawing from drugs, which creates the condition; further 
notes that the same article states that an estimated 10 million people in the UK have 
sleep problems; further notes that very many people at any one time suffer the effects 
of a blow to the head or withdrawal from drugs, prescription or otherwise; considers that 
those are not proper defences for rape or murder which warrant walking free without 
any consequence and if they are now deemed to be so, represent a massive legal 
loophole; further considers that anyone who kills or commits rape cannot be considered 
completely safe to walk free in the community without much more extensive tests to 
check that they will not act in the same manner again and that the seriousness of the 
act should require detention for such tests in all cases; and calls for a full-scale legal 
inquiry to consider this matter and to bring sense to UK law. 
 
P) Account of a Somnambulist Monk from Savarin’s Physiologie du 
Gout (quotation in Paradox Lost): 
“There was a monk…who was looked upon as a somnambulist. He used often to leave 
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his cell, and when he went astray, people were forced to guide him back. Many 
attempts were made to cure him, but in vain. One evening I had not gone to bed at the 
usual hour, but was in my office…when I saw this monk enter in a perfect state of 
somnambulism. His eyes were open but fixed and…he had a huge knife in his hand. He 
came at once to my bed, the position of which he was familiar with, and after having felt 
my hand, struck three blows which penetrated the mattress on which I laid…I saw an 
expression of extreme gratification pervaded his face. The light of two lamps on my 
desk made no impression, and he returned as he had come, opening the doors which 
led to his cell, and I soon became satisfied that he had quietly gone to bed…On the 
next day I sent for the somnambulist and asked him what he had dreamed of during the 
preceding night…’Father,’ said he, ‘I had scarcely gone to sleep when I had dreamed 
that you had killed my mother, and when her bloody shadow appeared to demand 
vengeance, I hurried into your cell, and as I thought stabbed you. Not longer after I 
arose…I thanked God that I had not committed the crime I had meditated.’ I then told 
him what had passed, and pointed out to him the blows he had aimed at me…” 
 
Q) Reform of the Law on Automatism and Insanity (an article I posted 
online on academia.edu written 09/04/2012) 
The law on automatism and insanity is currently being examined by the Law 
Commission. Automatism has been described as a “quagmire…seldom entered 
nowadays save by those in desperate need of some kind of a defence” (Lawton LJ in 
Quick). The need for reform has been recognized for some time, and here are some of 
the suggestions that have been made. 
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Abolish the internal/external divide doctrine 
Under this doctrine, automatism with an internal cause is deemed an insane 
automatism and therefore defined by the MacNaughtan Rules and leading to the 
special verdict. If there is an external cause, it is deemed a sane (or non-insane) 
automatism and leading to a plain acquittal.  
This doctrine is the most problematic for medical expert witnesses. Many medical 
conditions are a combination of a predisposition and a trigger, and therefore a 
combination of internal and external factors. The internal/external divide leads to 
anomalies, one notable example being in the case of a person with diabetes (Quick). If 
he either takes too much insulin, or neglects to eat or drinks alcohol, he may suffer a 
hypoglycaemic episode (low blood sugar) which being triggered by the administration of 
a drug is deemed to be a sane automatism. If he neglects his condition and fails to take 
sufficient insulin and becomes hyperglycaemic (high blood sugar), this is deemed an 
insane automatism, similarly if he suffers hypoglycaemia due to an insulin-secreting 
tumour.  
The other difficulty with this distinction is directing the jury when either insane or sane 
automatism is a possibility. See Appendix 1 for part of direction given in court. The 
terminology of ‘insane automatism’ even confuses lawyers, as the direction below 
demonstrates. 
If there is no distinction between the two, either all cases of automatism will have to be 
pleaded under the special verdict (or an alternative defence used e.g. lack of mens rea) 
or some other criterion will be used to distinguish between sane and insane automatism 
e.g. risk of recurrence or risk to the public. The criterion of dangerousness is used in 
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Canada (see Rabey and Parks). This would provide a better rational to the decision, 
understandable as it was, in R v T. 
Change disposal powers 
Judges have very flexible disposal powers in the Criminal Procedures (Insanity and 
Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991. However, those accused of homicide and acquitted by the 
special verdict must receive a hospital order, if they have a mental disorder. It is not 
known if sleepwalking would be considered a mental disorder (and this is one instance 
where the decision might be made on a case by case basis). 
Restrict the ambit of (sane) automatism 
The Butler Committee proposed restricting sane automatism to ‘transient states not 
related to other forms of mental disorder and arising solely as a consequence of (a) the 
administration, maladministration or non-administration of alcohol, drugs or other 
substances or (b) physical injury’ (para 18.23). This would not eliminate the diabetic 
anomaly mentioned above. Other suggestions are to restrict it still further to “reflex, 
spasm or convulsions” as per the first part of Clause 33(1) of the Law Commission’s 
Draft Criminal Code (this would make the definition of legal automatism and medical 
automatism virtually identical). This has been suggested in combination with widening 
the ambit of the insanity defence. This would have the arguable advantage of requiring 
the defence to prove the defendant was sleepwalking etc. 
The problem with this approach is the stigmatising label of “insanity”. This is already an 
issue with epilepsy and other conditions. The solution which has been advocated for 
some time is to change the name of the defence. For example in Canada it is now the 
defence of being ‘not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder’ (NCRMD). 
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Even this is not wholly satisfactory, given the number of physical complaints that can 
cause legal insanity. 
Apply the partial defence of diminished responsibility or a similar third verdict to 
all offences 
It has been argued that in some conditions, sleepwalking included, although the 
sufferers are not fully culpable, neither do they have no responsibility for their actions. 
The partial defence of diminished responsibility currently only applies to homicide, 
resulting in a conviction for manslaughter rather than murder, but some commentators 
argue that this concept should be applied to all offences. Given the flexibility of disposal 
given to judges by the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991, 
the arguments for this option are much weaker now.  
Partial Abolition of the Insanity Defence 
Some US states have ‘abolished’ the insanity defence. This is only partial abolition, 
since defendants are still able to argue lack of mens rea due to their mental illness. 
Another option (used in England & Wales between 1883 and 1964) is the verdict ‘guilty 
but insane’ and other variations e.g. ‘guilty but mentally ill’, which in some cases are in 
addition to the special verdict.  
The objection to the former option is the possibility that treatment may not be offered to 
either the acquitted or the convicted that are mentally ill. The objection to the latter 
option is unfair labelling of the mentally ill as criminals. 
Altering the standard or burden of proof 
The insanity defence is an anomaly, given that the burden of proof is on the defence. 
This was the case for the issues of accident, self defence and provocation prior to DPP 
57 
 
 
 
v Woolmington (Jones, 1995). Thus it has been argued that there should only be an 
evidential burden in insanity, the same as for same automatism. 
US Federal law requires ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of insanity of the defence, a 
higher standard than the balance of probabilities but less than beyond reasonable 
doubt. 
Changing the definition of legal insanity 
Various definitions are used in different jurisdictions. In the US, various states use the 
Model Penal Code definition (sometimes modified), the Durham test or the 
MacNaughtan Rules (often combined with a volitional limb). There has been a tendency 
away from the Durham test back to the MacNaughtan Rules. It’s unlikely that English 
law would change from the MacNaughtan Rules. The most likely changes would be an 
expansion of the definition from ‘knowledge of the nature and wrongfulness of the act’ 
to an ‘appreciation of the nature and wrongfulness of the act’. Scotland adopted such a 
definition (not yet in force) in the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, s. 
168 which states 
(1) A person is not criminally responsible for conduct constituting an offence, and is to 
be acquitted of the offence, if the person was at the time of the conduct unable by 
reason of mental disorder to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of the conduct. 
(2) But a person does not lack criminal responsibility for such conduct if the mental 
disorder in question consists only of a personality disorder which is characterised solely 
or principally by abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct. 
Changing the name of the defence 
The label of ‘insanity’ is very stigmatising. Whether or not a simple name change would 
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reduce the stigma is arguable. The Canadian equivalent is known as ‘not criminally 
responsible on account of mental disorder’ (NRCMD). Some would argue that that the 
stigma extends to any defence that denies criminal responsibility. That is unavoidable in 
some circumstances. 
 
R) Levels of Evidence for Diagnosis (Centre for Evidence-Based 
Medicine) 
1a) Systematic review (with homogeneity) of Level 1 diagnostic studies; or a clinical 
decision rule with 1b studies from different clinical centres 
1b) Validating cohort study with good reference standards; or clinical decision rule 
tested within one clinical centre 
1c) Absolute SpPins And SnNouts (An Absolute SpPin is a diagnostic finding whose 
Specificity is so high that a Positive result rules-in the diagnosis. An Absolute 
SnNout is a diagnostic finding whose Sensitivity is so high that a Negative result 
rules-out the diagnosis). 
2a) Systematic review (with homogeneity) of Level >2 diagnostic studies 
2b) Exploratory cohort study with good reference standards; clinical decision rule after 
derivation, or validated only on split-sample or databases 
3a) Systematic review (with homogeneity) of 3b and better studies 
3b) Non-consecutive study; or without consistently applied reference standards 
4) Case-control study, poor or non-independent reference standard 
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5) Expert opinion without explicit critical appraisal, or based on physiology, bench 
research or "first principles" 
(from http://www.essentialevidenceplus.com/product/ebm_loe.cfm?show=oxford) 
 
S) Publications Arising From My Research 
These publications are not the major publications that will contain and discuss the 
results of my doctoral research, but they are the product of work carried out for my 
thesis. 
MORRISON, I., RUMBOLD, J.M.M. and RIHA, R.L. (2014) Medicolegal aspects of 
complex behaviours arising from the sleep period: A review and guide for the practising 
sleep physician. Sleep Medicine Reviews, 18(3), p249-60. 
Summary: This review is aimed at summarizing the current state of knowledge 
regarding parasomnias, which have been implicated in medicolegal cases as well as 
providing guidance to those working within common law jurisdictions regarding the 
technical aspects of the law. Sleepwalking and sexsomnia as a defence are being 
raised more frequently in criminal cases and there has been public debate on their 
validity. Unfortunately, expert evidence on forensic sleep disorders continues to be 
heavily opinion-based with the potential for miscarriages of justice seen in recent highly 
publicized cases. There is an apparent inertia in research into violent sleep disorders. 
We review the current state of forensic sleep science in the United Kingdom (UK) and 
abroad and discuss the need to formulate guidelines based on available evidence. We 
also highlight the pressing necessity for more research in this area as well as the need 
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to reform the law, which is the subject of a recent Criminal Law Commission report in 
the United Kingdom. In time, this will facilitate the efficient, proportionate, and just 
disposal of violence arising from sleep, thus benefitting both society and the individual 
sufferer. 
RUMBOLD, J. and WASIK, M. (2011) 'Diabetic drivers, hypoglycaemic unawareness, 
and automatism'. Criminal Law Review, pp. 863-72. 
Summary: The recent case of Clarke and the issues that arise from unrecognized 
hypoglycaemic unawareness with respect to automatism and driving are reviewed. 
Diabetics will be rightly concerned that the courts do not properly acknowledge expert 
evidence of hypoglycaemic automatism, and the consequential prospect of being 
convicted for driving offences even where their self-management has been blameless. 
T) Seminal Sleepwalking Cases 
 
This is a short collection of high profile and important sleepwalking cases with the 
details reported in the press and academic literature. In some cases I have been able to 
add further details from interviews with the expert witnesses involved. I have also added 
some commentary. 
 
Parks 
Found not guilty of murder 
 
In Toronto in 1987, Kenneth Parks (23) fell asleep at home watching Saturday Night 
Live. The next thing he knew  
he “woke up” over a woman with a “help me” look (Cartwright, 2010) 
The “woman” was his mother-in-law. His level of consciousness gradually increased 
and he head the kids upstairs screaming. He tried to reassure but all the children 
heard was animal grunting noises.  When he realised he had a knife in his hands and 
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that there were two people lying covered in blood, he drove to the police station 
saying “I just killed someone with my bare hands; Oh my God, I just killed someone; I've 
just killed two people; My God, I've just killed two people with my hands; My God, I've 
just killed two people.  My hands; I just killed two people.  I killed them; I just killed two 
people; I've just killed my mother- and father-in-law.  I stabbed and beat them to death.  
It's all my fault”. Only then did he realise that he had several severed tendons in his 
hand which required surgical repair.  
In the interim period he had got up from the couch; put on his jacket and shoes; went 
out the house without locking the door (which he was normally punctilious about); drove 
23 km which would have required negotiating at least one set of traffic lights, depending 
on the route; entering his in-law’s home; and strangling his father-in-law into 
unconsciousness and stabbing and beating his mother-in-law to death. His description 
of the events he recalled was consistent during several interviews.  
Kenneth Parks was very close to his in-laws, especially his mother-in-law, having gone 
after their daughter when she ran away from home (before they were married). He was 
a ‘gentle giant’ (larger than average stature is a feature of chronic sleepwalkers) not 
known for violence.  
His acquittal was upheld in the Canadian Supreme Court, who held that since 
sleepwalking arose from the normal state of sleeping, it couldn’t amount to legal 
insanity. It was also commented that the medical evidence was different to that 
presented in Burgess. 
The prosecution instructed no sleep experts to refute the defence of sleepwalking.  
 
Falater 
Found guilty of first degree murder 
 
In Phoenix, Arizona, in 1997, Scott Falater went to bed, and was woken by the police at 
his door. When the detectives informed him that they were the Homicide Squad, he 
asked "Does that mean my wife is dead?" 
During the night he had got up to fix the pool motor. Perhaps his wife Yarmila had 
disturbed him during a sleepwalking episode, but for whatever reason he stabbed his 
wife of 20 years 44 times, coming back later to drown her in the pool. He tidied away his 
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tools, put them and the bloodied shirt and knife in a Tupperware container in the boot of 
the car, washed his face and went back to bed. A neighbour who saw Scott drown his 
wife called the police.  
This case contains a number of features that seem to be inconsistent with sleepwalking. 
If the washing of the face and tidying away of the tools, knife and shirt are seen as 
covering up, this rules out sleepwalking. However the washing of the face missed blood 
on the neck, the knife was not cleaned and part of the shirt was sticking out of the wheel 
well in the boot, enabling the police to find the evidence easily. If it was a cover-up, it 
was a very poorly organised one. On the other hand, it could be seen as an expression 
of Falater’s normal behaviour - he was a very tidy man. Crucially he made no effort to 
conceal the body at all. Although his wife may have triggered the initial violence by 
disturbing Falater, this could not have been the case when he later drowned her. The 
neighbour saw Falater motion to his dogs to keep down.  
Falater was a devout Mormon and devoted to his wife. He stated of her “She was my 
best friend and the only woman I ever loved”. In the months prior to the incident, Falater 
had been under considerable stress at work. The project he was working on was failing, 
and he was debating on what to tell his bosses. He asked his wife what to do, and she 
advised him to “Just tell them what they want to hear”. As a Mormon he normally didn’t 
consume any caffeinated beverages but he started taking caffeine tablets. He was also 
suffering sleep deprivation from the stress of his work situation. He was distraught on 
learning that his wife was dead. 
There were conflicting accounts about the state of their marriage. Also Falater had 
heard about the Parks case weeks before the death of his wife. 
 
Lowe 
Found not guilty by reason of insanity of murder 
 
In Manchester in 2005, Jules Lowe (22) had gone drinking with his father after his 
father’s partner had died. There was forensic evidence that suggested that Lowe had 
battered his father to death during a prolonged assault which had some features that 
were not indicative of a sleepwalking automatism. The defendant had had a 
considerable amount to drink; he may have sought out his victim; the episode lasted 
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some time, involving at least four separate attacks in the night (Pressman, Mahowald, 
Schenck et al, 2009); and there were attempts to clear up the blood. Mr Lowe had no 
memory of the events and did not mention sleepwalking at all in his interviews to the 
police. It was only nine months when a friend mentioned a TV programme about the 
actions possible during sleepwalking that Lowe mentioned to his solicitors that he was a 
sleepwalker and wondered if sleepwalking on the night in question was a possibility. 
The defendant had a personal and family history of sleepwalking from at least 
adolescence, corroborated by several witnesses among his family and friends. The 
defendant had no motive and made no organised attempts at cover-up (like Falater, 
there were some ineffective attempts to clear up blood). The expert witnesses described 
the testing done in Broadmoor as "the most detailed scientific tests in British legal 
history". Lowe was described as “the first sleepwalking murder in the UK” by Ebrahim, 
apparently ignoring Fraser from the previous century, and the admittedly contentious 
Boshears740 THE TIMES, 1961. US Sergeant is Cleared of Murder. The Times 
.  
An initial sleep study had proved technically inadequate and a further three-night study 
persuaded the initially skeptical prosecution expert (Dr Ebrahim) that this was in fact a 
case of parasomnia (whether a confusional arousal or sleepwalking). The case report 
published (Ebrahim & Fenwick, 2008) prompted heated discussion among the forensic 
sleepwalking community. It has been suggested that the amount of alcohol consumed 
by the defendant made the defence of sleepwalking untenable, and that the Alcohol 
Provocation Test used was inappropriate due to being unvalidated (Pressman, 
Mahowald, Schenck et al, 2009). The signs of an assault at four different loci were 
interpreted by the critics as signs of four separate assaults.  
Lowe’s father was known to be violent when drunk, so it entirely plausible that he might 
have provoked an incident. Again like Falater, if there were attempts to cover up they 
were very poorly organised.  
Lowe received a hospital order, and was released after ten months.  
 
Thomas 
Found not guilty of murder 
 
                                                     
740 Staff Sergeant Eugene Willis Boshears of the US Air Force was accused of strangling a young woman 
in Essex in 1961. He claimed he awoke to find himself strangling the woman in question. He later 
disposed of the body in a ditch. The jury acquitted him.  
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In Aberporth in 2008, Brian Thomas and his wife were on holiday in their campervan. 
They had stopped overnight in a car park and had been disturbed from sleep by boy-
racers in the car park where they were staying overnight. Later that night he had a 
dream that someone was on top of his wife in the campervan. He went to pull the man 
off by pulling at his neck. In the morning he realised he had in fact strangled his wife 
and called 999, saying “I think I've killed my wife. Oh my God. I thought someone had 
broken in; I must have been dreaming or something. What have I done?”  
Mr Thomas had a history of sleep disorders - he had been a sleepwalker since 
childhood. However, he attributed erectile dysfunction to the medication he took for 
depression and Parkinson’s disease, and so would periodically omit to take them so he 
could make love to his wife. He had come off his medications the week before the 
holiday in question. 
The prosecution accepted that Mr Thomas was not responsible for his actions, so the 
only issue at trial was whether the jury should find him not guilty by reason of insanity or 
just not guilty. Both the sleep experts agreed he had been suffering a sleep disorder, 
and when the forensic psychiatrist testified that there were no public safety concerns to 
justify a hospital order, the trial was halted and the judge directed the jury to acquit. The 
experts did not disclose the bulk of the details in court, to reduce the chance of “copy 
cat” crimes. 
The media coverage was universally sympathetic to Mr Thomas, who has no known 
motive and a well-established medical history. 
 
 
